Descent into Hell: The fall of Singapore - Pudu and Changi - the Thai Burma railway

by Peter Brune

  Their mortars . . . they decided to do a block mortaring. So, in other words, they’d drop their mortars along that line, and they might drop four or six shells . . . and then they’d come to the next lot . . . and we’d see them do that lot and we’d get out . . . and go back to the ones they’d just done.4

  When the Japanese moved up onto C Company, firing broke out, which caused the Australians to learn their first lesson in fire discipline within a night perimeter. Captain Victor Brand, RMO, 2/29th Battalion: ‘It was night time and you weren’t able to shine lights. I was feeling their wounds and trying to dress them with a syringe [grasped in his mouth] that I would use to give morphine. Clive Bowen [his Sergeant and a pharmacist] had made up a lot of morphine solution that I could use.’5 Brand discovered that six of the eight gunshot wounds he treated were caused by Australian .303 bullets. Orders were later given for only grenade and bayonet use during darkness.6

  As the retreating Garhwalis neared Parit Jawa village, they were ambushed and scattered. When only about 400 of them subsequently joined a detachment of the 7/6th Rajputana Rifles deployed one-and-a-half kilometres on the Parit Jawa Road outside of Bakri, Major Julius’s 65th Battery became vulnerable. At midnight he asked Lieutenant-Colonel Robertson for protection for his guns. By 1.30 am on 18 January, Captain Sumner’s A Company had left its 2/29th perimeter and was in position for this task. Both the 2/29th Battalion’s forward perimeter, and the Bakri crossroads itself, were now under threat of being cut off.

  Meanwhile, on 16 January General Percival had realised the potential threat of the enemy activity at Muar and of their landings on the west coast. Westforce’s line of communication was vulnerable. He therefore ‘adjusted the boundary’ between Bennett’s Westforce and Heath’s III Corps so as to give Heath the responsibility of securing these communications. Percival ordered the very recently arrived 53rd Brigade (Brigadier Duke) to move forthwith to Ayer Hitam to come under Heath’s command.

  At noon on 17 January, Percival, Bennett and Key held a conference at Westforce Rear HQ. During the course of their conversation, they discussed the option—if events at Muar continued to deteriorate—of whether to stage a withdrawal on the Trunk Road from Segamat. Yet again, and seemingly obsessed with the effect such a decision might have upon morale, Percival decided to further reinforce Muar and attempt to hold it. He now ordered one battalion of the 22nd Brigade AIF to journey to Muar to further bolster Brigadier Duncan’s 45th Brigade. The 2/19th Battalion AIF was now ordered to move from Mersing on 18 January and be replaced at Jemaluang by the 5th Norfolk Battalion of the 53rd Brigade. Yet again Bennett registered his desire to have his complete 22nd Brigade sent to him rather than the piecemeal offering proposed by Percival. Percival held that there was ‘not time in the existing situation to carry out the relief ’.7

  The 4th Anti-Tank Regiment sent four guns under the command of Lieutenant Bill McCure to Bakri in support of the 2/29th. Two were from its 16th Battery (Sergeants Harrison and Parsons) and two were from its 13th Battery (Sergeants Thornton and Peake). McCure decided to deploy two guns forward and two in reserve near Bakri. His choice of positions for his two forward guns would prove to be decisive. Just forward of C Company’s front, and about 350 metres from, and directly in line with, a bend to the right in the road, McCure placed Sergeant Clarrie Thornton’s gun. This position was far enough off the road to provide excellent camouflage and yet it had a long-range view of approaching tanks. It was here that Clarrie Thornton added a further refinement to the siting of his gun. Sergeant Harrison had told him that at Gemas the Japanese tanks had ‘aimed low so that the shells would explode underneath the guns’.8 Observing an extensive mound near his position, Thornton heeded Harrison’s advice and manhandled his gun behind it. Sergeant Charley Parson’s second gun was positioned in the cutting—around 450 metres from Thornton—and sited to give enemy tanks little time to react to its presence. Lieutenant Bill McCure’s base was sited in C Company’s perimeter about 350 metres behind Thornton and in line with the front of the cutting.

