The Pope and Mussolini

by David I. Kertzer

  14. Coppa 2011, pp. 20–21; O’Shea 2011, p. 81.

  15. Coppa 2011, p. 1; O’Shea 2011, pp. 74–80.

  16. Wolf (2010, p. 36) finds strong evidence that in these years Pacelli was linked to Umberto Benigni’s notorious network of informants but was savvy enough to avoid becoming “discredited by too open an association with Benigni and his ‘secret service.’ ”

  17. Coppa 2011, p. 30.

  18. Noel 2008, pp. 38–39.

  19. Wolf 2010, p. 74. Among the unorthodox practices in the German Church that Pacelli worked to stamp out was allowing women to sing in church choirs during High Mass; ibid., p. 61.

  20. Ibid., pp. 75–79.

  21. Ventresca 2013, p. 55. In September 1929 Monsignor Spellman visited Berlin; Eugenio Pacelli met him at the train station and hosted him during his stay. The American priest was impressed with his charm. “Seven out of ten people,” Spellman wrote to his mother on September 8, “consider him the most likely next Holy Father.” This prescience was especially impressive as the fifty-two-year-old Pacelli was not yet a cardinal. Gannon 1962, pp. 66–67.

  22. Papin 1977, p. 42.

  23. Charles-Roux 1947, pp. 74–77.

  24. Ibid., p. 77.

  25. Papin 1977, pp. 42–43.

  26. McCormick 1957, p. 75.

  27. Pacelli asked Pascalina to do her best to duplicate the congenial living quarters he had grown accustomed to in Germany. When he heard that the German bishops, in honor of his appointment as secretary of state, were planning to give him a new pectoral cross, he let them know that he would prefer German furniture. Pascalina then arranged for the furniture to be selected and sent from Germany. On the new secretary of state’s desk, visitors could see a little silver plaque containing the names of all the German bishops who had paid for it; Schad 2008, pp. 53, 62–65.

  28. For more on Pacelli’s “fogli di udienza,” see Pagano 2010.

  29. Charles-Roux 1947, pp. 74–75, 197; Ottaviani 1969, pp. 502–4.

  30. Tornielli 2007, p. 164.

  31. Ibid., pp. 164–65.

  32. ACS, MI, PP, b. 154, informatore n. 35 (=Bice Pupeschi), Città del Vaticano, 5 marzo 1930.

  33. O. Forbes, Annual Report 1930, February 13, 1931, C 1077/1077/22, in Hachey 1972, p. 196, section 147.

  34. Quoted in Ventresca 2012, p. 288.

  35. Martin 1996, pp. 18–19.

  36. As Wolf (2010, p. 138) put it, “The pope tended to be impulsive and effervescent, and sometimes not the least shy about making injurious statements; his secretary of state, the consummate diplomat, was always restrained and balanced, intent on avoiding anything that might feed the flames.”

  37. ACS, MI, FP “Gasparri,” informatore n. 42 (=Bianca D’Ambrosio), Roma, 21 gennaio 1930.

  38. ACS, MI, FP “Gasparri,” informatore n. 35, Città del Vaticano, 15 febbraio 1930.

  39. ACS, MI, FP “Gasparri,” informatore n. 35, Città del Vaticano, 4 marzo 1930.

  40. ACS, MI, FP “Cerretti,” informatore n. 35, Città del Vaticano, 29 maggio 1930. Monsignor Spellman, in a letter to his mother from Berlin in the fall of 1929, remarked that Pacelli and Pizzardo were good friends; see Gannon 1962, pp. 66–67. “Taking advantage of the pontiff’s personal benevolence toward him, Pizzardo, with an ability that recalls that of Cardinal Richelieu, has insinuated himself into the good graces of the pontiff in such a way that he is free to maneuver in any way he likes.” So reported a Vatican police informant in the fall of 1929. A creature of the Vatican, Pizzardo, according to the informant, had won the protection of key cardinals by “his ingratiating manner and Jesuitical unctuousness”; see Fiorentino 1999, pp. 89, 224–25. His staff was not entirely enamored of him. In 1934 all the major figures in the Vatican secretary of state office were invited to Rome’s Grand Hotel for a lunch in honor of a visiting American bishop. Monsignor Domenico Tardini, Pizzardo’s chief assistant, was there, as were Ottaviani and Borgongini. But Pizzardo was missing, busy giving a speech to the ecclesiastical assistants of Catholic Action. “If instead of going to give the talk,” noted Tardini, “he had come to the luncheon, it would have been better for him and … for the assistants of Catholic Action.” Tardini, diary entry, ca. 1934, quoted in Casula 1988, p. 87; the ellipsis is in the original.

