Clusium is said to have appealed for help to the Romans, who despatched envoys to negotiate. These men, however, abandoned their position of strict neutrality and fought shoulder to shoulder with the men of Clusium: one of them even killed a Gallic chief. Thus Rome drew on herself the vengeance of the Gauls. This improbable account seems to have been designed to explain the subsequent defeat of the Romans as divine punishment for the crime of their ambassadors; the appeal made by the barbarians to the ius gentium is ridiculously anachronistic. Nor is it likely that Clusium would appeal to Rome; more probably Diodorus is correct in saying that the Romans heard of the invasion and sent a force to Clusium to reconnoitre. In any case the Gauls abandoned their attack on Clusium and swept like a mountain torrent towards Rome which lay only eighty miles away. Their numbers reached some 30,000. The Romans had only two legions, which inclusive of the cavalry and light-armed troops might number 10,000 men. Even if they were not abandoned by their allies to face the peril alone, as is recorded, they would hardly muster more than 15,000 men; but it was perhaps the greatest army that Rome had yet put into the field. Then dawned that day which ever stood in black letters in the annals of Rome’s history. In the narrow Tiber valley to the north of Fidenae at the eleventh milestone from Rome flowed the little stream of the Allia. Here on the left bank of the Tiber the Romans took up their position. Their left wing was covered by the river, their main force was on the level plain, their right wing of reserves rested on the lower slopes of the Crustuminian mountains. The Gauls swiftly turned the Roman flank by routing the force on the hills and drove the main army back to the Tiber. Here some escaped across the river to Veil, but large numbers were cut to pieces; some of those on the hills may have fled to Rome. Three days later the Gauls arrived at Rome. The priests and the Vestal Virgins had fled to Caere. There was no resistance except in the citadel on the Capitol; the rest of the unresisting city was plundered and burnt.16
At this point legend steps in and relates how the Gauls found the senators who were too old to fight sitting on their ivory seats like gods upon their thrones, awaiting their fate in quiet dignity. Then the survivors at Veii begged Camillus to return from exile at Ardea and to save his country. Pontius Cominius swam the Tiber and reached the Capitol, whence he brought word that the Senate and People of Rome had chosen Camillus dictator. But the Gauls had marked the track of Pontius and would have taken the Capitol by surprise, had not the sacred geese aroused M. Manlius, surnamed Capitolinus, in the nick of time. After a siege of seven months the defenders were forced by famine to offer the Gauls a thousand pounds of gold to withdraw. But even as the gold was being weighed Camillus and his men appeared and drove the Gauls out of the city. This last incident is plainly designed to retrieve Roman honour. The story of Camillus’ exile was perhaps invented to save the conqueror of Veil from blame for the catastrophe and in order that he might be able to rally the survivors outside Rome; doubtless he played a leading part in the story of Rome’s recovery. All that results is that the Romans on the Capitol held out and at length bought off the Gauls, who had attained their object of plundering Rome; it is not likely that they had come to settle, and their departure was hastened by their sufferings from fever and by the fact that their own territory in Cisalpine Gaul was being threatened by the Veneti. The departing guests may even have been speeded on their way by a force of survivors, refugees from Rome and Latin volunteers, who mustered at Veii; but it was the Gauls’ own decision to retire.17
Rome suffered serious internal damage, especially as most of the houses were made of wood; traces of the work of the destructive fire have been found on the Palatine. But the later Romans tended to overestimate the loss, partly from a desire to explain the paucity of early historical documents; in fact the Gauls from superstitious awe may have left untouched some of the temples, where official documents were kept. Soon the city arose fresher and stronger from among her ashes, but the damage to her prestige took longer to heal. Rome’s power in central Italy collapsed, as it had in 509 when the Etruscan dynasty fell; the work of the fifth century had to be repeated in the first half of the fourth. Yet there was another side to the picture; common fear of the Gauls strengthened the idea of unity among the Italians. Finally, it was largely owing to Roman courage in defeat and resolution in rebuilding a barrier against the north that France and not Italy became the home of the Celts.
