Death Before Glory

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Death Before Glory Page 19

by Martin Howard


  On 3 May, Maitland appeared on the Commewyne, his corps carried in plantation boats, and landed at a plantation on the south side of the river. He was soon joined by the 16th Regiment and, on the following day, he moved through the woods to within a mile of Fort Amsterdam. A few shots were fired by enemy patrols which then promptly retired. Green and Hood, at headquarters on the Commewyne, now received a flag of truce from the Dutch commander, Lieutenant Colonel Balenburg. Terms were quickly agreed and Surinam was a British colony. Two thousand prisoners were taken; these were mostly Dutch white troops (the 5th and 8th Jagers, Colonial White Chasseurs and artillery) but there were also 400 men of the Colonial Black Rangers. The strength of this force, and of the fortifications, suggest that an even stiffer resistance might have been made. British combined army and navy losses were surprisingly light, only seven men killed and 21 wounded. This implies that the fire from Forts Frederick and Leyden was not as murderous as described in Green’s dispatch. The locals had given little help to the British, only coming around when the outcome was certain. Victor Hugues’ proximity on Cayenne meant that a garrison of 1,500 men, in part composed of Dutch soldiers, was judged necessary.8

  British success was not universal. Rear Admiral John Thomas Duckworth’s attempt to capture Curaçao in early 1804 came to nought. Overstretching his authority, resources and ability, he had sailed from Jamaica and landed 800 troops. Lacking any artillery support, he was impotent in the face of a Dutch garrison of 600 men placed behind fortifications and he had little alternative but to make a hasty retreat. His quest for prize money may explain his willingness to play the soldier as well as sailor. This failure was probably fortuitous; Surinam was arguably a conquest too far. Each new British dependency was a potential liability. A return of the spring of 1804 shows the number of British forces in the Caribbean to be 11,000 but scattered over 13 different islands and settlements with an average sick list of 2,000. William Myers, the commander-in-chief of the Windward and Leeward Islands, pleaded for reinforcements but, by the autumn, ministers were too preoccupied with the threat of a French invasion of England to send more men to the West Indies.9

  Under the circumstances, it is unsurprising that the only significant British action in the region in 1805 was defensive in nature. Napoleon’s expansionist policy included the launch of two fleets under Admirals Pierre-Charles Villeneuve and Edouard Thomas Burgues de Missiessy. The Emperor expected great things of his sailors, but the master commander on land had little understanding of the realities of the war at sea. The former fleet was forced back to Toulon by adverse weather, but Missiessy arrived at Martinique on 20 February. After consultations with General Joseph Lagrange and Admiral Louis-Thomas Villaret it was decided that British-held Dominica, vital for communication between Martinique and Guadeloupe, should be the first target. By midnight on the following day the force, possibly 4,000 strong, was moored off the Dominican town of Roseau on the south-west coast of the island. The French had hoped to take the British by surprise and, as related by a British resident, they were ready to employ subterfuge.

  Returning to Fort Young, I found the ships fully in view, and really within gunshot. There were five sail of the line, six heavy frigates, and several brigs and schooners. The fort hoisted the British colours and the enemy’s ships immediately did the same. The Governor, at that moment, received dispatches from Barbados, by a schooner, which had arrived during the night. This, however, mentioned nothing of either a British or French force having been seen. Though the ships displayed English colours our naval men were not to be deceived…

  General George Prevost, the British commander on the colony, ordered a shot to be fired across the fleet; the British Ensign was promptly lowered and the Tricolour raised.

  The French plan of attack was for three landings on the island’s west coast. General Lagrange was to disembark south of Roseau with 900 men; a second column under Adjutant-Commander Barbot was to land north of the town, and a third column of 900 men under General Claparède was to target Prince Rupert’s Bay (see map 9). To defend Dominica, Prevost had only 300 soldiers of the 46th Regiment, 400 of the 1st West India Regiment, a few Royal Artillerymen, and some companies of local militia. This modest force was necessarily divided between Prince Rupert’s Bay and Roseau.

