Predators
Page 12
FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AGENCIES, 2004–2013
Space will not allow an in-depth, case-by-case analysis of each of the drone strikes under President Obama, but the trends reflected in 2008 were repeated in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 with only a few exceptions (such as more attacks in North Waziristan and a tendency to go after more mid- or low-level Pakistani and Afghan Taliban targets instead of high-value foreign al Qaeda targets). Only those drone strikes that killed high-ranking al Qaeda or Taliban leaders will be analyzed here in detail. This analysis of the HVTs killed in Pakistan in 2009 sheds a fascinating light on the more notable successes of the drone campaign.
The campaign of 2009 began on January 1, when five militants were killed in a strike in South Waziristan. Among those killed in the strike were a high-ranking Kenyan al Qaeda explosives expert named Usama al Kini and his lieutenant Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan. Kini had trained the terrorists who carried out the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed hundreds of primarily African civilians in 1998. Considering the blood on this mass murderer’s hands, much of it Pakistani, his death was celebrated in the United States and Pakistan, as well as Africa.12
Other militant leaders killed soon thereafter included Abdullah Hamas al Filistini, a Palestinian al Qaeda trainer; Khwaz ali Mehsud, a senior deputy to Baitullah Mehsud; Mufti Noor Wali, a suicide bomb trainer for both al Qaeda and the Taliban; Kiyafetullah Anikhel, another of Baitullah Mehsud’s commanders; and finally on August 5, 2009, the most-wanted man in Pakistan, Baitullah Mehsud himself.13 His death was quietly celebrated throughout Pakistan by those moderates who abhorred the growing influence of the extremists.
Twenty-two days later, on August 27, a drone struck another interesting terrorist, named Tahir Yuldushev. Yuldushev was the most-wanted man in his native Uzbekistan. There he was wanted for founding the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a terrorist group that carried out a bloody bombing campaign in that country that killed numerous civilians.14 The IMU also kidnapped Americans in the region and spread terror to neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, killing scores.15 On August 27, 2009, the Pakistanis, however, announced that a U.S. drone attack on a group of Uzbeks had killed the notorious Yuldushev. (His successor, Uthman Adil, would subsequently be killed by a drone in 2012.)16
On September 7, 2009, another big fish was taken out in South Waziristan: Mustafa al Jaziri, an Algerian who was a member of al Qaeda’s shura. The following day Maulvi Ismail Khan, a Haqqani commander, was killed in North Waziristan. Six days leader Najmuddin Jalalov, the founder of a splinter group of Uzbekistani terrorists known as the Islamic Jihad Group, was killed in a drone strike. Jalalov’s Islamic Jihad Group became well known in Germany after three of its members were arrested for planning “massive” bombings of discotheques, airports, pubs, and nightspots frequented by Americans in Germany.17 His death was a huge relief for U.S., Uzbekistani, and German authorities and helped disrupt terrorist attacks against the West.
On October 21, 2009, Abu Musa al Masri, an Egyptian explosives expert and trainer, was killed by a drone in North Waziristan. On December 8 Saleh el Somali, a leader of al Qaeda’s foreign operations, was killed while traveling in his car in North Waziristan.18 On December 17 Zuhaib al Zahib, a commander of the al Qaeda fighting force known as the Lashkar al Zil (Shadow Army), was killed in North Waziristan. During this attack, the CIA took the unusual step of using five drones to fire ten missiles at the compound where Zahib was staying to make sure he did not escape.19 Sometime after the Zahib strike, Abdullah Said al Libbi, a Libyan who was head of the Lashkar al Zil, was also killed by a drone. Finally, on December 31 an important Taliban commander who was involved in attacks on the Pakistani army and Afghanistan, Haji Omar, was killed, along with his son and a woman, when he was hit by a missile in a hujra in North Waziristan.20
Also reported killed in 2009 in an unspecified drone strike was Saad bin Laden, Osama’s third oldest son.21 Saad was believed to have been involved in the bombing of a Tunisian synagogue that killed nineteen predominantly German and French tourists in 2002.