  41. “Italian State Gives Supplice to Pope,” NYT, February 12, 1930, p. 5.

  42. De Vecchi 1998, pp. 182–83 (30–31 maggio 1930).

  43. Ibid., pp. 194–95 (11 giugno 1930). On Tuesday, June 24, while attending a senate session, Mussolini spotted De Vecchi and asked how everything was going at the Vatican. The ambassador replied that on balance things were going well, but “the pope continued to be that very difficult person he has always been.” Mussolini asked about the pope’s health, and De Vecchi replied that the French ambassador had told him that the pope’s prostate was giving him problems, but that the doctors did not think an operation would help. When Mussolini replied that he was sorry to hear it, De Vecchi told him that should it come to it, a change in pope might not be a bad thing. Mussolini, having apparently already heard the reports of the problematic papal prostate, ignored De Vecchi’s comment and asked if it was true that the pope had requested an apparatus for his use during the long ceremonies in the Sistine Chapel so that he could relieve himself there. Ibid., pp. 209–10.

  44. Ibid., pp. 212–14 (27 giugno 1930).

  CHAPTER 12: CARDINAL PACELLI HANGS ON

  1. “Fascists Trample Portrait of Pope; Vatican Is Guarded,” NYT, May 28, 1931, p. 1. The following day, The New York Times published yet another front-page story on the crisis: “Mussolini Checks Anti-Catholic Riots.”

  2. Arnaldo Cortesi, “Catholic Meddling Charged by Fascisti,” NYT, May 27, 1931, p. 1; Casella 2009, p. 137.

  3. ASV, AESS, b. 430a, fasc. 342, ff. 37, 23 maggio 1931. The pope had another problem on his mind as well. In early May, Pacelli told the pope that Hermann Göring wanted to meet with him during his upcoming visit to Rome. Göring at the time was leader of the Nazi parliamentary delegation. The pope refused and told Pacelli he should not meet with him either, but Pacelli did arrange for Göring to meet with his undersecretary, Pizzardo. Wolf 2010, pp. 148–49.

  4. De Vecchi 1998, p. 225. Reports from the prefects over the next few days chronicle the shutdown of the Catholic Action youth groups and the protests lodged by the local bishops. ACS, CR, b. 33.

  5. Falconi 1967, pp. 201–2.

  6. Arnaldo Cortesi, “Pius XI Charges Fascisti with Hate and Violence; Four Bombings in Bologna,” NYT, June 1, 1931, p. 1. Later, the Vatican daily reported that more than 5,000 local male Catholic Action youth groups and about 10,000 female groups were shut down, affecting 800,000 members: “In margine alle polemiche,” OR, 10 luglio 1931, p. 1.

  7. When a number of southern Italian parishes went ahead with the holiday celebrations anyway, the pope ordered their priests to suspend all church public functions until further notice. Arnaldo Cortesi, “Pope Shifts Leader of Catholic Action: Punishes Parishes,” NYT, June 11, 1931, p. 1.

  8. ASMAE, AISS, b. 2, fasc. 6, Il segretario particolare di S.E. Il Capo del Governo a De Vecchi, 13 aprile 1931. The accompanying “pro-memoria” is dated 9 aprile 1931.

  9. Martini 1960a, pp. 578–79.

  10. Coco 2009, pp. 214–15.

  11. It also claimed that many cardinals objected to the pope’s recent actions, naming four in particular, among them Pietro Gasparri. The pope was furious. He told Monsignor Tardini to get in a car immediately and visit the four cardinals. Each would be required to issue a formal denial, to be published in the Vatican newspaper. “I have always been, and I will always be with the pope,” wrote Cardinal Gasparri. Coco 2009, pp. 217–18.

