Gallipoli
Page 39
Each Company was approximately 200 strong and this solid phalanx of men emerged from the Apex just before the shelling ceased. It was expected that stiff opposition would be met with at the top. The orders were that immediately the ground permitted, Companies were to open out to a frontage of 100 yards each and to fix bayonets, but to keep well closed up; that no shot was to be fired, but the position was to be carried with the cold steel. Some distance had to be traversed before the leading platoons were able to open out at all and it was less than 150 yards from the top of Chunuk Bair, where bayonets were fixed on the move. The two leading Companies swept in line in a final rush to the top, to find to their amazement the position was unoccupied. Certainly a small Turkish picquet was overwhelmed, without firing a shot, in a small trench on the seaward slope some distance from the top. But where were the Turks who had shattered the Auckland attack?48
Major William Cunningham, Wellington Battalion, New Zealand Brigade, NZ&A Division, NZEF
Still, the Wellingtons were hardly complaining and they tried to consolidate their position. Behind them the 7th Gloucestershires and 8th Welsh Regiment suffered far more as they were exposed to a deadly enfilade fire in reaching the summit where the remnants took up positions on the flanks of the Wellingtons. Malone split his companies between the forward and reverse slopes of Chunuk Bair, but they soon encountered serious problems.
For the best part of an hour the Wellington Battalion was unmolested in its digging operations, but owing to the hard and stony nature of the soil, and the fact that the majority of the men had only entrenching tools, progress was very slow, and the trenches were not more than 2 feet deep when the Turkish counter-attack started. Preceded by showers of bombs, the Turks worked their way up until they were able to fire into the gun-pits where our advanced covering parties had been placed. These pits soon became untenable and the survivors of the covering parties returned to their companies in the new front line. By now all digging had ceased and the front line companies, taking what cover their shallow trench line afforded, were engaged in a deadly musketry duel with the Turks, who were crowding up from the valley to recapture the hill. Enfilade machine gun fire from the old Anzac position made matters most unpleasant and soon the shallow front line trenches were filled with the killed and wounded. No longer able to hold the forward line, a few unwounded men were able to dash in safety to the reverse or seaward slope of the hill.49
Major William Cunningham, Wellington Battalion, New Zealand Brigade, NZ&A Division, NZEF
That retreat meant the Turks could creep forwards. The Wellingtons were able only to cling to their shallow trenches on the reverse slope, losing control of the brow of the hill. Some meagre reinforcements arrived but never as many as were replenishing the Turkish ranks.
Odd Turks began to work into a position from which they could fire into the reverse slope of the hill. When the forward trenches had been abandoned the Turks crept up close enough to the crest line to hurl showers of egg bombs among the men on the reverse slope. These had long fuses and were promptly thrown back before they exploded. Bolder and bolder, the Turks essayed a bayonet charge, but were promptly stopped by a few well-directed volleys at point-blank range. Several times the Turks gallantly repeated their attempts to charge over the top, but always with the same result. Ammunition was running short, and had to be collected from the dead and wounded. As the day wore on, still the defenders of the hill stuck stubbornly to their ground. In the afternoon a Turkish battery searched the slopes where our men were with accurately timed shrapnel. This shelling ceased about 4 p.m., but Colonel Malone fell a victim to the last salvo. He stood up in the trench where his headquarters were thinking the shelling had ceased and practically the last round fired killed him instantly.50
Major William Cunningham, Wellington Battalion, New Zealand Brigade, NZ&A Division, NZEF
The shattered remnants of the Wellingtons, (just 70 unwounded were left of the 760 men who had originally occupied the crest), the 7th Gloucestershires and the 8th Welsh were relieved after dark on the night of 8 August by the Otago Battalion and the Wellington Mounted Rifles. With more Turkish divisions marching purposefully towards the Sari Bair heights, the chances of such exposed positions being held were minimal.
Meanwhile, the 29th Indian Brigade was strewn across the ground below Hill Q. The general chaos can be seen in the combination of problems facing the ebullient Major Allanson commanding the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles:
Unfortunately the operation orders for the attack next day on the hill at dawn did not reach me till 1.30 a.m. and I had to get them all out to the outpost line. We had been heavily shelled that evening and I had been much frightened. We had no blankets and no coats, and when I got the orders I was so shivering with cold (fright!) that I could with difficulty read them. My regiment was ordered to make a frontal attack, leaving at 2.45 a.m., supported by two British battalions, and I arranged to send the outposts direct to the position of assembly allotted. The officer who issued the orders had never seen the country, he never had had a chance, and the point of assembly was the junction of two nullahs, each 2 feet wide. The confusion was, of course, awful, and as I could not get into touch with either the North Staffordshire or South Lancashires, to get on was all important. I started off to the attack on my own, asking the other regiments by note to follow. We were then two and a half hours behind the scheduled time for the attack.51
Major Cecil Allanson, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, 29th Indian Brigade
If anything, it was even worse for Second Lieutenant Reginald Savory who, as acting adjutant of the 14th Sikhs, was ordered to distribute the orders to the widely scattered companies of his battalion.
I took an armed orderly with me and set out across the Aghyl Dere in almost pitch darkness. It was then about 2 a.m. It took me an hour and a half to find MacLean, only about half a mile away, through thick scrub and dried-up river beds. I was challenged now and again, but no one could tell me where he was. I was in a fever. Here I was, with very urgent orders, and I could not find the man for whom they were intended. At half-past three I stumbled on him, fast asleep. I went through the orders with him, they were in indelible pencil on thin paper and difficult to read by the doused light of an electric torch. We were to assault Hill Q in company with the 5th Gurkhas, and with the 4th Australian Brigade on our left. Neither he nor I knew where Hill Q was. It was not marked as such on the map; nor had it been pointed out to us. All we did know was that within three-quarters of an hour or so we were to capture it. It was still dark and the men were fast asleep.52
Second Lieutenant Reginald Savory, 14th Sikhs, 29th Indian Brigade
Notwithstanding the problems facing the 29th Indian Brigade, Major Allanson seems to have been a determined officer and once he got his men moving he found they made surprisingly good progress.
The ground was covered by a horrible scrub, all nullahs with very steep sides. I advanced in more or less open formation of company columns, and got forward to within 500 yards of the objective without any trouble at all: this I decreased by 200 yards by short rushes. I recognised that reconnaissance and knowledge of the position was so important that I decided to be with the firing line in front, and left the Adjutant to control behind. Dallas and Underhill both came up, each with about 15 men, but all the rest of their double companies were close. They were working slowly up, picking their way splendidly. Suddenly Dallas went down, hit through the head;53 shortly after Underhill fell,54 and I saw reinforcement was essential.55
Major Cecil Allanson, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, 29th Indian Brigade
Thus it was that Allanson managed to get his troops into a promising position perched just under the crest of Hill Q.
Unsurprisingly, Monash’s 4th Brigade failed to make any impact on 8 August. The exhausted Australians erroneously believed that they were advancing along Abdul Rahman rather than their actual position, further back on a spur of Damakjelik Bair. The Turks soon stopped them in their tracks and nothing whatsoever was achieved.
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br /> While the British were unable to take control of the battle, the Turks were moving with purpose. By this time elements of the 4th, 8th and 9th Divisions had reached Anzac, while the 7th and 12th Divisions under the command of Colonel Feizi Bey were on their way to Suvla. Yet there was still much confusion. It was at this point that Mustafa Kemal came up with the ideal person to weld together the forces dealing with the threat to the Sari Bair heights and the Suvla landings. It could only be one man, as he modestly revealed to Liman’s Chief of Staff.
Unified control of operations was necessary to take into account the large enemy forces which had landed at Anafarta – and which were still landing – and to adopt overall measures as demanded by the situation. I said that there was no other course remaining but to put all available troops under my command. ‘Won’t that be too many?’ he said. ‘It will be too few!’ I replied.56
Colonel Mustafa Kemal, Headquarters, 19th Division, Fifth Army
Kemal may have been saying this for effect, but he was putting his reputation on the line. His replacement commanding the 19th Division was the redoubtable Lieutenant Colonel Mehmet Sefik.
By nightfall on 8 August British plans for the left hook had already failed, but they could hardly just give up. As at Helles, there was a tendency to keep trying, recycling plans and shuffling units in order to try to achieve success. This time the benighted Australian 4th Brigade was left to consolidate its positions as there was clearly no chance of pushing up Abdul Rahman to take Hill 971: that avenue had been firmly closed by the Turkish reinforcements. The main effort on 9 August would be made by the scattered elements of the 29th Indian Brigade and the 39th Brigade, who were to seize Hill Q. To their right a Composite Brigade, made up of battalions from the 13th Division and under the command of Brigadier General Anthony Baldwin, would attack the northern shoulder of Chunuk Bair. The New Zealand Brigade would consolidate its hold on the southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair before moving down on to Battleship Hill. A bombardment would begin at 04.30, with the assault timed for 05.15. In the event almost everything went wrong. Baldwin’s force got totally lost and was consequently nowhere near the start line at Zero Hour. That failure forced the cancellation of the attack by the already badly weakened New Zealand Brigade.
The only remaining hope lay with the 1/6th Gurkhas, who by this time had been reinforced by three companies of the 6th South Lancashires under the command of Major Geoffrey Mott. This was a weak force for a supremely difficult challenge. It may not have been far to the top of Hill Q, but the cliffs were steep. At least Allanson was pleased with the artillery barrage.
I had only fifteen minutes left: the roar of the artillery preparation was enormous; the hill was almost leaping underneath one. I recognised that if we flew up the hill the moment it stopped we ought to get to the top. I had my watch out: 5.15. I never saw such artillery preparation; the trenches were being torn to pieces, the accuracy was marvellous, as we were only just below. 5.18, it had not stopped and I wondered if my watch was wrong. 5.20, silence! I waited 3 minutes to be certain, great as the risk was. Then off we dashed all hand in hand, a most perfect advance and a wonderful sight. I left Cornish with 50 men to hold the line in case we were pushed back, and to watch me if I signalled for reinforcements. At the top we met the Turks: Le Marchand was down, a bayonet through the heart.57 I got one through the leg and then, for about 10 minutes, we fought hand to hand, we bit and fisted, and used rifles and pistols as clubs; blood was flying about like spray from a hairwash bottle. And then the Turks turned and fled, and I felt a very proud man: the key of the whole peninsula was ours.58
Major Cecil Allanson, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, 29th Indian Brigade
In the excitement of the charge, Allanson and his men dashed off down the other side of Hill Q. It was then that they were hit by shells fired either by the artillery at Anzac, the naval ships or the Turks. Allanson blamed the navy, but whoever was responsible it made little difference to the outcome.
All was terrible confusion: it was a deplorable disaster, we were obviously mistaken for Turks and we had to get back. It was an appalling sight: the first hit a Gurkha in the face; the place was a mass of blood and limbs and screams. We all flew back to the summit and to our old position just below. I remained on the crest with about 15 men. It was a wonderful view: below were the Straits, reinforcements coming over from the Asia Minor side, motor cars flying, we commanded Kilid Bahr, and the rear of Achi-Baba and the communications to all their army there.59
Major Cecil Allanson, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, 29th Indian Brigade
Allanson was an effective officer but he was being carried away here by his emotions. Hill Q was an important tactical position, but only in tandem with control of the overlooking heights of Hill 971 to the left and Chunuk Bair on the right – without them it was a death trap. The reality was that there were far too few men to hold the summit against even a weak Turkish counter-attack. Major Mott took over the command shortly after Allanson had been wounded.
There was no question of our seeing the Narrows owing to the bursting of shells – supposed to have been fired by our battleships, but as I heard afterwards fired by our field artillery. Unfortunately, I was compelled to order a return owing to an enormous number of Turkish reinforcements appearing in sight. The retirement was carried out successfully, although casualties were severe.60
Major Geoffrey Mott, 6th South Lancashire Regiment, 38th Brigade, 13th Division
The men fell back to their jumping-off positions, where they beat off further Turkish attacks before retiring still further under the constant pressure. Meanwhile, the wounded Allanson, his leg painful and stiffening, made his way back through the gullies.