5. THE RECOVERY OF ROME
The city was destroyed; its internal stability was shaken; there was no army of defence; the alliance with the Latins and Hernici had collapsed; the Gauls might return. But in these dark days the spirit of the Roman people did not waver. Wise leadership and the patriotism of the citizen body saved Rome. The internal struggle of the orders reached fever pitch in 367, but concessions were granted just in time to avoid disaster. So Rome set her shoulder to the gruelling task of reconstruction at home and abroad; that she accomplished so much is due largely to the wise direction of Camillus. The main work was to rebuild and protect the city. As earthworks had proved useless against the Gallic attack, a solid stone wall some twelve feet thick and twenty-four feet high, backed by the earlier agger which was now raised to the same height, was constructed around the whole city, including the Aventine, a distance of 5½ miles; traces of this so-called Servian wall still survive. It was perhaps not begun till 378 and was constructed of large blocks of tufa from the Grotta Oscura near Veii; the masons’ marks suggest that Rome, like any contemporary Greek city, imported a special building staff of Greek contractors, though the labour may have been supplied by the Roman army.18 The modernization of the army and the adaptation of the constitution to meet the pressing demands of the plebs, whose military services were more vital than ever, will be discussed later. How Rome addressed herself to her external problems is now the question.
Once again the Romans were forced to fight on many fronts and to face the hostility of Etruscans, Hernici, Aequi, Volsci and Gauls; and although there was no general revolt of the Latins as in 496 or 340, individual cities were restless and discontented. The traditional account of these wars is accepted in outline by some modern historians, but by others it is completely rejected: for instance, the verdict of K. J. Beloch is that ‘in the thirty years after the Gallic catastrophe Rome had not to wage any great wars’.19 The tradition is confused and confusing: great battles are won with little or no apparent result; cities are taken and retaken with monotonous regularity; the indefatigable Camillus is here, there and everywhere; vanquished foes reappear in full force the year after their defeat and even Livy begins to wonder whence the Volscians derived their inexhaustible supply: ‘unde totiens victis Volscis suffecerint milites’ (vi, 12, 2). The chronology is confused; many incidents are obviously duplicated and some are mere inventions dictated by national or family pride. But if due allowance is made for the unevenness of the annalistic tradition, and for the fact that many of these wars were merely glorified border raids, it may be conceded that the main lines of Rome’s recovery are clearly defined. With this warning in mind the traditional account may be briefly followed.
The Etruscans, who were the first to take advantage of Rome’s weakness by attacking Sutrium and Nepete in 389, were quickly beaten back by Camillus (Livy (vi, 3, 9) wrongly recounts similar events in 386). It was at this time that the territory of Veii was annexed and formed into the four new tribes and now, if not earlier, Sutrium and Nepete received their Latin colonists. Rome’s willingness to share these two outposts against Etruria with her Latin allies is the measure of her weakness and her wisdom. For the next thirty years Etruria gave little trouble.20 Of the Latin towns Tibur severed relations with Rome, though it did not break into open war until 360. Praeneste, which had probably remained outside the League, and Velitrae were ready to join hands with the Volsci. Tusculum, which was surrounded by Roman territory, showed slight hesitation in 381; but when the Romans approached it and found everything quiet they granted it peace and soon afterwards full Roman citizenship. Aricia, Ardea, Lavin
ium and Lanuvium remained loyal, as did some Latin cities in Volscian territory: Cora, Norba and Signia, together with Setia, which received a colony in 382. It is recorded that the Latins in alliance with the Volsci were defeated in 386 and 385 and again in 377 after they had captured Satricum; thereafter they remained quiet. The Hernici, who joined in the disturbances of 386, shared in the defeat and remained inactive for twenty-three years. The neighbouring Aequi had already been vanquished at Bola in 388. It was the Volsci who gave most trouble. They were led by the men of Antium and Satricum and supported by Velitrae; but these western towns were separated from the eastern ones of the Liris valley by the colonies at Circeii and Setia. The war ended with the destruction of Satricum and the forced re-entry of Antium and Velitrae into the League, but the details are doubtful. It is said that the Volsci who advanced to Lanuvium were defeated by Camillus at Marcion (or Maecium) in 389 and at Satricum in 386, and by A. Cornelius Cossus in 385, when a colony was planted at Satricum. Further Roman victories are recorded in 381 and 377; in the course of the war, which was not completed till 338, Satricum was said to have been captured no less than four times and Velitrae was repeatedly besieged.21
During the decade following 377 Rome enjoyed comparative peace abroad, but suffered at home from the disturbances which led up to the Licinian reforms; the annalists had sufficient domestic news without having to elaborate the border fighting. At the end of the 360s foreign affairs again predominate. With their internal difficulties now alleviated the Romans turned to the Hernici. After a defeat in 362 they captured Ferentinum in 361; three years later the Hernici asked for peace and were readmitted to alliance with Rome, but on less favourable terms than before. The Latin cities of Velitrae, Tibur and Praeneste were also restless and even employed Gauls as mercenaries against Rome; these were defeated near the Colline Gate in 360. By 358 Rome had reasserted her authority over the Latins, who had to renew the old treaty of Spurius Cassius, probably on less favourable terms. Naturally they were no longer allowed to appoint a commander in turn; the new League was under the nominal control of two annual praetors who were subordinate to the Roman consuls in the federal army. The defaulting cities were forced to re-enter the League; Velitrae, Antium, Tibur, Nomentum, Pedum, Privernum and Praeneste had all toed the line by 354. Antium was deprived of part of its territory, which was not incorporated into the League but was annexed by Rome and formed into two new tribes (the Pomptina and Poplilia; 358) as the Veientane territory had been. This raised the total number of tribes to twenty-seven.
