Descent into Hell: The fall of Singapore - Pudu and Changi - the Thai Burma railway

by Peter Brune

  With Brigadier Maxwell’s Brigade HQ about eighteen kilometres to the rear, Galleghan had assumed command of the Brigade operation at Namazie Estate. We have noted Galleghan’s lack of professional respect for his brigadier, and, through the intense pressure of recent events on the Trunk Road, Bennett too had become increasingly disenchanted with his 27th Brigade commander. Maxwell had repeatedly requested withdrawals before their planned timings, and had previously wrongly assumed that the Gordons had taken heavy casualties. Bennett’s diary for 28 January summed up a number of his repeated concerns: ‘Maxwell again full of flap messages. Fearful for his men’s comfort. Makes wild statements.’25

  At 6.00 pm on 28 January, Galleghan ordered a withdrawal to commence at 7.00 pm. To his great credit, the withdrawal proceeded as had his handling of the brigade at the Namazie Estate—flawlessly. The exhausted 27th Brigade soldiers withdrew in darkness, trekked over nineteen kilometres to their transport and arrived just north of Ayer Bembam in the early hours of 29 January. Wigmore has recorded that Lieutenant-Colonel Boyes ‘set aside standing orders’ to use his A Echelon transport to ferry a number of his troops back, and also employed a water cart for the same purpose as well as handing out water.26 ‘Black Jack’ Galleghan’s compassion was no less impressive: ‘The highlight of the day had been the sight of the C.O. giving a nip of whisky to the men as they passed him standing by the roadside—a present from Padre Polain.’27

  The Japanese followed up the 27th Brigade withdrawal with their usual speed. Daylight on 29 January found the 2/26th Battalion deployed as the forward unit near the 31-mile peg on the Trunk Road. To its rear, the Gordons occupied a position astride the road near the 29-mile peg, while the 2/30th was deployed at the junction of the Trunk Road and the road leading eastwards to Sedenak on the railway.

  Lieutenant-Colonel Boyes’s dispositions made maximum use of his ground. The Battalion perimeter was nestled in amongst rubber and ran off into jungle and swamp. He sited his A Company to the right of the road, with C Company to the immediate left of it, and partly on a raised contour. To C Company’s left, he deployed his D Company, on ‘the reverse slope of a hill, while covered with lalang on the crest, offered good cover on its rear slopes, and only maintained a sec [sic ‘section’] on the fwd slopes as a standing patrol . . .28 B Company occupied a ‘kidney shaped’ contour on the left flank, which dominated the open country from the left forward portion of the perimeter right around to the left rear. Boyes took full advantage of the excellent fields of fire offered in front of his forward B and D Company positions by dismounting machine guns from his carriers and allotting a section to each.29 Despite there being a shortage of entrenching tools, the 2/26th ‘took advantage of rubber drains that were fairly plentiful in the area’.30

  The first enemy incursion into the 2/26th perimeter occurred shortly after 8.00 am and bordered on the comical:

  . . . a cyclist patrol of about thirty dressed in Japanese, British and native clothing were observed moving down the rd. Fire was withheld until the party stopped and dismounted between A & C Coys area then while they offered a good target at close range the nearer secs of both coys opened fire and wiped them out to a man.31

  An hour later the ‘comedy’ was over. The D Company standing patrol on the forward slope of its hill was confronted by a battalion strength assault coming up that feature. After inflicting around 50 casualties upon the enemy who had ‘bunched up’ before attacking, the standing patrol withdrew in great haste. Their flight was followed by a concentrated enemy mortaring and shelling. The 2/26th Battalion replied with accurate mortar fire.

  When the Japanese failed to follow up their artillery and mortar fire, the commanding officer of D Company, Captain Treacy, rightly assumed that they were engaged in an outflanking movement. Accordingly, he sent a patrol out to assess the enemy’s strength and intent, which discovered that they were in great strength on the hill. Treacy now ordered a strong platoon attack on the western flank, which was covered by supporting fire from HQ Company and a further platoon. The attack went in with grenades and bayonets to the fore, and the platoon returned to its lines with three captured light machine guns, boxes of ammunition and a number of rifles, at a cost of six of its B Company soldiers wounded.32