  12. Ibid., pp. 222, 242–43.

  13. He added, “and it was clear that Monsignor Borgongini”—also present at the meeting—“was on the other.”

  14. MAESI, vol. 266, 80–81, 10 juillet 1931.

  15. Coco 2009, pp. 241–42.

  16. DDI, s
eries 7, vol. 10, n. 322. “I didn’t want it,” De Vecchi (1998, pp. 267–68) would later quote Pacelli as saying of the escalation of the conflict with Mussolini. “It is the wish of my superior” (diary entry for July 11, 1931). The account of Pacelli’s meeting with Talamo comes from Dino Grandi’s diary. Coco 2009, p. 239.

  17. The issue was put out five hours earlier than normal that day and was practically sold out before government agents realized what had happened and seized the remaining copies; Binchy 1970, pp. 522–23. Binchy reports that several hundred copies of the encyclical were smuggled out of Rome in a plane piloted by the future cardinal archbishop of New York, Francis Spellman, bound for Paris. It is not clear where Binchy gets the idea that Spellman piloted a plane, which seems improbable. Morgan (1939, pp. 186–87) interviewed Spellman about the episode. His account confirms that the pope called Spellman to his library and handed him the copies of the encyclical with instructions to ensure they were published abroad, and that Spellman then did get them across the French border and to Paris, where he gave the copies to various American news services. De Vecchi’s diary (1998, p. 257) reports that, according to Monsignor Pizzardo, “the Pope is suffering greatly, he is not eating and he sleeps very little; he lives in anxiety and angst.”

  18. Quoted from the text of the encyclical as published in CC, 9 luglio 1931 III, pp. 97–122.

  19. Non abbiamo bisogno, encyclical of Pope Pius XI, English translation, http://​www.​vatican.​va/​holy_​father/​pius_​xi/​encyclicals/​documents/​hf_​p-​xi_​enc_​29061931_​non-​abbiamo-​bisogno_​en.​html. This translation omits the phrase “and regime,” found in the original Italian text, which I have restored. The parenthetical clarification of “Fascist” Party appears in the official Vatican translation. On the pope’s effort to make clear he was not opposing the Fascist regime as such, see also Moro 2008, p. 423.

  20. Garzonio 1996, pp. 58–59.

  21. Mussolini, too, was eager to put the battle behind him. With a few exceptions, the Fascist newspapers greeted the encyclical with moderate and respectful tones. Il Lavoro fascista, identified with the extreme anticlerical wing of the PNF, was among the exceptions, accusing the pope of serving the interests of the international anti-Fascist movement. It also repeated widespread rumors that saw the origin of the crisis in Monsignor Pizzardo’s ambitions to take Cardinal Pacelli’s place as secretary of state. In this view, Pizzardo—the Vatican official responsible for overseeing Catholic Action—was working in league with L’Osservatore romano editor Giuseppe Dalla Torre on behalf of anti-Fascist forces, while Pacelli supported collaboration between the pope and the Fascist regime; MAESI, vol. 266, ff. 64–66.

  22. Gentil, the French chargé d’affaires to the Vatican, who was present, reported on this to the French foreign minister, in MAEI, vol. 266, 110–112, 20 juillet 1931.

  23. ASV, AESI, pos. 849, vol. 3, fasc. 519, f. 79r. By mid-July both sides were working to put the battle behind them. At two A.M. on July 17, a bomb went off in the Vatican. The explosion woke up many in the city—although the pope slept through it—and thousands in nearby areas of Rome. Pacelli was said to have heard it go off while he was still at work in his office. A Vatican attendant had found the homemade bomb the previous evening inside St. Peter’s Basilica, hidden under a portable pulpit. Papal Gendarmes had inspected the metal cylinder and, hearing no ticking, concluded it was likely a hoax. To be on the safe side, they had left it in the middle of a field on Vatican grounds for the night, before deciding what to do. It was there it exploded, leaving a big hole and uprooting trees twenty yards away. The Fascist press attributed the bomb to anti-Fascists eager to worsen the conflict between the regime and the Vatican, and the Vatican did nothing to contradict this view. Arnaldo Cortesi, “Bomb Roar at Night Alarms the Vatican,” NYT, July 18, 1931, p. 1.

  24. ASV, AESI, pos. 849, vol. 3, fasc. 519, ff. 80r–80v.

  25. ACS, CR, b. 68, Tacchi Venturi a Mussolini, 25 luglio 1931. The previous day the pope had told Pacelli about the message he was sending to Mussolini via Tacchi Venturi, reminding the Duce that the pope had refrained from condemning him or Fascism as such, but only wanted a satisfactory way out of the impasse. Even in Masonic France, the pope told Pacelli, Catholic associations enjoyed more freedom than they did in Italy. ASV, APAC, b. 430a, fasc. 343, ff. 21.

  26. Far from convinced that his successor was up to the task, Gasparri included a script for him to use in talking to the pope. It read: “Most Blessed Father, I come as your most humble son to let Your Holiness know what I feel from my conscience. I am extremely upset at the impasse that the negotiations with Mussolini have reached. It seems to me that Your Holiness, who has said he does not want to humiliate anyone, would do a fatherly act by giving Father Tacchi Venturi the order not to insist on the conditio sine qua non and go right ahead with the note that would bring the conflict to an end forever.” ASV, AESI, pos. 849, vol. 3, fasc. 519, ff. 91r–92v.

  Even as he was trying to get the pope to let up, Gasparri was also peppering Mussolini with unsolicited advice. On July 14, professing to be the Duce’s “friend and admirer” (a phrase he repeated before his signature), Gasparri pleaded with him not to do anything to worsen the conflict. ASV, AESS, pos. 515, fasc. 530, p. 83r, Gasparri a Mussolini, 14 luglio 1931. Then in a letter apparently sent after his meeting with Tacchi Venturi, Gasparri told the Duce that he had just been briefed on the Jesuit’s mission. Proclaiming himself an “admirer and friend of Your Excellency,” he begged Mussolini to take this new opportunity to end the conflict between church and state. ASV, AESS, pos. 515, fasc. 530, pp. 80r–80v, Gasparri a Mussolini, n.d. An annotation by Domenico Tardini explains that the letter dated from late July or the first days of August, but there is no proof that it was sent.

  27. Curiously, the French diplomat attributed Pacelli’s lack of influence to the pope’s anger at his brother. The pope blamed Francesco Pacelli for not foreseeing the regime’s move against Catholic Action and not ensuring that the concordat had clearer language protecting it. MAEI, vol. 266, 122–24, 6 août 1931, Gentil au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères. Rumors were circulating that Pacelli would be replaced as secretary of state as soon as the Catholic Action crisis was resolved. “Pacelli to Quit Soon, the Vatican Indicates,” NYT, August 13, 1931, p. 8.

  28. The typed version of this in Mussolini’s private papers refers to “Pio IX” rather than Pio XI; perhaps it was a Freudian slip. ACS, CR, b. 68, Roma, 2 settembre 1931.

  29. “L’Accordo fra la Santa Sede e il governo italiano per l’Azione cattolica,” CC 1931 III, pp. 549–52. The second paragraph dealt with Mussolini’s objection to the existence of separate Catholic Action groups linked to particular professions: they risked competing with the Fascist professional societies, which had a monopoly on the organization of labor. Professional Catholic Action groups were to limit their scope to religious activities and give their full support to the Fascist regime’s professional organizations. The final point specified that local Catholic Action groups were not to engage in any athletic activity, as all organized sports were to come under the authority of the Fascist sports groups. This was no small matter, since sports had been one of the most important attractions in recruiting boys to local Catholic Action chapters; see De Felice 1974, p. 275.

  30. De Felice 1974, p. 263.

  31. Francesco Ferrari quoted in Malgeri 1994, p. 57. Italy’s foremost historian of Fascism came to the same conclusion. “It seems to us,” wrote Renzo De Felice (1974, pp. 270–71), “to be beyond debate that at the time the agreement represented a defeat for the Church.”

