Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume 2

by Charles Moore

  The imagined oration ended with a personal plea from Mrs Thatcher to Reagan: ‘You will also cause me very real political difficulties if you pursue your proposal for eliminating ballistic missiles too actively. In our people’s minds it will raise two questions: isn’t Labour right after all in wanting to get rid of nuclear weapons … ? And why on earth should we pay out all that money for Trident, if it’s going to be abolished in 10 years?’ The next British general election could ‘turn’ on these points, so ‘you must help me deal with these arguments. The best way is to reaffirm strongly that the Alliance will continue to rely on nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future.’90

  Rarely does a civil servant’s draft so clearly set out policy thinking and political tactics, and reveal such a close understanding of his principal’s mind and character. Powell’s high ability and confidence in doing so show why he had become indispensable to Mrs Thatcher, and therefore very irritating to the Foreign Office, whose officials felt – and were – excluded from the inner counsels. In response to the draft press statement, Geoffrey Howe argued for greater caution: a good agreement in Camp David might not be possible, and therefore it might be more prudent not to press for a joint statement at all.91 But Powell was surely correct in his summary of the British problem, and in his bolder sense of how Mrs Thatcher could best argue her case personally with her closest ally. At the heart of this lay a crucial concession. To try to stave off the elimination of ballistic missiles, she needed to welcome the proposed zero for INF missiles in Europe. ‘She didn’t like the plans to get rid of INF,’ recalled Powell. ‘To be perfectly honest she never liked any disarmament at all. She had to be pushed and bullied into anything of that sort. I think that having gone all the way to secure the deployment of these missiles, she was reluctant to give them up. But she was sufficiently pragmatic to realize that there was no alternative to some sort of deal.’92 Powell was also skilful in his methods. He had cultivated a close relationship with Price, the Ambassador, and he ensured that she privately passed Price her pre-Camp David thoughts so that they would go ‘directly to the President, not put in telegrams which get [Mrs Thatcher underlined] splattered all round the State Department’.93 In the end, she followed Powell’s advice happily, and successfully.

  Just as Mrs Thatcher was preparing for her visit to Washington, a story broke in a Beirut newspaper which threatened the stability of Reagan’s presidency. The scandal, which eventually became known as ‘Iran–Contra’, began with revelations that the Reagan administration had been secretly engaged in efforts to sell weapons to Iran in return for the release of American hostages held by Iranian proxies in the Lebanon.* This ran contrary to US policy towards negotiating with terrorists, and was also, very likely, contrary to US law. There was talk of impeachment, if Reagan’s knowledge of the operation could be proved. What had happened, it eventually emerged, was that the NSC staff, under Poindexter and his staffer, Colonel Oliver North, had been running the scheme without reference to Shultz and the State Department. As the story grew, Reagan denied it publicly, the day before Mrs Thatcher arrived in Washington. It was ‘utterly false’, he insisted.94

  Although the White House probably did not realize it, Mrs Thatcher knew that Reagan was not telling the truth.95 According to Charles Powell, ‘We knew about it because of the extraordinarily close intermeshing of GCHQ, Cheltenham and NSA [the US National Security Agency] operations.’96 Information provided to the Americans was gathered by GCHQ and passed through British channels. British analysts were thus able to work out that something was going on and make an accurate guess at what it was. Although Mrs Thatcher was unhappy with what was happening, she calculated that there was nothing to be gained by pursuing the issue with the administration. ‘We couldn’t raise it because we weren’t supposed to know about it,’ Powell recalled. ‘We didn’t want to do anything frankly that would cut us off from the extraordinary flow of information which we got from the NSA.’97 Because of this, and because the whole business had nothing to do with her, the best line open to Mrs Thatcher was ‘Defend the man, not the policy.’98 But the news added to the sense of crisis and drama surrounding her Washington visit.