  The Japanese responded with heavy artillery and mortar fire, and when enemy aircraft appeared, the newly won but exposed lalang grass position was abandoned for the security of the original perimeter. To add to the enemy’s frustration in forming up and moving forward, the 2/26th’s dismounted armoured car machine guns took a heavy and continuous toll. The Battalion Diarist noted that the Japanese ‘did not seem disheartened by the heavy casualties they were suffering’.33 Late that morning sustained fighting broke out across the entire front, but the Japanese were still frustrated in their attempts to gain ground, mainly because of the Australians’ excellent observation and resulting supporting fire. A notable example occurred at around 2.00 pm when a large enemy force was seen by D Company forming up in front of its neighbouring C Company. The resulting 2/15th Field Regiment’s fire was most accurate—and was supplemented by high-explosive 2/26th mortar fire.

  During the mid-afternoon a number of enemy in front of A Company on the right flank emerged and planted a white flag and signal on the road. They were killed, but succeeded in guiding a flight of Japanese bombers. A Company took casualties, which reduced its strength to 57 all ranks.

  At 7.15 pm the 2/26th Battalion withdrew from its perimeter to the 21½-mile peg forward of Kulai. This was a significant location, as it marked the convergence of the railway and Trunk Road. Throughout its fighting on 30 January, the Battalion gave no ground and inflicted, for the loss of twelve killed and 51 wounded ‘or shocked’, heavy enemy losses. The 2/26th Unit Diarist estimated that the Battalion had killed approximately 500 Japanese, without taking into account the highly effective artillery support. It would seem that a total enemy casualty figure of 500 is conservative. Wigmore quoted a captured Japanese account of the action, which supports the statement:

  . . . the frontal resistance was so powerful that a pincer movement was attempted, but ‘the warriors continued their suicidal resistance like wounded boars’. Near the end of the battle ‘the enemy, defying death, strangely and impudently counter-attacked with bayonets along the whole line’. The force which had detoured to the right flank made a fierce attack, but was repelled, and ‘finally, one severely wounded soldier was the sole survivor of the rosy-cheeked commander’s unit.’34

  Thursday, 29 January 1942, marked the end of the 27th Brigade AIF’s campaigning on the Malay Peninsula. Through a fortnight’s tough fighting countering the Japanese axis of advance along the Trunk Road, it had repeatedly shown its enduring fighting qualities, its professional use of artillery and mortar support, its magnificent mastery of minor infantry tactics both in defence and attack, and the great skill and elan of its officers. When the achievement of its detached 2/29th Battalion’s defiant performance at Bakri and its participation in Anderson’s column’s epic fight to Parit Sulong are added to the 2/30th and 2/26th Battalions’ fighting withdrawal along the Trunk Road, the 27th Brigade amply demonstrated its right to be awarded no less praise and respect than any other formation in the AIF.

  Having covered General Bennett’s Westforce operation (27th Brigade AIF) along the Trunk Road during the period 24–30 January 1942, we now turn to Westforce’s other task: the parallel withdrawal along the nearby railway by the 9th Indian Division (General Barstow) during the same period. At this time the Division was composed of two brigades. The first was the 8th Indian Brigade (Brigadier Lay), which consisted of the 1/13th Frontier Rifles and the 2/10th Baluch (plus one company of the 3/17th Dogras). The 22nd Indian Brigade (Brigadier Painter) was the second, and was composed of the 5/11th Sikhs and an amalgamated battalion consisting of one company of the 2/12th Frontier Force Regiment and the 2/18th Garhwalis.

  On 23 January, the 22nd Indian Brigade had been deployed to guard the Kluang airfield, w
ith its 2/18th Garhwal to the north at Paloh, where a road ran westwards to join the Trunk Road near Yong Peng. When the Japanese attacked, the Garhwalis withdrew and during that process, its HQ lost contact with its four rifle companies. Lionel Wigmore:

  Lacking this contact, the companies continued their withdrawal and reached Kluang that night—by which time the Kluang airfield also had been abandoned by the air force. The 8th Indian Brigade, on the main road covering the approach from the north, held off the enemy during the day and at night passed through Yong Peng. It was then transported to the Rengam area, on the railway line south of Kluang.35

  The withdrawal by the Garhwalis created an opportunity for the Japanese to gain ground. As a consequence, the 22nd Brigade was ordered to stage a counterattack (by the 5/11th Sikhs), which was to be facilitated by the rearward 8th Brigade moving forward from Rengam. After spending the night three kilometres south of Niyor, the 5/11th Sikhs put in a spirited action against a Japanese force forming up on their front, and then withdrew. During the night of 25/26 January, the 22nd Brigade pulled out to Rengam, to be joined by the Sikhs the next morning, and the 8th Brigade arrived at Sayong Halt that same night.

