by Peter Hart
Lieutenant John Millar, 1/5th KOSB, 155th Brigade, 52nd Division
It was these young inexperienced Scots of the 52nd Division that were earmarked for the next offensive.
HUNTER-WESTON AND GOURAUD had intended an attack in the centre to follow the advances on the flanks achieved on 21 and 28 June. The idea was for the right-hand British division to make an attack in the Achi Baba Nullah sector supported by the combined strength of the British and French artillery. Meanwhile the French were to try to take the remaining Turkish trenches on the western bank of Kereves Dere. This project had been made easier by the French success in capturing the Quadrilateral on 30 June, which removed a potent source of enfilading fire. The 52nd Division was brought up into the line to replace the haggard remnants of the RND, while the French prepared their artillery for the attack set for 12 July. A sophistication introduced into the plan was the idea of splitting the 52nd Division attack into two parts to try to maximise artillery usage in two separate barrages. Thus the 155th Brigade would attack alongside the French at 07.35, while the 157th Brigade to their left would attack separately at 16.50.
The bombardment opened at 04.30 and the French troops on the right went over the top at 07.35. Among them was Sergeant D’Arnaud Pomiro of the 175th Regiment.
Without exception, we leapt out at an athletic pace, under a thin rain of bullets and a few shrapnel shells. We were advancing towards the second trench objective. The left got there a bit before me because I had a few metres further to go. Got there all the same; didn’t find any Turks. But at the base of the ravine I saw at least three hundred of them swarming about under terrible sustained fire from us. For my part I fired eight rounds, I slaughtered four Turks including an officer; I threw a grenade at a group of four who were creeping up to within 20 metres. Then I passed out. Coming to myself, I made my way to the rear.27
Sergeant D’Arnaud Pomiro, 3rd Battalion, 175th Regiment, 1st (Métropolitaine) Brigade, 1st Division, CEO
Pomiro had been knocked out by a splinter of stone thrown up by a Turkish bullet or shell. The French had done well but were then drawn into an attritional battle to hold their gains against the usual intensive Turkish counter-attacks.
However, alongside them, the 155th Brigade attack met considerably more resistance.
I remember putting my head down and going all I could, barely conscious that at any moment I might be laid out. It seemed like running against a hailstorm. Bullets sputtering – showers of shrapnel across the ground we were crossing – HE shells exploding all around, raising clouds of dust and making the air reverberate with their explosion. The air was dark with dust and smoke and dimly I remember men falling at intervals.28
Lieutenant James Harrison, 1/4th Battalion, KOSB, 155th Brigade, 52nd Division
As the brigade pushed on to secure the first and second lines of the Turkish trenches, there was an awful confusion as they charged the third line which was their final objective.
About 150 yards away, we could see the parapet of what looked like another trench. Accordingly, we doubled across in that direction, and on getting up to this third trench we found it to be untenanted and only a couple of feet deep. However, it afforded us some cover, and in we scrambled – the order immediately coming along for every man to fill his two sand bags and build up the parapet. The ground was like flint, and we could make little headway with our entrenching tools. To the left from where I found myself, this shallow trench ran up towards a wood and there seemed to be a great deal of rifle and machine gun fire coming in our direction from this wood. In front of us, however, there appeared to be no enemy at all. After about half an hour, during which time we suffered numerous casualties, word was passed along to extend towards the wood. I got out and doubled across the open until I came to a very comfortable-looking shell hole, into which I very contentedly jumped. Very shortly after I heard shouts of, ‘Retire! Retire!’ I got back safely, crawling most of the way, as a shell burst very close and I found I had lost the power of one of my legs.29
Corporal Tom Richardson, 1/4th KOSB, 155th Brigade, 52nd Division
By this time, the fog of battle had descended, but it was decided to continue with the second attack. The 157th Brigade attack, made at 16.50, was an almost identical performance: bombardment, advance facing some resistance, confusion over the absence of the third trench and a fallback to consolidate, where they came to rest alongside the 155th Brigade in the Turkish second line. During the battle medical officer Lieutenant George Davidson had a strange meeting with Hunter-Weston.
