A History of the Roman World

by Scullard, H. H.

  Proceeding down the Asiatic coast the Romans were joined at Elea by Eumenes; but here P. Scipio fell ill and had to be left behind. His brother advanced inland towards Thyatira while Antiochus retreated eastwards, not to avoid battle, but to seek suitable ground where his cavalry, chariots, elephants and superior numbers would have full scope. He had gathered a host of some 75,000 men to face the 30,000 Romans; their fighting quality was good but the variety of their equipment and training made co-operation of the parts difficult. In a carefully chosen position in the plain of Magnesia-ad-Sipylum he fortified a camp between two rivers, the Phrygius and Hermus. The Romans camped on the opposite (western) side of the Phrygius and then crossing over offered battle with their flanks covered by the two rivers. Antiochus drew up his army but would not advance against the strong Roman position. A third time the Romans moved their camp nearer the enemy’s and again offered battle, though their right wing was unprotected; an engagement followed (probably in January 189).

  The Roman weak spot was their exposed right wing in the south; here they massed their cavalry under Eumenes, hoping to defeat the enemy’s armoured horsemen before or while these attempted to outflank the Roman line. In this they succeeded. After the archers and slingers had scattered the Syrian scythe-chariots Eumenes charged home and thrust the cataphracts in confusion on to their own centre. Meantime Antiochus himself had led a successful charge of his Iranian horse on his right and had driven back the Roman left wing. But he repeated the error he had made at Raphia, by carrying on the pursuit instead of wheeling to support his centre or his broken left. The phalanx in the Seleucid centre had been drawn up with gaps between the columns and these had been filled with elephants. It stubbornly resisted the Roman legionaries until the elephants began to stampede and its flank was turned by Eumenes’ successful cavalry charge. Gradually giving way to the legions under Domitius Ahenobarbus, who was the real commander in Africanus’ absence, it was finally cut to pieces. The Syrian camp was captured and their losses were immense. Antiochus fled to Sardes and then to Apamea; when he saw his empire falling like a house of cards and the towns of Asia Minor surrendering to the Romans he laid down arms and sought terms. Thus the Romans had won Asia Minor, like Greece, at a single blow.11

  4. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE EAST

  Antiochus’ ambassadors reached L. Scipio at Sardes, where he had been rejoined by his brother, Africanus, who proposed very similar terms to those demanded before the battle: the withdrawal of Antiochus beyond the Taurus, an indemnity of 15,000 talents, the payment to Eumenes of an old debt of 400 talents and a quantity of corn, and the surrender of Hannibal together with certain Greek agitators. When hostages had been given, an armistice was concluded. The terms were not crushing. The indemnity was large – the largest known to ancient history: Carthage had paid only 10,000 talents after the Hannibalic War – but it was not beyond Antiochus’ power to pay. The surrender of Hannibal merely meant that he must leave Antiochus’ territory; indeed Scipio, ever generous, may have inserted this clause to give him the opportunity of escape, an opportunity which Hannibal did not miss. The terms show that Scipio intended to leave Syria humbled but still alive and to give Rome no further occasion for interference and dispute. These terms were revised later by the Senate when ten commissioners were sent to make the final settlement with Cn. Manlius Vulso who succeeded Scipio in 189. The additional clauses were: Antiochus was not to war in Europe or the Aegean; if attacked by any of these nations he could resist, but he must not have sovereignty over them or attach them to himself as friends; Rome should arbitrate in such disputes; he must surrender his elephants and fleet, except ten ships which were not to sail west of Cape Sarpedonium. Thus the Senate showed a jealous anxiety to exploit the victory and to rob the king of his armaments which would have been useful in the future against a neighbour like Egypt, in crushing internal troubles and in checking the expansion of the Rhodians who, not being allies of Rome, were left considerable scope for expansion. Unable to guarantee that he would not be attacked, Rome gave him the right to resist assaults but not to procure allies in the region from which he had been excluded. Scipio’s more generous terms would have allowed him freedom for development within definitely prescribed limits; Syria could still have flourished under a Roman protectorate. In the Senate, however, there had been a reaction from the policies of the Scipios and the final peace meant that Syria would have little chance to develop a prosperous national life and that the weakening of the central power would hasten the breaking up of the state; Rome would be drawn into the east and the foundations were laid of that Roman predominance which was to last eight hundred years.12

