Gallipoli
Page 35
Our existence here has been more monotonous than anything I have ever endured before. We have been stuck in the same place in the same trenches, doing the same thing – nothing! Our programme every day is as follows: 3 a.m. ‘stand to’ till 4 a.m., then sleep again (if the flies will let you) till 8 a.m. when you rouse up again and prepare for one’s breakfast at about 8.15. Breakfast has to be rushed otherwise the flies get too numerous in the vicinity of the jam. After breakfast you settle down as comfortably as you can and start to do nothing, interrupted at 10.20 by inspecting your platoon lines, but once that is done you can really get going and go on doing nothing till 8 p.m. with short interruptions for food.2
Second Lieutenant Hugh Heywood, 1/6th Manchester Regiment, 127th Brigade, 42nd Division
Every so often there would be a sudden flurry as one side or the other tried to improve its tactical position. Small, almost unnoticeable features of the landscape could provoke vicious spasms of fighting. Lieutenant Charles Lister was involved in one such skirmish over some disputed barricades.
The artillery shelled the advanced Turkish post for about 20 minutes while we massed, with a covering party of men with bombs and bayonets and a main body of men with sandbags, in the trench, ready to rush out up the old communication trench and push our sandbag barrier still farther forward. We realised the importance of rushing in immediately our shelling ceased. But as it turned out we were rather too close, for a shell fell among our people and buried six of them, who were, however, dug out unhurt or only slightly wounded. The shell luckily did not burst. This was followed by a Turkish shell which fell right in the middle of us as we were all crouching for the rush, hit Freyberg in the stomach, killed another man, and covered me with small scratches, which bled profusely at the moment. We had by now got to our original barrier, so I got our covering party out and rushed them up the trench over quite a number of dead Turks. We stopped our men just short of the Turkish advanced post: threw bombs and at once started the new barrier – not a Turk in sight. The snipers, however, soon came back and made work at this point difficult, so we moved back and contented ourselves with a gain of about 40 to 50 yards on our old position. I have been hit in about six places, but all tiny little scratches.3
Lieutenant Charles Lister, Hood Battalion, 2nd Naval Brigade, RND
Lister was evacuated for medical treatment on Imbros. Behind him the VIII Corps was getting nowhere fast.
THE DIVERSIONARY ATTACK on Friday 6 August would be supported by the 1/5th Manchesters who would attack in order to protect the right flank of the advancing 88th Brigade. In addition they would be supported by the massed machine guns of the 127th Brigade. The British bombardment opened up at 14.20 but the Turkish response was almost immediate. They had been expecting an attack.
Our own bombardment started and I’ve never seen or heard or smelt anything like it; the shells were bursting wherever you looked, there was a hellish din and overall a dense cloud of pungent, sickly yellow smoke, through which nothing could be seen distinctly. Bits of shell were flying about in every direction; either from Turkish shells or from the ‘blow back’ from ours. This went on for nearly 2 hours.4
Second Lieutenant Hugh Heywood, 1/6th Manchester Regiment, 127th Brigade, 42nd Division
Lieutenant General Sir Francis Davies, who had arrived fresh from service on the Western Front, was ‘horrified at the total inadequacy of the British bombardment’.5 Warfare on the Western Front had danced to the rhythm of the guns for most of 1915. Bombardments there were measured in hundreds of thousands of shells; soon millions of shells would be expended in a single day. The barrage offered in support of the infantry on 6 August was totally insufficient. As the infantry would find soon enough when they went over the top at 15.50.
All the line on the left to the Krithia Nullah got over the parapet and went for the Turks. As soon as our fellows got over an absolute hellish rifle and machine gun fire was opened on them. They fairly dropped and it was a vile sight, but the dust soon got too thick for us to see further than 30 or 40 yards from the trench. We who had to stay behind could only listen and hope.6
Second Lieutenant Hugh Heywood, 1/6th Manchester Regiment, 127th Brigade, 42nd Division
There was little hope for the men in No Man’s Land. The result was abject failure and the slaughter of another generation of the ‘Immortal’ 29th Division. The collective spirit may have been willing but thousands of men were paying the penalty for wishful thinking. Buoyed up by optimistic reports that lacked foundation in reality, Major General Henry de Beauvoir de Lisle, commanding the 29th Division, ordered a night attack to be carried out by the 86th Brigade at 22.30. After protests from some of his officers the attack was cancelled. As it was, Heywood and his machine gunners of the 1/6th Manchesters were on the qui vive all night in expectation of a Turkish counter-attack.