  The following afternoon (26 January), General Heath held another conference to formulate a timetable for the complete withdrawal to Singapore Island on the night 31 January/1 February 1942. That timetable saw General Bennett issue his Westforce schedule at 12.20 am on the 27th. His orders for the 27th Brigade (Brigadier Maxwell) on the Trunk Road and the 9th Indian Division (General Barstow) on the railway were to hold their present positions that night. On the second night (27/28 January), the 27th Brigade was to withdraw to the 44-mile peg and the 9th Division to railway mile 440. On the third night, 27th Brigade was to withdraw to the 32-mile peg. On the fourth night, they were to reach road mile 25 and railway mile 450 respectively. And on the fifth night (31 January/1st February), both formations were to cross the causeway to Singapore Island.36

  We now come to a tragic train of events. When the above Westforce timetable was released it contained a mistake for the night 27/28 January. In the text of the orders the 9th Indian Division was given railway mile 440 as its destination, while in the appendix that destination was given as railway mile 438½. The intended position was that quoted in the text (440), because the ground between 430 and 440 consisted of extensive rubber estate ground and its inevitable estate roads would present the Japanese with numerous and speedy avenues for outflanking any force on the railway adjacent to that ground.

  After visiting Bennett early on 27 January, General Barstow returned to his HQ at Rengam and summoned Brigadiers Painter and Lay, where he issued verbal orders to them: Painter’s 22nd Brigade was to hold the area from railway mile 437 to 432, while Lay’s 8th Brigade was to occupy a rearward position to defend a section of the railway leading to Sedenak. Predictably, Painter protested for the reasons just described, but Barstow was adamant. The order stood.

  Later, Brigadier Painter did not help matters by deploying his battalions behind each other along the railway, and thereby further enhancing his chances of being cut off. And when Lieutenant-Colonel Parkin of the 5/11th Sikhs subsequently asked him twice for permission to both widen his perimeter and place a ‘linking’ company to the rear between the two brigades to offset this risk, Painter refused.

  During the late afternoon of 27 January Barstow again went forward to visit Brigadier Lay and ordered him to occupy a ridge about one-and-a-half kilometres south of Layang Layang. Lay’s Brigade passed through the 22nd Brigade at around 4.00 pm that afternoon. In his withdrawal along the railway, Barstow was to be handicapped by the fact that there was no road between a point just south of Layang Layang and Sedenak, a distance of some sixteen kilometres. All 9th Division artillery and transport had therefore to be sent from Rengam along estate roads to the 40½ mile peg on the Trunk Road, and as a consequence, all infantry would be required to travel by foot. To compound this vehicle problem, wireless communication (carried in trucks) was thus unavailable, and therefore messages had to be sent via the railway telephone line. When Barstow left late on 27 January for his HQ, he knew that wireless communication from his HQ forward was not possible, and therefore told his two brigadiers to ‘coordinate their movements by mutual agreement’.37

  At about 10.00 pm Lay told Painter that his 8th Brigade was moving just south of Layang Layang and that he would call again later. Then disaster struck. For not the first time during the Indian Army’s campaigning in Malaya, a railway bridge just south of Layang Layang was ‘accidentally’ demolished. This had two tragic consequences. The first was that the 22nd Brigade was now out of touch with the 8th Brigade, because the railway telephone was destroyed with the blown bridge. The second was that the stream now became an obstacle, if a fairly shallow one, to the withdrawal of the 22nd Brigade. And to compound these catastrophic events, Brigadier Lay’s 8th Brigade did not occupy the ridge as ordered by Barstow, but one 1500 metres further back, thereby increasing the gap between the two formations. Incredibly, ‘no attempt was made either to repair the telegraph line or inform 22nd Brigade that the bridge had been blown’.38 Moreover, Lay did not make any attempt to inform Painter of his new dispositions. Kirby described the blowing of the bridge and Lay’s failure to occupy the ridge selected by Barstow as ‘two unfortunate events’.39 When elements of the 22nd Brigade heard Japanese movement around their flank during the early hours of 28 January, and after Painter yet again refused a plea from Parkin to withdraw, the whole brigade was about to feel desperately ‘unfortunate’. At 10.15 am Brigadier Painter finally decided to pull back down the western side of the railway.