  Meanwhile other settlements were made by the consuls of 189, M. Fulvius Nobilior and Cn. Manlius Vulso, who superseded the Scipios. The Aetolians, once again rebuffed by the Senate, had renewed war against Philip during the winter. But their hopes were frustrated by news of Magnesia and then by the arrival of Fulvius with two legions (spring 189). Now for the first time Rome had four consular legions in the east, although the two in Asia were little more than garrison troops. After laying siege to Ambracia, Fulvius was persuaded to offer more lenient terms than unconditional surrender, and by the autumn the Senate had ratified a peace (a foedus iniquum), which subordinated the Aetolians to Rome and involved them in considerable territorial losses including Delphi, together with an indemnity of 500 talents. The long chapter of Aetolia’s independent history was closed and Rome had accomplished in three years a settlement which Macedon had never been able to achieve. There was an epilogue to the war in Greece. Cephallenia had expressly been excluded from the peace. Rome wished to drive the pirates from this island and to gain this valuable base in the Ionian sea. After a four months’ siege Fulvius took Same and subdued the island (January 188).

  About the same time the final settlement of Asia was accomplished. The consul Manlius carried out an extensive expedition through the territory of the Galatians and reduced them to complete submission (189). The fact that Manlius acquired a staggering amount of booty and money by systematic extortion and warfare, and that the final defeat of the barbarians in their mountain strongholds of the Phrygian plateau involved great loss of life, tends to obliterate the real value of this achievement. It appears an act of wanton imperialism instead of a necessary piece of police work. The barbarians were a continual menace to the Greek and native communities of Asia Minor and only their complete submission would secure lasting peace, for the small army of Eumenes could hardly be expected to hold them back. The harsh and avaricious conduct of Manlius, who fought the barbarians with their own weapons, had turned a wise plan, well suited to Rome’s protectorate mission, into a shameful blot on her good name.

  In the spring of 188 Manlius joined the ten senatorial commissioners at Apamea and the final treaty was signed and honoured by Antiochus. As laid down by the terms, the king was confined to Syria. A great part of the territory ceded by Antiochus was divided between Eumenes and the Rhodians, with the river Maeander as the boundary between; the continental possessions of Rhodes were thus quadrupled, and the kingdom of Pergamum embraced more territory than the Italian federation including Sicily. The status of the Greek towns of the western seaboard proved a thorny question. Eumenes, the former champion of their liberty, now claimed sovereignty over them, but the Rhodians in jealousy urged their liberation, which had in fact been promised by the Scipios to those cities which surrendered. It was decided that cities previously subject to Antiochus were to be free (liberae et immunes), but those which had been tributary to Attalus and those which had opposed or seceded from the Romans during the war were to pay tribute to Eumenes; many individual exceptions were made. But since the liberated towns formed a barrier between Eumenes and the sea the king did not hesitate to claim Pamphylia, alleging that it was ‘on this side Taurus’, although he had been granted Telmessus, an enclave in Rhodian territory. Since the exact frontier was doubtful the Senate granted him western Pamphylia.

  This settlement was
a far cry from the proclamation of liberation for the Greeks with which Rome had entered the war. But it was a partial fulfilment, and showed clearly that the Romans themselves wished to wash their hands of Asia. In the autumn of 188 Manlius evacuated Asia, and after his army had been attacked by barbarians on its march through Thrace he arrived back in Italy, leaving Eumenes instead of a Roman army to be a bulwark against future disturbances. Pergamum would act as a wedge between Syria and Macedon, and at the same time limit the ambitions of the border states, Bithynia, Pontus, Cappadocia and Galatia. If Pergamum and Rhodes took a large share in frightening the Senate into war with Antiochus, it was certainly they, and not Rome, who reaped the main harvest. In little more than ten years Rome had overthrown the two great Hellenistic monarchies, but so far from having imperialistic aims, she had not left a single soldier behind in either Greece or Asia. She left the Hellenistic world free to abuse its liberty, and only when this occurred was she again unwillingly forced to intervene. But her patience was not inexhaustible.

