Nullification: How to Resist Federal Tyranny in the 21st Century
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The only part of the two concluding resolutions that remains to be noticed, is the repetition in the first, of that warm affection to the union and its members, and of that scrupulous fidelity to the Constitution, which have been invariably felt by the people of this state. As the proceedings were introduced with these sentiments, they could not be more properly closed than in the same manner. Should there be any so far misled as to call in question the sincerity of these professions, whatever regret may be excited by the error, the General Assembly cannot descend into a discussion of it. Those, who have listened to the suggestion, can only be left to their own recollection of the part which this state has borne in the establishment of our national independence, in the establishment of our national Constitution, and in maintaining under it the authority and laws of the Union, without a single exception of internal resistance or commotion. By recurring to these facts, they will be able to convince themselves, that the representatives of the people of Virginia, must be above the necessity of opposing any other shield to attacks on their national patriotism, than their own consciousness, and the justice of an enlightened public; who will perceive in the resolutions themselves, the strongest evidence of attachment both to the Constitution and to the Union, since it is only by maintaining the different governments and departments within their respective limits, that the blessings of either can be perpetuated.
The extensive view of the subject thus taken by the committee, has led them to report to the House, as the result of the whole, the following resolution:
Resolved, That the General Assembly, having carefully and respectfully attended to the proceedings of a number of the states, in answer to its resolutions of December 21, 1798, and having accurately and fully re-examined and reconsidered the latter, finds it to be its indispensable duty to adhere to the same, as founded in truth, as consonant with the Constitution, and as conducive to its preservation; and more especially to be its duty to renew, as it does hereby renew, its protest against “the alien and sedition-acts,” as palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution.
VI.
The States Are the Protecting Shield
Speech of Connecticut Governor Jonathan Trumbull Opening of the Special Session of the Legislature February 23, 1809
Governor Trumbull addresses the legislature of Connecticut on the subject of the embargo enacted by President Jefferson. The significance of his remarks is obvious. In addition to opposing the embargo and endorsing the principle of state interposition, he expressly declares it to be “useful for the general good, if the State Legislatures were often to cast a watchful eye towards the general government, with a view, candidly to consider, and judiciously discern, whether the powers delegated to the United States are not exceeded, or are so exercised as not to interfere with or counteract those which are reserved by the people for their own management.”
Gentlemen of the Council, Mr. Speaker, and Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:
Impressed with the importance of the communications which I have now to lay before you—prompted also by the concurrent petitions of a number of the citizens of this State, conveyed to me with their resolutions adopted in their several town meetings, convoked for the purpose; and having had under my own consideration, the very alarming crisis of our national affairs, arising from a variety of measures adopted and contemplated by our national legislature, more especially from the permanency of the embargo, with the means resorted to for its more rigorous enforcement, and particularly the late law of Congress, passed on the 9th day of January last, containing many very extraordinary, not to say unconstitutional provisions for its execution: I have viewed the prospect so momentous and threatening, that I have not hesitated to convene the Legislature of the State, at this unusual time, in order that they may have an opportunity to consider and deliberate on the extraordinary situation into which our country seems about to be plunged, if not speedily prevented: and to devise such constitutional measures as in their wisdom may be judged proper to avert the threatening evil.
It will be useful for the legislature to take a view of the various measures of the national legislature, during their present and preceding sessions, not only those which have immediate relation to the embargo, but other acts which have been and are under their consideration, affecting the rights, interests, welfare, and even the peace of the Union. Indeed, it would be useful for the general good, if the State Legislatures were often to cast a watchful eye towards the general government, with a view, candidly to consider, and judiciously discern, whether the powers delegated to the United States are not exceeded, or are so exercised as not to interfere with or counteract those which are reserved by the people for their own management. When under the direction of a wise and prudent discernment, a temperate caution—not an over jealous disposition, such an examination will always prove a wholesome measure.
