For That One Day: The Memoirs of Mitsuo Fuchida, Commander of the Attack on Pearl Harbor

by Tadanori Urabe

  When I heard this, I clapped my hands in spite of myself as I thought, “Well said!” Chief of Staff Ugaki, who was presiding at the meeting, stared at me, meaning that we were not supposed to applaud during such a serious fleet meeting. At that time, the Japanese Navy had seven regular aircraft carriers—Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku and Ryujyo—apart from the small and obsolete carrier, Hosho. We also had three auxiliary carriers—Zuiho, Shoho and Taiyo. At the time of our Stage One Operations meeting, the Taiho was under construction but plans to convert the super battleship, Shinano, to a carrier had not yet been decided. However, conversions of large merchant ships—namely, Junyo, Hiyo Chuyo and Ryuho—to auxiliary carriers had been speeded up, with plans to have them commissioned as carriers during the course of 1942.

  What we referred to as auxiliary carriers were more like floating airfields, and the auxiliary carriers themselves were not designed to engage in battles. Their key function was to carry and launch the air squadrons that would be the major force in the decisive battles of the fleet. In order to correct their defensive vulnerability, the auxiliary carriers had to be protected by a dedicated escort of battleships and cruisers. If the logic of this thinking had been accepted, there should have been no trouble in organizing three task force fleets. However, the conservatives are almost always slow in making decisions and taking action. This idea was not adopted for the Midway operation.

  An additional vulnerability was also found in the carrier’s radio communications equipment. The back of an aircraft carrier is the flight deck, and it is taboo to put tall masts around the deck. Since the radio communications function of a carrier is quite weak, it was unacceptable to use a carrier as the command center for a fleet, despite the fact that the carrier, Akagi, was the flagship of the Nagumo Task Force. The Nagumo Task Force’s Chief of Staff Kusaka, who felt uneasy about this point, visited the Command Center of the Combined Fleet for a meeting with Chief of Staff Ugaki. He asked Ugaki, “As a feature peculiar to an aircraft carrier, the radio capability of the Akagi is poor, and our interception of enemy communications is not as effective as the Yamato’s. Therefore, we want you to advise us immediately on the Akagi of any enemy communications received by the Yamato that indicate movements of the enemy task force.”

  However, this was not a request that could be easily accepted. During sea battles, the transmission of radio signals must be curtailed. Here, the solution would have been for Admiral Yamamoto to take command of the Nagumo Task Force in the vanguard, but as the Supreme Commander of the entire fleet, on board the Yamato. It was my personal conviction at the time. While the Japanese Navy failed to adopt my theory, the US Navy organized themselves from the middle stages of the Pacific War along the lines I had proposed to my Navy. Both Commander Halsey of the Third Fleet and Commander Spruance of the Fifth Fleet took command of their task forces while on board a battleship with carriers as their core force.

  Unfortunately, the organization of fleet divisions in the Midway operation was no different from our traditional line-up of ships. Admiral Yamamoto was on board the flagship Yamato, still calling the group of battleships under his direct command the main force and supporting the entire fleet while he was 300 nautical miles away from the main naval battle forces. However, looking at the aftermath of the Battle of Midway, did the group of battleships under his command make any contribution to the entire operation? Here, I could not help but suspect for the second time that Yamamoto was only a mediocre admiral.

  PART FOUR

  SUNSET OF THE EMPIRE

  Aviation Staff Officer of Entire Naval

  General Headquarters—Early Summer, 1945

  30

  Appendectomy

  It was May 27, 1942, Naval Memorial Day. It had been 37 years since Admiral Togo annihilated Russia’s Baltic Fleet at the Battle of the Sea of Japan and hoisted the Z flag on top of the mast of his flagship, Mikasa.

  Time passes. On this day, the Nagumo Task Force sailed out of Hiroshima Bay as the advance attack force. Even now, I can see the flagship Akagi passing through Kudako Strait and coming out of Hiroshima Bay to Iyo Nada. It was past 9:00 in the morning. The sun on this May morning was shedding its beams brilliantly across the blue sea from among the clouds, and the Akagi was gliding over the mirror-like sea. She was heading for the Bungo Strait. I was sitting on the flex chair underneath the bridge, and I was watching the passing view, feeling the breeze on my cheek.

