Death Before Glory

by Martin Howard

  Goyrand launched two sorties to regain the flèche but both were beaten back by the outnumbered British grenadiers and light infantry. Moore had been critical of the soldiers, but these were among the best troops in Abercromby’s army and the Republicans were no match for them in hand to hand combat. The desperate nature of the action is clear from the casualty figures; the valiant 27th lost 120 killed and wounded and the French close to 200 men. The flèche was secured and two 6-pounders placed in it. When another party of men emerged from the fort they were carrying biers for the dead and wounded; it was obvious that no more counter-attacks were to be made.

  Further resistance was likely to be futile. The Morne owed its strength to its inaccessibility, not its fortifications, and the besiegers were now dug in close to the walls. Goyrand had lost 1,400 men in the siege and the commander accepted that there was now an overwhelming case for surrender.

  The bombardment continued; it was very destructive. Pressed by wise representations based on the exhaustion of the powder, the cisterns, the poor quality of the stagnant water which it was necessary to desalinate, on the cries of women and children demanding bread, on the protection of republicans who had survived this memorable siege, I hesitated no longer to listen to the voices of suffering humanity.

  A flag of truce was sent out on the 25th and the capitulation signed the next day. Moore watched proceedings, ‘…we formed a lane from the gate and the garrison to the amount of 2,000 marched out, laid down their arms and were conveyed to the Vigie and from thence on board transports. The garrison consisted chiefly of blacks and men of colour’.

  When the British flag was raised above Morne Fortune there was cheering on the ships of the fleet. Midshipman Dillon says that all was ‘joy and cheerfulness’ but the success had been expensive in lives, money and time. British casualties were significant; 566 officers and men killed, wounded or missing between the assault on Morne Chabot on 28 April and the final action on Morne Fortune on 24 May. The financial bill was perhaps £500,000 and the operation had cost Abercromby a full month, time he could ill afford as the rainy season was approaching. The victory was not complete. Many Republican sympathisers had fled into the wooded interior and remained a threat. Abercromby admitted that he had made a ‘barren conquest’. The general wrote to Dundas that the island could be considered no more than a ‘military post’ and that the black population remained ‘complete masters’ of the place. He was forced to leave his best officer, John Moore, in charge of 4,000 men to undertake the unenviable task of suppressing the insurgents and maintaining some form of peace in the colony.9

  The disillusioned Moore believed that Abercromby should have stayed longer on St Lucia to consolidate its capture using the whole army; ‘The General and Admiral think they have cleared themselves from all trouble by running away from it’. This was a harsh and self-interested judgement. Abercromby had wider objectives and was running out of time. The weeks spent at St Lucia effectively precluded an attack on Guadeloupe; but he was determined to recover St Vincent and Grenada. He sailed first to Cariacou Bay with the Grenada division and then on to St Vincent where he arrived on 7 June. Here, the situation had stagnated with the British garrison in Kingstown dominated by French Republicans and native Caribs on the fortified heights of the Vigie a few miles to the east (see map 8). Troops were disembarked on the 8th with the intention of launching a decisive attack on the Vigie the following day. Abercromby’s plan was for a frontal assault by three columns under Fuller, Morshead and Hunter, whilst two columns under Dickens and Knox worked their way around the enemy’s rear. The attacking units totalled 2,800 and the encircling force 1,250 men. The commander was no doubt mindful of the debacle on the St Lucia Vigie and, at 7 o’clock of the morning of the 9th, he opened an artillery bombardment to soften up the defenders. This had some effect, a significant number of Caribs fleeing before their escape route was closed, but the white contingent and the troops imported from Guadeloupe and St Lucia bravely held their positions. By early afternoon, it was judged ‘absolutely necessary’ to storm the heights as daylight would soon be lost. Abercromby describes the successful outcome to Dundas.

