In another direction also Rome’s horizon widened. In 348 she made a treaty with Carthage, which revised the old agreement reached at the beginning of the Republic. The fact that the Romans allowed Carthage to stiffen up the conditions shows that their real interests were still confined to Italy and that their commercial ambitions were very humble. The treaty asserted Rome’s claim to speak for the cities of the Latian coast as far south as Tarracina (Anxur). Antium and the Volsci naturally disliked this and trouble followed; in 346 M. Valerius Corvus captured Satricum and celebrated a triumph over the Antiates, Volscians and men of Satricum.27 This discontent quickly communicated itself to the Latins who decided to make one supreme bid for freedom. But before the Latin revolt broke out, the Campanians, who by defending the Sidicini had drawn a Samnite attack on themselves, are said to have appealed to Rome for help against the Samnites; the Romans responded and waged the First Samnite War in 343–341 against their former allies. The military details of this war are very confused and improbable, and Diodorus knew of no such war before the great Samnite War of 327. Further, it is very unlikely that the Romans would risk breaking with their Samnite allies on the very eve of a Latin revolt. Many believe, therefore, that the war was invented to justify Rome’s later dealings with Campania. The evidence is not conclusive, but it must be admitted that the whole narrative of these years becomes clearer if the war is rejected. In any case the Romans renewed their alliance with the Samnites in 341 and disclaimed any responsibility for the Sidicini, the very people on whose behalf their war with Samnium is said to have been fought.28
7. THE END OF THE LATIN LEAGUE
The Latins determined to profit by Rome’s domestic troubles (pp. 107–8). In 343 they launched an attack against the Paeligni in an attempt to cut the communications between Rome and Samnium. When two years later these two states renewed their alliance the Sidicini, feeling themselves threatened by the Samnites, appealed successfully to the Latins for protection. Thus the Latins and Sidicini, together with the Campanians, ranged themselves against Rome and Samnium.29 The storm broke when the Latins demanded from the Romans independence or equality; the request that Livy puts into their mouths – full Roman citizenship and a half share in the government – is clearly an anticipation of the claims made by the Latins two hundred and fifty years later on the eve of the Social War. Their demand was refused, and the Latins mustered for their war of independence. In 340, while one consul protected Rome, T. Manlius led a force through the territory of the Paeligni, joined the Samnites and marched with his allied forces down the Liris. At Trifanum near Suessa he met the Latin allied forces in a great battle. The Campanian horsemen, who might have outflanked the Romans, were sadly ineffective, and the Latin resistance was broken. The Romans quickly made peace with the Campanians, and two years later all resistance was stamped out: in 339 Q. Publilius Philo celebrated a triumph over the Latins and in 338 L. Furius Camillus defeated the northern Latin towns of Pedum and Tibur, while C. Maenius overcame the southern Latins and Volscians in a battle near Antium, which was taken. The various Latin cities submitted and their independence was ended (338).30
The Latin League, which had survived numerous changes, was now dissolved. Many of the cities and colonies were deprived of their rights of commercium and conubium with each other and of all common political activity. Although religious gatherings on the Alban Mount were permitted to continue, the meetings at the Caput Ferentinae were forbidden and the League was politically dead. If the Romans had followed this destructive policy alone, they would merely have driven the Latin opposition underground, stored up trouble for the future, and weakened themselves for their future struggles against the Etruscans, Gauls and Samnites by forfeiting the military support of their old allies. Instead they created a confederacy. They bound the conquered Latins to themselves by ties of common interest, and by a wise liberality they stimulated the patriotism of the Latins for a state of which they became members. Not all were to be fully privileged members from the beginning; complete citizenship was a prize which the Romans held out as an attainable ideal of practical value. Rome became the mother of Italy, training her children by carefully graded stages up to the privilege of full family life. This was an immense stride forward in Rome’s history and indeed in the history of mankind. The conquered people were not to be dragged along at Rome’s chariot wheels as slaves; they were asked to share in the privileges and responsibilities of their conqueror. Rome thus grounded her hegemony of Italy on moral principles, however much they may have been dictated by self-interest. The moral justification of the Roman conquest of Italy is that when Pyrrhus and Hannibal came to deliver the Italian peoples from the yoke of Rome, they failed because the Italian confederacy preferred to remain loyal to Rome’s leadership.
