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Delphi Complete Works of William Dean Howells

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by William Dean Howells


  “Then you have already, at your age, evolved that ‘instinct of death,’ which Metchnikoff, in his strange book, thinks the race will come to when men begin living rightly, and go living on to a hundred and fifty years or more, as they once did.”

  “Who is Metchnikoff, and what is the name of his strange book?” the light skirmisher cut in.

  “He’s the successor of Pasteur in the Pasteur Institute at Paris, and his book is called The Nature of Man.”

  “That blighting book!” One of the women who had caught on to the drift of the talk contributed this anguished suspiration.

  “Blighting? Is it blighting?” the first speaker parleyed.

  “Don’t you call it blighting,” she returned, “to be told not only that you are the descendant of an anthropoid ape — we had got used to that — but of an anthropoid ape gone wrong?”

  “Sort of simian degenerate,” the light skirmisher formulated the case. “We are merely apes in error.”

  The closest listener put this playfulness by. “What seems to me a fundamental error of that book is its constant implication of a constant fear of death. I can very well imagine, or I can easily allow, that we are badly made, and that there are all sorts of ‘disharmonies,’ as Metchnikoff calls them, in us; but my own experience is that we are not all the time thinking about death and dreading it, either in earlier or later life, and that elderly people think less about it, if anything, than younger people. His contention for an average life four or five times longer than the present average life seems to be based upon an obscure sense of the right of a man to satisfy that instinct of life here on earth which science forbids him to believe he shall satisfy hereafter.”

  “Well, I suppose,” the first speaker said, “that Metchnikoff may err in his premises through a temperamental ‘disharmony’ of Russian nature rather than of less specific human nature. The great Russian authors seem to recognize that perpetual dread of death in themselves and their readers which we don’t recognize in ourselves or our Occidental friends and neighbors. Other people don’t think of death so much as he supposes, and when they do they don’t dread it so much. But I think he is still more interestingly wrong in supposing that the young are less afraid of death than the old because they risk their lives more readily. That is not from indifference to death, it is from inexperience of life; they haven’t learned yet the dangers which beset it and the old have; that is all.”

  “I don’t know but you’re right,” the first speaker said. “And I couldn’t see the logic of Metchnikoff’s position in regard to the ‘instinct of death’ which he expects us to develop after we have lived, say, a hundred and thirty or forty years, so that at a hundred and fifty we shall be glad to go, and shall not want anything but death after we die. The apparent line of his argument is that in youth we have not the instinct of life so strongly but that we willingly risk life. Then, until we live to a hundred and thirty or forty or so, we have the instinct of life so strongly that we are anxious to shun death; lastly the instinct of death grows in us and we are eager to lay down life. I don’t see how or why this should be. As a matter of fact, children dread death far more than men who are not yet old enough to have developed the instinct of it. Still, it’s a fascinating and suggestive book.”

  “But not enough so to console us for the precious hope of living again which it takes away so pitilessly,” said the woman who had followed the talk.

  “Is that such a very precious hope?” the first speaker asked.

  “I know you pretend not,” she said, “but I don’t believe you.”

  “Then you think that the dying, who almost universally make a good end, are buoyed up by that hope?”

  “I don’t see why they shouldn’t be. I know it’s the custom for scientific people to say that the resignation of the dying is merely part of the general sinking and so is just physical; but they can’t prove that. Else why should persons who are condemned to death be just as much resigned to it as the sick and even more exalted?”

  “Ah,” the light skirmisher put in, “some of the scientific people dispose of that point very simply. They say it’s self-hypnotism.”

  “Well, but they can’t prove that, either,” she retorted. Then she went on: “Besides, the dying are not almost universally willing to die. Sometimes they are very unwilling: and they seem to be unwilling because they have no hope of living again. Why wouldn’t it be just as reasonable to suppose that we could evolve the instinct of death by believing in the life hereafter as by living here a hundred and fifty years? For the present, it’s as easy to do the one as the other.”

  “But not for the future,” the first speaker said. “As you suggest, it may be just as reasonable to think we can evolve the instinct of death by faith as by longevity, but it isn’t as scientific.”

  “What M. Metchnikoff wants is the scientific certainty — which we can have only by beginning to live a century and a half apiece — that the coming man will not be afraid to die.” This, of course, was from the light skirmisher.

  The woman contended, “The coming man may be scientifically resigned if he prefers, but the going man, the gone man, was rapturously ready to die, in untold thousands of martyrdoms, because he believed that he should live again.”

  The first speaker smiled compassionately, and perhaps also a little patronizingly. “I’m not sure that you have met the point exactly. Metchnikoff denies, on the basis of scientific knowledge, that it is possible for a man, being dead, to live again. In those two extremely interesting chapters of his, which treat of the ‘Religious Remedies’ and the ‘Philosophical Remedies’ for the ‘disharmonies of the human constitution,’ he is quite as unsparing of the sages as of the saints. The Christians and the Buddhists fare no worse than Plato and the Stoics; the last are no less unscientific than the first in his view, and no less fallacious. What he asks is not that we shall be resigned or enraptured in view of death, but that we shall physically desire it when we are tired of living, just as we physically desire sleep when we are tired of waking.”

