For That One Day: The Memoirs of Mitsuo Fuchida, Commander of the Attack on Pearl Harbor

by Tadanori Urabe

  On December 26th, Shimazaki and I reported to the General Staff Headquarters at 9:00 AM and, after a rehearsal at the First Operations Department, went to the palace together with Nagano and Commander Nagumo. We waited for only a short time, and His Majesty appeared, accompanied only by his chief aide-de-camp, Shigeru Hasunuma.

  Standing directly across from His Majesty, I unfolded the layout in front of him and, pointing with my finger at the relevant places on the battlefield diagram, gave a blow-by-blow description of our battle achievements against the enemy ships. For each topic of discussion, I showed and described to him aerial photographs we had taken. His Majesty looked at the photos with great interest, turning them vertically and horizontally. Our allotted time was 30 minutes, but we ended up spending one-and-a-half hours. Following me, Shimazaki reported on the battle development and achievements of the attack on the air bases.

  When Nagano asked, “Are there any more questions?” the Emperor responded, “Not particularly.” However, after a short while, he asked Nagano, “Are you bringing these photographs back?”

  Nagano relied, “We will have them framed and delivered to place by your side.”

  The Emperor said, “The mounting can be done later. I will take them now to show them to the Empress.” Thus, the Emperor himself left the room carrying more than a dozen photos.

  Upon our return from the palace, we were received at the official residence of the Minister of the Navy, where more than a dozen military counselors and leading dignitaries of the Navy were present.

  There, Shimazaki and I repeated exactly what we reported to the Throne just a short time earlier. Prince Fushiminomiya was among the dignitaries, but it was the eldest person in the audience, Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu, who, more than the others, praised us. The reason was that we had destroyed all the capital ships of the US Pacific Fleet. This had been the aim of the Japanese Navy for the past 30 years. Adding to his praise, he said he admired me because, “You are an ideal example of a warrior; you have not ignored accurate surveillance in analyzing your battle achievements.” This was really too much praise for me. While I felt like sinking through the floor, regretting that we missed destroying the enemy carriers, here these dozen naval counselors were overjoyed with the sinking of the battleships, offering drinks to me one after another.

  When I left the celebration party at the official residence and returned to General Staff Headquarters, Prince Takamatsunomiya Nobuhito approached me. The Prince was in the same 52nd class with me at the Naval Academy, and he was a member of the General Staff at that time. He told me that he wanted me to tell the story I reported to the Throne earlier today to members of the imperial families, who would be getting together at the Kasumigaseki Detached Palace tomorrow. And I did not have to worry about confidentiality matters as only adults would be attending.

  This was also the greatest honor. Thus, the next day, on December 27th, we visited the Detached Palace where both Shimazaki and I talked on the subject alternately for about an hour-and-a-half from 2:00 in the afternoon. Prince Fushiminomiya was hosting the meeting, and His Royal Highness was very considerate to us. I was impressed that Prince Mikasanomiya was taking notes until the very end of our presentation.

  Following all the events with the royal audiences, Shimazaki and I flew from Yokosuka to Iwakuni Base to return to our squadrons. We shared one piece each of adzuki-bean yokan [a Japanese jelly confection] from the famous store, Toraya, with the crew members to share the honor of the previous days.

  23

  The State of Mind of the Air

  Squadron Crews

  On December 10, 1941, the Emperor summoned Chief of General Staff Nagano to give him the following benevolent Imperial Rescript:

  Imperial Rescript

  The Combined Fleet accomplished a great achievement by destroying the enemy fleet and air force in the Hawaii area at the inception of the war. I was deeply pleased by this and wish that both officers and soldiers will exert even more effort to secure great achievements in the future.

