Another event in 1802 caused great alarm in the British West Indian islands. On 9 April, troops of the elite flank companies of the 8th West India Regiment mutinied at Prince Rupert’s Bluff on Dominica. Three British officers and all the white non-commissioned officers were murdered by the mutineers, a mixture of African-born soldiers and French-speaking Creoles. It appears that they had rebelled because of a rumour that they were to be reduced and sold as slaves. The West India Regiment had been already used to remove brushwood and drain swamps near to the fortifications and they believed that this work – probably ordered to stem the prevailing sickness − was a ploy to assess their suitability for cutting cane. A resident, who has left the best account of the affair, describes the local reaction, ‘…so strong was the apprehension that these proceedings were a first step towards a general insurrection among the slaves, that the white inhabitants only whispered their terrors to each other, afraid to declare, in the hearing of the black population, all that had taken place at Prince Rupert’s’.
The island’s governor, Cochrane Johnston, invoked martial law and a force of 1,800 men made up of the 68th Regiment, a detachment of the Royals, marines, and the St George’s Militia was quickly raised to tackle the rebels, estimated as 450 strong. The two parties confronted each other on the 12th.
The Royals, 68th Regiment, and marines having taken up their ground in front of them [the mutineers], Governor Johnston rode up to address them. Scarcely, however, had he addressed his regret and sorrow, that the corps of which he was the colonel and which had distinguished itself at the capture of the Danish settlements [St Martin, 1801] should so have acted, when the angry feelings betrayed by the mutineers led him to wheel a little round; and, again fronting them, he, without losing further time, gave the word for them to order, and ground their arms. A few only obeyed this order; and one of their ringleaders, stepping out, called to them ‘not to lay down their arms, as Governor Johnston would cheat them’.
At this point, the Royals fired a volley and the 68th and the marines advanced with the bayonet. After returning a few shots, the mutineers fled down a steep precipice. Over a hundred were killed in the action and several prisoners who were subsequently court-martialled and found guilty of mutiny were executed. Those British officers who had been held captive by the miscreants escaped unhurt. Following this episode, the governor resolved not to discharge black soldiers back to their local community during the peace but to keep these men, such as those from the disbanded 8th West India Regiment, in British pay.3
The Peace of Amiens was always likely to be short-lived. Both Britain and France treated it as no more than a short interlude in their titanic struggle. Ministers were distrustful of Bonaparte and the regular army, 132,000 strong, remained more than twice the size it had been at the end of the previous war in 1783. The navy, with 32 ships of the line and more than 50,000 seamen and marines in service, was also well prepared for the renewal of fighting. Britain’s sudden declaration of war in May 1803 caught Bonaparte off guard, with half his warships committed to the Saint Domingue expedition. In the wider West Indies, neither the British fleet nor the army had been placed on a peace footing and, in early 1803, there were close to 10,000 men − a mixture of white regulars, West India Regiments and other troops – in the Windward and Leeward Islands. In the twelve years of impending Caribbean warfare, Britain’s enemies at various periods were to be the French but also the Spanish, the Dutch and the Danes.4
The news of Britain’s declaration of war in the West Indies formally arrived in the region in mid-June 1803, but army and navy commanders on the scene had been given early warning of the inevitable end of peace. Lieutenant General William Grinfield, the commander-in-chief in the Windward and Leewards, had toured the islands ‘for the purpose of awaking the drowsy soldiers’. Now, he took aboard supplies for 4,000 men who were themselves prepared to embark at 24 hours’ notice on Commodore Samuel Hood’s fleet. Grinfield was given orders to attack one or more of Martinique, St Lucia and Tobago; he judged the first place to be too strong but he believed capture of the latter two islands to be feasible with his 3,000 strong force (2/1st, 64th, 68th, 3rd West India Regiment, Royal Artillery, Royal Military Artificers, black pioneers).
St Lucia was the first objective and the bulk of the force was disembarked in Anse du Choc, the bay to the north of the town of Castries, on 21 June (see map 5). Enemy outposts were driven in and Castries taken. The French commander, General Jean-François-Xavier Nogues, a veteran of Marengo, was holed up on the Morne Fortune with only a handful of troops. Poyen criticises the French strategy of dividing their forces ‘en petits paquets’ among the islands. Nogues’s desperate efforts to organise the defence of the Morne were witnessed by Lasalle de Louisenthal, formerly of Lowenstein’s Hussars, who had joined his family on the colony.
Diseases had decimated the French. General Nogues had scarcely 160 men of which 50 had been detached to Gros Islet. They called up the militia but very few were mustered. Most hid themselves away. For others the journey was too long. The general placed his men in front of the breach [on the Morne], placed six cannons in the front and awaited his enemy. Summoned by the English to surrender, he replied ‘L’Empereur a donné ordre de ne pas rendre une fortresse avant qu’elle n’ait été attaquée, je m’ens tiens à cet ordre’.