  At 6.45 am on 18 January, five Japanese light tanks made their move. Corporal Jim Kennedy, Signals, 2/29th Battalion: ‘. . . a noise, a clank, clank, clank, and then there was cannon fire, and somebody yelled out, “tanks!”. . . and then all hell broke loose!’9 As at Gemas, the gunners of the 4th Anti-Tank Regiment showed a remarkable fire discipline. Thornton waited for the first two tanks—travelling at about twenty kilometres an hour10—to be side-on and then opened fire with armour piercing (AP) shells. But the shells ‘seemed to go straight through them’.11

  Although hit and damaged, the first two tanks continued slowly down towards the entrance to the cutting. Meanwhile Thornton now opened up on the fourth and fifth tanks, which stopped them in their tracks. An urgent request was then placed with McCure to send high-explosive (HE) shells forward. Parson’s gun now came into play with HE shells which set the leading tanks ablaze. When the third tank became jammed between these stationary infernos a 2/29th officer dropped grenades through its turret and blew it up. Thornton now completed the demise of the Japanese tanks by hitting the fourth and fifth tanks with HE shells. Captain Victor Brand, RMO, 2/29th Battalion: ‘. . . what a racket these guns made. What a racket! . . . It was the noise of this gun that was most impressive.’12

  But the ‘racket’ was far from over. At around 7.15 am Thornton, although having sustained a shrapnel wound to a hip, was now confronted by three more Japanese tanks.13 The first approached the bend cautiously before shelling his position. It was at this time that the mound in front of his gun came into play—the shells either whizzed past or landed on that obstacle rather than beneath his gun. Thornton replied with a burst of HE shells. ‘The tank stopped dead in its tracks, burning furiously and billowing a trail of smoke.’14 One of the remaining two tanks remained behind the blazing tank, while the third took to the jungle and came into a position about 180 metres in front of Thornton and C Company. In an extraordinary display of speed and precision, Thornton turned his gun on the tank in the jungle and scored multiple hits, which stopped it. If the Australians were proving brave and well drilled, then the Japanese infantry were no less so. Not once, but twice, Japanese infantry manned the crippled tank and fired upon Thornton. Now receiving fire from both tanks, the Australian turned his attention back to the tank on the road, and despite shells ‘whizzing past’, finally crippled it and then set it on fire. Thornton would later record that his crew then ‘turned quickly on the tank firing at us from the jungle and silenced it, this time for keeps’.15

  The Japanese lost all eight tanks during that brief but intense engagement with Thornton’s and Parson’s guns. The former had wreaked his share of the havoc by firing around 70 shells. Later that day, and during a lull in the fighting, Sergeant Ken Harrison went forward to view the carnage. Harrison, in The Brave Japanese: ‘The officer in the front tank had committed hara-kiri by stopping a direct hit from a two-pound shell. In another tank the driver was still seated at the controls with an air of determination, but he had no head. And there were numerous charred bodies.’16

  Although the tank action was followed by an understandable lull, the Japanese resumed their attack upon the 2/29th’s C Company around 8.30 am. Not long after daylight, movement within the Battalion perimeter had become most hazardous, as Japanese snipers had infiltrated the area during the night. Lance-Corporal John Roxburgh, Signals, 2/29th Battalion:

  There were Japs up in the trees . . . There were officers being potted off . . . and some bloke said, ‘There’s the bastard up a tree.’ They opened up with their machine guns, and this little tiny Jap fell out of the tree, as dead as a door nail, and we looked at him, little rubber boots and underneath his shirt, in a little bag around his middle, he had a little pouch of food . . . [he was] more towards C Coy than us . . .17

  Roxburgh’s observation is astute. The officers were ‘being potted off ’ for a number of reasons. First, most of them were wearing their insignia; unlike the other r
anks, most were carrying pistols; gestures of command and body language tended to give their rank away; and at times they were prone to underestimate the close proximity and cunning of the enemy sniper. The lessons of jungle warfare were coming thick and fast. Private John Boehm, B Company: ‘11 Platoon was just near us, and they were saying, “There’s a sniper firing. . . . Clark [Lieutenant] is going to draw his fire.” I could hear this in the background. He got it right between the eyes . . . he was only in his twenties.’18

  By 9.30 am the Japanese, in addition to their sniping just outside and inside the 2/29th perimeter, had set up machine guns in front of C Company. Three Bren gun carriers were sent to deal with this threat, and, although all three sustained wounded, the machine guns were either eliminated or forced to move. The Japanese infantry to their rear were unable to pierce the Australians’ perimeter. With the enemy tank assault defeated, and his Battalion more than holding its own against Japanese artillery, mortar fire, and infantry attacks, Lieutenant-Colonel Robertson left for 45th Brigade HQ on the back of a motor cycle driven by a despatch rider named Baulkham.