On the present occasion, it will be unnecessary for me to enter into any particular statement of our private sufferings, or the threatening aspect of our public situation, in relation to the unprecedented acts of our General Government which are accumulating upon us. The individual feelings and experience of the members of this Legislature, now convened from all parts of the State, will speak the private distresses which have been produced by these acts: and your general information will give you, gentlemen, a correct view of the dangers which impend our public interests, liberty, rights and property, arising from the same source. Despairing of substantial relief from any other quarter, the people are now looking with anxious solicitude and hope, to the wisdom and direction of the Legislature of their own choice; and seem confident that some mode may be devised to remove the pressure under which they are at present suffering. To your collected wisdom and prudence they submit the task. And may it not be hoped, that, with our united efforts under a temperate, discreet and firm consideration of our situation and circumstances, we may be able by the influence of divine aid, to fulfill the just and reasonable expectations of our fellow citizens? Whenever our national legislature is led to overleap the prescribed bounds of their constitutional powers, on the State Legislatures, in great emergencies, devolves the arduous task—it is their right—it becomes their duty, to interpose their protecting shield between the right and liberty of the people, and the assumed power of the General Government….
In all our deliberations on this momentous occasion, may the divine wisdom guide us into the path of duty, and lead us to the happiest results for the general good, the peace and security of the people.
VII.
We Resist
Resolutions of the General Assembly of Connecticut 1809
At a special session of Connecticut’s General Assembly in February 1809, the following resolutions in support of Governor Jonathan Trumbull’s position and policy were adopted. They urge all parties to abstain from cooperating in the enforcement of an embargo whose substance and execution the legislature describes as unconstitutional. (These resolutions make particular reference to the legislature of Massachusetts, where similar sentiments were to be found.)
This Assembly have attended with anxious concern, to the several acts of Congress interdicting foreign commerce, and more especially to an act, approved on the 9th day of January last, by the President of the United States, under the title of “An Act, to enforce and make more effectual an act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States.” After solemn deliberation and advisement thereon, the General Assembly are decided in the opinion, and do Resolve, that the acts aforesaid are a permanent system of measures, abandoning undeniable rights; interdicting the exercise of constitutional privileges, and unprecedented in the annals of nations; and do contain provisions for exercising arbitrary powers, grievous to the good people of this State, dangerous to their common liberties, incompatible with the constitution of the United States, and encroaching upon the immunities of this State.
Resolved, That to preserve the Union, and support the constitution
of the United States, it becomes the duty of the Legislatures of the States, in such a crisis of affairs, vigilantly to watch over, and vigorously to maintain, the powers not delegated to the United States, but reserved to the States respectively, or to the people; and that a due regard to this duty, will not permit this Assembly to assist, or concur in giving effect to the aforesaid unconstitutional act, passed, to enforce the Embargo.
Resolved, That this Assembly highly approve of the conduct of his Excellency the Governor, in declining to designate persons to carry into effect, by the aid of military power, the act of the United States, enforcing the Embargo, and that his letter addressed to the Secretary for the Department of War, containing his refusal to make such designation, be recorded in the public records of this State, as an example to persons, who may hold places of distinguished trust, in this free and independent republic.
Resolved, That the persons holding executive offices under this State, are restrained by the duties which they owe this State, from affording any official aid or co-operation in the execution of the act aforesaid; and that his Excellency the Governor be requested, as commander in chief of the military force of this State, to cause these resolutions to be published in general orders: And that the secretary of this State be and he is hereby directed to transmit copies of the same to the several sheriffs and town clerks.
Resolved, That his excellency the Governor be requested to communicate the foregoing resolutions to the President of the United States, with an assurance that this Assembly regret that they are thus obliged under a sense of paramount public duty to assert the unquestionable right of this State to abstain from any agency in the execution of measures, which are unconstitutional and despotic.
Resolved, That this Assembly accord in sentiment, with the Senate and House of Representatives, of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, that it is expedient to affect certain alterations in the constitution of the United States; and will zealously cooperate with that commonwealth and any other of the States, in all legal and constitutional measures for procuring such amendments to the constitution of the United States as shall be judged necessary to obtain more effectual protection and defence for commerce; and to give to the commercial States their fair and just consideration in the Union, and for affording permanent security, as well as present relief, from the oppressive measures, under which they now suffer.
Resolved, That his Excellency the Governor be requested to transmit copies of the foregoing resolutions to the President of the Senate, and Speaker of the House of Representatives, in the commonwealth of Massachusetts, and to the Legislatures of such of our sister States, as manifest a disposition to concur, in restoring to commerce its former activity, and preventing the repetition of measures which have a tendency, not only to destroy it, but to dissolve the Union, which ought to be inviolate.
General Assembly, special session, February, 1809.
JOHN COTTON SMITH,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
JONATHAN TRUMBULL, Governor.
Attest, SAMUEL WYLLYS, Secretary.
VIII.