The elaborate scheme of enfranchisement which Rome evolved was not the work of a moment, but its main lines were laid down by the settlement of 338. First, some of the nearest Latin towns (Lanuvium, Aricia, Nomentum and Pedum, together with Tusculum if it had not already been incorporated in 381) were granted full Roman citizenship and retained their municipal governments. Rome thus counterbalanced the ravages of war by increasing the number of her full citizens; within a generation a Tusculan noble reached the Roman consulship (322). In 332 two new tribes were formed in Latium, named Maecia and Scaptia. Secondly, some towns (municipia) accepted civitas sine suffragio, which at this time was not regarded as an inferior brand of Roman citizenship, but was an alliance whereby Rome and the municipium exchanged social rights (conubium and commercium). These municipia remained separate respublicae with full local autonomy except that they surrendered an independent foreign policy, provided Rome with troops (their munus), and were liable to visits by Roman judicial prefects. Their status thus resembled that of ius Latii, while their citizens could obtain full Roman citizenship by settling in Rome itself; gradually, however, the balance of power was tipped further in Rome’s interest and the character of the municipia declined. The first towns to accept civitas sine suffragio were not Latin, but Campanian or Volscian: Fundi, Formiae, Capua, Suessula and Cumae; and Acerrae in 332. The aristocracy of Capua is said to have received full, as opposed to half-, citizenship, but this is improbable, although they perhaps received some economic privileges. Thirdly, the other Latin cities and colonies retained their old status. Officially they remained on the same footing as Rome, being allies (socii Latini nominis), bound by an ‘alliance on terms of equality’ (foedus aequum). But in view of the disparity of strength between themselves and Rome, they would in practice have to fight on Rome’s behalf rather than on their own. And they were limited by being bound to Rome and not to each other. They were forbidden commercium and conubium, at least temporarily, with one another, but retained these rights with Roman citizens; as about half Latium consisted of Roman citizens the limitation was not drastic. The underlying principle of ‘divide and rule’ was a keystone of Roman policy. The cities of this class were the Latin colonies, Signia, Norba, Ardea, Circeii, Sutrium, Nepete and Setia. Tibur and Praeneste were deprived of some of their territory, but, like Cora and Gabii, retained their alliances with Rome. Fourthly, Antium received special treatment. It occupied an important position and had practised piracy for some time. After destroying its fleet the Romans allowed the Antiates to retain possession of their city, but a small Roman colony was sent to occupy a part of their territory. These settlers retained their Roman citizenship and had local home rule, like the municipia, but instead of serving in the Roman army they guarded the seaport. Only nine Roman citizen-colonies of this sort were founded before the First Punic War, since the type of Latin colony was preferred. Velitrae received somewhat similar treatment: the rebels were driven into exile and their lands were distributed to Roman settlers who kept their citizenship.
Such in brief was the organization by which Rome built up a federation in Italy. The allies supplied troops to fight alongside the Romans in their common interests, but it was the Roman citizens who paid the taxes
to support citizen and allied troops alike. The allies of Athens, who soon contributed money in place of naval help, came to feel that they were paying tribute to a mistress. Rome avoided levying tribute; she fought her battles side by side with her allies who thus felt the reality of their alliance. It was this policy of generating mutual interest and sentiment that won for Rome the hegemony of Italy and the power to unify its peoples into a nation. (See also Chapter VI, 7.)
V
THE UNION OF THE ORDERS AND THE CONSTITUTION
1. ECONOMIC DISTRESS
The Gallic invasion brought in its train a period of extreme distress. Amid this confusion the demands of the plebeians became more insistent until in 367 the Licinian Rogations won for them a considerable political victory which went far to unite the orders. Economic depression formed the background to much of the discontent. This centred around conditions of land tenure and the harsh laws of debt; it was aggravated by actual shortage of food. It has already been seen how pressing were these problems in the early days of the Republic (pp. 75f.). During the fifth century, and especially in its last decades, Rome’s conquests in Italy had increased the amount of ager publicus. If the plebs had been refused a fair share of Roman territory earlier, it would obviously be fatal to refuse their demands when this territory had been so greatly increased partly as a result of their efforts. So although some land may have been sold by the state to those who could afford to buy, some was distributed in plots to individual citizens as their absolute property (assignatio) The tribunes were not yet powerful enough to propose such measures, which were moved by magistrates and voted by the Comitia Centuriata with the Senate’s approval. Part of the land taken from Veii was distributed in this way in 393 in allotments of perhaps 4 iugera each (Diodorus, xiv, 102, 4; Livy v, 30, 8, gives 7 iugera). Patricians could apply for such land, but would probably sell or lease their portions; the poorer citizens were the chief gainers. By such grants of land the Romans secured the proximity and the interest of responsible self-supporting property owners who would rally to defend the state in hours of need. There were other means of relief for those who lacked land: they could share in the founding of colonies where they received allotments, and it is estimated that some 50,000 people may have gone to colonies between 450 and 290 BC. Or land could be obtained by squatting (occupatio) on state property with the right of possessio. Nominally a rent was paid, but most of such land fell into the hands of the richer farmers who could afford to develop it and who in practice seldom paid their dues.
In these circumstances it is not surprising that the legislation of this period should include some agrarian enactments. Such are found in the Licinian Rogations of 367 by which the amount of public land held by any individual was limited. Since the form of the law, as preserved, is similar to that enacted by Tiberius Gracchus in 133 BC, many historians reject the economic clauses of the Licinio-Sextian legislation as anticipations of later conditions. This radical criticism seems unjustified. Some details, for instance, that the limit was set at 500 iugera (300 acres), may be due to Gracchan influences, but a clause which limited the tenancies of public land may be accepted.1 This measure, however, did not solve the land problem, which was rather met by the rapid advance of Rome in Italy, by the increasing number of colonies, by fresh distributions of land and perhaps by the slow growth of industry.