Nogues bravery was laudable but his paltry forces were no match for the British troops who attacked the Morne on the 22nd led by George Prevost and Robert Brereton. Grinfield, in his peremptory dispatch, describes the assault commencing at 4 o’clock and lasting for half an hour. Most of the fighting was borne by the Royal Scots and the 64th. A number of senior officers on both sides were wounded; the brother of General Nogues suffered a severe wound to the thigh and was only saved from the wrath of the rank and file by Brereton who took him in his arms. Louisenthal expresses his surprise that the overweight British general (‘son extraordinaire embonpoint’) had reached the top of the Morne. The British total losses were 20 killed, 120 wounded and eight missing, reflecting the stiff French resistance. Despite the intensity of the fighting there was a good relationship between the adversaries, Grinfield commenting that, ‘…no sooner were the Works carried by Assault and the Opposition no longer existed, that every Idea of Animosity appeared to cease and not a French soldier was either killed or wounded’. Six hundred and forty French prisoners were sent back to France and Nogues and several of his officers were permitted to return to Martinique. The victorious Grinfield garrisoned the new acquisition with the 68th Regiment and three companies of black troops under Brereton’s command.5
The next target was Tobago. Most of the island’s inhabitants were British and the chief town and fort of Scarborough (see map 2) was defended by a French garrison of little more than 200 soldiers and sailors under the command of General César Berthier. Hood and Grinfield sailed from St Lucia and reached Tobago on 25 June, the greater part of the troops being landed by the late afternoon. It was, as Grinfield related in his dispatch, a bloodless coup.
…the two leading columns [the most advanced column of two companies of the 64th and five companies of the 3rd West India Regiment under the command of Brigadier General Thomas Picton] marched forward towards Scarborough and meeting with no Opposition in the Defiles of St Mary’s, advanced to Mount Grace, from which place I sent a Summons to the Commandant-General Berthier, who returned an answer by proposing Terms of Capitulation…
These were quickly agreed, the French garrison marching out and laying down their arms with the full honours of war. Grinfield praised Hood for his exemplary naval cooperation and the commodore, in his own dispatch, noted the general’s ‘superior energy’. French plans to make Tobago a naval depot had been frustrated and the colony was garrisoned by eight companies of Royal Scots and a detachment of black troops. Grinfield now returned to Barbados.6
It was often easier to conquer Caribbean islands than to safeguard them. The commanders in the West Indies had a firmer grasp of this reality than
ministers in London. Any new acquisition of a ‘valuable’ sugar island sucked in resources to ensure its adequate supply and protection from French reprisals. Much of the power remained in civil hands and military considerations were often subjugated to local needs. Governors remained reluctant to call out their militia. Grinfield had little control of local shipping and Commodore Hood’s fleet was not strong enough to frustrate all enemy movements. When Henry Addington’s ministry ordered the assimilation of the Dutch colonies of Demerara, Berbice and Surinam, Grinfield pointed out that his expeditionary force would soon be nothing more than several weak garrisons. St Lucia and Tobago required 2,000 men and the former Dutch possessions would consume most of the rest. Promised reinforcements, a battalion from Gibraltar, did not arrive. Grinfield’s objections were not due to any ulterior reluctance to undertake military operations; his case for conserving the status quo was pragmatic.
The general’s reservations were ignored. Dutch colonists on the South American mainland had been unnerved by a visit by Hugues and had appealed to Britain for help. The temptation of another easy conquest was too great to resist for the army’s political masters. By August 1803, Grinfield had intelligence that Demerara would indeed make little resistance and on 18 September his force of 1,300 men was anchored off the main settlement of Georgetown. A flag of truce was immediately sent to the Governor of Demerara and Essequibo with a summons and orders to wait only one hour.
The Commander in Chief of the Land and Sea Forces of His Britannic Majesty being fully assured of their decided Superiority to the Forces of the Batavian Republic [the successor of the Republic of the United Netherlands, extant 1795−1806], in these Colonies, and certain of being able to prevent Succours being thrown in…with the View therefore to prevent unnecessary Effusion of Blood, or the Mischief which must ensue to the Colonies, should the Troops be under the necessity of making good the Landing, and the Ships to enforce a Passage, the Commander in Chief thought it right to trouble your Excellency with this summons…
The Governor complied with the demand for immediate surrender of the two colonies under his jurisdiction. Berbice capitulated five days later to a detachment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Nicholson of the Royals. Again there was no fighting. The Dutch garrisons, around 1,500 men, entered British service as the York Light Infantry Volunteers.7
Grinfield and many of his men died of yellow fever, but this did nothing to stem the political momentum for acquisition. In March 1804, the new commander-in-chief, Sir Charles Green, was instructed to combine with Hood to attack Dutch Surinam (now the South American Republic of Suriname). The planters were thought to be friendly, but this was not likely to be a repeat of the meek submission of the other Dutch colonies. More resistance was expected and the attack would be complicated by the labyrinthine local geography and significant Dutch fortifications. In his later explicit dispatch, Green explained that the coastline ‘…is of very difficult Approach, shallow, and full of Banks; that a Landing is only to be attempted at the top of the Tide, and at particular Points; the Coast is uncleared, and from Wood, and the marshy Nature of the soil, it is impossible to penetrate into the Interior except by the Rivers and the Creeks’.