Federalism Cannot Last without Nullification
Fort Hill Address
John C. Calhoun
July 26, 1831
John C. Calhoun (1782–1850) represented South Carolina in the House and Senate and served as vice president under John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson. As we noted in chapter 3, he anonymously composed the South Carolina Exposition and Protest in 1828. His writings emphasized the importance of the right of state nullification in the preservation of a federal system.
What follows here is an excerpt from Calhoun’s Fort Hill Address, in which the sitting vice president defends nullification against criticism. As vice president, he almost certainly restrained himself from the more radical statement on the subject he might have made, but the reader will nevertheless discover a rigorous argument in the excerpt below.
Calhoun has been demonized in our popular culture to the point that anyone so much as referring to him is smeared and condemned, but as we saw in chapter 3, abolitionists fighting against the constitutionally questionable aspects of the fugitive slave laws did not hesitate for a moment to appeal to Calhoun’s arguments and to refer to him by name. We, too, are capable of assessing his arguments on their merits.
The question of the relation which the States and General Government bear to each other is not one of recent origin. From the commencement of our system, it has divided public sentiment. Even in the Convention, while the Constitution was struggling into existence, there were two parties as to what this relation should be, whose different sentiments constituted no small impediment in forming that instrument. After the General Government went into operation, experience soon proved that the question had not terminated with the labors of the Convention. The great struggle that preceded the political revolution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power, turned essentially on it, and the doctrines and arguments on both sides were embodied and ably sustained;—on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and the Report to the Virginia Legislature;—and on the other, in the replies of the Legislature of Massachusetts and some of the other States. These Resolutions and this Report, with the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the same time (particularly in the case of Cobbett, delivered by Chief Justice M’Kean, and concurred in by the whole bench), contain what I believe to be the true doctrine on this important subject. I refer to them in order to avoid the necessity of presenting my views, with the reasons in support of them, in detail….
The great and leading principle is, that the General Government emanated from the people of the several States, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people forming one aggregate political community; that the Constitution of the United States is, in fact, a compact, to which each State is a party, in the character already described; and that the several States, or parties, have a right to judge of its infractions; and in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the language of the Virginia Resolutions, “to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.” This right of interposition, thus solemnly asserted by the State of Virginia, be it called what it may,—State-right, veto, nullification, or by any other name,—I conceive to be the fundamental principle of our system, resting on facts historically as certain as our revolution itself, and deductions as simple and demonstrative as that of any political or moral truth whatever; and I firmly believe that on its recognition depend the stability and safety of our political institutions.
I am not ignorant that those opposed to the doctrine have always, now and formerly, regarded it in a very different light, as anarchical and revolutionary. Could I believe such, in fact, to be its tendency, to me it would be no recommendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our political institutions and the union of these States. I never breathed an opposite sentiment; but, on the contrary, I have ever considered them the great instruments of preserving our liberty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves and our posterity; and next to these I have ever held them most dear. Nearly half my life has been passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public reputation I have acquired is indissolubly identified with it. To be too national has, indeed, been considered by many, even of my friends, my greatest political fault. With these strong feelings of attachment, I have examined, with the utmost care, the bearing of the doctrine in question; and, so far from anarchical or revolutionary, I solemnly believe it to be the only solid foundation of our system, and of the Union itself; and that the opposite doctrine, which denies to the States the right of protecting their reserved powers, and which would vest in the General Government (it matters not through what department) the right of determining, exclusively and fina
lly, the powers delegated to it, is incompatible with the sovereignty of the States, and of the Constitution itself, considered as the basis of a Federal Union. As strong as this language is, it is not stronger than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who said, to give to the General Government the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to make “its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers;” and that, “in all cases of compact between parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress.” Language cannot be more explicit, nor can higher authority be adduced.
That different opinions are entertained on this subject, I consider but as an additional evidence of the great diversity of the human intellect. Had not able, experienced, and patriotic individuals, for whom I have the highest respect, taken different views, I would have thought the right too clear to admit of doubt; but I am taught by this, as well as by many similar instances, to treat with deference opinions differing from my own. The error may, possibly, be with me; but if so, I can only say that, after the most mature and conscientious examination, I have not been able to detect it. But, with all proper deference, I must think that theirs is the error who deny what seems to be an essential attribute of the conceded sovereignty of the States, and who attribute to the General Government a right utterly incompatible with what all acknowledge to be its limited and restricted character: an error originating principally, as I must think, in not duly reflecting on the nature of our institutions, and on what constitutes the only rational object of all political constitutions.