Most of the day I had been watching the battlefield from the Observation Hill, then at 5 p.m. went to tea in the mess where I was alone. General Hunter-Weston entered in a few minutes, and sitting opposite me said, ‘What an extraordinary thing war is!’ The progress of the day had greatly satisfied him, I could see, and he was in great glee. ‘Yes!’ I said. ‘But I wish to goodness it was all over!’ ‘My dear sir,’ he replied, ‘we’ll have years of it yet!’ I asked if he thought there was any possibility of its ending this year. ‘Absolutely none!’30
Lieutenant George Davidson, 89th Field Ambulance, RAMC
Overnight there were some panicky withdrawals here and there among troops that were, not unnaturally, terrified at the prospect of imminent Turkish counter-attacks. The new front lines were not yet secure and the men knew that they needed time to consolidate their positions.
As a result of these fears the 1st Naval Brigade of the RND was first called up into reserve and then committed to an attack next day alongside yet another French effort towards Kereves Dere. They were meant to go over the top at 16.30 on 13 July. But just about everything that could go wrong on that unlucky day duly did so. Appalling staff work meant that one battalion did not receive its orders in time and eventually the depleted Portsmouth and Nelson Battalions were forced to go forward on their own. A fairly good barrage was fired but the troops were late in arriving at their allotted jumping-off positions and went over the top some twenty minutes late, at around 16.50. With no idea of what was happening they advanced in the open from the old British front line and were greeted by the forewarned and well-armed Turks. Once again there was confusion over the location of the third Turkish line. The Drake and Hawke Battalions were then ordered forwards in order to further bolster the line. When they reached the former Turkish front line they found themselves in a manmade hell, yet one of the old guard of RND officers could still raise a smile.
It was indescribable, just hundreds of men wandering about in the captured trench system in the burning sun, with corpses blackened and stinking lining the old Turkish firing steps, the sinister symmetry of their position being the only sign of any method at all. The redeeming feature of that occasion was A. P. Herbert’s instruction to the sentries on his platoon frontage, ‘Remember, regard all Turks with the gravest suspicion!’31
Lieutenant Douglas Jerrold, Hawke Battalion, 1st Naval Brigade, RND
Dehydrated by their recent physical exertions, their throats coated with the powdery dust that filled the air and their parched tongues sticking to the roofs of their mouths, the dominant thought of the men clinging to their newly captured trench was a craving for water. Yet there was no safe way back to the water points, for communication trenches were either non-existent, half blocked by bursting shells or choked with corpses and, worse, the former No Man’s Land was still being raked by Turkish snipers. Even if water bottles or biscuit tins full of water reached them there was only a tablespoon or so per man; not even enough to wet their parched lips.
Our water bottles were now empty and thirst increased with the increasing heat of the day; yet we had to carry on without water until the following day, when the Battalion Chief Petty Officer arrived with a large skin bag which looked for all the world like a diseased bagpipe minus the chanter. For a measure he carried a Wills tobacco tin, which normally contained two ounces of tobacco, and from this tin each man received two rations of water. Unfortunately it was found impossible to get fo
rward to an isolated Company of the Drakes, who set to dig for the precious liquid; but as soon as they reached moist earth they stuffed their mouths with it in order to relieve their torment.32
Able Seaman Thomas Macmillan, Drake Battalion, 1st Naval Brigade, RND
When the counter-attacks came it was up to the artillery to protect the front line troops as best they could. As they sweated blood, loading the guns time and time again, carrying out their practised drill like automatons till the guns glowed red, it was a question of which would collapse first, the guns or the gunners.