The second main grievance arose from the harsh laws of debt. The story of how the patrician M. Manlius Capitolinus, who had saved the Capitol from the Gauls, gave up his property to redeem debtors from slavery and was killed for aiming at a tyranny, may deserve little credence, but it does reflect the serious economic situation. As Solon at Athens proclaimed a Seisachtheia, so the tribunes Licinius and Sextius in their Rogation of 367 decreed that interest already paid should be deducted from the original loan, and the balance, if any, should be repaid within three years. Modern attempts to discredit this measure are not very convincing; it was a temporary expedient which treated the symptoms rather than the disease.2
Attempts at relief consisted either in limiting the rate of interest or in bankruptcy laws, neither of which was very successful. No experiment was tried on the lines of allowing the debtor to compound with his creditor for a sum rather less than the full amount. In 357 M. Duilius and L. Menenius, two tribunes, fixed the rate of interest at one-twelfth (8⅓ per cent); if such a law had been contained in the Twelve Tables it was now re-enacted (p. 80). In 352 a Commission of Five was set up by the consuls as a state bank. They had powers to make advances from the state to debtors in difficulties, to take over mortgages on adequate security, or to settle them by allowing bankruptcy proceedings. Five years later the legal rate of interest was reduced by half, and another three years’ moratorium was declared; as the state had taken over many mortgages, the Treasury would have to stand the loss in such cases. In 342 a tribune, L. Genucius, carried a measure to forbid loans and usury; Livy appears a little doubtful about this law, but it may well have been another temporary expedient which soon fell into disuse. Foreign conquests and increased colonization offered some relief in the following years, but in 326 (Livy, viii, 28) or 313 (Varro, L. L., vii, 105) the question of enslavement for debt was once more faced and finally settled. It was scarcely possible to amend the law relating to nexum laid down by the Twelve Tables, but it could be rendered harmless. The Lex Poetelia stands out like an ancient Magna Charta. ‘In that year’, wrote Livy, ‘the liberty of the Roman plebs had, as it were, a new beginning; for men ceased to be imprisoned for debt.’ The details are obscure, but apparently it was decreed that judgement must be obtained before execution was carried out; and Pais may be correct in supposing that loans were to be made on the security of the property, and not of the person of the borrower. ‘The bonds of the citizens were released and thereafter binding for debts ceased,’ wrote Cicero.3 A landmark had been set up, but the financial and agricultural problems still awaited a permanent solution.
2. VICTORIES OF THE PLEBEIANS
Since plebeians had been elected consular tribunes, it would be illogical to exclude them from the consulship if it should be re-established. Yet the plebeian demand for this privilege resulted in the most famous constitutional struggle in Roman history: the ten years’ agitation which produced the Licinian laws. In 376 two tribunes, C. Licinius and L. Sextius, proposed that the consulship should be restored and that one consul should be a plebeian; their economic proposals have already been mentioned. Their eight colleagues blocked the measure. For ten years, it is said, Licinius and Sextius were re-elected to office while the struggle raged. According to Livy no patrician magistrates were elected for five years, though Diodorus reduces the period of ἀναϱχία to one year. Camillus twice was elected dictator. In 368 the patrician resistance began to weaken: the number of commissioners who regulated various religious ceremonies (sacris faciundis) was raised from two to ten, of whom five were to be plebeians. At one point the poorer plebeians were willing to drop the law about the consulship, if only the economic measures were passed: but the plebeian leaders stiffened their backs, until finally in 367 all the measures were passed and became law; L. Sextius himself was elected as first plebeian consul for 366. Many details of this struggle are suspicious, but the passage of the bill in 367 should not be questioned.4
The patricians tried to minimize their loss by depriving the consuls (or praetores consules) of some of their duties. The ordinary civil jurisdiction of the city was handed over in 366 to a regular magistrate with imperium, inferior to that of the consuls; he was named, like them, praetor, but was never called consul, while the consuls themselves retained this part of their title and dropped the additional praetores. This praetor probably was to be patrician, but by 337 the plebeians won admission to the magistracy. In 367 two curule aediles were elected from the patricians, but in the following year it was arranged that this office should alternate annually between the two orders. And thus, notwithstanding attempted patrician evasions, a settlement had been reached. The wea
lthy plebeians had secured access to the consulship: the other magistracies would be attained in course of time. The Licinian Laws decided the struggle of the orders in every real sense. The final compromise may have been brought about partly through the intervention of the aged Camillus, ‘the second founder of Rome’, who died two years later, but not before he is said to have vowed a temple to Concord (Concordia Ordinum) to commemorate the equalization of the orders.5
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