  The entire lineup of the Nagumo Task Force was, from the top: the flagship light cruiser, Nagara, and 12 destroyers (Nowaki, Arashi, Hagikaze, Maikaze, Kazagumo, Yuugumo, Makigumo, Akigumo, Urakaze, Isokaze, Tanikaze, Hamakaze) of the 10th Division led by Rear Admiral Susumu Kimura; then, two cruisers (Tone, Chikuma) of the Eighth Division led by Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe; two fast battleships (Haruna, Kirishima) of the Second Group of the Third Division; the main force, two aircraft carriers (Akagi, Kaga) of Carrier Division 1 under the direct command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo and two carriers (Hiryu, Soryu) of Carrier Division 2 led by Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi; followed by eight oil tankers of the supply convoy (Kyokuto Maru, Shinkoku Maru, Toho Maru, Nippon Maru, Kokuyo Maru, Nichiro Maru, No.2 Kyoei Maru and Hoko Maru). There were 33 ships in total.

  It was a spectacular sight—like a grand fleet review—to see those ships passing the narrow straits in an almost endless procession of ships lined up astern. Yurishima Island in Ehime Prefecture came in sight to the forward port side. It was a small island covered with green woods. Overlapping with Yurishima Island, Aoshima Island was veiled in haze. The coast of Shikoku was murky and covered by a thick mist. I noticed three seaplanes, with their prominent two floats, from the Kure Naval Aviation Squadron flying above. They were probably on antisubmarine alert duty in the Bungo Strait as preparation for our fleet’s mission.

  On the starboard side, Yashirojima Island in Yamaguchi Prefecture appeared very clearly. There were many tiers of wheat fields cultivated up to the mountain ridges. They had already turned yellowish, suggesting that summer was near. Then, two perfectly rounded islands, Ominase and Kominase, appeared, both like images from a dream in peaceful sleep.

  I was enjoying the panoramic view of the Seto Inland Sea that appeared and receded, a view that I could never tire of. I felt a longing for this scenic area and the cape that was passing in front of me. Twenty years ago, I became well acquainted with the area as a student at the Naval Academy, sailing the sea every winter vacation.

  Just then, Staff Officer Genda came down to find me. He said, “I heard that you were in bad shape at Kagoshima Base.”

  “Right. I was worried because I kept feeling sharp pains in my belly.”

  “What did the chief doctor have to say?”

  “I just came back yesterday and was too busy preparing for the mission to see the doctor. But at the base, our army surgeon asked the Army Hospital in Kagoshima to see me, and I had a checkup.”

  “And what did the Army Hospital say?”

  “The doc said something difficult like ‘pyloric atresia.’ He took an X-ray and looked into my belly, and then he ordered me to refrain from drinking. That’s why I was depressed.”

  “And you behaved yourself at the base without alcohol?”

  “Something like that.”

  I laughed, but Genda turned serious and said, “Take good care of yourself. If you should break down now, our task force will be in deep trouble.”

  I answered, “I know. But you must have been so busy preparing for this operation.”

  Genda said, “I was too busy to keep my feet on the ground. At any rate, our planning has been mixed up with the post-operation analysis of Stage One Operations. I didn’t have any time to study this operation. Even Kusaka seemed fully occupied with negotiations for the promotion of our dead pilots from the Hawaii operation to war heroes.”

  I responded, “That is the point. We are not necessarily competing for the credit, but our air squadrons have been depressed. They gave an immediate two-grade prom
otion to the special mini-submarines on the excuse that the number of the war dead was nine. But there were 55 from the air squadron who died, and they will say that that is too many. They seem to believe that the two-grade promotion depends more on the scarcity value rather than actual battle achievements.”

  Genda continued, “No question about it. Kusaka himself had a difficult time accepting the decision made by the central authority. He was making tremendous efforts to boost the morale of the air squadrons, the core of our entire fleet operation. The decision was finally announced before we headed out, but it was a big disadvantage that our Chief of Staff was not able to focus on the details of Stage Two Operations.”