  In Washington, there was a good deal of support for Mrs Thatcher’s views on the elimination of nuclear weapons, and sympathy with her difficult political position. Just as Charles Powell was drafting his ‘speech’ for his boss, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, who considered the idea of zero ballistic missiles within ten years ‘completely unacceptable’,99 told Reagan, at a meeting on 27 October, ‘As your chief military adviser, I do not recommend that you submit the proposal, Mr President.’100 Nevertheless, the policy of eliminating all ballistic missiles over ten years was not actually withdrawn, but was enshrined in a National Security Decision Directive, which the President signed on 3 November.101 Shultz told Reagan that they wanted to secure Mrs Thatcher’s agreement to this approach at Camp David. At the same time, though, he stressed that it was important that ‘she returns to London stronger politically and reassured about the direction of our policies.’102 On Trident, the Americans felt, they could give her reassurance, since the breakdown at Reykjavik meant that nuclear modernization could now go ahead, at least for the time being. The real task was ‘to find a mutually acceptable formula that addresses Mrs Thatcher’s insistence that drastic nuclear reductions such as the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles are inadvisable as long as conventional and chemical imbalances exist in Europe’.103

  In line with Powell’s advice, Mrs Thatcher had decided to welcome the zero INF deal, but the Americans did not yet know this. In the run-up to her visit, there was concern, if not irritation, at the idea that she might add this to her list of grievances. The Americans felt that the Europeans had been pushing them to negotiate reductions for years. Now that agreement had been reached to do away with the missiles, European leaders seemed to want to keep them after all. Reagan, advised Ty Cobb, an NSC staffer, should ‘make this an issue with Thatcher, when she starts whining that “European interests were not taken into account.” I know that RR doesn’t like to talk tough, least of all with Thatcher, but I think its [sic] time to unload on them. They simply can’t keep urging us to do this and that, then when we do they scurry for cover.’104 Remembering what had happened at Camp David in 1984, the Americans were also jumpy about whether Mrs Thatcher would turn up with a draft joint statement at the ready. Powell told the London Embassy that ‘the Prime Minister had no intention of doing so … The President and Prime Minister might agree that a joint statement would be desirable at the end of the talks, but that remained to be seen.’105 In fact, American anxieties were well founded. Mrs Thatcher arrived in Washington on Friday 14 November with a text in her handbag.

  The next morning Bernard Ingham sent her a note explaining how ‘you should be able to turn this visit into a roaring success.’106 He warned her that the press wanted rows on Reykjavik, the Iran scandal and US support for international criticisms of the fishing zone in the Falklands. The best outcome, he advised, would be to concentrate on what mattered to her: ‘This visit is highly important in domestic political terms for you. You want to show back home that the old magic works with the Americans and that in your hands the West’s defence is secure. The stronger your statement agreed at Camp David the more you should concentrate on this issue and play the rest away.’ So she had every incentive to drive a hard, if friendly bargain with Reagan.

  As was her preferred tactic, so that she could be calmer and politer when she met the President, Mrs Thatcher took out her frustration on others first. On the day she arrived, she had separate meetings with Caspar Weinberger and George Shultz. To Weinberger, she announced that her visit was ‘possibly the most important she had ever made. The defence of the free world was at stake.’107 To Shultz, Mrs Thatcher wisely proclaimed her support for the zero INF deal. Beyond this, as Shultz recalled, she gave him ‘unshirted hell’.108 She particularly emphasized the European p
erspective of sharing a continent with the much more heavily armed Soviets. Shultz tried to reassure her by saying that ‘it was in practical terms impossible to conceive of them [the Reykjavik disarmament proposals] being brought to the point of agreement during President Reagan’s remaining term in office.’109 Mrs Thatcher was not much appeased – ‘she could not emphasise too much the degree to which the United States proposal on ballistic missiles, and the failure to consult in advance about it, had undermined confidence in Europe.’ The proposal would do nothing less than ‘undermine the security of Western Europe’, she told Shultz, before delivering her coup de grâce: if pursued, it would ‘cause you to lose me and the British nation’.110

  While Secretary of State and Prime Minister did not agree, given what was at stake they saw the necessity of finding the ‘mutually acceptable formula’ which Shultz had advocated to Reagan. Charles Powell and others worked late to redraft the statement that would be issued at the conclusion of the visit with what Mrs Thatcher praised as their ‘golden pens’.111 The next morning, as they flew to Camp David, the British passed their draft to Shultz, Poindexter and Ridgway, who accepted it. At one point, Mrs Thatcher was very persistent about a minor change. Poindexter was impressed: ‘I remember thinking afterwards, that’s why they refer to her as “the lady with the iron pants”. Very tough.’112 The hard work of negotiation was complete before Mrs Thatcher had even arrived at Camp David.

  At Camp David, recalled Charles Powell, Mrs Thatcher was ‘very nervous about her meeting with Reagan and needed intensive hand-holding’.113 The stakes, of course, could hardly have been higher. In the end, it turned out that she had little to worry about other than the President’s skills as a driver: ‘There is a rather romantic photograph of her coming off the helicopter with Reagan holding his hands out. It’s real “Gone with the Wind” stuff,’ recalled Charles Powell, who watched as Mrs Thatcher climbed aboard the President’s golf cart. ‘She was petrified being driven around by Reagan. She was absolutely convinced he was going to tip her into the woods or something. She hated it. You could see the sort of fixed expression on her face.’114 The two met for a tête-à-tête in Aspen Lodge, the President’s cabin. Reagan explained the Iran business, misleadingly: ‘He assured the Prime Minister that there had never been any question of bargaining for the release of the hostages.’ Then he gave her a long account of his talks at Reykjavik. Mrs Thatcher repeated to the President, in more measured terms, the arguments she had put to George Shultz and ‘underlined the inadequacy of airbreathing systems [that is, non-ballistic weapons that require the oxygen in the earth’s atmosphere, such as cruise missiles and aircraft] alone to provide deterrence’.115 For his part, Reagan ‘left no doubt’ about the US commitment to strategic nuclear modernization, the United Kingdom’s independent deterrent and ‘its modernisation with Trident’. At the end of all this, Mrs Thatcher laid a copy of the joint statement before him: ‘The President accepted this without demur.’116

  In came Shultz, Reagan’s Chief of Staff Donald Regan, Poindexter and others for cocktails, lunch and a much more general conversation. It was all very genial, although Mrs Thatcher did indulge her habit of going on and on. Jim Kuhn, Reagan’s executive assistant, managed to get Reagan aside during a break and told him, ‘Mr. President … you haven’t said anything. You have lots of points you need to make.’ But ‘The president just smiled. “Jim,” he said, “you’ve got to understand that Maggie and I are old friends, and I just couldn’t step in like that. She’s much too dear of a friend.” ’117 At last, however, Reagan got his chance, and gave a further description of his Reykjavik meetings. He praised Gorbachev for being ‘the first Soviet leader not to reaffirm the goal of world Communist domination … He was also the first Soviet leader to propose the elimination of weapons which the Soviet Union already possessed.’ On the other hand, ‘he recalled Mr Gorbachev’s refusal to have any serious discussion at Reykjavik of the causes of conflict between East and West.’ Reagan remembered his own anger as the meeting broke down. ‘Mr Gorbachev’s parting words had been that it was still not too late, to which the President had replied: it is for me.’118

  Before flying to Camp David that morning, Mrs Thatcher had breakfasted with Vice-President George Bush. He had spoken to her frankly about the crisis over the Iran arms-for-hostages affair. ‘The climate was as ugly’, he told her, ‘as anything he had seen in a long time … People had not believed the President, for the first time in his Presidency. Congress was loaded for bear [that is, ready for a fight].’119 With this gloomy view in her head though not on her lips, Mrs Thatcher raised the matter with Reagan and pointed out that she would be asked about it at the press conference. ‘She would say that the President had reaffirmed to her that the United States did not pay ransom of any sort for hostages,’ Powell recorded. ‘That was of course our policy too.’120

  Mrs Thatcher was so pleased with the agreed statement that she reprinted virtually its entire text in her memoirs.121 She had good reason for her satisfaction. The statement announced that the priority in arms control would be ‘an INF agreement with restraints on shorter-range systems; a 50 per cent cut over five years in United States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons; and a ban on chemical weapons’.122 It stressed both leaders’ support for ‘the SDI research programme, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty’.* This was followed by a reassertion, crucial for Mrs Thatcher, of nuclear deterrence: ‘We confirmed that NATO’s strategy of forward defence and flexible response would continue to require effective nuclear deterrents based upon a mix of systems. At the same time, reductions in nuclear weapons would increase the importance of eliminating conventional disparities.’ Finally, ‘The President reaffirmed the United States intention to proceed with its strategic nuclear modernisation programme, including Trident. He also confirmed his full support for arrangements made to modernise Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent with Trident.’

