Gallipoli
Page 41
Captain Geoffrey Meugens, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Back on the lighter, Lieutenant Colonel Wright kept order, marshalling his men down the gangway and into the sea. It was a tricky, nerve-racking business and therefore imperative that the officers kept control of their inexperienced men, checked their fears and tried to keep them under tight military discipline. Otherwise they would soon degenerate into a rabble before they had even landed.
The majority of the men were under fire for the first time, it was a nerve trying moment and they received that kind of shock that stagnates action and they simply lay down on the deck undecided what to do, but a few words from Lieutenant Hart brought them to their senses and then all made tracks for the sea. Personally I groped my way through, my sole thought being to get away from the lighter, being under the impression that they were only firing at the lighter.11
Sergeant William Taylor, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Many of the men of the Manchesters and Lancashire Fusiliers took considerable strength from the sight of their officers struggling up to their necks in the cold water, helping them one by one to safety.
We had a warm time of it whilst we were on board as there is very little cover on board these lighters, so we had a lot of our chaps put out of action. I can tell you I said my prayers more than once. Well, the skipper dived overboard with a rope so that we could have something to assist us to get ashore, as a great many could not swim. I was one of them – so I thought my time had come! We got orders to get ashore and when I got to the bottom of the gangway our CO was in the water helping all that came off the boat. He was wounded while he was doing this, but he stuck to his guns like a hero.12
Lance Sergeant Thomas Dolan, 9th Lancashire Fusiliers, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
As the troops slowly struggled ashore the lighter drew less water and was washed over the offending sandbar closer to the beach, before grounding again. This time she was in an even worse position, as she was caught between the sandbank and rocks projecting out from Nibrunesi Point. The level of Turkish fire from the north side of Lala Baba was gradually increasing and Colonel Wright detached a company under the command of Major Harry Bates to deal with the threat. They moved off in skirmishing order in four platoon lines.
The order was given, ‘Fix bayonets!’ and not a shot to be fired – everything was to be done with the bayonets. All the time the Turks were firing at random at us, and we had to move very cautiously. We made a zig-zag course up the slopes of the hill under very trying circumstances, as most of our men were having their first baptism of fire and everybody dripping wet.13
Sergeant W. Jones, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
They were perhaps fortunate that the Turks were fatally distracted by the tempting targets in the lighters still trapped on the shoaling sandbanks below them.
We moved towards it in four lines quite safely as the firing was all directed towards the ship and lighter. We reached the bottom of the hill and got to within about 30 yards of the enemy trench before they realised our presence and they had scarcely fired a round at us before Major Bates gave a shout and the whole Company picked this up and charged the trench.14
Company Sergeant Major Charles MacDonald, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
The Turks were soon overwhelmed; indeed most of them evacuated their trench as soon as they saw the dark shapes charging up the hill towards them.
We had very few casualties going up, and judging from the amount of rifle fire I should say the Turks had no more than thirty or forty men on the north side of this position. On nearing the top we came across one long trench which the Turks were hastily evacuating. We cleared this with the bayonet killing about a dozen of the enemy, the remainder getting away under cover of the darkness.15
Captain Edward Hartley, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
When the over-excited men showed signs of losing discipline and charging off into the darkness after the Turks, their senior NCOs and officers intervened swiftly. It was perhaps just as well that they managed to retain order, for a minor incident then occurred which reveals the risks of changing plans even for the best of motives. Lala Baba was not the objective of the 34th Brigade, who had been landed in the wrong place, but rather of the 32nd Brigade. The confusion that ensued could have been disastrous as the Yorkshiremen charged up and across the hill.
It was a blessing that orders had been given previously that not a shot was to be fired, because the East Yorks Regiment evidently taking us for a force of Turks came for us with fixed bayonets and totally unEnglish yells. We lined up and prepared to receive the supposed enemy. The mistake was not discovered until they were on top of us. If orders had been given to fire one shudders to think of what might have happened.16
Company Quartermaster Sergeant F. L. Eaton, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
One way or another, Lala Baba had been secured.
Back on the beach, Captain Geoffrey Meugens had been charged with collecting and sorting out the other companies of the Manchesters as they slowly pieced themselves together in the sand dunes along the shoreline. No sooner had the problem of flanking rifle fire been dealt with than another emerged.
The old gun at Ghazi Baba started firing and we saw the shells going over us and bursting about 200 yards to our right front. The men I thought here were very good, lying still and trying to clean their rifles, which were soaked of course and nearly all choked with sand. Being unarmed, I picked up a rifle, but the bolt simply stuck fast and I could not open it. I gave it to a private who had lost his.17
Captain Geoffrey Meugens, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Meanwhile, Wright was trying to refocus on his designated mission to advance along Kiretch Tepe Ridge.