  The conference at Bakri was attended by Brigadier Duncan; General Bennett’s GSO1, Colonel Thyer; Lieutenant-Colonel Robertson; and the newly arrived Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, CO 2/19th Battalion. Robertson was able to inform the gathering that his 2/29th had been fighting troops from the Imperial Guards Division and that he had patrols out to contact the Jats and bring them into Bakri. Still seemingly unaware of the enemy strength—and events towards the coast—Duncan decided to deploy the now arriving 2/19th Battalion at and around the Bakri crossroads, leave the 2/29th in its current positions, and, after recovering the Jats, to attack and drive the enemy back. It was to prove wishful thinking.

  As Baulkham and Robertson were returning to the 2/29th perimeter, they ran headlong into a Japanese roadblock. In the ensuing burst of fire both were hit. Despite their wounding, Baulkham managed to drive on and Robertson managed to hang on, until, some relatively short distance from the 2/29th, the CO fell off the motor bike. Captain Victor Brand, RMO, 2/29th Battalion:

  He [Baulkham] just fell off the bike and I was attending to someone . . . and he collapsed the bike quite close to me. And I don’t know who said, or who knew, that Robertson had fallen off the bike a couple of hundred yards back there, so . . . Neil Gahan took a carrier and went down the road and lifted him into the carrier and brought him back to where we were . . . I helped lift him out; we laid him on the ground . . .19

  Baulkham had been hit in the arm. Captain Brand: ‘It ripped all his nerves and vessels; that’s why it was amputated later on . . . so I sent him back with the first load of wounded . . . he got back to Australia.’20 The CO was in a far worse state. Brand: ‘He [Robertson] obviously had a head injury and he had some bullet wounds. I didn’t take much notice of it, because he was obviously mortally wounded.’21

  Lieutenant-Colonel John Robertson had been examined by a medical board weeks before, but had pleaded with General Bennett to be allowed to command the Battalion he had raised, in its first action. Bennett had granted him his wish on the condition that he be sent home after the first few days of that fight. The 2/29th felt his loss keenly and when detailed to dig his CO’s grave, ‘the sergeant in charge burst into tears and most of the men were visibly affected’.22 It is a popularly believed story that before his death, Robertson summoned the 4th Anti-Tank Regiment’s Lieutenant McCure to offer him an apology for reputedly reacting to the presence of the regiment in much the same way as Lieutenant-Colonel Galleghan had at Gemas. During an interview with the author Brand maintained that he was with the CO for the full 30 minutes before he died; that no such meeting took place; and that Robertson’s head injuries were so severe that he would have been in no position to have had such a discussion.23

  When Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan Maxwell was promoted to command the 27th Brigade AIF, Major Charles Anderson, his second-in-command, assumed command of the 2/19th Battalion. Anderson was 43 years of age when he arrived at Bakri. Born in Cape Town, South Africa, he had seen action with the King’s East African Rifles during the First World War and had been awarded a Military Cross. He had subsequently married an Australian, emigrated to Australia and had settled on a property at Crowther in New South Wales. After having joined the 56th Militia Battalion in 1938, Anderson had enlisted in the AIF and was posted as second-in-command of the 2/19th at its inception. Lieutenant Jim Howard, Carrier Platoon, 2/19th Battalion:

  Appearance wise, he probably looked like a country Parson: horn rimmed glasses; five-ten, maybe six feet [height]; quick-speaking; inquisitive mind; a master of quick decision exercise . . . a quiet sort of man . . . tended to be a bit of a loner . . . but the Battalion practically worshipped him. He was an inspiration.