  From Major-General Hunter’s Divisions on the Right a Part of Lowenstein’s Corps, and Two Companies of the 42nd Regiment, with some Island Rangers, availed themselves of the Profile of the Hill, and Lodged themselves within a very short distance of the Fort. At Two o’ clock the Two remaining companies of the 42nd Regiment, from Major-General Hunter’s Column, and the Buffs [3rd Regiment], supported by the York Rangers from Major-General Morshead’s, were ordered to advance to the attack. The enemy, unable to withstand their Ardour, retired from the first, second and third Redoubts but rallied round the New Vigie, their principal post. They were now fully in our power…

  Knox and Dickens had closed the trap and at 5pm the French commander, Marinier, surrendered. British losses amounted to 38 killed and 141 wounded. Abercromby estimated the number of prisoners as around 700 with perhaps 200 of the insurgents escaping into the jungle with the Caribs. Private John Simpson of the 42nd witnessed the capitulation; ‘…the next morning [10th] the French marched out with Drums beating and Colours flying and passed the English Army who stood with presented Arms. They consisted chiefly of Negroes and the nake[de]st set of ratches [wretches] ever was seen…’

  Moreau de Jonnès believed Abercromby’s surrender terms to be ‘honourable but very hard’. The Vigie garrison was treated as prisoners of war except for the wounded who were to be returned immediately to France. The fate of the native Caribs on the island is a more tragic story. They were widely dispersed and the British set about systematically destroying their infrastructure. Private Simpson relates that the Caribs were in large numbers in the woods but difficult to catch; in one typical encounter, seven of his comrades were killed and eight wounded by an invisible enemy hiding in the trees and the undergrowth. This led, he explains, to more radical measures; ‘…by sending parties as far in to the woods as they [the British] could and destroyed all the fruits and roots they could come at, every day for a considerable time till we at last got them reduced to a state of starvation’. The black rangers were vital in this jungle war. A contemporary English historian admitted that, ‘on negroes depend the preservation of the colony of St Vincent being separated from Great Britain’.

  By the end of October, more than 5,000 black Caribs were captured and it was decided that they should be deported. British correspondence suggests no more sinister intent, Dundas twice emphasising to Abercromby that the captives should be managed with humanity. In the event, affairs were clumsily handled, the Caribs being first evacuated to the tiny island of Balliceaux in the Grenadines where they were devastated by disease and then to the underdeveloped island of Roatan in the Bay of Honduras. By 1802, the survivors had begun to colonise the Central American coast. The attitude of British historians to the episode has evolved. Fortescue, writing in 1915, is dismissive; ‘with this incident the Black Caribs vanish from history, none too soon for the peace of St Vincent’. Modern authors have understandably taken a dimmer view, Duffy referring to Balliceaux as a ‘concentration camp’ and, in considering previous deportations of entire communities, he describes the Caribs’ treatment as that which ‘came closest to genocide’.10

  The British were also taking control on Grenada. The reinforcement of 3,000 men from St Lucia had landed at Palmiste on the west coast (see map 7) on 10 June to join the 2,000 men already on the colony. The plan was for the new force under the command of Nicolls to attack the enemy at Goyave whilst the garrison force, under the leadership of Brigadier General Campbell, would advance from the windward side of the island to attack the enemy’s rear. Nicolls quickly overpowered token French resistance at Goyave on the 11th but the Campbell column was still only half way across the colony and Fédon was able to escape with 1,000 insurgents to his camp at Belvidere on Mount Quoca (Mount St Catherine, 2,500 feet). Abercromby made it explicit to Nicolls that only Fédon’s unconditional surrend
er was acceptable; ‘The Atrocity of his Character and the Cruelties of which he has been guilty, render it impossible to treat with him upon any other Terms’.

  Having completed his conquest of St Vincent, Abercromby joined Nicolls on 16 June to find the enemy invested. Nicolls was keeping a respectful distance and all operations had been slowed by the heavy rain. The stronghold was formidable and is well described by William Dyott.

  Mount Quoca is the highest mountain in the island of Grenada, extremely strong by nature, as it is a ridge, one end of which is almost perpendicular. The enemy had added greatly to its natural strength, having by dint of negro labour got some heavy cannon to the top. The place from the beginning of the resurrection had been their grand camp and principal place of assembly, and it is a most remarkable situation. It consists of three heights, one rising above another, on each of which they had cannon.