  “And to that end,” the light skirmisher said, “he asks nothing but that we shall live a hundred and fifty years.”

  “No, he asks that we shall live such natural lives that we shall die natural deaths, which are voluntary deaths. He contends that most of us now die accidental and violent deaths.”

  The woman who had caught on demanded, “Why does he think we could live a century and a half?”

  “From analogies in the lives of other animals and from the facts of our constitution. He instances the remarkable cases of longevity recorded in the Bible.”

  “I think he’s very inconsistent,” his pursuer continued. “The Bible says men lived anywhere from a hundred to nine hundred years, and he thinks it quite possible. The Bible says that men live after death, and he thinks that’s impossible.”

  “Well, have you ever met a man who had lived after death?” the first speaker asked.

  “No. Have you ever met a man two hundred years old? If it comes to undeniable proof there is far more proof of ghosts than of bicentenarians.”

  “Very well, then, I get out of it by saying that I don’t believe in either.”

  “And leave Metchnikoff in the lurch!” the light skirmisher reproached him. “You don’t believe in the instinct of death! And I was just going to begin living to a hundred and fifty and dying voluntarily by leaving off cheese. Now I will take some of the Gorgonzola.”

  Everybody laughed but the first speaker and the woman who had caught on; they both looked rather grave, and the closest listener left off laughing soonest.

  “We can’t be too grateful to science for its devotion to truth. But isn’t it possible for it to overlook one kind of truth in looking for another? Isn’t it imaginable that when a certain anthropoid ape went wrong and blundered into a man, he also blundered into a soul, and as a slight compensation for having involuntarily degenerated from his anthropoid ancestor, came into the birthright of eternal life?”
/>   “It’s imaginable,” the first speaker granted. “But science leaves imagining things to religion and philosophy.”

  “Ah, that’s just where you’re mistaken!” the woman who had caught on exclaimed. “Science does nothing but imagine things!”

  “Well, not quite,” the light skirmisher mocked.

  She persisted unheeding: “First the suggestion from the mystical somewhere — the same where, probably, that music and pictures and poetry come from; then the hypothesis; then the proof; then the established fact. Established till some new scientist comes along and knocks it over.”

  “It would be very interesting if some one would proceed hypothetically concerning the soul and its immortality, as the scientific people do in their inquiries concerning the origin of man, electricity, disease, and the rest.”

  “Yes,” the light skirmisher agreed. “Why doesn’t some fellow bet himself that he has an undying soul and then go on to accumulate the proofs?” The others seemed now to have touched bottom in the discussion, and he launched a random inquiry upon the general silence. “By-the-way, I wonder why women are so much more anxious to live again than men, as a general thing.”

  “Because they don’t feel,” one of them at table ventured, “that they have had a fair chance here.”

  “Oh! I thought maybe they felt that they hadn’t had their say.”

  “Is it quite certain,” the closest listener asked, “that they are more anxious to live again than men?” He looked round at the ladies present, and at first none of them answered; perhaps because they feared the men would think them weak if they owned to a greater longing than themselves for immortality.

  Finally the woman who had caught on said: “I don’t know whether it’s so or not; and I don’t think it matters. But I don’t mind saying that I long to live again; I am not ashamed of it. I don’t think very much of myself; but I’m interested in living. Then” — she dropped her voice a little— “there are some I should like to see again. I have known people — characters — natures — that I can’t believe are wasted. And those that were dear to us and that we have lost—”

  She stopped, and the first speaker now looked at her with a compassion unalloyed by patronage, and did not ask, as he might, “What has all that to do with it?”

  In fact, a sympathetic silence possessed the whole company. It was broken at last by the closest listener’s saying: “After all, I don’t know that Metchnikoff’s book is so very blighting. It’s certainly a very important book, and it produces a reaction which may be wholesome or unwholesome as you choose to think. And no matter what we believe, we must respect the honesty of the scientific attitude in regard to a matter that has been too much abandoned to the emotions, perhaps. In all seriousness I wish some scientific man would apply the scientific method to finding out the soul, as you” — he turned to the light skirmisher— “suggest. Why shouldn’t it be investigated?”

  Upon this invitation the light skirmisher tried to imagine some psychological experiments which should bear a certain analogy to those of the physicists, but he failed to keep the level of his suggestion.

  “As I said,” the closest listener remarked, “he produces a secondary state of revolt which is desirable, for in that state we begin to inquire not only where we stand, but where he stands.”

  “And what is your conclusion as to his place in the inquiry?”

  “That it isn’t different from yours or mine, really. We all share the illusion of the race from the beginning that somehow our opinion of the matter affects its reality. I should distinguish so far as to say that we think we believe, and he thinks he knows. For my own part, I have the impression that he has helped my belief.”

  The light skirmisher made a desperate effort to retrieve himself: “Then a few more books like his would restore the age of faith.”

