by Roy Jenkins
Frank Debenham, Esq.
E. O. Fordham, Esq.
Sir John Fleming.
St. George Lane Fox Pitt, Esq. Capt. The Hon. Fitzroy Hemphill.
A. Holland, Esq.
Sir Jonathan Hutchinson.
Sir Thomas J. Lipton, Bart. Wilson Marriage, Esq.
Sir H. Marshall.
Sir Edward L. O’Malley.
Sir C. Parry, Bart.
Sir David Paulin.
Sir George Riddell.
-Dunean.
Sir William Robertson.
Sir C. Shaw.
J. Seligman, Esq.
Sir George H. Sutherland. David S. Waterlow, Esq.
Sir Frederick W. Wilson.
Lord Wodehouse.
-Muspratt.
R. Hunter Craig, Esq.
Sir Charles Gold.
Sir A. P. Gould.
B. F. Hawksley, Esq.
Sir Frank Hollins, Bart.
Sir Alexander Waldemar Lawrence, Bart.
Sir Wilfrid Lawson, Bart, M.P. Sir H. Munro.
Henry Oppenheim, Esq.
F. St. Quintin, Esq.
F. H. Smith, Esq.
J. Weston Stevens, Esq.
Halley Stewart, Esq.
James Thornton, Esq.
Appendix B
The Constitutional Position of the Sovereign
I propose to deal in this memorandum with the position of a Constitutional Sovereign in relation to the controversies which are likely to arise with regard to the Government of Ireland Bill. In a subsequent paper I will deal (i) with the actual and prospective situation in Ireland in the event of (a) the passing, (b) the rejection of that Bill; and (2) with the possibility and expediency of some middle course.
In the old days, before our present Constitution was completely evolved, the Crown was a real and effective, and often a dominating factor in legislation. Its powers were developed to considerable lengths by such kings as Henry VIII, and enforced with much suppleness and reserve by Queen Elizabeth; but the Tudor Sovereigns had a keen eye and a responsive pulse to the general opinion of the nation. The Stuarts, who followed, pushed matters to extremes, with the result that Charles I lost his head, and James II his throne. The Revolution put the title to the Throne and its prerogative on a Parliamentary basis, and since a comparatively early date in the reign of Queen Anne, the Sovereign has never attempted to withhold his assent from a Bill which had received Parliamentary sanction.
We have had, since that date, Soverigns of marked individuality, of great authority, and of strong ideas (often from time to time, opposed to the policy of the Ministry of the day) but none of them—not even George III, Queen Victoria or King Edward VII—have ever dreamt of reviving the ancient veto of the Crown. We have now a well-established tradition of 200 years, that, in the last resort, the occupant of the Throne accepts and acts upon the advice of his Ministers. The Sovereign may have lost something of his personal power and authority, but the Crown has been thereby removed from the storms and vicissitudes of party politics, and the monarchy rests upon a solid foundation which is buttressed both by long tradition and by the general conviction that its personal status is an invaluable safeguard for the continuity of our national life.
It follows that the rights and duties of a constitutional monarch in this country in regard to legislation are confined within determined and strictly circumscribed limits. He is entitled and bound to give his Ministers all relevant information which comes to him; to point out objections which seem to him valid against the course which they advise; to suggest (if he thinks fit) an alternative policy. Such intimations are always received by Ministers with the utmost respect, and considered with more care and deference than if they proceeded from any other quarter. But in the end, the Sovereign always acts upon the advice which Ministers, after full deliberation and (if need be) reconsideration, feel it their duty to offer. They give that advice well knowing that they can, and probably will, be called to account for it by Parliament.
The Sovereign undoubtedly has the power of changing his advisers, but it is relevant to point out that there has been, during the last 130 years, one occasion only on which the King has dismissed the Ministry which still possessed the confidence of the House of Commons. This was in 1834, when William IV (one of the least wise of British monarchs) called upon Lord Melbourne to resign. He took advantage (as we now know) of a hint improvidently given by Lord Melbourne himself, but the proceedings were neither well advised nor fortunate. The dissolution which followed left Sir R. Peel in a minority, and Lord Melbourne and his friends in a few months returned to power, which they held for the next six years. The authority of the Crown was disparaged, and Queen Victoria, during her long reign, was careful never to repeat the mistake of her predecessor.
The Parliament Act was not intended in any way to affect, and it is submitted has not affected, the Constitutional position of the Sovereign. It deals only with differences between the two Houses. When the two Houses are in agreement (as is always the case when there is a Conservative majority in the House of Commons), the Act is a dead letter. When they differ, it provides that, after a considerable interval, the thrice repeated decision of the Commons shall prevail, without the necessity for a dissolution of Parliament. The possibility of abuse is guarded against by the curtailment of the maximum life of any given House of Commons to five years.
Nothing can be more important, in the best interests of the Crown and of the country, than that a practice, so long established and so well justified by experience, should remain unimpaired. It frees the occupant of the Throne from all personal responsibility for the Acts of the Executive and the legislature. It gives force and meaning to the old maxim that ‘the King can do no wrong.’ So long as it prevails, however objectionable particular Acts may be to a large section of his subjects, they cannot hold him in any way accountable, and their loyalty is (or ought to be) wholly unaffected. If, on the other hand, the King were to intervene on one side, or in one case—which he could only do by dismissing Ministers in de facto possession of a Parliamentary majority—he would be expected to do the same on another occasion, and perhaps for the other side. Every Act of Parliament of the first order of importance, and only passed after acute controversy, would be regarded as bearing the personal imprimatur of the Sovereign. He would, whether he wished it or not, be dragged into the arena of party politics; and at a dissolution following such a dismissal of Ministers as has just been referred to, it is no exaggeration to say that the Crown would become the football of contending factions.
This is a Constitutional catastrophe which it is the duty of every wise statesman to do the utmost in his power to avert.
H.H.A.
September 1913.
The Irish Situation;
The Constitutional Position of the Sovereign
I proceed to consider the prospective situation in Ireland in the event of the passing or of the rejection of the Bill.
If the Bill becomes law (whether or not its passing is preceded by another general election) there will undoubtedly be a serious danger of organised disorder in the four north-eastern counties of Ulster. It is, in my opinion, a misuse of terms to speak of what is likely to happen as Civil War. The total population of the area concerned is little over 1,000,000. It is divided between Protestants and Roman Catholics— and in that part of the world political and religious differences roughly coincide—in the proportion of seven to three (Protestants 729,624, Roman Catholics 316,406). In two of the four counties (Armagh and Londonderry) the Protestant preponderance is not greater than six to five. It is not, therefore, the case of a homogeneous people resisting a change to which they are unitedly opposed. On the contrary, there will be a considerable and a militant minority strongly in favour of the new state of things, and ready to render active assistance to the forces of the executive. In the remainder of Ulster, and in the three other provinces of Ireland, there will be an overwhelming majority of the population on that side of the law.
But, while anxious that things should be seen in their true perspective, I have not the least disposition to minimise the gravity of the situation which will probably arise. The importation of rifles has, so far, been on a small scale, and the drilling and training of volunteers, though it is no doubt accustoming numbers of men to act together, to obey orders, and to develop esprit de corps, is not likely to produce a body which can stand up against regular troops. But the genuine apprehensions of a large majority of the Protestants, the incitements of responsible leaders, and the hopes of British sympathy and support, are likely to encourage forcible resistance (wherever it can be tried); there is the certainty of tumult and riot, and more than the possibility of bloodshed.
On the other hand, if the Bill is rejected or indefinitely postponed, or some inadequate and disappointing substitute put forward in its place, the prospect is, in my opinion, much more grave. The attainment of Home Rule has for more than 30 years been the political (as distinguished from the agrarian) ideal of four-fifths of the Irish people. Whatever happens in other parts of the United Kingdom, at successive general elections, the Irish representation in Parliament never varies. For the last eight years they have had with them a substantial majority of the elected representatives of Great Britain. The Parliament of 1906 was debarred by election pledges from dealing with the matter legislatively, but during its lifetime, in 1908, the House of Commons affirmed by an overwhelming majority a resolution in favour of the principle. In the present Parliament, the Government of Ireland Bill has passed that House in two successive sessions, with British majorities which showed no sign of diminution from first to last. If it had been taken up by a Conservative Government, it would more than a year ago have been the law of the land. It is the confident expectation of the vast bulk of the Irish people that it will become law next year.
If the ship, after so many stormy voyages, were now to be wrecked in sight of port, it is difficult to overrate the shock, or its consequences. They would extend into every department of political, social, agrarian and domestic life. It is not too much to say that Ireland would become ungovernable—unless by the application of forces and methods which would offend the conscience of Great Britain, and arouse the deepest resentment in all the self-governing Dominions of the Crown.
It follows, from what has been said above, that while in my opinion—from the point of view of social order—the consequences of the passing of the Bill would be unquestionably less serious than those of its rejection, yet no forecast, in either event, can be free from anxiety. Any practicable means of mitigation—still more, of escape—deserves, therefore (whencesoever it is suggested), impartial and mature consideration.
The demand, put forward recently by Mr. Balfour, for a General Election, between now and the beginning of next session, is open to objections of the most formidable character, (i) If such an election resulted in a majority for the Government, and the consequent passing of the Irish Bill next session, the recalcitrance of North-East Ulster would not in any way be affected. Sir E. Carson, and his friends have told the world, with obvious sincerity, that their objections to Home Rule have nothing to do with the question whether it is approved or disapproved by the British electorate. It is true that the Unionist Leaders in Great Britain have intimated that, in such an event, they would not give ‘active countenance’ (whatever that may mean) to the defiance of the law. But what effect can that have on men who have been encouraged to believe, and many of them do believe, that under Home Rule their liberties and their religion would be in jeopardy ? (2) If the election resulted in a Government defeat, the circumstances are such that neither in Ireland nor in Great Britain would it be accepted as a verdict adverse to Home Rule. There may not be much active enthusiasm for Home Rule in the British constituencies, but the evidence afforded, not only by the steady and persistent majorities in the House of Commons, but by the bye-elections, tends to show that (at the lowest) it meets with acquiescence as an inevitable necessity in itself, and as a first step towards further devolution. All the most trustworthy observers agree that, even where the bye-elections have gone against the Government, the attempt (wherever made) to arouse interest and resentment by pushing to the forefront the case against Home Rule and the supposed wrongs of Ulster, has met with no success. The General Election would be fought, as the bye-elections have been, not predominantly on Home Rule, but on the Insurance Act, the Marconi contract, and a score of other ‘issues’ which happened for the moment to preoccupy public attention. (3) The concession of the demand for a General Election, at this stage, would be in the teeth of the intentions of the Parliament Act. One of the primary and most clearly avowed purposes of that Act was to abrogate the power of the House of Lords to force a dissolution. The assumption which underlies the whole measure is, that a Bill which can survive the ordeal of three sessions, prolonged over two years, in the House of Commons, ought without the need of another election, to pass into law.
It is quite another matter to suggest that, after the Bill has passed, a General Election should take place before it has come into active operation. Parliament will then have completed, or nearly completed, four out of its possible five years; and if the country were either on general or particular grounds averse to the Government, the new Parliament would consider, before anything irreparable has been done, whether to repeal or to amend the Irish Government Act. If, moreover, it were known beforehand that this would happen, any outburst of disorder in Ulster would everywhere be regarded as premature and inexcusable.
There remains the proposal, to which Lord Loreburn has during the last week given his authority, for settlement by Conference. I wrote to Lord Loreburn, as soon as I read his letter in The Times to ask him to tell me precisely what he meant. I expressed sympathy with the spirit of all that he had written, and acquiescence in the reasoning of much, though not the whole, of his argument. But I pointed out that the parties concerned in this controversy, including Sir E. Carson and Mr. Redmond, are not likely, at the moment, to accept an invitation (from any quarter) to come into a room and sit round a table, for the purpose of talking in the air about the Government of Ireland, or about Federalism and Devolution. It is no good blinding one’s eye to obvious and undeniable facts, and one of those facts, relevant to the present case, undoubtedly is, that there is a deep and hitherto unbridgeable chasm of principle between the supporters and the opponents of Home Rule. It is a question not of phraseology but of substance. Four-fifths of Ireland, with the support of a substantial British majority in the present and late House of Commons, will be content with nothing less than a subordinate legislature with a local executive responsible to it. They insist, moreover, that (whatever may be done with Devolution elsewhere) the claim of Ireland is peculiar, and paramount in point of time and urgency. A settlement which ignored these conditions would be no settlement at all. But within these conditions — so I said to Lord Loreburn — there is (so far as I am concerned) no point — finance, Ulster, Second Chamber, representation of minorities, etc., upon which I am not ready and anxious to enter into conference, and to yield to any reasonable suggestion.
For a Conference to be fruitful, there must be some definite basis upon and from which its deliberations can proceed. I fear that at present (it may be different nearer the time) no such basis can be found. I shall be only too glad if that fear can now or hereafter be satisfactorily dispelled.
I feel bound to add, that after the experience of 1910, when there was on both sides perfect goodwill and a sincere desire for agreement, that an abortive Conference would be likely to widen differences and embitter feeling.
H. H. A.
INDEX
Abbot, Dr. Edwin, 16-17 Aberdeen and Temair, 1st Marq. of, 316, 396, 5o8»
Aberdeen, Lady, 508/1 Acland, Sir Arthur H. D., 45, 46, 60, 61, 72//, 92, 97, no, 129-30, 152, 157 Adair, Sir William, 316 Addison, Christopher, Viscount Addison, 341, 464, 483 Affirmation Bill (1883), 36 Agadir crisis, 233-9 Aga Khan, 494/1 Agar-Robartes, T. C.
R., 280 Aitken, W. M., see Beaverbrook Akers-Douglas, A., 1st Viscount Chilston, 217
Alba, Duke and Duchess of, 497 Alverstone, Viscount (Sir Richard Webster), 38, 254 Amery, L. S., 221 Archer-Shee, Sir Martin, 471 Armenian massacres, 98 Articles Club, 45-6
Asquith, Anthony (“Puffin”), 94, 176, 262, 263, 268, 332, 414, 488 Asquith, Arthur (“Oc”), 30, 56, 176, 264, 332, 378, 506
Asquith, Cyril (“Cys”), 30-1, 176, 328, 378, 460, 466
Asquith, Elizabeth, see Bibcsco Asquith, Emily (mother, nee Willans), 13-14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 29 Asquith, Evelyn (sister, Mrs. Wooding), 13, 16, 181
Asquith, Helen, (first wife, nee Melland), 28-31, 43, 52-5, 57, 61, 74, 81, 90 Asquith, Herbert (“Beb”), 30, 52, 56, 176, 378
Asquith, Herbert Henry, 1st Earl of Oxford and Asquith:
family and schooling, 13-18; youth in London, 19-20; at Balliol, 20-5 his tastes: bridge, 264, 269, 272-3, 286-7, 309, 346; drink, 412; golf, 26, 264, 273; motoring, 259;
music, 272; reading, 14, 24, 56, 58-9, 264-6, 273, 393, 464, 517, 518/r, theatre, 19-20, 33, 262, 267
writing: for The Spectator, 31-3; on law, 36-7; of memoirs, 257, 273, 466, 494-5, 506, 517 appearance, 95; health, 230-1, 376, 501
his own estimate of his capacities, 332-7
his detachment from the business out* look, 139, 238n
as a speaker, at school, 17; at Oxford, 24; on the platform, 31, 44-5, 71, 138-40,199,489; in House of Commons, 42-4, 63, 66, 86, 166, 174, 207, 210, 227, 392-3, 467, 489; “wait and see”, 208; Romanes lecture, 467
attendance in Parliament, 44, 57, 61, 66, 67, 92, 103, 198 first marriage, 28-31, 52-3, 55
second marriage, 74-82 in “society” before second marriage, 25> 35» 47. 53“4> 7b; and after, 93-5, 101-2, 185, 266-73, 483-4 houses and income, 89-90, 92, 161 175, 184-5, 259-60, 261, 347, 466-7, 493-5
friendships with: Venetia Stanley,