  The rebels had named the three heights the Camp de Liberté, the Camp L’Egalité and, the highest, the Camp La Mort. The latter had been used for massacring their prisoners. There was a second enemy camp called ‘Asche’s’ four miles to the north east of St George’s.

  Abercromby grasped the nettle on the night of 11 June, ordering Count Heillemer of Lowenstein’s Chasseurs to storm Mount Quoca whilst other units were deployed to block the insurgents’ escape and to take Asche’s camp. The choice of the foreign corps to make the main assault was propitious. Dyott saw the light infantry ‘scrabbling through the woods, getting behind trees and taking a shot when they could get an opportunity’. Captain Lasalle de Louisenthal of the Chasseurs describes them using their swords as scaling ladders to climb the sheer incline and take the enemy in the rear. It was an audacious and overwhelming attack, Heillemer killing more than a hundred of the enemy for the loss of only seven men. Louisenthal saluted the achievement of his unit, ‘Au début, personne ne voulut croire à ce success extraordinairement rapide. Personne ne pouvait le comprendre!’. Fédon fled after slaughtering 40 white prisoners. Total British losses between 9 and 19 June were nine killed and 60 wounded.

  The back of Fédon’s forces had been broken. Asche’s camp fell to another determined assault by Lowenstein’s Chasseurs and light infantry. According to Dyott, the foreign troops had to be pressed on by British regulars; ‘…they would have played the very game the brigands were practising and have bush fought them all along the ridge’. It only remained to take retribution. Nicolls informed Abercromby that ‘we were divided in search of the Monsters in every direction…’ By October, Major General Charles Graham was able to report that the island was tranquil. There were still a few insurgents in the woods but they were causing little trouble, ‘…they rather deserve our Contempt than merit our Resentment.’ Fédon had not been captured but was rumoured to have drowned from a canoe while attempting escape.11

  The subjugation of Grenada completed Abercromby’s campaign in the Windward Islands. This can be judged to have been a qualified success. The gains had restored the situation to that at the end of 1794 with the addition of the Dutch colonies. On the other hand, St Lucia remained vulnerable to French intervention, Guadeloupe had not been attacked, and the whole project had drained vital resources from Saint Domingue. Exhausted by his exertions, Abercromby returned home in August 1796 leaving General Graham in command. As was the norm in the West Indies, the subsequent period of relative inactivity was marked by a virulent outbreak of yellow fever. In the Windwards and Leewards, around 2,500 British soldiers perished from disease between April and October. John Moore’s retaining force on St Lucia was similarly afflicted, being reduced from 4,000 strong to 1,000 men fit for duty between June and November. There were 5,000 sick on Dominica alone.

  The decimation of their West Indian forces − we will return to the precise losses in Chapter 11 – might have deterred ministers from taking more initiatives in the region. There was a growing realisation in London that the available forces were inadequate to obtain full control of Saint Domingue or to launch a fresh assault on Guadeloupe. Abercromby had thought it necessary to have an army in excess of 12,000 men to recapture the latter and Forbes wanted at least 8,000 fresh men to gain ground on the former. However, the changing political and military situation dragged Dundas’s attention inexorably back to the Caribbean. The declaration of war by Spain in early October raised the prospect of an attack on the vulnerable Spanish colonies of Trinidad and Puerto Rico. Abercromby was instructed to return to the region to undertake the new conquests. He was faced with a daunting task. The garrison to windward was perhaps 3,000 men short of the 12,000 thought necessary to ensure security and he could expect few reinforcements, in all likelihood mostly German mercenaries of dubious motivation and quality. There were some compensating factors. He was at least absolved of any responsibility for Saint Domingue; the final operations here were left to General John Graves Simcoe. Also, the threat from Hugues was subsiding. The Republican leader was involved in infighting, had a shrinking army at his disposal, and was more interested in self-aggrandisement than insurrection.12