Up at 4 a.m. this morning. Turks counter-attacked in force and gave us particular hell with vengeance. We’ve just stopped firing for the third time this morning and, as far as we can find out, the ground gained yesterday has been held by our chaps. Had a glorious time – started at 6.30 a.m., stopped firing at 9.10 p.m. Worked the old gun till the springs broke and the piece itself was so hot that the bearings expanded with the heat and stopped the recoil. We fired 1,160 rounds. My hands are burnt beautifully. Can hardly close my left. Got a whack on the knee which put me off the gun for half an hour but it’s OK again. Heavy fighting all night. What a day. One of the hottest and best we’ve had. Have just repulsed a mass attack by the Turks. Can’t close my right hand, agony to write. We’re all like niggers. Absolutely black with cordite smoke and dust. Like Mater to see me now. Gee, these Turks are some fighters – they counter-attacked all night.33
Corporal Ralph Doughty, 2nd Battery, 1st Field Artillery Brigade, AIF
In the end the gains were secured and locked firmly into the Allied defensive system. Turkish losses had been serious – in the region of 9,800 – but their reserves were nearer to hand and those losses were soon made good. Over the next few days the four relieving divisions of the Turkish Second Army would take over the Helles lines. But the cost to the Allies was far more hurtful: it was apparent that the 52nd Division had been largely destroyed by its involvement in the attacks, while all residual energy in the RND had drained away. The British suffered some 3,100 casualties and the French a further 840. This seemingly relatively low loss by the French concealed a greater predicament. Over the previous ten weeks or so they had driven themselves into the ground. The Asiatic fire that had smashed into their right flank, coupled with the mordant chasm of Kereves Dere, had finally defeated them. They would do little more for the rest of the campaign than hold their line. They had fought hard, backed to the hilt by their splendid artillery, but they could give no more.
COMMENTARY ON THE ATTACKS made on 21 June, 28 June, 30 June and 12–13 July has often been coruscating, as the attacks had little or no chance of making significant gains. Also, when they launched them, Hamilton and all the other senior generals were well aware that the new divisions were on their way as a result of the decisions of the Dardanelles Committee meetings of 7 and 17 June. As we shall see, Hamilton had already decided that the main effort would be launched from Anzac – there was therefore no prospect of taking Achi Baba or Kilid Bahr even by means of the much-vaunted ‘bite and hold’ tactics. It would take them years at the current rate of progress. Concentrated artillery support could achieve small-scale advances, but the very nature of limited front attacks caused severe problems once the Turks realised what was happening.
Attacks on a limited front tended to be much more costly to the attackers, in that they allowed the concentration of the fire of a large proportion of enemy guns on the area attacked. Further, attacks on a limited frontage simplified, for the Turkish commander, the problem of the handling of his reserves (always the most difficult problem for the defenders), and facilitated the delivery of counter-attacks, not merely by reason of the early movement of reserves towards the threatened point, but also of the short distance from each other of flanks that were not being attacked and were therefore ready points for support to counter-attacks.34
Colonel John Anderson, 1/6th Highland Light Infantry, 157th Brigade, 52nd Division
But surely the most damning criticism comes from Major General Granville Egerton, commander of the 52nd Division. Although often dismissed with faint contempt as a man too old and infirm for active service on such an enervating battlefront, he was none the less an experienced officer and his analysis of the fighting on 12–13 July is persuasive.