One or two wounded began to crawl in: one poor fellow crept back very slowly under a heavy fire and rolled fainting into our arms over the parapet. When we came to clean him we found he had three huge holes in his stomach and half his insides were outside.7
Second Lieutenant Hugh Heywood, 1/6th Manchester Regiment, 127th Brigade, 42nd Division
It took five field dressings to staunch the flow of blood, after which he was given morphine and stretchered back. His chances of survival would have been meagre.
The Turks did not, however, counter-attack; they remained firm in their positions. Indeed, Liman was so confident of the ability of his Helles divisions to withstand further onslaughts that he ordered the reserve 4th Division based at Serafim Farm to march towards Anzac early on 7 August. This illustrated the total failure of the Helles operations designed to pin the Turkish garrison. Yet the plan remained the same and that morning the badly under-strength 127th and 125th Brigades of the 42nd Division attacked along Krithia Spur.
The preparatory barrage commenced at 08.10, with the massed machine guns standing ready to create a rainstorm of bullets on vulnerable points behind the Turkish lines.
The only difference was that the Turk hardly replied at all. It lasted till 9.40 and the job for which my machine gun section had been detailed was to fire for the last half hour, i.e. from 9.10 to 9.40, at aiming marks which we had previously put up and set so as to carry us on to certain of the Turkish trenches. The object was to try and get any Turks who might be being sent up to support the firing line. In the half hour the three guns got through about 6,000 rounds so I hope we did some damage. At 9.40 the line charged and got a dreadful time from shrapnel and the enemy’s machine gun and rifle fire. We could see the line being simply mown down; it was a very nerve-trying sight.8
Second Lieutenant Hugh Heywood, 1/6th Manchester Regiment, 127th Brigade, 42nd Division
The aftermath of the Manchesters’ charge was terrible; the evidence of their failure soon lay in No Man’s Land for all to see. Alongside them the Lancashire Fusiliers of the 125th Brigade initially had slightly more success breaking through on Krithia Spur, even getting men through into the Turkish support lines. Private Arthur Kay was in the second wave of their attack.
Suddenly the guns ceased and afterwards we heard the shouts of our boys over the parapets. Some of them did not run a yard before they were hit. Our ‘C’ Company advanced – we suffered the worst, for the Turks were ready for us. I am sure I was half-mad when I saw my mates dropping as I was running. I did not get to their trench for I was hit through the neck – a narrow shave for me. It came right through. The blood spurted out, of course. I dropped down but managed to crawl back to our old trench. I rolled into the trench. One poor fellow was moaning; he had been hit in the back with shrapnel. You could put your arm through the hole it had made. I got his field-dressing and did the best I could for him, whilst I myself was growing weaker.9
Private Arthur Kay, 1/7th Lancashire Fusiliers, 125th Brigade, 42nd Division
The Turks soon threw them back; their only remaining gain was in the Vineyard sector. Here some of the worst fighting was experienced by the
1/9th Manchesters when they moved up to relieve the Lancashires. A key figure in the defence of the north-west corner of the Vineyard was Captain William Forshaw.
I and about twenty men were instructed to hold a barricade at the head of the sap. Facing us were three converging saps held by the Turks, who were making desperate efforts to retake this barricaded corner, and so cut off all the other men in the trench. The Turks attacked at frequent intervals along the three saps from Saturday afternoon until Monday morning, and they advanced into the open with the objective of storming the parapet. They were met by a combination of bombing and rifle fire, but the bomb was the chief weapon used both by the Turks and ourselves.10
Captain William Forshaw, 1/9th Manchester Regiment, 126th Brigade, 42nd Division
Alongside Captain Forshaw at the head of the sap was Sergeant Harry Grantham.
There were all sorts of bombs. Round bombs and bombs made out of jam tins and filled with explosives and bits of iron, lead, needles, etc. It was lively while it lasted. We could see the Turks coming on at us, great big fellows they were, and we dropped our bombs right amidst them. Captain Forshaw was at the end of the trench. He fairly revelled in it. He kept joking and cheering us on, and was smoking cigarettes all the while. He used his cigarettes to light the fuses of the bombs, instead of striking matches. ‘Keep it up, boys!’ he kept saying. We did, although a lot of our lads were killed and injured by the Turkish firebombs. It was exciting, I can tell you.11
Sergeant Harry Grantham, 1/9th Manchester Regiment, 126th Brigade, 42nd Division
The bombs used by both sides lacked potency. They could of course kill but, not having much explosive power or a proper fragmentation casing, they were far more likely to wound, or bespatter the victims with cuts from hundreds of minute fragments. That is not to say that they were not dangerous if you were unlucky or over-ambitious.
Bombs were bursting all around us. Some of the boys in their excitement caught the Turkish bombs before they exploded, and hurled them back again. They did not always manage to catch them in time and three of them had their hands blown off. What made the position worse was that as soon as we had entered the trench a bomb laid out six of us. I was one of them. I bandaged up my leg, bandaged the others and sent them back – I carried on.12
Lance Corporal Thomas Pickford, 1/9th Manchester Regiment, 126th Brigade, 42nd Division
The fighting continued for the best part of two days. Even when the 1/9th Manchesters were relieved, Forshaw insisted on staying on to lead the defence.
I was far too busy to think of myself or to think of anything. We just went at it without a pause while the Turks were attacking, and in the slack intervals I put more fuses into bombs. I cannot imagine how I escaped with only a bruise from a piece of shrapnel. It was miraculous. The attacks were very fierce at times, but only once did the Turks succeed in getting right up to the parapet. Three attempted to climb over, but I shot them with my revolver. All this time both our bomb throwing and shooting had been very effective, and many Turkish dead were in front of the parapet and in the saps. The attack was not continuous, of course, but we had to be on the watch all the time, and so it was impossible to get any sleep. Fortunately, we had no fewer than 800 of those bombs, but we got rid of the lot during the greatest weekend I have ever spent.13
Captain William Forshaw, 1/9th Manchester Regiment, 126th Brigade, 42nd Division
The physical and nervous exhaustion that followed their eventual relief took its toll on Forshaw, despite his apparent insouciance.
Myself, a few men and the Captain held a trench which was almost impossible to hold, but we stuck it like glue, in spite of the Turks attacking us with bombs. I can tell you I accounted for a few Turks. Our Captain has been recommended for the VC and I hope he gets it because he was very determined to hold the trench till the last man was finished. But we did not lose many. Our Captain has not got over it yet, but it is only his nerves that are shattered a bit.14
Lance Corporal Samuel Bayley, 1/9th Manchester Regiment, 126th Brigade, 42nd Division
Forshaw would be awarded the VC for his reckless disregard for his personal health and would for ever be known as the ‘Cigarette VC’. The fighting over the Vineyard – an area of ground just 200 yards long and 100 yards wide – continued for several days as the British strove to incorporate it into their lines and the Turks tried to eject them. Here was the chance for revenge as the Turks counter-attacked. The moment the Turks charged out of their trenches they too were massacred. The Australian gunners of 1st Field Artillery Brigade once again sweated in the blazing heat as they poured shells into easy targets over the next few days.