  The Imperial Seal

  December 10, 1941

  In the following year, on February 11, 1942, Commander Yamamoto of the Combined Fleet granted a Citation of Appreciation to the special mini-submarines attack unit. The Citation read as follows:

  Citation of Appreciation: Special Attack Unit

  On December 8, 1941, in concert with our air squadrons, the special attack unit assailed the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor at the inception of the war, sacrificing themselves, and accomplished a great battle achievement. Their deeds of valor that increased the prestige of the loyalty of the men of the Imperial Navy, in and outside the nation, and enhanced the morale of the entire Navy are recognized as truly outstanding.

  Therefore, I grant a Citation of Appreciation.

  February 11, 1942

  Commander of the Combined Fleet

  Isoroku Yamamoto

  The reason it took so long before this Citation of Appreciation was granted was that it was customary for the Japanese Navy in those days to issue citations only after confirmation of the battle results. In this context, no one survived from the mini-submarine unit, and the US side had not announced anything to date regarding any incident involving the mini-submarines. Besides, according to information from a third country, presumed to be Sweden, there were rumors that a special mini-submarine crew had been captured and was being held as war prisoners. Given the situation, there was enough reason to delay the issuance of the citation.

  Nevertheless, it was imperative to recognize these nine crew members as having died in action, though unrepatriated, promoting them by two steps and respecting them as war heroes. It was also important to conduct a state funeral for these nine war heroes in order to enhance the fighting morale of the public in general. And I suspected that this had been the reason to expedite the granting of the citation.

  Prior to this, I heard that Captain Hanku Sasaki, Commander of the Special Attack Unit, submitted a petition to announce 10, instead of nine, war heroes, the reason being that one remaining crew member, Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki, had been captured only because the fortunes of war turned against him, and there was no difference in his fighting spirit because he had staked his life along with the other nine crew members. The Navy tried to hide the fact that Sakamaki was captured using various means, such as erasing Sakamaki’s image from a group photograph of all ten crew members taken before the mission or erasing his signature from a collection of the group’s autographs. However, there were some among the public who thought that the number of war heroes—nine—was peculiar, and, to some extent, it was like an open secret.

  On December 26th, when I was in Tokyo for a meeting, Commander Ryunosuke Ariizumi, the staff officer in charge of submarines at Imperial Headquarters, came to see me to sound me out.

  “Commander Fuchida, why don’t you give credit for the explosive sinking of the Arizona to the special attack unit?”

  I smiled wryly and answered, “We do not necessarily claim credit for each other’s achievements, and since the special mini-submarines were engaged in a special attack mission, I personally would very much like to publicly and loudly talk about their contribution—but not with regard to the Arizona. You know what? The Arizona was moored at its post on the east side of Ford Island, and a repair ship called the Vestal was moored next to the Arizona on the outside. Therefore, a torpedo could not possibly have reached the Arizona. If we should announce that it was an instantaneous sinking by a mini-submarine, we will be laughed at around the world.”

  Commander Ariizumi was a submarine specialist and senior to me by one year at the Naval Academy. He was a hot-blooded guy who enthusiastically promoted the use of special mini-submarines in the attack on Pearl Harbor from the start, and he seemed to have disliked my comment and went out of the room indignantly.

  Back then, news photos, brought in through third countries, showed the disastrous sinking scene of the Arizona. They were most appealing as evidence of the a
chievement by the special attack unit, and they wanted to use them to glorify their nine war heroes.

  In the end, the story that was concocted gave credit for the instant sinking of the Arizona to the special mini-submarine attack unit, and the state funeral for the nine war heroes was carried out on a grand scale amidst jubilation across the entire nation.

  We were fighting in one place after another in the south at that time, but the mindset of the air squadron crews who overheard this was not without hostility. Everybody knew too well that the instant sinking of the Arizona was the result of an induced explosion caused by an 800-kilogram armor-piercing bomb. This bomb was dropped by the air attack squadron, and it penetrated the Arizona’s magazine. Besides, there were 55 fliers killed in action, who never returned, and there was no news that they would be promoted to war heroes. Some of the crew members made sarcastic remarks, complaining that the naval authorities might think that there were too many candidates for an elevation to war hero and that the two-step promotion process must not have much value.