  The first French wave came ashore south of Roseau, Prevost’s left flank, and was opposed by detachments of the 46th and the 1st West India Regiment and militia. Moreau de Jonnès, aboard the invading fleet, could see ‘strings of men in red coming down the hills and winding down the sides of the streams on the way to dispute our landing’. Prevost had given orders that ‘not an inch of ground’ was to be yielded and the French advance was vigorously resisted with the support of two field pieces manned by gunners and sailors. The troops were heroically led by their officers. Major Abraham Augustus Nunn of the 1st West India Regiment was mortally wounded and his place taken by Captain Maurice Charles O’Connell of the same unit. Despite also being wounded, O’Connell fought on, in Prevost’s words, ‘…[the wound] could not induce him to give up the Honour of the First, and he continued in the Field animating his men, and resisting the repeated charges of the Enemy until about One o’clock, when he obliged the French to retire from their advanced position with great Slaughter’.

  Frustrated to the south of Roseau, the invaders landed a column a mile and a half to the north of the town near Morne Daniel. Prevost had few resources to resist this second attack, only a hundred or so militia who were shaken by fire from French frigates close in to the shore. They soon had to fall back and Barbot’s men pushed on to take a redoubt on Morne Daniel, the 1st West India Regiment and militia defenders overwhelmed by the number of their adversaries. The column originally destined for Prince Rupert’s Bay had been becalmed and these men were now landed to join the second column with the intent of cutting off Prevost’s retreat. Roseau was in flames having received a heavy bombardment from the French fleet. The dry roofs of the houses were highly inflammable. The town was protected only by a howitzer, a 6-pounder, and a part of a light company of militia. Prevost realised that the situation was desperate with his right flank conceded and a real danger of the British force being encircled and trapped. He decided to surrender Roseau and to leave the negotiations to the local governor. The general then made an audacious escape with the remainder of his force to Prince Rupert’s.

  …I crossed the Island, and, in Twenty Four Hours with the Aid of the Inhabitants, and the Exertion of the Caribs, got to the Garrison [Prince Rupert’s] on the 23rd – After Four Days’ continued March through the most difficult country, I might almost say existing.

  Roseau and its local militia had been sacrificed but Dominica saved. The French had no appetite for a regular siege of Fort Cabrits at Prince Rupert’s Bay and when Lagrange’s summons for surrender was refused they decided to evacuate. Lagrange had fallen out with Missiessy and was deaf to the pleas of General Jean Augustin Ernouf, who offered extra troops to capture the island. After destroying the remaining defences at Roseau and disarming the militia, the French fleet sailed from Dominica on the 28th, first to Guadeloupe and then to the smaller islands of St Kitts, Nevis and Montserrat where contributions were levied. British losses in this brave defensive campaign were 21 killed, 21 wounded and eight men, all of the Royal Artillery, captured by the enemy. Prevost estimated French losses at about 300. Poyen’s figures are, as always, significantly different, British casualties being given as close to 200 and the French as little more than half of this. Moreau de Jonnès comments that there were ‘300 or 400 wounded’ aboard his ship and that they were taken to the hospital at Martinique.10

  A period of British and French naval manoeuvring now followed. We will only briefly review these events as their greater significance lay beyond the West Indies. Missiessy returned to Rochefort having stopped at the port of Santo Domingo to land reinforcements and supplies. Napoleon was still determined that his navy would influence affairs and, on 14 May, Villeneuve finally arrived w
ith part of his fleet at Martinique. The Emperor’s intentions were unclear – was the foray to the Caribbean a feint? – but the British Government was concerned enough to plan to send more troops to the region under the command of Sir Eyre Coote. Myers at Barbados was acutely anxious, fretting that the strength of the enemy was such that none of the islands were safe. Villeneuve was, however, receiving conflicting signals from Paris. He was awaiting reinforcements, but meanwhile was given free rein to attack St Lucia, Dominica and other islands so long as he was able to return to Boulogne at short notice. In the event, the only offensive action was the capture of Diamond Rock, a tiny British-held dominion off Martinique. The Emperor’s eyes were by now focussed more on the grey waters of the Channel than the blue expanses of the Caribbean. The British navy had not been idle and, in early June, Nelson brought his fleet into Carlisle Bay; although inferior to the French armament, the British admiral embarked a force of 2,000 troops and moved to protect Trinidad, passing Tobago and Grenada. Myers and the troops were disembarked at Antigua and the fleet turned north following the elusive Villeneuve. The French had stopped operations and had flown the West Indies. Nelson sent ahead warning of Villeneuve’s return to Europe and himself returned to Gibraltar. Napoleon’s directive to Villeneuve to make him ‘master of the Channel for the space of three days’ was never fulfilled and his plan to invade England was abandoned by August. The naval duel was to culminate in Nelson’s crushing victory at Trafalgar in October 1805.11