By year’s end more than sixteen top al Qaeda and Taliban militants and more than five hundred lower-level fighters had been killed. The majority of those who were killed in the strikes were described as “foot soldiers,” not HVTs. A U.S. official spoke of this remarkable trend, saying, “This effort has evolved because our intelligence has improved greatly over the years, and we’re able to identify not just senior terrorists, but also al-Qaeda foot soldiers who are planning attacks on our homeland and our troops in Afghanistan. … We would be remiss if we didn’t go after people who have American blood on their hands. To use a military analogy, if you’re only going after the generals, you’re likely to be run over by tanks.”22
Hunting for lower-level operatives was not the only trend that began at this time. According to the media sources available for 2009, in total as many as 527 militants and terrorists were killed at a collateral damage cost of forty civilians (and twenty-four unknown). This meant that for the year 2009 roughly 7 percent of those who were killed in the drone campaign were listed by the media as “civilians.” The following list is a breakdown of the drone strikes of 2009 with sources from the Pakistani and Western media that led to this startling conclusion:
1. January 1, S. Waziristan, five terrorists killed, no civilians23
2. January 2, S. Waziristan, four unknowns killed24
3. January 23, N. Waziristan, ten militants (four of them foreigners) killed25
4. January 23, S. Waziristan, one Taliban, four civilians killed26
5. February 14, S. Waziristan, twenty-five militants killed (among them Arab and Uzbek fighters), no civilians reported killed27
6. February 16, Kurram Agency, thirty-one people killed at a “militant hideout,” described as a “camp of Afghan Commander Bahram Khan Koch” (presumed militants)28
7. March 1, S. Waziristan, eight militants killed, no civilians29
8. March 12, Kurram Agency, twenty-two militants killed, no civilians30
9. March 15, Bannu, North-West Frontier Province, five militants killed (including two Arabs), no civilians31
10. March 25, S. Waziristan, eight “foreign militants” killed in a convoy, no civilians32
11. March 26, N. Waziristan, four unknowns killed33
12. April 1, Orakzai Agency, fourteen Taliban and al Qaeda members killed, no civilians34
13. April 4, N. Waziristan, four to ten militants (including foreigners) killed, seven foreign women and children also reported killed35
14. April 8, S. Waziristan, three to four militants killed, no civilians36
15. April 19, S. Waziristan, three to seven militants killed, no civilians37
16. April 29, S. Waziristan, approximately four Taliban militants and two unknowns killed38
17. May 9, S. Waziristan, ten Taliban killed, no civilians39
18. May 12, S. Waziristan, eight foreigners and local Taliban killed, no civilians40
19. May 16, N. Waziristan, eight local militants and two Arabs killed, no civilians41
20. June 14, S. Waziristan, five militants killed, no civilians42
21. June 18, S. Waziristan, nine Taliban fighters killed, no civilians43
22. June 18, S. Waziristan, five killed at “hideout of Taliban commander Mullah Nazir”44
23. June 23, S. Waziristan, six militants killed, no civilians45
24. June 23, S. Waziristan, as many as seventy killed at a funeral, including eighteen civilians and approximately fifty-two described as “militants”46
25. July 3, S. Waziristan, thirteen militants killed, no civilians47
26. July 7, S. Waziristan, sixteen militants killed, no civilians48
27. July 8, S. Waziristan, fifty suspected militants killed, no civilians49
28. July 8, S. Waziristan, seventeen militants killed, no civilians50
29. July 11, S. Waziristan, eight Taliban killed, no civilians51
30. July 1
7, N. Waziristan, five Taliban killed, no civilians52
31. August 5, S. Waziristan, one to three Taliban (Baitullah Mehsud and his guards) and one civilian (his wife) killed
32. August 11, S. Waziristan, twelve extremists killed, no civilians53
33. August 21, N. Waziristan, twelve unknowns killed54
34. August 27, S. Waziristan, eight militants killed, no civilians55
35. September 7, N. Waziristan, five fighters killed, no civilians reported killed56
36. September 8, N. Waziristan, eight militants killed, no civilians57
37. September 14, N. Waziristan, four foreign militants and four unknowns killed58
38. September 24, N. Waziristan, twelve Afghan Taliban militants killed, no civilians59
39. September 29, S. Waziristan, five suspected Taliban killed, no civilians60
40. September 29, N. Waziristan, seven unknowns killed61
41. September 29, Khyber Agency, no deaths62