The major river, the Surinam, was the key to the capture of the capital Paramaribo, ten miles upstream, and the subjugation of the colony (see map 12). Accordingly, the Dutch engineers had constructed a series of powerful fortifications, also well described by Green. At the mouth of the river was the battery of Bram’s Point with seven 18-pounders; then there was Fort Amsterdam at the confluence of the Surinam and Commewyne (Commewijne) with 80 pieces of ordnance; 2,000 yards away on the right bank of the Surinam where it met the Commewyne was Fort Leyden with 12 heavy guns; Fort Frederick with 20 heavy guns was 1,200 yards lower down; Fort Purmurent with 10 guns stood nearly opposite to Fort Amsterdam on the river’s left bank; finally, Fort Zeelandia, a battery of 10 guns, defended Paramaribo. The fire of all these works and batteries was intended to prevent ships going up the river.
It was obvious that a substantial effort was required and that effective army and navy cooperation was paramount. On 25 May, Green and Hood, both aboard the Centaur, anchored about 10 miles off the mouth of the Surinam; most of the remainder of the fleet had joined them by the following day. There was an available force of 2,150 men divided into an advanced corps, the 1st and 2nd Brigades, and Royal Artillery ordnance. Green describes the opening of the campaign.
On the 26th, a Corps [the advanced corps], consisting of the Flank Companies of the 16th and 64th Regiments, the Rifle company of the 2nd Battalion 60th Regiment, made up by Detachments from the Battalion Companies of the 16th, 64th, and 6th West India Regiments, to about Six Hundred Men, and the 1st Brigade [Battery] of Royal Artillery, besides Armed Seamen, was detached in different Vessels under Convoy of His Majesty’s Ship Hippomenes, Captain Shipley. This Corps was commanded by Brigadier-General [Frederick] Maitland, who was directed to effect a Landing at the Warappa Creek, about Ten Leagues [thirty miles] to the Eastward of the Surinam River, where the Enemy occupied a Post. The Object of the Operation was to obtain a Water Communication with the Commewyne River, to procure Plantation Boats in sufficient Number to transport the Troops down that river towards its Junction with the Surinam, and thereby facilitate our Approach to take a Position in the Rear of Fort New Amsterdam; and also with a view to cut off a considerable Detachment of the enemy stationed at Fort Brandwacht [a lesser fortification close by], on the Mud Creek. On the same Day, Preparations were made for landing a Body of Troops to take Possession of Bram’s Point…A Detachment of Troops under Brigadier General [William Carlyon] Hughes immediately landed and took Possession of Bram’s Point, making Prisoners a Captain and Forty-four men. The Entrance being thus secured, the Commodore made Signal for the Ships to go into the River as soon as possible; in the Course of that and the following Day, the most considerable Part of the Fleet anchored in the River.
Green sent a flag of truce up the river to the Dutch Governor whose refusal to yield was received on the 28th. The British General resolved to lose no time in driving in the enemy posts but an attempt on Fort Purmurent by a detachment of the 64th and some seamen was frustrated by the state of the tide.
The winning of Surinam was as much about overcoming jungle, swamp and water as defeating the human enemy. On the 29th, intelligence was gained that there was a way through the woods by which the troops might be brought up to the rear of Forts Leyden and Frederick. On the same night, Hughes took command of a party of a detachment of the 64th supported by a lesser number of the 6th West India Regiment, some seamen and soldiers from the Artificers Corps, in all about 180 men. They were led along the path by local guides.
A great Quantity of Rain having recently fallen, it was found that the Path, at all Times difficult, had become almost impassable, but no Obstacle could damp the enterprising Spirit of our Seamen and Soldiers, who, with persevering Courage, after a laborious March of five Hours arrived near the Rear of Frederici Battery [Fort Frederick]. The Alarm having been given, a considerable Fire of Grapeshot was made upon the Troops, before they quitted the wood, while forming for the Attack, and of musketry as they approached the Battery. The Assault of our intrepid Seamen and Troops with fixed Bayonets was so animated and rigorous as to prevent any further Resistance. The enemy fled to Fort Leyden, having set Fire to the Powder Magazine by the Explosion of which a few British Officers and Men were severely wounded.
Hughes now moved against Leyden with similar results, his force again making an impetuous attack in the face of grapeshot and musketry. The fort quickly surrendered. Most of the 150 strong garrison were captured but some escaped across the Commewyne to Fort Amsterdam.
This action, described by Green as a ‘brilliant affair’, meant that a position was secured whereby a bombardment could be made against Fort Amsterdam. A communication with Maitland’s detachment had been opened and the country now controlled ‘abounded with resources of all kinds’. On the 30th
, the army and navy commanders went ashore to inspect the shelters designed to give the newly captured works and occupying troops some protection from the intermittent fire of the fort. Two British mortars threw some shells in return and the Dutch fire was soon silenced. Green had by this time received a report of Maitland’s successful landing at the Warappa Creek. The commander sought to combine his forces, the plan being for the bulk of his troops, still on the ships, to disembark at Fort Leyden and march up the north bank of the Commewyne to eventually link with Maitland on the opposite side of the river. All stores, supplies and artillery were conveyed along the river in naval vessels.
Death Before Glory Page 18