There was a good deal of firing going on and we were being peppered pretty freely from all directions, but we did not reply for two reasons: our rifles, by order, were not loaded, and we could see nothing to shoot at. I had previously given my Company Commanders orders as to the order of march, objective and also compass bearings. These latter were now of no use as we had been landed two miles south of where we should have been. We were all fearfully cold as it was a cool night, we were in thin khaki drill and soaked to the skin. The men were wonderfully cheerful and keen. We could dimly see the outline of the [Suvla] Point and Karakol Dagh, so I gave the company commanders a line to march on, more or less guessing the direction.18
Lieutenant Colonel Bashi Wright, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Wright was demonstrating a robust determination to push forward to secure his objectives, overcoming problems as they arose, without being deflected from the ultimate aim.
After we had gone a few hundred yards we crossed a muddy kind of dyke which I put down as the cut from Salt Lake to the sea. During the march, we were fired at a good deal from the front and flanks, but could not see any of the enemy. After about a mile or more I heard the men shouting and several screams, so I knew that they had got into a body of Turks. I could see nothing of the three companies in front, but could hear them, and was quite sure that a pretty good scrap was going on.19
Lieutenant Colonel Bashi Wright, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
For the less well briefed men, tramping along the beach and across the low sand hills, there seemed no logic to their movements and the persistent Turkish sniper activity tore at their nerves. It was also very difficult to maintain a coherent formation, especially when they began to ascend the foothills and then the heights of Karakol Dagh that formed the western end of Kiretch Tepe Ridge. Here they encountered serious opposition from the Turks.
Instead of two or three sentry posts we ran into several strongly held, well-entrenched picquets. I hope I am not going too far in saying that I shall always consider that the order ‘not to load rifles’ had a very dish
eartening effect. I know that it would have bucked our fellows considerably if they could have taken a few pot shots at the retreating enemy and brought a few down. We were discovered then and nothing was gained by silence. The whole thing was a beastly nerve-racking experience in the dark.20
Captain Geoffrey Meugens, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Behind Meugens’ men, R Company, having helped the 6th Yorkshires clear Lala Baba, was dutifully following on along the beach, before cutting further inland across the ridged foothills and gullies of the southern face of Karakol Dagh to catch up with the rest of the 11th Manchesters.
Once on the ridge it was exceptionally hard going. The narrow, jagged ridge was covered in prickly scrub and fell away steeply on both sides; indeed it was at times precipitous to the north. Meugens was sent to check the progress of the men advancing along the broken north face of the ridge, but on his return he made a near-fatal error.
I made a perfectly fatuous mistake. Immediately below me I saw No. 2 Platoon in line halted – they were very dimly outlined and about 50 yards in front two small groups of scouts. A good way in front of these I thought I saw bayonets flashing. I decided that these must be my Company who I had understood were pushing on and I made a bee-line for the bayonets. After a bit I got into a hollow but pushed on knowing I should come to them over the next spur. Now I was alone I began to feel extremely tired and it is to that I ought to attribute my mad act in walking over a skyline on this next spur without any precautions whatever. I was thinking about my Company and not about Turks as I did so, but I very soon woke up when I saw about 20 yards away a small trench and realised that the bayonets really belonged to a picket of about fifteen Turks. They all started yelling and firing at once and I decided to bolt for it. As I turned something hit me on my right shoulder and knocked me over. I thought then the best thing to do was to lie still and they kept it up for what seemed a horribly long time. Suddenly I heard Major Sillery’s voice calling out to the men to come on and the Turks stopped firing. I nipped back over the spur and found about a platoon of our fellows. When I had persuaded them not to bayonet me, I told them to come on and clear out the trench. When we came in sight of it, however, the Turks made up their mind to leave it. I reached the trench at one end as the last Turk left it at the other.21
Captain Geoffrey Meugens, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
The Turks occupied a series of both prepared and impromptu positions: sangars of piled-up rocks, natural breaks in the rock formations and narrow gullies.
As the light grew clearer we got badly sniped, officers in conspicuous uniforms being the first to suffer. Up to this time none of our rifles had been fired, and we found that most of them were badly jammed owing to their bath the night before. Another reason that we could not get a large volume of fire to bear on the enemy was the limited amount of frontage and cover on the crest of the ridge. The Turkish snipers shot very effectively – no doubt we made good targets for them.22
Lieutenant Allan Norbury, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Although wounded, and feeling increasingly exhausted from loss of blood, Meugens continued to lead his men forward as best he could.
As far as I could make out there were a lot of these trenches all over the hill and the result of our people meeting them was that though the Turks did not hold them for long, they sufficed to make our columns break up and in the dark the men got rather scattered. The time was now about 03.30 and very soon it began to get light. Our fellows were scattered all over the place in little groups and one had a great job trying to get them together. We were still being fired on, and the fire increased, while our fellows were practically all unable to return it owing to their rifles being still clogged with sand. I got someone to tie me up – rather ineffectually – and we pushed on. By the time we got up to the third line of defences it was broad daylight and the firing was very hot indeed.23
Captain Geoffrey Meugens, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
The bayonet might be useful at close quarters, but bullets were needed to deal with the Turkish snipers. At last they began to get their rifles working again.