Heavy fighting all day. A few monitors with 14″ guns came up and helped to paint the landscape hideous. Towards evening the Turks attacked in massed formation. Every available gun was turned on to repelling them, which they did with terrible effect. Not one Turk succeeded in getting within striking distance of our fire trench. The shrapnel just tore long lanes in the advancing lines, and their well-planned attack came to a sticky end. Fighting all night … Very hot day. Heavy fighting up in the infantry trenches all day. Chas and I up to the first line this afternoon. Had a good screw around. The heaviest fighting during the last four days has been in a vineyard. The vines are trampled down and torn about with HE and shrapnel and interspersed with bodies. Our fellows got it pretty heavy in one corner, but Johnny Turk got it hot, too.15
Corporal Ralph Doughty, 2nd Battery, 1st Field Artillery Brigade, AIF
How many more futile attacks would be launched, how many more men would die on both sides before their commanders grasped that an advance was impossible for either side at Helles? The fighting finally shuddered to a halt on 13 August. The losses in this most ineffective of diversions were huge, with the British losing over 3,300 in their attacks and the Turks sacrificing 7,500 to their crazy obsession to regain control of a few blasted vines that were of no use to either side. This was fighting for the sake of it: it wasn’t strategy; it wasn’t tactics; it was legalised manslaughter. When the second British attack failed, Liman had the confidence to order another of his Helles divisions, the 8th Division, to march north. Now everything had changed – indeed, the positions had reversed: Helles had become the backwater where little or no progress was likely; any remaining hopes for tangible success had shifted to the new offensive planned to burst out of Anzac.
AUGUST: ANZAC BREAKOUT
To take on the responsibility for a new task, with troops I did not know and in a completely vague and unknown situation, was no mean task. It was responsibility for a battle that had been going on for three days and which had resulted in the defeat and disorder of every commander and unit taking part – a battle which was a life and death struggle for the nation begun by others and ending in bloody defeat. I however accepted the responsibility with pride.1
Colonel Mustafa Kemal, Headquarters, 19th Division, 5th Army
THE BREAKOUT FROM ANZAC was the centrepiece; the very heart of the August Offensive that was the last chance for the Gallipoli campaign of 1915. There were three main elements of the operational plans as prepared by Lieutenant General Sir William Birdwood and Brigadier General Andrew Skeen. The first was a major diversion centred on the assault by the 1st Division on Lone Pine in the late afternoon of 6 August; then the main event was the dramatic breakout from Anzac, intended to seize the key heights of Chunuk Bair and Hill 971 by dawn on 7 August; and finally concerted attacks to be launched on The Nek and Chessboard. Depending on your viewpoint, this was either a brilliantly imaginative programme that left little to chance, or a farrago that substituted optimism for realism. Brigadier General John Monash considered it to be a new beginning.
I am very well satisfied both with the policy and the progress of our operations. We have dropped the Churchill way of rushing in before we are ready, and hardly knowing what we are going to do next, in favour of the Kitchener way of making careful and complete preparations on lines which just can’t go wrong. For
that’s what’s going to happen in Gallipoli in a very little while, and what’s going to happen in Flanders and Belgium later on.2
Brigadier General John Monash, Headquarters, 4th Australian Brigade, NZ&A Division, AIF
Others were deeply sceptical, particularly as to whether it was physically possible to carry out the planned flanking march at night in the unhospitable country north of Anzac. One such was Major Cecil Allanson of the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles.
When the method of attack was disclosed to me confidentially that afternoon I gasped. It is to be remembered that Anzac is completely invested by the enemy; that no one has been able to reconnoitre the ground outside and that no one can absolutely guarantee the map. There are no villages and no inhabitants to help one, and the whole country seemed to be stiff, with very sharp rocky cliffs, covered with thick scrub. I have a few ideas about night marches, their great difficulty and the need of careful reconnaissance; but when I was told that we were to break through the opposing outpost line at 10 p.m. on the 6th, march along the sea coast for three miles then turn at right angles and attempt to get under this big ridge about two miles inland, by dawn, and covered from the sea by innumerable small hills and nullahs, I felt, ‘What one would have done to a subaltern at a promotion examination who made any such proposition?’ The more the plan was detailed as the time got nearer, the less I liked it, especially as in my own regiment there were four officers out of seven who had never done a night march in their lives. The one hope was that the scheme was so bold it might be successful.3
Major Cecil Allanson, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, 29th Indian Brigade
The delightfully curmudgeonly New Zealander Colonel William Malone was also a sceptic. His natural penchant for maintaining a tight control of any situation was threatened by the many variables lurking within the plan.