  XXI

  AROUND A RAINY-DAY FIRE

  A number of the Easy Chair’s friends were sitting round the fire in the library of a country-house. The room was large and full of a soft, flattering light. The fire was freshly kindled, and flashed and crackled with a young vivacity, letting its rays frolic over the serried bindings on the shelves, the glazed pictures on the walls, the cups of after-luncheon coffee in the hands of the people, and the tall jugs and pots in the tray left standing on the library table. It was summer, but a cold rain was falling forbiddingly without. No one else could come, and no one could wish to go. The conditions all favored a just self-esteem, and a sense of providential preference in the accidental assemblage of those people at that time and place.

  The talk was rather naturally, though not necessarily, of books, and one of the people was noting that children seemed to like short stories because their minds had not the strength to keep the facts of a whole book. The effort tired them, and they gave it up, not because a book did not interest them, but because it exhausted their little powers. They were good for a leap, or a dash, or a short flight in literature, even very high literature, but they had not really the force for anything covering greater time and space.

  Another declared this very suggestive, and declared it in such a way that the whole company perceived he had something behind his words, and besought him to say what he meant. He did so, as well as he could, after protesting that it was not very novel, or if so, perhaps not very important, and if it was important, perhaps it was not true. They said they would take the chances; and then he said that it was merely a notion which had occurred to him at the moment concerning the new reading of the new reading public, whether it might not be all juvenile literature, adapted in mature terms to people of physical adolescence but of undeveloped thinking and feeling: not really feeble-minded youth, but æsthetically and intellectually children, who might presently grow into the power of enjoying and digesting food for men. By-and-by they might gather fortitude for pleasure in real literature, in fiction which should not be a travesty of the old fairy-tales, or stories of adventures among giants and robbers and pirates, or fables with human beings speaking from the motives and passions of animals. He mentioned fiction, he said, because the new reading of the new reading public seemed to be nearly altogether fiction.

  All this had so much the effect of philosophical analysis that those comfortable people were lulled into self-approving assent; and putting themselves altogether apart from the new reading public, they begged him to say what he meant. He answered that there was nothing more phenomenal in the modern American life; and he paid a pretty tribute to their ignorance in owning that he was not surprised they knew nothing of that public. He promised that he would try to define it, and he began by remarking that it seemed to be largely composed of the kind of persons who at the theatre audibly interpret the action to one another. The present company must have heard them?

  His listeners again assented. Was the new reading public drawn from the theatre-going, or more definitely speaking, the matinée class?

  There was something odd, there, the philosopher returned. The matinée class was as large as ever: larger; while the new reading public, perfectly interchangeable with it in its intellectual pleasure and experiences, had suddenly outnumbered it a thousandfold. The popular novel and the popular play were so entirely of one fibre and texture, and so easily convertible, that a new novel was scarcely in every one’s bread-trough before it was on the boards of all the theatres. This led some to believe that we were experiencing a revival of the drama, and that if we kept on having authors who sold half a million copies we could not help having a Shakespeare by-and-by: he must follow.

  One of those listening asked, But how had these people begun so instantaneously to form themselves into this new innumerable reading public? If they were of that quality of mind which requires the translation of an unmistakable meaning from the players to the playgoers, they must find themselves helpless when grappling in solitude with the sense of a book. Why did not they go increasingly to the theatre instead of turning so overwhelmingly to the printed word?

  The p
hilosopher replied that they had not now begun to do this, but only seemed to have begun, since there really was no beginning in anything. The readers had always been in the immense majority, because they could read anywhere, and they could see plays only in the cities and towns. If the theatre were universal, undoubtedly they would prefer plays, because a play makes far less draft upon the mental capacities or energies than the silliest book; and what seemed their effort to interpret it to one another might very well be the exchange of their delight in it. The books they preferred were of the nature of poor plays, full of “easy things to understand,” cheap, common incidents, obvious motives, and vulgar passions, such as had been used a thousand times over in literature. They were fitted for the new reading public for this reason; the constant repetition of the same characters, events, scenes, plots, gave their infantile minds the pleasure which children find in having a story told over and over in exactly the same terms. The new reading public would rebel against any variance, just as children do.

  The most of the company silently acquiesced, or at least were silent, but one of them made the speaker observe that he had not told them what this innumerable unreasoning multitude had read before the present plague of handsome, empty, foolish duodecimos had infested everybody’s bread-trough.

  The philosopher said the actual interior form of non-literary literature was an effect of the thin spread of our literary culture, and outwardly was the effect of the thick spread of our material prosperity. The dollar-and-a-half novel of to-day was the dime novel of yesterday in an avatar which left its essence unchanged. It was even worse, for it was less sincerely and forcibly written, and it could not be so quickly worn out and thrown away. Its beauty of paper, print, and binding gave it a claim to regard which could not be ignored, and established for it a sort of right to lie upon the table, and then stand upon the shelf, where it seemed to relate itself to genuine literature, and to be of the same race and lineage. As for this vast new reading public, it was the vast old reading public with more means in its pocket of satisfying its crude, childish taste. Its head was the same empty head.

 

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