  XIII

  ROME AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

  1. THE GROWING TENSION

  During the forty years embraced by this chapter, Rome’s foreign policy underwent a subtle change. Starting with the Greek particularistic principle of temporary alliances which had led to something like a protectorate system, Rome gradually turned to a policy of annexation in Greece. The philhellenic protectorate policy of the Scipios and Flamininus was abandoned in favour of a return to the old system of alliance, which really meant dependence. This reaction, led by Cato, was based on a dislike of things Greek and of the deleterious effect of eastern conquest on the character of Rome’s generals. Further, the people looked askance at the increasing power which foreign conquest vested in the Senate and its prominent members. But beside this partly conscious reaction, Rome was driven on by circumstances. The view that she deliberately encouraged quarrels and rivalries in Greece in order to regain a foothold there is hardly acceptable, but having guaranteed the freedom of Greek cities, she could not disregard their quarrels and still more their appeals. The period shows a welter of disputes referred to the Senate. Rome showed herself slow to intervene, slow even to enforce her decisions, but it is little wonder if her patience was gradually broken down by this bombardment from the Greeks, whom she wished to ignore. We must now trace her relations first with Greece and then with Macedon till the outbreak of the Third Macedonian War.

  Even before the Romans left Greece trouble was brewing in the Peloponnese. Though Philopoemen’s dream of the whole Peloponnese united under the Achaean League was fulfilled, it was soon shattered by the revolt of Sparta and by Philopoemen’s own lack of statecraft. Sparta had sent a force against her political exiles who after the recent social revolution were rallying in the liberated towns of the Laconian coast (189). When Philopoemen intervened, Sparta seceded from Achaea and offered Fulvius an explanation of its conduct which had infringed the Spartan-Roman Treaty. The question was referred to the Senate which being more concerned with Asiatic affairs replied ambiguously to an Achaean embassy. Thereupon Philopoemen stormed Sparta, massacred the anti-Achaean party, incorporated the city into the League, dismantled her walls, expelled the Helots, restored the exiles, and abolished the old Lycurgan constitution (188). But the Senate held back. Two years later the restored exiles ungratefully found grounds to complain to Rome about Achaea’s conduct, but the Senate merely expressed disapproval.

  In 185 a stiffening is noticeable in the Senate’s conduct, due perhaps to the political decline of the Scipios and the growing ascendancy of Cato, and other political rivals of theirs, together with increasing anxiety concerning Philip’s conduct. Having taken no action for four years despite much provocation, the Senate suddenly intervened. On his return from Macedon, Q. Caecilius Metellus (consul 206) rebuked Achaea for its treatment of Sparta and demanded that the League assembly should be summoned, but he was refused on the legal ground that he had no written instructions from the Senate. The Achaeans then received a sharp rebuke from the Senate, and Ap. Claudius Pulcher ordered a League assembly (184), which was marked by mutual recriminations. Thereafter Rome forced a settlement on Achaea, whose envoys had to sign it though thereby they broke the laws of their League: Achaea retained Sparta in the League at the price of restoring the exiles of 190 and rebuilding her walls. The League refused to endorse the settlement, but came to an agreement with Sparta whereby the exiles were not to be recalled. The Senate swallowed the insult.

  In 183 Messene revolted from Achaea. The Senate warned the Achaeans, but did not prevent Italian blockade-runners helping Messene. Nothing daunted, Philopoemen defeated the Messenians, but was himself captured and poisoned. Thus died the ‘last of the Greeks’. He was ultimately succeeded, not by the like-minded Lycortas, father of the historian Polybius, but by Callicrates, who advised the Senate actively to support the pro-Roman at the expense of the patriotic parties in the various cities. Then, relying on Rome’s support, he persuaded the Achaeans to restore the Spartan and Messenian exiles and to allow the refortification of Sparta and the restoration of the constitution of Lycurgus (181). This action of Callicrates marked a new era in the relations of Greece and Rome, whereby Rome tended to support those who appealed to her authority whether right or wrong. As a result she had many flatterers but few friends. Callicrates is adjudged ‘the initiator of great miseries to all the Greeks, but especially to the Achaeans, who because of their good faith had hitherto the privilege of dealing on something like equal terms with Rome.’1 So ended the long Achaeo-Spartan imbroglio, the somewhat tedious details of which have been recorded because they illustrate the changing methods of Roman policy. Next, it will be seen how this was affected by the conduct of Philip.