42 September 30, N. Waziristan, eight militants killed, no civilians63
43. October 15, N. Waziristan, four suspected militants killed, no civilians64
44. October 24, Bajaur Agency, twenty-two terrorists killed, no civilians65
45. November 4, N. Waziristan, four unknowns killed66
46. November 18, N. Waziristan, four militants killed, no civilians67
47. November 20, N. Waziristan, eight militants killed, no civilians68
48. December 7, N. Waziristan, three militants killed, no civilians69
49. December 8, N. Waziristan, three unknowns killed70
50. December 17, N. Waziristan, two militants killed, no civilians71
51. December 17, N. Waziristan, twelve suspected Taliban militants killed, no civilians72
52. December 18, N. Waziristan, eight Taliban killed, no civilians73
53. December 26, N. Waziristan, thirteen militants killed, no civilians74
54. December 31, N. Waziristan, three militants killed, no civilians75
Although it is based on news service reports (usually informed by local Pakistani sources), the preceding list helps explain why Obama, a president who was trying to improve America’s frayed, post–Iraq invasion image among Muslims, continued the unpopular drone strikes. Simply put, he had to have known that the CIA was waging perhaps the most precise bombing (or, more accurately, “guided-missile”) campaign in world history. Clearly the combination of high-resolution optics and spies on the ground was working to minimize civilian casualties, even as hundreds of militants and terrorists were killed with surgical precision. Many of those who were killed were involved in mass-casualty terrorism plots that would have taken the lives of many more civilians had the plotters not been killed. Certainly, Obama and the CIA felt they were saving civilian lives by killing those who murdered innocents in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Africa, and the West. The bad public relations fallout in Pakistan and the blowback of hatred for America among families of slain militants and the few slain civilians was apparently worth it.
Thus, the Obama administration made several attempts to change the widely held perception that the drones were killing predominantly civilians. One U.S. official, for example, described the drones’ much vaunted accuracy in the following exaggerated terms:
In the past year, in the neighborhood of 600 militants—including more than two dozen terrorist leaders—have been taken off the battlefield. In the same period we can’t confirm any noncombatant casualties. This is a weapon—fuelled by good intelligence—that allows us to counter an urgent and deadly threat in otherwise inaccessible places. And it’s far more precise than conventional ground operations. What’s the alternative to this kind of rigor, assuming the United States and its allies are unwilling to allow al-Qaeda and its friends to plot and murder freely?76
Another U.S. official similarly claimed that the CIA had killed two thousand militants and just fifty noncombatants in the period of 2001–2011 (i.e., a ratio of 2.5 percent civilian deaths).77 On a separate occasion Deputy Homeland Security Adviser John Brennan emphatically stated,
One of the things President Obama has insisted on is that we’re exceptionally precise and surgical in terms of addressing the terrorist threat. And by that I mean, if there are terrorists who are within an area where there are women and children or others, you know, we do not take such action that might put those innocent men, women and children in danger. In fact I can say that the types of operations that the US has been involved in, in the counter-terrorism realm, that nearly for the past year there hasn’t been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities that we’ve been able to develop.78
The preceding casualty list indicates that the basic thrust of Brennan’s statement—namely, that the CIA was making every effort to avoid civilian casualties in the FATA—was true, although the deputy adviser was obviously exaggerating when he said there hadn’t been a “single collateral death.” For his part, President Obama said, “I want to make sure that people understand that actually, drones have not caused a huge number of civilian casualties. For the most part, they have been very precise, precision strikes against al-Qaida and their affiliates. And we are very careful in terms of how it has been applied.”79 Obama rejected the notion that “we’re just sending in a whole bunch of strikes willy nilly.” Stressing the pinpoint nature of the strikes, he said, “This is a targeted, focused effort at people who are on a list of active terrorists, who are trying to go in and harm Americans, hit American facilities, American bases.”80