  The following year saw little military activity in the West Indies but ministers, despite the persisting high mortality among the troops garrisoning the islands, remained determined to diminish French power in the area. There was still a will to control the Caribbean. Napoleon’s invasion of Spain in 1808 was to influence policy both to leeward and windward as the Spanish were now allies and their colonies, such as Cuba, had to be protected from the French. We must remember that Britain’s enemies included Holland and, from 1807, Denmark, and it was against the Danish islands of St Thomas, St John and St Croix that the next decisive action was taken. General Henry Bowyer assembled a force of 2,500 men from Barbados and other British islands and, sailing with Rear Admiral Cochrane’s fleet, arrived at St Thomas on 21 December 1807. The Danish commander-in-chief, Casimir Wilhelm Von Scholten, was summoned to surrender the island and, after establishing that he was faced by overwhelming force, he duly complied. Bowyer left a garrison of 300 men of the 70th Regiment and moved on to St John and St Croix, which both succumbed without resistance within a few days. The benign nature of the coup was reflected in Bowyer’s platitudinous dispatch to the Secretary of State for War, Castlereagh; ‘I am convinced that had it been necessary to have called for the Exertions of the Sea and Land Forces employed upon the Expedition, that they would have added another Laurel to the many already acquired by British Valour and Discipline’. The troops and sailors had readied themselves for a landing and were left deflated by the prompt capitulation of the Danes. Midshipman John Luard was ‘disgusted’ at the lack of action, ‘It was not for this that I joined the navy’.12

  Troops were hastily collected to reinforce the naval occupation of Marie Galante off Guadeloupe, a cause of some ill-feeling as the islet was a rich source of naval officers’ prize money. The navy was also struggling to effectively blockade Guadeloupe and Martinique. The latter appeared close to starvation in early 1808 but, during the summer, French corvettes slipped through Cochrane’s cordon to bring in more men, stores and provisions. Guadeloupe was also supplied by the end of the year. Frustrated by his inability to either starve the enemy on land or to defeat him at sea, Cochrane urged General George Beckwith to attack Martinique. The successful assault on the island in 1809 and the subsequent capture of Guadeloupe in 1810 were the major West Indian actions of the Napoleonic period.

  Beckwith had a substantial force at his disposal for the conquest of Martinique. His army of 10,000 men was organised into two divisions. The First, under the command of General George Prevost, totalled 7,071 troops and was divide into a 1st Brigade (the 7th Regiment, 23rd, detachment 1st West India Regiment, Royal Artillery), a 2nd Brigade (the 8th, 13th, detachment 1st West India Regiment, Royal Artillery), and a Reserve (flank companies 25th, 3 and 4/60th, 4th West India Regiment, Light Infantry Battalion, Royal Artillery). The Second Division under the command of General Frederick Maitland totalled 3,710 men and was divided into a 3rd Brigade (63rd, Royal York Rangers), a 4th Brigade (flank companies of the 15th and 46th, battalion companies of 15th, York Light Infantry Volunteers, detachment 8th West India Regiment) and a 5th Brigade (the 90th, 3rd West India Regiment and Royal Artillery). The French defending force, under the command of the governor, Admiral Louis Thomas Villaret, was 3,500 strong, made up of 2,400 infantry, 300 sailors, and six battalions of National Guard. There was artillery support with 280 to 290 pieces of ordnance. The quality of the French troops was variable; in the 26th ligne there were veterans of Egypt and Italy, whereas the 82nd was weaker with more foreign elements (see Chapter 2). Their senior officers were mostly of low calibre, some of them aged and lacking the confidence of their men. Villaret was an experienced seaman but had done little fighting on land.