  In response to these complaints, I told them: “The special mini-submarines engaged in the attack had no hope of survival from the beginning. Give the credit for sinking the Arizona to them.”

  As these words of authority came from their General Commander, they became quiet about this matter, but it seemed that complaints still remained among the captains and aviation heads at the First Aviation Fleet’s Command Center. Under these circumstances, a Citation of Appreciation was granted to the forces that participated in the Battle of Hawaii, even though it was already April 15th. The citation read as follows:

  Citation of Appreciation: Forces Participating in the Battle of Hawaii

  The annihilation of most of the main force of the US Pacific Fleet and air power in position, resulting from the fierce attack of the air squadrons on December 8, 1941, by a surprise attack after having advanced a long distance, on the naval port of Hawaii at the outset of the war, made an enormous contribution to the following operations, and I recognize the deeds of valor as prominent and grant this Citation of Appreciation.

  April 15, 1942

  Commander of the Combined Fleet

  Isoroku Yamamoto

  At the sight of this citation, I was rather disturbed by the expression, “prominent deeds of valor.” The evaluation of our deeds as “prominent” was below the best evaluation of “outstanding.”

  In view of the nature of their mission, I had no objection to the use of “outstanding deed of valor” for the citation to the special mini-submarine attack unit. However, if we consider the overall battle results, it was the air squadrons that annihilated the US Pacific Fleet, and they should be praised without question for their “outstanding deeds of valor.” Instead, our evaluation was one rank below— “prominent deeds of valor”—and this annoyed me.

  This happened later, but when I was assigned as the Chief Staff Officer of the First Aviation Fleet, Captain Yoshitake Miwa was the Chief of Staff. Since Miwa was on the staff of the Combined Fleet at the beginning of the war and responsible for determining which units should be given credit for battle achievements, I took advantage of the opportunity to ask him about the story behind the Citation of Appreciation.

  Miwa responded to my question by explaining that, “As the staff officer in charge of crediting, I drafted ‘outstanding deeds of valor’ for the citation, but Commander Yamamoto himself downgraded the rank one step and decided on ‘prominent deeds of valor.’ According to what he said, the reason was that if Commander Nagumo had more aggressively made repeat attacks, there would be no problem with ‘outstanding deeds of valor.’ However, because Nagumo retreated after one attack, Commander Yamamoto instructed me to write ‘prominent’ instead.”

  Now, I understood. As I suspected, Nagumo’s intentions were not in line with those of his boss, Commander Yamamoto.

  Also, Vice Admiral Matomu Ugaki, Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet at the time, describes his feelings in his War Memoirs. His diary entry of December 7, 1941 states: “The telegram that arrived last night said that the Task Force Fleet was taking the first course to return via ‘L’ point and contained the report on the battle results. It gives me the impression of self-satisfied thieves running away after only limited success. With only 30 damaged or lost planes, it is of primary importance to expand our battle achievements as much as possible.”

  Then, he mentions that there were opinions among the staff to make them go back to attack Hawaii again, but he gives three reasons for believing it was too late, admitting their opinions to return were totally justifiable, and concludes, “If I were the commander, I would encourage my men to expand their battle achievements further until Pearl Harbor is completely destroyed. But I can take care only of my own business, not theirs.”

  Here, we can perceive the atmosphere at the Command Center of the Combined Fleet that resulted in the downgrading of credit and appreciation to “prominent deeds of valor.” Based on this state of affairs, the granting of the Citation of Appreciation was delayed by four months, and, accordingly, the Navy’s Personnel Department delayed the measure to provide the two-step promotion of the 55 fliers killed in action to war heroes. In the end, this did not help to enhance the morale of the Nagumo Task Force, the main force of the Combined Fleet.