  “Unhh,” I groaned, then asked Genda, “OK, what is your assessment of this operation?”

  “We are following without question the plan of the Combined Fleet’s High Command. I am counting on you.” Then, Genda hastily disappeared up the ladder to the operations room, as if he remembered that there was something else he had to do.

  It was nighttime. The fleet was passing through the minesweeping waterway of the Bungo Strait. While I lay in bed in my private room, I was seized by an indescribable pain. I pushed the button to call the sailor assigned to me to send for the ship’s chief doctor. Before long, the doctor came to examine and, after a short while, said it was appendicitis. He took a blood sample from my earlobe and went back to his consultation room. He returned, this time accompanied by the fleet’s chief doctor. He said he was ready to begin surgical procedures.

  I was deflated by this situation, and so was the Fleet Command Center when they heard about this development. If the General Commander of the air attack squadrons was immobilized because of his surgical operation, it would surely affect the military operation. However, the doctor said that I would not survive without the operation. In addition, our chief doctor was a master surgeon, and the Akagi was the ship responsible for performing surgical operations for the entire fleet. I thought, “He already has the surgical knife in his hand,” so I resigned myself to the necessity for surgery. I was operated on that night, and I was put in a wartime sickroom below the ship’s waterline.

  31

  Defeat at the Battle of Midway

  The Midway operation ended in defeat.

  The Imperial Japanese Navy, whose motto had been to fight against heavy odds, was defeated by the few, possessing heavy odds themselves.

  The cause of our defeat was nothing but hubris. The US side proclaimed it as a victory of information. Our plan had leaked out completely, giving the Americans a chance to get around their enemy. From top to bottom, the Japanese were too smug over the victories in our Stage One Operations, and the result was that we underestimated the US Navy. Pride goes before a fall.

  At 3:00 AM (Midway local time) on June 4, 1942, I was awake in bed in the Akagi’s wartime sickroom. The Midway operation was scheduled to start on this day. It had been a week since I was operated on, and it was only yesterday that my stitches had been taken out, but I had managed to regain some strength. The chief doctor, however, did not allow me to leave the room yet. From the flight deck, I could hear the roaring of engines for the trial run. I could not stand it any more. It was a shame that someone other than the General Commander should take leadership in this important campaign—because of appendicitis. I sneaked out of the sickroom, without permission from the doctor, of course. However, we were already in battle mode, and all the watertight bulkheads had been closed down, so the only way out was through manholes. It required a fair amount of effort to open and close more than a dozen manhole doors that were between the sickroom and the upper deck. When I reached the upper deck, I was completely exhausted. I still had another 20 meters to climb up a ladder to get to the flight deck. When I finally made it to the deck, I began to feel dizzy and almost fell because of lack of blood to the brain.

  Air crews on the deck were surprised to see me and helped me to sit up. They laid me in the corner of the deck underneath the launch communications center and put a parachute sack under my head as a pillow. Lying on the deck, I waved my hand telling the crews, “Do your best. I am counting on you.” Solely because I wanted to give them this encouragement, I had forced myself up to the flight deck.

  At 4:30 AM, 30 minutes before dawn, the first wave of the air attack squadrons took off to attack Midway Base. The launching point was 240 nautical miles to the northwest of Midway. It was a combination of 108 bombers dispatched from four carriers—the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu—comprised of 36 level bombers (Type 97 Carrier Attack Bombers, 18 each from the Hiryu and Soryu), 36 dive bombers (Type 99 Carrier Bombers, 18 each from the Akagi and Kaga) and 36 planes of the air supremacy squadron (Zero fighters, nine each from the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu).

  Usually, I was the one to lead the attack as General Commander, but since I could not move because of my appendicitis operation, Hiryu’s Air Group Commander, Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga, took my place as the leader. The mission was the total destruction of the enemy’s air power at Midway Base.