Urinating on the bolts seemed to be the only way to open them, and it was a big relief to be able to fire upon the enemy, who, skilfully concealed behind the rocks and bushes, were picking off our officers and NCOs with uncanny certitude. Major Bates, our Company Commander, was wounded in the wrist and stomach, but with heroic disregard of pain and discomfort he still kept on leading us. The sun was boiling hot, and what with the heat and the salt water we had inadvertently swallowed we were suffering untold agonies from thirst. The wounded were indeed a pitiful sight, with swollen tongues and lips.24
Company Quartermaster Sergeant F. L. Eaton, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Nevertheless the Manchesters continued to press forward until they reached the junction with the main body of Kiretch Tepe, the Karakol Gap.
We were brought up by a heavy fire from the opposite side of the gap, where the majority of the Turks had collected. We could see very few Turks, as there was good cover for them in the broken ground. We were also very much worried by rifle fire from the right flank which appeared to come from the low ground, which was covered with scrub. I was unable to clear this with the men at my disposal. At this spot I lost in killed and wounded seven officers and about 50 to 60 men. I estimated the numbers of the Turks at this time to be about 300 and judging by the volume of fire, they were receiving reinforcements rapidly. We could not go on without covering fire of some sort, were in a most exposed position and the Turks had begun to shell us from two guns somewhere to our right front. It was an unpleasant situation.25
Lieutenant Colonel Bashi Wright, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
The attack across the Karakol Gap was made at about 10.00 on the morning of 7 August. Crucially, despite his machine gun having been dropped to the bottom of the sea during the landing, Lieutenant John Lithiby stripped it right down and achieved a veritable miracle.
Lithiby came up. He told me that he had got the machine gun close behind in working order and asked me what he should do. I told him to try to find cover on the top of the hill, to open fire on the Turkish position and that I would try to get the men across the gap under cover of his fire. Lithiby and Sergeant Pickles got the gun to the top but could find no cover. In spite of this, under heavy fire, they mounted the gun and let off belt after belt into the Turks. I was watching and saw a few Turks get up and run back and hoped more would go. Whether they did or not it was our only chance, so I ordered the advance. The officers and the whole battalion got up and walked across the gap. This sudden movement seemed to surprise the Turks as they drew back from the crest and I had very few casualties during this advance.26
Lieutenant Colonel Bashi Wright, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
But the Turks had merely fallen back to the next defensible point. And the further the Manchesters advanced up Kiretch Tepe the more it broadened out on either side of the sharp ridge line. Soon it became apparent that the Manchesters would be swallowed whole if they attempted to continue their advance.
I saw that we should not get far without reinforcements: the Turks were getting round us on both flanks, I had nobody to attend to my wounded, and at the rate we were going on our ammunition would not last. I wrote two messages to this effect and sent them off by separate messengers with orders to try and find Brigade Headquarters. One of them got through eventually, but was delayed through having fallen into a nullah and injured his knee. The other did not reach his destination. There were no signs of any troops on the plain and we seemed to be alone and to be gradually being surrounded. We managed to get on a bit further and were finally held up about 3 miles from the sea a few hundred yards in advance of a high point in the ridge which was afterwards known as Jephson’s Post. The officers and men behaved most gallant
ly and made several desperate efforts to take the next hill without success. The forward slope of the hill was without cover and under a very heavy rifle and machine gun fire, shrapnel was bursting over us from two guns on our right front and the men were worn out with hard work and heat. They were fainting with thirst as they had given up any water they had in their water bottles to keep the machine gun going. At about noon my leading companies were about half-way to the next hill – the Benchmark – and could not move, machine gun ammunition had run out, my Second in Command and two Company Commanders had been killed and a third wounded – we were suffering heavily. I was hit myself and there were no signs of our being reinforced. Anxious as we were to take the Benchmark, it was impossible and there was nothing to do but hang on as best we could and hold the ground we had taken.27
Lieutenant Colonel Bashi Wright, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Captain Meugens had struggled on as best he could having been wounded, but he was now utterly exhausted. Reluctantly, he made his way along the ridge to the beach.
We saw no British troops at all advancing on our right and our Battalion seemed absolutely isolated. It is a curious fact that we were sniped all the way down from the plain, which seemed to be alive with Turks. We found Captain Oliver there and Sergeant Hall, bleeding badly from a severed artery in the arm. There were about fifteen of us and the Turks sent about six shrapnel over and then left us in peace. Sergeant Hall’s condition was serious and we used frantic endeavours to get into semaphore communication with all sorts of boats in the bay. But the hours went on and no boat of any kind came near us or anywhere near the north end of the bay. The bay was crowded with transports loading into lighters but the lighters never seemed to move.28