  Bernard Ingham gleefully reported to Mrs Thatcher that the press was full of ‘glowing praise’ for her performance at Camp David, mentioning in particular the Telegraph’s leading headline: ‘Thatcher Trident Triumph’.123 The only important omission from her prized statement was any language repudiating the idea of abolishing ballistic missiles. The Times’s diplomatic correspondent noticed: ‘The chasm between Europe’s cautious step-by-step view of nuclear disarmament and Washington’s grand vision was not bridged during the talks.’124 Each party could take refuge in the ambiguity of wording about nuclear deterrence being ‘based on a mix of systems’. There was neither an agreement, nor an agreement to disagree: it was more an agreement to pretend to agree. What mattered, from Mrs Thatcher’s point of view, was that the President had agreed to give priority to the proposals she favoured, inevitably pushing any discussion of the elimination of ballistic missiles into the indefinite future.

  There were several factors, of course, in the weakening of Reagan’s Reykjavik agenda for nuclear disarmament. There was institutional opposition, such as that of the Joint Chiefs. There was outside expert opposition, such as that offered by Henry Kissinger.* Above all, there was the effect of the Iran–Contra scandal. On 25 November, Oliver North was fired and John Poindexter resigned after revelations that profits from arms sales to Iran were being diverted to the Contras in Nicaragua.† Poindexter was replaced as National Security Advisor by Frank Carlucci, who, on appointment, told the President that he ‘disagreed with Reykjavik’.125 As he sought to return Reagan to the nuclear fold, Carlucci was happy to pray Mrs Thatcher in aid: ‘I finally said, “Mr President, if you move to get rid of nuclear weapons, Margaret will be on the phone in five minutes.” “Oh, I don’t want that,” he said.’126

  Mrs Thatcher’s letter of comfort to Ronald Reagan at the height of the Iran– Contra affair, December 1986: ‘anything which weakens you, weakens America; and anything that weakens America weakens the whole free world.’

  By the end of the year, Reagan had been forced to bend to the anxieties of Mrs That
cher and those around him. The Soviets also made clear that they had no interest in pursuing the ballistic-missile proposal. The mood had changed: ‘I don’t remember Reykjavik being a burning issue when I arrived as Deputy National Security Advisor on January 1, 1987,’ said Colin Powell.127 The talk now was of nuclear-arms reduction, not of a nuclear-free world. As George Shultz recalled, the proposal to abolish ballistic missiles ‘just sort of faded. She was the exclamation point, after which there was nothing much.’128

  In later years, Mrs Thatcher came to have a kinder view of what Reagan had achieved at Reykjavik. In her memoirs, she wrote that ‘President Reagan’s refusal to trade away SDI for the apparent near fulfilment of his dream of a nuclear-free world was crucial to the victory over communism. He called the Soviets’ bluff.’129 Many Reagan supporters took the view that Reagan had elicited concessions from Gorbachev which could never be taken back. By sticking to SDI, he had emerged stronger, Gorbachev weaker. In principle, Mrs Thatcher accepted this argument, but her most powerful memory of Reykjavik was of her fear of what might have happened. ‘I don’t think she ever came to see it as a success,’ said Charles Powell.130 ‘I think the lesson of Reykjavik was that Reagan wasn’t really reliable in international affairs,’ said Bernard Ingham. ‘He had to be kept on a strict rein. I suppose Reykjavik is the classic example where she found reason to worry about his understanding of life.’131 But the aftermath of Reykjavik at Camp David also confirmed her sense of her own ability to influence events favourably, and to make good use of her real friendship with Ronald Reagan. Her staunch personal support over Iran–Contra – the reassuring sense she gave him that she would be with him in difficulty – helped keep that friendship strong. Once the Reykjavik difficulty had been overcome, the rest of Reagan’s term would, by comparison, be plain-sailing for her.