  The sunrise was at 5:00 AM (Midway local time). After the first wave was launched, attack planes of the second wave were lifted to the flight deck to stand by. They were armed with anti-ship weapons in the event the enemy fleet appears. In this second wave, there were 36 planes from the torpedo bombing squadron, led by Lieutenant Commander Shigeharu Murata (Type 97 Carrier Attack Bombers, 18 each from the Akagi and Kaga), 36 planes from the dive bombing squadron, led by Lieutenant Commander Takashige Egusa (Type 99 Carrier Attack Bombers, 18 each from Hiryu and Soryu) and 36 planes from the air supremacy squadron, led by Lieutenant Commander Shigeru Itaya (Zero fighters, nine each from the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu)—the best conceivable formation of the Nagumo Task Force. I thought that even if the enemy task force should appear, the sooner the better for us to beat them quickly. It was not from conceit but from my conviction in the skill and strength of the squadrons under my command.

  But my major concern was the search operation.

  That day, the operation was a single search covering a fan-shaped area from the east to the south of the Nagumo Task Force, sandwiching Midway Island. It consisted of seven search lines, and the spotter aircraft were one reconnaissance seaplane from the Haruna, two each from the Tone and Chikuma, and one carrier attack bomber each from the Akagi and Kaga.

  In a single search procedure, planes take off after sunrise and are able to see throughout their flight, but it takes more than two hours to reach the front-end of the 300-nautical-mile patrol area. Therefore, it is not effective if the need is to grasp the enemy situation as soon as the sun rises. In order to obtain more timely information, a double search is employed.

  In a double search, single search planes are launched in darkness so that they will reach the front-end of the 300-nautical-miles patrol area by sunrise. However, as the planes make their way to the front-end, they are flying in darkness and cannot conduct search activities. Back in those days, planes were not yet equipped with radar, and search depended exclusively on human eyes. There was no other way. In summary, in a double search procedure, planes are launched at sunrise in order to obtain more timely information. Using this method, the entire picture of the enemy’s position within the patrol area could be grasped in less than an hour after sunrise, but double the number of reconnaissance planes were required.

  Meanwhile, the Nagumo Task Force’s Command Center, like the Combined Fleet Headquarters, was firmly convinced that if they struck Midway, the US Task Force in Pearl Harbor could be lured out and destroyed. Influenced by this optimistic view, that day’s search procedures lacked all necessary precautions.

  However, the fact was, the US Task Force had already advanced to the Midway area, waiting for its opportunity to attack. From the start, the US side was aware of the Japanese Navy’s Midway operations plan. Perhaps contributing to this, the Combined Fleet Headquarters named the operation, “MI Operation”—as if trying to signal its intention to the US side. As a consequence, th
e US Pacific Fleet’s High Command seems to have prepared serious countermeasures.

  As an example, the Yorktown, which was badly damaged in the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 8th, was given temporary repairs on a small island nearby, then she was towed to Pearl Harbor sparing no effort. Working round-the-clock, shipyard crews completed repairs on the Yorktown in time for the Battle of Midway. In contrast, the Shokaku and Zuikaku were damaged in the same battle. Their takeoff and landing functionalities were impaired due to damage to their flight decks, but the damage was limited, and the ships were able to return to Kure Naval Port under their own power. Still, since the repair work was done with no sense of urgency, they were not ready in time for the Battle of Midway. There was such a great gap between the mental preparations of the two sides. On our side, I thought arrogance from top to bottom was to blame.

  That day, if the Nagumo Fleet had carried out a double search and taken all possible measures, the enemy task force could have been sighted within the patrol area in less than an hour after dawn. If that had happened, we could have annihilated the enemy by launching the second wave attack squadrons, resulting in a sweeping victory for our side at Midway. It is too late for regrets, but, because of this lack of thoroughness in our search, the Midway operation went completely against our original expectations.

  The first wave air attack squadron, led by Lieutenant Tomonaga, reached Midway two hours after takeoff. On the way, they were intercepted by 26 Buffalo fighters, outdated US Marine Corps’ planes, but they were wiped out after a brave fight with the 36 Zero pilots of our air supremacy squadron.