The renewal of the Latin League appeared as a threat to Etruria. In 359 the men of Tarquinii took up arms, and they were aided two years later by Falerii. In 353 Caere joined Tarquinii, but was quickly defeated by Rome and was accorded a hundred years’ truce. Tarquinii and Falerii were brought to heel in 351 and were granted a forty years’ truce. Eight years later Falerii exchanged the truce for a permanent alliance with Rome. The details of these Etruscan wars are uncertain, but the result is important. For forty years Rome was free from danger on her northern front while she was busy asserting her authority in central Italy. Rome’s treatment of Caere is controversial. At some time Caere received civitas sine suffragio, which meant that it shared the private privileges and obligations of Roman citizenship (commercium, conubium and militia). It was later regarded as the first municipium to receive this privilege, which was granted as a reward for protecting the Vestal Virgins during the Gallic invasion of 390. Another tradition, which suggests that this treatment was regarded as a punishment (for some unspecified revolt in the third century?), reflects conditions of a later period when civitas sine suffragio was considered an inferior form of citizenship. If this latter tradition be accepted, Caere probably received a contract of hospitium with Rome in 390, a treaty of alliance for 100 years in 353, and civitas sine suffragio perhaps between 353 and 338 or not until c. 274.22
For thirty years after the sack of Rome the Gauls, according to Polybius, refrained from further attack; when they returned Rome was safe behind her new-built walls. Livy, however, recounts various battles against the Gauls in 367, 361 and 360; in one of these T. Manlius Torquatus fought a duel with a gigantic Gaul and robbed him of his torque or collar. Doubtless the Gauls who had penetrated as far south as Apulia occasionally raided Latium, but the traditional Roman victories in the field may be questioned.23 In 332–331 when the Celtic advance on the Danube was checked by Alexander the Great, the Romans concluded a thirty years’ treaty with the Senones. The Gallic effort was slackening. They could not capture walled towns and began to question their ability to repeat the performance of Allia. For fifty or more years they had been a serious menace, but they had presented no real hin -drance to Rome’s revival. Indeed, by weakening Etruria, by forcing on Rome the role of Italian martyr, and by making the Italic tribes more conscious of their ethnic unity and their indebtedness to Rome, the Gauls hastened the recovery of the city they had laid low. After a number of transitory raids and one or two major episodes they withdrew beyond the Apennines, but they left behind an uncomfortable memory from which the Romans never quite shook themselves free.
6. ROME’S WIDENING HORIZON
At one moment it appeared possible that the growing power of Rome might have been ground to insignificance by the upper and nether millstones of Etruria and Magna Graecia, but in the end the central power expanded at the expense of the extremities. The decline of Etruria, caused by internal dissension and weakness and by the pressure of other nations, had been gradual. After the loss of Rome and Latium southern Etruria had echoed to the tramp of Roman armies. Carthage, Etruria’s ally, had so weakened under the Greek attack in Sicily that the Sicilian Greeks became strong enough to help Cumae to break the Etruscan sea power in 474. The Etruscan hold on Campania was finally lost at the end of the fifth century when the Sabellian tribes swept down from the mountains over the Campanian plain, overwhelming Etruscan and Greek alike. Finally, the Etruscans had lost control of the region of the Po under the assault of the Gauls; by 350 their stronghold Felsina succumbed, and some fifteen years later the Adriatic shore submitted. At the same time Hellenism in southern Italy was weakening. As ever, the Greek cities were frequently torn by party strife; even if united internally they often quarrelled with their neighbours, whether for racial, political, constitutional, or economic reasons. But a more potent cause was the threat from the inland peoples, a danger to which Greek coastal colonies were always exposed. In southern Italy they had easily reached a modus vivendi with the early inhabitants, but the balance was upset by the arrival of the Sabellian tribes.
The steady southward movement of the Sabellian peoples has already been mentioned. Caused by overpopulation and pressure from the north and ex -pedited by the custom of the Sacred Spring, it led to a new grouping of the powers, by which the Etruscan and Greek colonies lost their primacy. The Sabellian mountain-dwellers, shouldered off by the Etruscans and the warlike Picenes, had pressed further southwards, thus incidentally forcing the Aequi and Volsci down into the Latin plains where they had been checked by the Latins. The Sabellians themselves had gradually reached the hills and valleys above the Campanian plain and were soon tempted down by its fertility. The invaders quickly swept over the plain; Capua succumbed c. 423 and Cumae in 421. Neapolis served as a refuge for the fleeing Greeks, but virtually the whole of Campania from Cumae to Salerno became Sabellian. Yet the superior Greek and Etruscan civilization of the earlier inhabitants soon conquered the hardy mountain-dwellers who adapted their mode of life to their new surroundings. These Campanians, now in possession of the richest land in Italy which produced three garden crops a year, soon settled down to city life and grew very wealthy. Their chief city, Capua, became the second city of Italy and the head of a league, which did not, however, include all the Oscan towns of Campania. The attractiveness and ease of their life led to a certain deterioration of character, so that later they readily became a spoil to their mountain kinsmen, especially as foreign tyrants were constantly
draining their military resources by hiring mercenaries from them.24
South of Campania another band of Sabellians, known as the Lucanians, settling in what is practically the instep of the foot of Italy, absorbed the earlier population. Here the Greek cities were hard pressed by Dionysius of Syracuse, who, having defeated the Carthaginians in Sicily, tried to carve out in South Italy a continental addition to his Sicilian empire (405–367). To this end he entered into a league with the Lucanians and recruited Gallic mercenaries. The allied Greek cities were defeated by the Lucanians in 390 and at Elleporus in 389 by Dionysius himself, who captured Rhegium, raided the Etruscan coast, reoccupied Elba and pressed up the Adriatic coast, founding colonies at Ancona and Adria. Hellenic Italy was saved from the Syracusan danger on the death of Dionysius’ son, but it had not learnt its lesson. Cities continued to quarrel, though Tarentum attained some eminence under the wise rule of Archytas. This weakness elicited further attacks from the Italians in the second half of the fourth century. The aggressions of a league of the Bruttians in the toe of Italy forced the Greeks to appeal to the mother country, whence King Archidamus of Sparta and later Alexander of Epirus came to champion the cause of western Hellenism, just as Timoleon had come from Corinth to save the Sicilian Greeks. It was during these disturbed days following the break up of Dionysius’ empire that some Greek privateers raided the coast of Latium.25
The Sabellians who settled in central Italy were known to the Romans as Samnites. They formed a loose league, which did not include outlying tribes as the Lucanians, the Oscans of Campania, the Paeligni, Marsi, Marrucini or Vestini. They were highland farmers and crofters, who lived in villages rather than towns, and though some larger landowners probably existed, differences in wealth were not great. Each valley or plateau comprised a pagus with an elective leader (meddix), whose functions were largely limited to leadership in war and a summary jurisdiction. These pagi were loosely grouped together in cantonal associations (Caraceni, Pentri, Hirpini, and Caudini), and each of these populi formed a touto, led by a meddix tuticus. These in turn were grouped in a wider league with a central meeting-place at Bovianum Vetus, where cantonal chiefs would gather in emergencies to appoint a federal commander-in-chief and where a federal council, and possibly an assembly, also met. But the lack of a really strong central administration made it difficult for the Samnites to sustain a long war. Though they could easily be roused to heroic vigour and had a passionate sense of unity in defence of their land, they tended to scatter quickly when on the hunt for booty. In 354 they made an alliance with the Romans, and the interests which both peoples had in the middle Liris valley were probably defined to their mutual satisfaction. However, a more potent factor in driving them to co-operate was probably common fear of the Gauls, and when this fear became less urgent the preoccupation of Rome with the Latins and of the Samnites with southern Italy rendered the alliance still useful. In the same year Rome had made a truce with Praeneste; perhaps she feared a coalition of Latins and Samnites. But beside bringing the Romans and Samnites into contact for the first time, the Samnite alliance created a barrier in central Italy against the southward advance of the Gauls and the northward spread of Greek civilization.26
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