  Philip’s loyalty to the Roman cause during the war with Antiochus was rewarded by the remission of the rest of his indemnity and by permission to keep the cities he had captured – but with a reservation. Glabrio had allowed him to retain those Thessalian cities which he took from the Aetolians, provided that such cities had sided with Aetolia voluntarily and not under compulsion. Though this settlement was in line with the policy adopted towards Eumenes in Asia, it obviously contained seeds of future unrest. Philip controlled a wide area which included the coastal strip of Magnesia with Demetrias, and towns on the Phthiotic coast, in Perrhaebia, in Hestiaeotis, and on the borders of Athamania and Dolopia, but the Romans had tried to limit his activity, and Glabrio’s order to desist from besieging Lamia in 191 still rankled in his mind. If Philip felt aggrieved, Rome felt suspicious of his extraordinary activity in rebuilding the power of Macedon. By fresh taxation, by developing his mines, and by settling many Thracians in Macedon he strengthened his country’s manpower and economic resources. His object may have been entirely pacific, but to Rome this presaged war. Indeed Polybius believed that Philip had decided to renew the war with Rome when his preparations were complete and that his successor Perseus merely followed in his father’s footsteps. However this may be, the revival of Macedon increased Rome’s suspicious fears.

  Complaints soon reached Rome from various Thessalian cities that Philip was not observing the terms of the peace by withdrawing his garrisons. The details were very intricate, as it would not always be easy to determine whether a given city had gone over to the Aetolians of its own free will or not. The Senate dispatched a commission of enquiry, led by Caecilius Metellus. At a subsequent meeting at Tempe, although the Thessalians put forward a weak case, Philip foolishly let his tongue run away with him and observed that ‘his sun had not altogether set’; nor did he improve his claims by adding that he knew that he would have to give up what he had received, whether or not his cause was just. He was then ordered to evacuate the cities which were appealing; they were to be added to the Thessalian League. A more serious situation, which had already arrested senatorial attention, arose from his occupation in 187 or 186 of two Thracian cities, Aenus and Maroneia, after their evacuation by Antiochus; Eumenes also on very slender gr
ounds was putting in a counter-claim to these towns. The Roman commissioners required Philip to withdraw his garrisons from the two towns and referred the question to the Senate, which sent out a fresh mission under Appius Claudius and declared the towns free. This, however, so incensed Philip that he cruelly arranged a massacre in Maroneia. An enquiry was instituted and Philip’s agent was summoned to Rome, but he mysteriously died on the journey. Rumour added that Philip was merely taking steps to hush up the affair.

  To counter Rome’s increasing suspicion, which was fed by a further mass of complaints from his neighbours in 184, Philip prudently sent his younger son Demetrius to Rome to protect his interests. Demetrius, who had made a good impression in Rome while there as a hostage after the Second Macedonian War, now obtained from the Senate a verdict in his father’s favour which helped to relieve the tension between Rome and Macedon. But reports from Greece were not entirely reassuring, so a message which was sent to congratulate Philip on his compliance ended with a warning. The cause of Rome’s suspicion was that the king, whose activity was now checked on the coast, had turned his attention to his northern boundaries where he planned new fortresses and shifted the population about. And even when he tried to add his name to the list of ancient explorers by climbing Mount Haemus, a high peak in the Balkans (probably Mt Vitocha), to investigate a rumour that the Black Sea, the Adriatic, the Danube, and the Alps could all be seen thence, his action was interpreted as an attempt to plan an invasion of Italy. But if Philip’s public affairs prospered, his private life was less happy. On the return of Demetrius to Macedon his elder brother Perseus accused him of plotting to win the succession to the throne and suggested that Flamininus and other Romans had been playing on his ambitions. Philip ordered the death of Demetrius and only later found that his fears had not perhaps been fully justified. Sick at heart at his own impetuous folly, he himself died soon afterwards (179). Though he did not live to see the dawn of that glorious day of which he dreamed, when Macedon once more should guide the world, he had raised his country to a height which it had not reached since the death of Alexander. Philip, rather than Philopoemen, might be called ‘the last of the Greeks’.2