  PART THREE

  SUDDEN DARKENING

  Carrier Division 1 Officers, at the Command Center—Rear Admiral

  Kakuji Kakuta (front row, center), Chief of Staff Captain Yoshio Miwa

  (front row, left) Senior Staff Commander Fuchida (front row, right)

  24

  Naval Battle off Malaya

  On December 10, 1941 (Tokyo time), I lay on the bed in my private room [on the Akagi] all day as I felt fatigued and was slightly feverish. As the evening wore on, Genda entered my room without knocking, with a big smile on his face. As I rose up on the bed, I found that he came to tell me the jubilant news of the Naval Battle off Malaya.

  The news was that 26 Mitsubishi G4M Betty Bombers (Type 1 Land-Based Attack Bomber) and 59 Mitsubishi G3Ms (Type 96 Land-Based Attack Bomber)—85 planes in total —of the 22nd Air Squadron that had been deployed in Indochina had sunk the HMS Prince of Wales, the flagship of the British Eastern Fleet, and her escort battle cruiser, the HMS Repulse. The British ships had sortied from Singapore in an attempt to intercept Japanese Army convoys which were landing on Kota Bharu, off the eastern coast of Malaya, near Kuantan.

  The Prince of Wales was sunk after being hit by five torpedoes and a 500-kilogram bomb. The Repulse was also sunk after five torpedo hits and a 250-kilogram bomb. However, our damage was limited to three planes.

  “Oh, they did it!” I was beside myself with joy.

  Prince of Wales was the newest unsinkable battleship that was the pride of Britain. The ship gained popularity among the British people based on its engagement with the German battleship, Bismarck. I could imagine how discouraged the British people must have been by the unexpected loss of the ship.

  I said, “This should have convinced the leaders of the Japanese Navy of our argument of the non-utility of battleships.”

  To this, Genda did not nod and did not give any indication of agreement. He simply said, “I don’t know.”

  A man with his sharp mind must have seen through the stubbornness of the Japanese Navy’s bone-headed leaders. I happened to see evidence of this after the war. The War Memoirs of Rear Admiral Ugaki, who was the Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet when the war broke out, describes his feelings about the role of the battleship and the airplane as follows:

  “I cannot help but confirm the undoubted strength of planes based on developments since last night [December 9th]. This brand new battleship that once participated in the sinking of the Bismarck demonstrated unexpectedly weak defensive capabilities. On this basis, the non-utility theory of battleships and the versatility theory of aviation should gather much greater momentum.”

  He repeatedly regrets that the Southern Expediti
onary Fleet, which destroyed the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, included two fast battleships under the command of Rear Admiral Ozawa and surface ships of the Second Fleet in the battle that lasted day and night on December 9th. Interestingly, Ugaki stated in his diary entry of December 16th that, “As of today, construction of the Yamato has been completed, and she is scheduled to be officially listed and enrolled in the First Squadron. I am pleased with the addition of such great strength.”

  And during the evening of the following day, December 17th, a detailed report on the battle achievements of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor arrived. Seeing the report, Ugaki wrote his impression as follows:

  “This is the grace and help of Heaven. We should celebrate this truly excellent battle result. The 5:5:3 capital ships ratio we have suffered has become quite the opposite now with the addition of the Yamato. What we failed to achieve by treaty, we have taken by force. Now is the time to let them understand the situation. The 20 years of hardship we have endured have borne fruit for us now. I pay respect to the struggle and efforts of all parties concerned. However, the first strike at Hawaii should have left a deep resentment in their mind. There is no way of knowing what means they might employ as retaliation, whether aircraft carriers or superior air power. We should not let our guard down by any means.”

  Looking at the latter half of his statement, I was almost about to thank Ugaki for his insightful understanding of the power of aviation. However, then, as the proverb says, “As the twig is bent, so grows the tree,” I found the following entry in his diary, dated December 26th, which only reaffirmed his total lack of understanding: