by Peter Hart
The first time I took Corporal Denton and we had a great day together and gained a lot of valuable information for which General Godley thanked me. The last time I was out for two nights and a day and I took Trooper M. McInnes and Corporal Young. We had a most exciting and interesting time dodging Turkish outposts. I was able from what I saw of the country to make a map and gain much information as to the movement of the Turks and would not have missed the experience for the world.3
Major Percy Overton, Canterbury Mounted Rifles, New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, NZ&A Division, NZEF
Overton found no serious Turkish presence; it did indeed seem that there were opportunities for exploitation. Gradually the vision of a left hook out of Anzac dawned: moving into the valleys and then pushing up the ridges to seize the key heights of the Sari Bair range – thereby evading all the main Turkish defences.
Birdwood’s first outline proposals were presented to Hamilton on 30 May. The plan was for a night attack to burst out of Anzac and overwhelm the Turks on Hill Q and Chunuk Bair, then sweep down next day to take the Turks on Battleship Hill and Baby 700 from the rear. To achieve this he asked for the assistance of the 29th Indian Brigade and a further British division for the advance across the Peninsula and attack on Kilid Bahr. This, then, was the scheme that had reached the top of Hamilton’s agenda as he pondered his options. Next he considered the feasibility of a fresh landing in the Suvla Bay area, to overcome the problem of lack of space at Anzac. This would allow more divisions to be brought ashore with room to breath and then be deployed forward in good order. Suvla had been considered as a landing site in April but had been rejected as too far away from the ultimate objectives. The Royal Navy was therefore brought into the planning process to achieve a simultaneous landing with the Anzac breakout.
The Royal Navy had one innovation to offer the army. Prompted by Fisher – always a pacesetter when it came to new types of ship – the navy had ordered a number of armoured motor lighters in February 1915. These shallow-draught craft were each capable of carrying 500 soldiers and were known colloquially as ‘beetles’ – a reference to the shape of their prominent prows, from which a ramp would be dropped to facilitate the troops getting ashore. They represented a great advance from the towed strings of rowing boats used on 25 April and offered the chance to mimic the intended impact of the River Clyde without the disadvantage of grounding eighty yards from shore. However, these were not sophisticated craft and they still had some drawbacks, in particular they were slow and difficult to manoeuvre, rather like the Thames barges they resembled.
The navy also tried to find beaches in the Suvla Bay area suitable for a landing. The conclusions were that while the beach stretching south from Nibrunesi Point was ideal for a landing, there were probably shoaling waters in the bay itself. No detailed survey could be done, as it would undoubtedly attract the attention of the Turks, but this sound practical advice was ignored.
Hamilton intended to form the divisions landing at Suvla into the new IX Corps, and there was considerable debate as to who should take command. The first suggestion emanating from Kitchener was Lieutenant General Sir Bryan Mahon, then leading the 10th Division and therefore already on his way to the Peninsula. He was probably the most realistic choice, but Hamilton did not rate Mahon highly enough for a corps, believing he had reached his peak as a divisional commander. It was this decision to reject Mahon for promotion that triggered the disastrous sequence of events that followed. Hamilton boldly asked for either Lieutenant General Sir Julian Byng or Lieutenant General Sir Henry Rawlinson, both of whom were attracting much admiration for their performances on the Western Front. For that very reason Hamilton’s request was curtly rejected and Kitchener in turn not only refused to remove Mahon from his divisional command but stipulated that whoever commanded IX Corps must be senior to him. The British Army still made a shibboleth of seniority which could sometimes get in the way of the appointment of younger, more competent men. This was especially problematic when most of the more promising generals were already fully engaged on the Western Front. The intransigence of both Kitchener and Hamilton left only two feasible candidates: Lieutenant General Sir John Ewart and Lieutenant General Frederick Stopford. But Ewart was too physically frail for Gallipoli, which meant Stopford was the last man standing. It was not the ideal method of selecting a leader for a complex operation of war demanding excellent leadership qualities, proven military command skills and steely determination. What they got was a 61-year-old man who was in semi-retirement as the Lieutenant of the Tower of London. He was a career soldier, but his career had been of the sort that had not featured the command of troops in action and his expertise had been largely in staff work – valuable, but not the skill set required at Suvla Bay. Mahon would have been a far better choice.
Meanwhile, there had been an update on the Anzac plans. Birdwood’s schemes went through the usual process of conception and review as he attempted to keep pace with the changing situation. The availability of additional troops led him to add Hill 971, the highest peak of the Sari Bair range, to the list of objectives, while his requirement for the suppression of Turkish batteries believed to be in the Chocolate Hill and W Hills sector of Suvla was passed over to Stopford. After due consideration was given to the need for moonless nights during the build-up of forces at Anzac, the attack was eventually fixed for 6 August.
The plan for the ANZAC Corps’ operations was drawn up largely by their Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Andrew Skeen. A key element was a series of diversionary operations, of which the first was to be a full-scale attack at 17.30 on 6 August on Turkish positions on Lone Pine on the southern half of 400 Plateau. After dark, while the fighting was still raging at Lone Pine, hopefully distracting all Turkish eyes, the left hook would be launched in a series of four columns marching out from Anzac and along North Beach. These would be divided into covering forces and assaulting columns. The Right Covering Force was to seize the series of Turkish outposts in the foothills commanding the valleys leading up to the Sari Bair Ridge. This done, the Right Assaulting Column was to advance through Sazli Beit Dere and Chailak Dere before climbing to Rhododendron Ridge, then up to their objective of Chunuk Bair. The Left Covering Force was to advance further along the beach, then up Aghyl Dere before securing the left flank by over-running Damakjelik Bair. Meanwhile, the Left Assaulting Column would continue further along Aghyl Dere before climbing Abdul Rahman Spur leading up to Hill 971. These plans for a night attack were excessively ambitious, given the extreme complexity of the terrain, the weak physical state of many of the troops and the distances that would have to be covered before the objectives could be attained. Although plans had been made to distract the Turks the timetable was so rigid that there would be no scope for mistakes, or the Turks would surely be on top of Sari Bair and waiting for them. Almost as a throwaway GHQ endorsed the idea of a major holding operation to be launched by VIII Corps at Helles in order to prevent Turkish reserves from marching north to reinforce Anzac.
The GHQ staff produced the initial plans for the Suvla landings. The original concept was for a coup de main whereby the covering force of the 11th Division would land on the night of 6 August on the beaches to the south of Nibrunesi Point and overwhelm the Turkish outposts on the Lala Baba hills and Hill 10 before moving swiftly inland to seize the Kiretch Tepe and Tekke Tepe ranges that dominated the whole Suvla Bay area. One complication was the defence works and artillery positions that it was suspected existed on the southern slopes of Chocolate Hill and W Hills, the foothills lying below the main Tekke Tepe range. It was decided to attack these from the rear and hence the troops would skirt the northern shore of the Salt Lake behind Suvla Bay to attack them before dawn on 7 August. One thing was certain: the high ground must be seized as soon as possible, thus allowing the 10th Division to come ashore and then cooperate, if necessary, in the ANZAC Corps’ advance on Hill 971 and the Sari Bair range. But the main intention was to establish a secure supply base for the future
push forward across the Peninsula after the success of the Anzac breakout.
The plans were communicated to Stopford and his formidable Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Hamilton Reed, VC, who was fresh from service on the Western Front. Stopford’s initially favourable reaction was soon eroded by the pessimistic council of Reed, who considered that attacks on prepared positions were impossible without proper artillery support. This he had learnt through bitter experience. But were his warnings appropriate to the situation facing the IX Corps at Suvla? Were they facing quite such formidable trench works? Or was speed more important, in order to catch the Turks before they could reinforce the sector? Lieutenant Geoffrey Ryland gained an insight into the pessimistic mindset of the senior officers of the IX Corps during an offshore naval reconnaissance.
Towards the end of July the Captain received orders to send me on board the destroyer Arno to point out to various Generals salient features of the landscape north from Gaba Tepe, round Suvla Point into the Gulf of Xeros. I was informed that it was essential these officers should be thoroughly acquainted with the nature of the country since a new landing was projected. When I arrived on board the Arno a number of Generals were already there and almost immediately we weighed anchor and left Kefalo Bay and set course for Gaba Tepe. On the way across it occurred to me that if all this array of ‘Red Tabs’ was observed by the Turks on the deck of a destroyer steaming close inshore in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay, it would not need great imagination on their part to conclude that another landing was to be made. I therefore reported to the Captain of the Arno and suggested that we might induce the Generals to put on white working rig. He agreed and the Generals also fell in with the suggestion. The result was rather comic since elderly Generals, several of whom had large drooping moustaches, looked odd in sailor suits and caps, in most cases the latter being too small for them. I suppose at the age of 25 most people over 45 look old, but I was shocked at the apparent age of some of these officers and wondered how they would be able to stick the very unpleasant and unhealthy conditions on the Peninsula. I pointed out to them all the features which we knew so well like Chocolate Hill, W Hills, the Anafartas, the Salt Lake, Kavak Tepe, Kiretch Tepe and Ejelmer. One of the Generals asked me where the Turkish trenches were and seemed surprised when I told him there weren’t any. I do not think he believed me!4
Lieutenant Geoffrey Ryland, HMS Ark Royal
This was at the root of the problem: the generals simply could not believe that the Turks were not well dug in and present in force. As these tremulous doubts multiplied at IX Corps headquarters, a series of changes was introduced into the original GHQ plans. The first was to land a brigade inside Suvla Bay, from which it would take less time to march round the northern boundary of the Salt Lake. This was unfortunate in view of the navy’s justifiable fears of shoaling waters inside the bay. It was also totally unnecessary as the Salt Lake had completely dried out during the long hot summer of 1915 and there was thus no need to march round it. Secondly, the capture of Chocolate Hill and W Hills was now considered problematic without the support of howitzers and so could no longer be contemplated until after dawn on 7 August. When Stopford produced his orders for the landings they had lost all sense of purpose. Now all reference to the urgency of the 11th Division rapidly seizing the Kiretch Tepe and Tekke Tepe ranges had been expunged and the 10th Division was no longer charged with any particular responsibility to push out and assist the attacks from Anzac. This process of dilution was continued by Stopford’s subordinates. Major General Frederick Hammersley, in command of 11th Division, was hamstrung by his own fears. His orders stating that the capture of W Hills was to be attempted only ‘if possible’ were a clear abrogation of responsibility. The whole process of command and control within IX Corps was a disaster; the intent of the landings was being submerged by conditional inanities that left no one responsible for the attainment of Hamilton’s defined objectives. But Hamilton and his staff also bear a great deal of blame for failing to properly direct and control their subordinates – indeed, Stopford subsequently claimed that he had never had even a one-minute conversation with Hamilton prior to the Suvla landings.5
Anzac, though, was at the heart of the matter. The left hook swinging up to the heights of Sari Bair was to be the apogee of the complex series of attacks, diversions and holding operations that had been commissioned by Hamilton. But were the Turks really so unprepared? It seems certain that well before the August operations began Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal was worried by the perceived weakness of the northern flank of their Anzac positions.
I believed that the new attempts would be made by an extension of the Anzac front to the north in pursuit of his aim of dominating the Sari Bair range. These ideas and opinions I passed on to the regimental commanders of the 19th Division and also to my staff. Sometimes even, on quiet nights when there was no action, I used to carry out with my regimental commanders short war games on the map regarding these points.6
Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal, Headquarters, 19th Division, Fifth Army
Fortunately for Hamilton, Kemal’s superiors did not share his fears and, despite his repeated written and verbal protests, did little to strengthen either the northern borders of Anzac or indeed the Suvla Bay defences.