  Abercromby arrived at Martinique on 17 November. He was resolved to make Trinidad his first objective. The necessary reinforcements, around 2,000 men including the 2nd Regiment of the Irish Brigade and Hompesch’s Light Infantry, arrived at the end of January 1797. With troops collected from Barbados, Tobago and St Vincent this brought Abercromby’s total force to close to 3,750, comprised of approximately 2,500 British regulars (2nd Queens, 14th, 53rd, 3rd flank companies, detachments of the 38th and 60th Regiments) and 1,000 men of the two foreign corps, Hompesch’s and Lowenstein’s Chasseurs. This small army was to rendezvous at Cariacou Bay in the Grenadines before being transported to its final destination, Port of Spain, on the 13-ship squadron of the Martinique station naval commander, Rear Admiral Henry Harvey. It seems that general and admiral had struck up a good relationship, a vital ingredient for a successful combined operation.

  Port of Spain was Trinidad’s main town and was protected by three forts. The Spanish garrison was 600 strong and there were also 1,600 marines and seamen aboard five Spanish ships anchored a few miles along the coast. This may have added up to a formidable obstacle; but the land defences were weak, the ships were seriously undermanned and the Spanish governor, Don José Chacon, had no stomach for a fight. In fairness to the governor, his garrison was a toxic mixture of French Republicans, French Royalists and Spanish; many of the second and third factions were antagonistic to the first and saw potential gain in British intervention.

  It transpired that the most spectacular event of the attack on Trinidad was the self-immolation of the Spanish fleet on the night of 16 February. Thomas Brisbane witnessed the destruction.

  When we came off Port d’Espagne we found the enemy’s fleet…As the sun was setting it was too late to attack them that night but it was resolved to do so at daylight the following morning. About ten o’clock that night we discerned a fire among the enemy’s ships which presented a most awful appearance. As the fire extended to the guns they went off in succession, and on the flames reaching the magazines they exploded with a tremendous crash, while the burning fragments and sparks were seen for a considerable period high in the air.

  Spanish Rear Admiral Don Sebastien Ruiz de Apodaca had taken the drastic step to deny the British the use of his ships. Abercromby landed a few hundred men about four miles to the west of the town on the 17th. Brisbane says that Port of Spain was occupied ‘after a very trifling resistance’ and Ensign David Wainwright confirms that he and his comrades met little opposition. Abercromby later communicated to Dundas that the town and its environs, with the exception of the two smaller forts, were quickly under his control. Chacon was weighed down by the defeatism of his small garrison and the lack of provisions and ammunition. He gratefully complied with Abercromby’s polite summons to surrender, ‘…I see with sorrow his [Chacon’s] troops are without hope of being able to carry out his wishes’. It was fortunate that the enemy was feeble as the landing, not for the first time in the
campaigns, was unduly prolonged and there were well documented instances of drunkenness and plundering committed by the invaders. Captain Lasalle de Louisenthal claims that the 3rd Regiment were the main miscreants. ‘If Don Chacon and Admiral Apodaca had attacked and if they had come out of the fort with only a hundred men, they would have been able to annihilate almost the entire army…happily this thought did not enter their heads’.

  The single fatality of the attack on Trinidad, Lieutenant Villeneuve of the 8th Regiment of Foot, Brigade Major to Hompesch, was very likely a victim of friendly fire. Only a handful of men were wounded. In contrast, the spoils were great. More than 2,000 Spanish soldiers and sailors were made prisoner, and about a hundred guns and a surviving ship of the line captured. The colony was, in the words of one officer, a ‘valuable acquisition’; all the troops would later receive significant prize money.13

  Abercromby left a 1,000-strong Trinidad garrison under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Picton and turned his attention to Puerto Rico. He approached this venture with an optimism based more on perceived Spanish weakness that the strength or quality of his own forces. The new batch of reinforcements, 1,600 men of the 87th and a detachment of Lowenstein’s Chasseurs, was of poor calibre and a total force of just over 4,000 men was not obviously adequate to overcome real resistance. On 17 April, Harvey’s fleet of some sixty ships anchored off the north-east coast of Puerto Rico near San Juan which was the capital, a major port and, more significantly, a substantial fortress.