In December 2009 the New York Times published an article based on an interview with a U.S. government official that stated,
Assessments of the drone campaign have relied largely on sketchy reports in the Pakistani press, and some have estimated several hundred civilian casualties. Saying that such numbers are wrong, one government official agreed to speak about the program on the condition of anonymity. About 80 missile attacks from drones in less than two years have killed “more than 400” enemy fighters, the official said, offering a number lower than most estimates but in the same range. His account of collateral damage, however, was strikingly lower than many unofficial counts: “We believe the number of civilian casualties is just over 20, and those were people who were either at the side of major terrorists or were at facilities used by terrorists.”81
The CIA itself finally entered the fray when one of its spokemen made the following statement: “While the C.I.A. does not comment on reports of Predator operations, the tools we use in the fight against Al Qaeda and its violent allies are exceptionally accurate, precise and effective. Press reports suggesting that hundreds of Pakistani civilians have somehow been killed as a result of alleged or supposed U.S. activities are—to state what should be obvious under any circumstances—flat-out false.”82
A 2011 article published for Bloomberg supported the CIA statement and reported that the number of civilian deaths resulting from drone strikes had plummeted. According to this article, titled “U.S. Said to Reduce Civilian Deaths after Increasing CIA Pakistan Strikes,”
The Central Intelligence Agency, while increasing the frequency of drone strikes in Pakistan, has reduced civilian casualties, a U.S. official and independent analysts said. The 75 strikes launched in the ungoverned tribal region since the drone program accelerated in mid-August have killed several hundred militants without causing any deaths among civilian non-combatants, said the U.S. official, who, lacking authorization to discuss the program, requested anonymity. Analysts who monitor developments in the region said figures based on press reports show a decline in unintended deaths, although verifying exact figures may be impossible. “The drone strikes do appear to be becoming less lethal for civilians as time goes on,” said Bill Roggio, editor of The Long War Journal.83
As this article states, some independent scholars, such as Roggio, backed up the government’s claims to small numbers of civilian casualties. Georgetown professor Christine Fair eve
n went so far as to declare on television, “Actually the drones are not killing innocent civilians. Many of those reports are coming from deeply unreliable and dubious Pakistani press reports, which no one takes credibly on any other issue except for some reason on this issue. There’ve actually been a number of surveys on the ground, in FATA. The residents of FATA generally welcome the drone strikes because they know actually who’s being killed. They’re very much aware of who’s being killed and who’s not.”84
Like John Brennan and the unnamed government official quoted in the Bloomberg article, Fair exaggerated to make her point. No one outside of the government could realistically argue that the drones didn’t kill any civilians; my own study shows forty civilians were killed in the year 2009 alone. But the greater point—that the drones were not clumsily killing mass numbers of civilians—is supported by the data in the preceding casualty list.
The media reports on which the casualty list is based are the products of journalists’ interviews with civilians, Taliban, and local officials from the targeted areas. But the journalists, even the Pakistani reporters, rarely gain access to the actual targeted strike zones. The Taliban distrust even Pakistani journalists who are generally opposed to the strikes on their country. Therefore, scholars trying to assess the number of slain civilians in the strikes perforce have to rely on secondary media accounts from Western and Pakistani journalists who have access to local civilian, government, and Taliban sources. (The Taliban seem to be remarkably forthcoming in discussing the deaths of their comrades.)
One widely quoted study based on the available media reports demonstrates that the drones kill predominantly noncivilians. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann at the New America Foundation carried out a case-by-case, sourced study of drone strike fatalities that concluded,