  The British strategy was very similar to that of Grey 15 years earlier, the plan being to force the entrance to Fort Royal Bay and to seize the dominant position of Morne Bruneau to the north of Fort Royal (see map 3). The French strategy, determined by the insufficiency of the garrison, was to concentrate forces in the immediate vicinity of Fort Desaix (formerly Fort Bourbon but renamed by Napoleon). On 31 January, Maitland disembarked the bulk of the Second Division at Sainte Luce in the south of the island, detaching the York Rangers to land further to the west at Anse d’Arlet, where they quickly took the batteries at Cape Solomon gaining a safe anchorage for the fleet. Pigeon Island soon surrendered to a bombardment. Maitland himself pushed on to Lamentin, meeting no resistance and accepting the submission of a number of local militia. By the 3rd, he was entrenched within gunshot of Fort Desaix covering the potential landing place of the Cohé du Lamentin.

  Prevost’s First Division also landed on the 31st at Malgré Tout on the Bay Robert to the south of the Bay of Galion on the east coast. Again this was unopposed. After waiting four hours for the disembarkation of the artillery horses, the troops set out on the night march south through difficult country towards the River Lézarde. The horses had still not come up and the light artillery pieces had to be dragged by men on their hands and knees. Five miles was achieved with great difficulty. The enemy at first fell back but then made a stand in a strong position on a hill adjacent to Morne Bruneau. Prevost was still without his artillery, but he nevertheless ordered a general assault by the 1st Brigade and the Light Infantry Battalion of the Reserve. There was to be a frontal attack by the 7th and the 1st West India Regiment and turning movements to the French right and left by the remaining troops. The outcome is best related by Captain Thomas Henry Browne of the 23rd.

  The action began about nine o’clock in the morning [1 February], the Fusiliers leading, supported by the Light Companies which had been formed in to a Brigade. Two companies only of the 23rd were at first engaged, but the opposition of the French was so serious, that the remainder of the Regiment moved up and commencing a steady and brisk fire they began to give way. Our men cheered loudly and chased them with the Bayonet. We pursued [the French] to a second hill called Mont Sourrirè [the Heights of Sourier] where they rallied and received great reinforcements. We attacked again – they made a vigorous stand for several hours, and we were engaged within half musket shot. This sort of work would not do as we were expending ammunition and not gaining ground. We were ordered again to the charge and they gave way.

  Lieutenant John Harrison of the same regiment confirms the obstinate resistance, ‘…the French repeatedly returning to the attack with drums beating’. It was by now becoming dark and Prevost controlled the heights, the enemy taking refuge under the guns of their redoubts. The British troops made fir
es and slept among the sugar canes protected by strong piquets thrown out to their front.

  On the next day (2 February), Beckwith ordered the Light Battalion and the 7th Regiment to take the troublesome redoubt. The attempt was repulsed with the loss of 200 men, but during the night the redoubt was abandoned and occupied by the British. The defenders had retired into the fort, spiking their guns. On the 5th, Maitland led his men around the north of Fort Royal to Negro Point, effectively completing the investment of Fort Desaix. The capture of this fort was now the final objective, its fall ensuring the mastery of Martinique. Work began on the construction of gun and mortar batteries whilst more cannon, mortars and howitzers with their ammunition and stores were landed and dragged to the points designated by the engineers. There was incessant rain. Browne describes the siege work as ‘exceedingly tedious’. Morale, however, remained good. Inside the fort, Villaret watched his foe at work and prepared for the siege; he refused to read a letter sent by Beckwith. ‘We were occupied day and night with the defensive works’. In his journal, he notes that he went into the town to visit the 700 sick and wounded. His own house and some magazines had been pillaged and he ordered veterans to take up arms to ‘control the blacks’. French batteries fired at intervals, but both Villaret and Beckwith agree that they had little effect against the besiegers.

 

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