It seems to me that the fighting of this battle was premature and at the actual moment worse than unnecessary – I submit that it was cruel and wasteful. The troops on the Peninsula were tired and worn out; there were only two Infantry Brigades, the 155th and the 157th, that had not been seriously engaged. It was well known to the higher command that large reinforcements were arriving from England and a grand attack was to be made at Suvla. Was it not therefore obvious that the exhausted garrison at Helles should be given a fortnight’s respite and that the fresh attacks from that position should synchronise with those at Suvla and Anzac? I contend that the Battle of July 12–13th was due to a complete want of a true appreciation of the situation. If the conception of the battle was wrong the tactics of the action were far worse. The division of the attack of two Brigades on a narrow front into two phases, no less than 9 hours apart, was positively wicked.35
Major General Granville Egerton, Headquarters, 52nd Division
Shortly after the battle finished Hunter-Weston began to suffer from the effects of sunstroke. On 25 July he was evacuated home and was forced to hand temporary command of VIII Corps to General William Douglas. Often cruelly caricatured as a buffoon, Hunter-Weston was capable of moments of piercing insight and not resistant to tactical innovation. Nevertheless he had entirely failed to master the endemic problems of 1915 trench warfare against a determined enemy of roughly equal number, and without the superior artillery power that would have offered the only chance of success. This in itself is not surprising, for generals all along the Western Front were encountering exactly the same challenges and they too were failing with horrendous losses. But Hunter-Weston’s readiness to carry out orders, his willing acceptance of severe casualties and his stubborn persistence against the odds were not the right qualities for the hopeless situation he faced. Yet the overall responsibility for the disaster was not his: Helles was a doomed front and the unnecessary attacks in June and July 1915 were a terrible indictment of the man in overall command. The real burden of guilt should rest on the slim shoulders of General Sir Ian Hamilton, a man whose mind had long turned to the new horizons of Anzac and Suvla.
NEW BEGINNINGS: HAMILTON’S PLANS
A battle is a swirl of ‘ifs’ and ‘ands.’ The Commander who enters upon it possessed by some just and clear principle is like a sailing ship entering a typhoon on the right track. After that he lives from hand to mouth.1
General Sir Ian Hamilton, Headquarters, MEF
THE CUMULATIVE DECISIONS of the Dardanelles Committee meetings on 7 and 17 June had assigned the 10th, 11th and 13th Divisions to the Gallipoli campaigns. These were all New Army divisions raised under the famous recruitment campaign spearheaded by Lord Kitchener in the first year of the war. In addition the 53rd and 54th Divisions, both Territorial Army formations, were despatched to Hamilton. This was all strangely haphazard as it seemed to depend far more on the availability of troops than on a realistic assessment of the overall strategic situation and the paramount needs of the Western Front. There had also been no proper consideration of the readiness of these divisions for war. Their training was woefully inadequate: although willing in the sense that they were all volunteers, these men were still civilians in uniform rather than soldiers. Their regimental officers were all either older men recalled to the colours from retirement, or young callow officers with little suitability for command other than their class status.
The question was, what would Hamilton do with this huge addition to his forces? A whole range of options lay before him: a new Asiatic landing, the siren call of a landing on the Bulair Isthmus at the neck of the Peninsula, more attacks at Helles, or a renewed assault at Anzac. Most of these were swiftly dispensed
with. The arguments against a landing on the Asiatic side of the Straits or at Bulair had not changed, while the summer battles at Helles had dimmed enthusiasm for frontal assaults on a narrow front against layered trenches. Anzac, though, was different; success there would allow a swift march to the promised land of Kilid Bahr. The only problem was that Anzac had so small a bridgehead that there was not physically enough room there to take the number of troops required. But then, as luck would have it, Birdwood hatched a plan that seemed to offer an attractive solution.
Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood, commanding the ANZAC Corps, had long been monitoring the situation to the north of Anzac, beyond his outposts in the foothills and looking towards Suvla Bay.
Soon after our landing I had made up my mind that we must eventually attack at Suvla, beyond my left. With this possibility in view I had given the strictest orders that no demonstration or attack of any kind should be made in that direction, though the country there was easier. I wanted to let the Turks think that we entirely ignored it, and that any breaking out we might contemplate would come from my right – in conjunction, perhaps, with the force at Helles.2
Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood, Headquarters, ANZAC Corps
The idea of a breakout away from the Anzac trenches was obviously an attractive one and there was little sign of a Turkish presence in the tangled inhospitable mass of gullies and ridges visible from Walker’s Ridge. It seemed that the Turks were relying on the sheer slopes to guard their northern flank. Birdwood and his staff despatched scouts to find out exactly what the situation was. Major Percy Overton of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles played a leading role.