  His tone of voice wouldn’t change. He didn’t have what I would describe as a good speaking voice . . . a quiet sort of bloke by nature.24

  Private Gus Halloran, 2/19th Battalion:

  A very quiet, very unassuming bloke. You would almost say gentle. A tremendous walker, he had legs like a mallee bull—he was over 40 years of age—and if you could keep him in sight, you were doing extremely well. He never conveyed the impression of being hard but he was determined, very resolute. Everyone liked him and respected him.25

  Private Jim Stewart, Signals, 2/19th Battalion:

  He was a great leader . . . a very quiet voice. As a matter of fact his voice was almost effeminate. But he had instilled in the whole of the Battalion a great faith in him. He did simple things that gave everyone confidence, like we had a bloke called Ted Donnelly, who was a bloody problem, he was always drunk and always fighting and always getting into trouble. Anderson made him his personal body guard, he changed like that [click of the fingers] he was completely devoted to Anderson. Wherever Anderson was, Donnelly was behind him with his Tommy gun . . . he [Anderson] instilled this sort of confidence . . . Unobtrusive, but he didn’t have to discipline people because people did as he said. He had a good lot of other officers. Most stuff didn’t get to the Battalion orderly room . . . it usually got to the company orderly room.26

  On 18 January 1942, having left two platoons of his D Company out of battle—one of them was guarding the concrete bridge at Parit Sulong—Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson deployed his B Company on his left flank, about 1300 metres down the Parit Jawa Road. He ordered Captain Keegan to patrol aggressively down that road given the uncertain whereabouts of both the Indians and Japanese. Anderson sited Captain Beverley’s A Company to the left of the road to link up with B Company and the one available platoon of Captain Westbrook’s D Company. C Company (Captain Snelling) was stationed astride and to the left of the Muar Road, forward of Bakri village. The Battalion’s carriers, pioneer platoon and mortars were positioned near Battalion HQ. A and B Echelon (Captain Newton) were around one-and-a-half kilometres to the rear of 45th Brigade HQ. The 2/19th had occupied their perimeter at Bakri by approximately 12.30 pm.

  At about midday a 2/19th armoured car patrol which had been sent down the Muar Road to make contact with the 2/29th met an enemy roadblock. As Brigadier Duncan had decided to send the 2/29th Battalion’s A Company back to its Battalion perimeter, it was sent back down the Muar Road with a carrier, an armoured car and mortar support to destroy the roadblock and rejoin the Battalion. Although the attack failed, A Company ascertained that the enemy road obstacle was covered by infantry on both sides of the road, and was able to estimate their numbers and firepower. The roadblock itself consisted of a burnt out truck and a number of rubber trees laid over and around it.

  Anderson now sent A Company 2/29th Battalion, two platoons of his C Company and carriers and mortars to attack and clear the obstacle. The 2/19th were well drilled in their use of carriers. Lieutenant Jim Howard:

  We converted them to mobile machine gun nests within our own infantry. They proved effective. We were attached to a company. You were within their ranks, any enemy would have to come through them to get at you, to get close eno
ugh to lob a grenade . . . and the infantry knew that you needed their protection . . . and they were getting protected, because they could go down on their bellies and we could sit up, and shoot the shit out of people 50 or 60 yards away.27

  With the carriers providing covering fire, and an accurate mortar barrage, the roadblock was cleared. The 2/29th’s A Company then reoccupied their perimeter and Lieutenant Howard’s carriers returned with the 2/29th’s Captain Gibson and various correspondents and cameramen who had filmed Thornton and Parson’s 4th Anti-Tank Regiment’s action that morning. Their film footage and stills remain some of the most graphic and detailed of the fighting in Malaya.28 A number of trucks containing 2/29th wounded also passed through to the 2/19th area.

  When a Jats officer reached Bakri at 4.00 pm with news that his Battalion remnants were about nine kilometres north-west of Bakri village, and further, when that location and the 2/19th’s perimeter came under concentrated shell fire an hour later, Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson knew that any thought of offensive action was lost for the day. That night Brigadier Duncan ordered the remaining elements of the Garhwalis and Rajputs back into the 45th Brigade perimeter.

  During the night of 18 January, the Japanese continued to exert pressure upon the 2/29th. At about 8.00 pm they again attacked C Company with an estimated force of 100 to 150 who advanced ‘shouting and clashing their weapons together and generally working themselves up into a frenzy’.29 Employing their enemies’ shouts and other forms of noise as a guide to their location, the soldiers of C Company inflicted telling losses upon the Japanese, who were followed up and pushed well back from the Australian perimeter. Another enemy attempt at the same locality, this time with 40 men, met the same fate. Throughout its fighting forward of Bakri, the Japanese were unable to penetrate the 2/29th perimeter, and were, on all occasions, beaten back with substantial losses. The Battalion’s constant patrolling forward of their perimeter, their aggression and superb use of the bayonet were the keynotes of their success.