  At daylight on 28 January, General Barstow set out from his Sedenak HQ to visit his Brigades. With him were a 9th Indian Division staff officer, Colonel Trott (an Australian) and Major Charles Moses, an 8th Division AIF liaison officer. The Moses papers contain a vivid account by both men of what then transpired.

  Lieutenant-Colonel Trott:

  On the morning of the 28th January, 1942, Major General Barstow, Comd. 9th Ind Div set out to visit his two Brigades which lay one in rear of the other astride the railway. The 22nd Ind Inf Bde, the leading Bde, being in the vicinity of Layang Layang . . . We proceeded forward in a small rail inspection car driven by an Indian military driver.

  The General first contacted the Comd. 8th Bde (the rear brigade.) [Brigadier Lay] Here he discovered that a gap between the Bdes existed, and that, in error, a railway bridge had been destroyed by the 8th Bde in their withdrawal during the night before, which demolition the Bde was not covering. The destruction of the bridge had severed signal communications with 22 Inf Bde and these had not been re-established.

  Having ordered the leading Bn [the 2/10th Buluch] to move forward and cover the demolition the General with Major Moses and myself then proceeded forward in the rail car, until further progress was stopped by the demolished bridge. We got out of the car, crossed the damaged bridge and walked forward along a high railway embankment towards Layang Layang station, which station was visible in the distance. The General and Major Moses walked along the eastern side of the embankment and I, some little distance in the rear, was walking along the western side of the embankment. We had proceeded about 300 yards when suddenly from half right in the high grass on the eastern side, a Japanese appeared about 30–40 yards away and yelled: almost simultaneously with his appearance fire was opened by concealed enemy with light automatics and rifles.

  My immediate reaction was to leap down the embankment on the side nearest me [the western side] into the long grass. I made two ineffectual efforts to get back over the railway embankment but the volume of fire made this impracticable, so that I made my way into the jungle about 50 feet from the railway . . .40

  In the confusion of the moment, Major Charles Moses had gone the way of General Barstow down the eastern side of the embankment. Major Moses:

  When General Barstow and I were about three-quarters of the way down the embankment, I realized we w
ere on the same side as the enemy and said to the General: ‘Come on Sir, we can’t stay here, let’s go back over the top.’ I scrambled under fire up the embankment which had long grass to about 15 ft. of the top, and glanced back to see the General sliding downwards into the high grass. He appeared unhurt and I thought he had in mind making his way back on the eastern side of the embankment. I told Col. Trott this when I later joined him on the other side . . .

  When I last saw General Barstow sliding into the high grass he did not appear to be wounded. It was only after some hours, when he had not returned to the 8th Inf. Bde. that we realized he might have been wounded and perhaps taken prisoner.41

  General Barstow was dead. His loss was felt very keenly both within the Indian Army and the AIF. Gordon Bennett would later write that Barstow was ‘a popular officer, particularly amongst the Australians’, and that he was ‘fearless’ and ‘inspiring’, but that he was ‘hampered by some very weak officers under his command’.42

  The leading battalion of 22nd Brigade ran into Japanese blocking the railway at about midday on the 28th. Although the Sikhs managed to clear this initial Japanese force they suffered ten of their number killed and 35 wounded. Painter was now faced with a cruel decision. He could maintain his effort to clear a way through to the 8th Brigade by a single or series of railway attacks, or he could attempt an encircling movement around the enemy and hope to regain his lines. In choosing the latter option, he faced a number of challenges. The first was the fact that he would have to carry his wounded through tough terrain; second, that poor speed of movement through the rubber, jungle and possible swamp might cause him to fail to reach Lay in time; and third, that he possessed no artillery support to assist him in a railway breakthrough—and thus the associated risk of further casualties. In the end, he chose a jungle exit. But after following a track through the jungle shown on his map, that passage abruptly ended, and 22nd Brigade were brutally condemned to a jungle trek by compass that would see it take 48 hours to gain a position still three kilometres north of Sedenak. On 31 January, Brigadier Painter was forced to leave his wounded behind at a rubber plantation, and on 1 February with only 400 of his number left, he ordered a surrender. Less than a quarter of that number escaped to Singapore.