The nullahs on the journey back were too horrible, full of dead and dying, Maoris, Australians, Sikhs, Gurkhas, and British soldiers, blood and bloody clothes, and the smell of the dead now some two days old. I gave morphia (I always carry it) to ever so many men on my way down who could get no further and were obviously done. On arriving down I reported to the General, looking like nothing on earth, my clothes and accoutrements in ribbons, filthy dirty and a mass of blood. I told him that unless strong reinforcements were pushed up, and food and water could be sent us, we must come back, but that if we did we gave up the key of the Gallipoli Peninsula.61
Major Cecil Allanson, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, 29th Indian Brigade
It was already too late. A brief glimpse of the Straits prior to a shambolic retreat is nowhere near victory; incontrovertibly, the abruptness with which the Turks ejected the 1/6th Gurkhas and 6th South Lancashires showed how far from success they were. The Anzac offensive was all but over. The only remaining question was whether they could retain their lodgement on just one small shoulder of the Chunuk Bair summit.
The Turks, under the command of Kemal, were now ready to launch their counter-attack with the best part of three regiments at dawn on 10 August. Although they perhaps could not have known it, the odds were firmly in their favour. The British plans had fallen into disarray and in the chaotic landscape between Walker’s Ridge and Damakjelik Bair there were the remnants of multifarious units of various nationalities commanded for the most part by men who had no idea where they were or what they were meant to be doing. On Rhododendron Ridge and Chunuk Bair itself there were some 2,000 soldiers, representing four different brigades and three different divisions. The New Zealanders had been relieved overnight and the Chunuk Bair positions were now the responsibility of the 6th Loyal North Lancashires and the 5th Wiltshires. Many of the British soldiers were already exhausted, thirsty and demoralised. Their Turkish opponents were unstoppable as they poured over the ridge line at 04.45 that morning. On Chunuk Bair they overwhelmed the British defenders in an instant before throwing themselves down the precipitous slopes in pursuit. Charging down Rhododendron Ridge, they over-ran the Pinnacle and were only stopped by the massed machine guns of the New Zealanders at the Apex. North of the ridge the Turks swept down over the Farm Plateau some 300 feet below and slaught
ered those defending troops that had not run for their lives.
The sheer terror of some men, the bewilderment of others; none of whom had slept for four days; all of whom were at the end of their physical tether; all mixed up together; with strange officers trying to control men whom they had never seen before; with men looking for officers they could not find; with shouted orders merely adding to the uproar; with some unashamedly running away; with others trying to slip past, as if on some duty or errand, but intent only on putting as much distance as possible between themselves and the enemy; it was like the bursting of a dam. Yet, as the waters of a flooded river eventually spread out, slow down, and come to a trickle, so, in due course, the rush was stopped and the men led back. All this was only on a very narrow front, and for a very short time, but it was nasty while it lasted. Those like us who were in trenches on the sides of the ravine, watching their front and facing the enemy, were the lucky ones; not only did the torrent miss them, but they were dealing with the tangible and could see that the Turks were not following up. It is the fear of the ‘unknown’ that matters. Most of those who had run, when the panic started, were not at the time engaged directly with the enemy, but were in reserve in the clefts and gullies behind.62
Second Lieutenant Reginald Savory, 14th Sikhs, 29th Indian Brigade
The retreat would end, the Turkish troops would run out of steam and their advance would grind to a halt, but the damage was done: Chunuk Bair was once more firmly back in Turkish hands.
The planning, the secrecy, the courageous attacks, the heroic resistance – in the end the attack from Anzac had been for nothing. In the four-day battle the ANZAC Corps had lost 12,500 men, that is, 33 per cent of the total. By far the highest casualties had been suffered by the 13th Division, who lost 5,500 men, but the 1st Australian Division and NZ&A Divisions had lost a further 5,800 between them.