  32. MAEI, vol. 266, 153–55, Gentil au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 8 septembre 1931. However, on his return from his summer holiday, Fontenay reported that on September 3 the pope convened a secret meeting of eleven cardinals, summoning Gasparri back to Rome from his summer mountain retreat, and of the eleven, ten expressed support for the deal he had struck. MAEI, vol. 266, 174–80, Fontenay au Ministre des Aff
aires Étrangères, 29 septembre 1931. Given the pope’s forceful personality and the consequences that a cardinal would suffer for incurring the pope’s wrath, it is not clear how revealing this “vote” is.

  33. MAEI, vol. 266, 167–69, Gentil au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 17 septembre 1931.

  34. ASV, ANI, pos. 23, fasc. 3, ff. 46r–48r, Borgongini-Duca, handwritten memorandum, “Dopo il conflitto,” n.d.

  CHAPTER 13: MUSSOLINI IS ALWAYS RIGHT

  1. De Vecchi to Mussolini, January 18, 1933, quoted in De Vecchi 1998, p. 53n60. An informant described Ciriaci as “an intelligent, able man, accommodating and compliant in the relations between the highest Catholic organization in the Kingdom over which he presides and the organs of the Fascist State.” ACS, MI, FP “Ciriaci,” informatore no. 390, “Orientamento in senso nazionale e verso il Regime da parte del Comm. Ciriaci,” 18 gennaio 1933.

  2. Moro 1981, pp. 289–91. The Fascist regime, Moro writes, encouraged this moralizing campaign, but as I will argue in this chapter, this is only partly true. In many cases the Church’s moralizing campaign pushed the regime further than it wanted to go. The campaign, calling on local Catholic Action members to report offending behavior to the local police authorities, began in the 1920s. A seventy-two-page booklet, Per la difesa della moralità, was already in its fourth edition in 1928, published by the Central Secretariat for Morality of national Catholic Action. Praising the Fascist government’s efforts to combat “the disastrous effects of freedom that has degenerated into license,” it offered boilerplate language for local groups to use in sending denunciations in to the local authorities. ASV, AESI, pos. 929, vol. 1, fasc. 615, f. 35.

  3. The Fascist press, taking note, reported what it called Pius XI’s “holy struggle against the immorality of female fashion.” “Il papa contro la moda femminile,” Il Regime fascista, 22 giugno 1926, p. 2.

  4. These controls were to be enforced through the licenses granted to beachfront establishments. ARSI, TV, b. 7, fasc. 393, “Circolare per tutti i prefetti dal Ministero dell’Interno, 18 giugno 1926; Oggetto: bagni.” On June 27, 1926, the minister sent a copy of the order to Tacchi Venturi along with a letter showing how seriously the government was taking the papal concern. In an audience with a Catholic girls’ group that month, the pope called for a national crusade against women’s immoral dress. In audiences with women’s groups, he regularly denounced current female fashions. The outside world, he warned one such group in June, did all it could to seduce them into forgetting even the most elementary sense of female dignity. “Il papa contro la moda femminile,” Il Regime fascista, 22 giugno 1926, p. 2. By 1928 Tacchi Venturi, following the pope’s instructions, was lobbying with government ministers to extend the government’s repressive action against girls’ dress both in school and in public. Immodest female clothing, he argued, was a great source of corruption. If the government made it a crime for a woman to wear a dress that failed to go well below her knees, it “would be of huge consolation to the Vicar of Christ.” ARSI, TV, b. 15, fasc. 1067, 26 novembre 1928. Tacchi Venturi’s note bears his annotation “presentato a S.E. il 26 novembre 1928.” S.E., or “Sua Eccellenza” (His Excellency), could refer to Mussolini but could also refer to one of the government ministers. Bressan (1980, pp. 106–8) recounts the lavish attention that the pages of L’Osservatore romano devoted to questions of “immorality” and to pressuring the government authorities to take more aggressive action.