The great open spaces of Suvla Bay, despite Stopford’s and Reed’s fears, were only weakly defended by the Anafarta Detachment under the command of a German officer, Major Wilhelm Willmer. He had control of just three battalions: the Broussa Gendarmerie Battalion, the Gallipoli Gendarmerie Battalion and the regular 1/31st Regiment. As artillery he had two batteries stationed up on the heights of the Tekke Tepe range, with two 8-year-old mountain guns available for more immediate support. His plans were simple; they had to be, as he did not have sufficient men or resources to prepare major fortifications or continuous trench lines. Instead he selected certain key points for defence on the coastal hills of Lala Baba, Hill 10 and the Karakol Dagh continuation of Kiretch Tepe. Here there were localised trenches and he managed to lay a few mines. The troops at these outposts were to act as tripwires, causing maximum disruption, before they fell back to join the rest off his forces dug in as best they could on Chocolate Hill, Green Hill, W Hills and Kiretch Tepe, where a far more determined resistance was intended. In the meantime it was expected that the Turkish reserves from the Bulair sector would be making their way to the rescue.
THE BRITISH PLANS HAD BEEN MADE. When complete, they bore all the distinctive imprimaturs of Hamilton and his staff. They were not stupid, in the sense that considerable imagination had been shown and there had been a commendable attention to detail in their construction. The problem lay in the overcomplication that was the hallmark of a Hamilton plan. Just as on 25 April, there was a rash of schemes stretching from end to end of the Peninsula. Too many elements were supposedly dependent on each other’s success, but as physically separate entities they were unable to help each other achieve that success. Once again there were diversions that were major operations in themselves. The forces assigned to the various operations were also often unsuited to the operations that lay before them: the ANZAC Corps charged with the main responsibility for breaking out of Anzac was a husk racked by disease and suffering from an underlying exhaustion; the British units which were to make the new landings at Suvla were totally inexperienced; the VIII Corps at Helles was experienced enough but worn down by their ordeals in continually attacking trench lines between themselves and Achi Baba. Taken as a whole the scheme was utterly unrealistic. It demanded feats of endurance from the assaulting columns climbing to Sari Bair which would have made Hannibal think twice; it asked raw troops to perform like veterans and sickly veterans to put their illnesses behind them; it required leadership from incompetents; it sought to create diversions by attacks that bitter experience had already shown were bound to fail. And worst of all it assumed, despite all the evidence so far accumulated, that the Turks would fight badly.
AUGUST: HELLES SACRIFICE
&n
bsp; The omens from the Helles sacrifices had not been propitious.1
Colonel Cecil Aspinall, Headquarters, MEF
THE DOG DAYS OF SUMMER brought little hope of respite for the VIII Corps at Helles. The remorseless sun blazed down upon them, the Turks were as implacable as ever, their trench system rivalling anything to be found on the Western Front at that stage of the war. Front lines, support lines and redoubts faced the VIII Corps in front of Krithia, while behind them reserve line trenches snaked their way up and along the contours of Achi Baba. And behind that more fortifications barred the way to Kilid Bahr. Under Hamilton’s plans the VIII Corps was required to pin the Turkish Helles garrison while the main offensives progressed at Anzac and Suvla. The initial plans were remarkably similar to the disastrous attacks made on 12–13 July: there were to be two highly localised attacks in order to use limited artillery resources for maximum effect. On 6 August the freshly replenished 88th Brigade of the 29th Division was to attack the Turkish lines north of Krithia Nullah and push up Fir Tree Spur. Next day it was the turn of the 125th and 127th Brigades of the 42nd Division to attack along Krithia Spur and up Krithia Nullah itself. The aim was to pinch out the Turkish salient in the centre. That was as far as their intended role went, but the VIII Corps, under the temporary command of Major General William Douglas pending the arrival of Lieutenant General Sir Francis Davies, was optimistic. For some unfathomable reason success was more or less assumed and the capture of both Krithia and Achi Baba was confidently anticipated.
The prevailing character of the Helles fighting at the start of August was one of routine trench warfare. The men lived in their trenches day in, day out, with little or nothing to do or look forward to. Second Lieutenant Hugh Heywood of the 1/6th Manchesters found that, although he could have been killed at any moment, his life was one of mind-numbing tedium.
