A History of the Roman World

by Scullard, H. H.

  18 CAPUA. The rebel cities, Capua, Atella and Calatia, issued coins (mainly bronze) as an act of independence: some depict elephants (see Scullard, The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World, 70 ff. For Hannibal’s coinage in Italy see E. S. G. Robinson, Num. Chron., 1964, 37 ff. The coins issued by the Barcids in Spain, with probable portraits of Hamilcar, Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Mago, may be mentioned here: see E. S. G. Robinson, Essays in Roman Coinage (ed. R. A. G. Carson (1956), 34 ff.) On the sources see J. von Ungern-Sternberg, Capua im zweiten punischen Krieg: Untersuchungen zur römischen Annalistik (1975).

  A report in the Daily Telegraph of 2 February 1976 refers to the discovery near Santa Maria Capua Vetere of what appears to be a military encampment (? Hannibal’s camp).

  19 HANNIBAL’S MARCH AGAINST ROME. According to Polybius (ix, 5) Hannibal marched through Samnium and crossed the Anio; Coelius (Livy, xxvi, 11) sent him through Samnium, the Paelignian Sulmo, Amiternum and Reate: but Livy (xxvi, 7–11) thought he advanced direct along the Via Latina. E. W. Davies, Phoenix, 1959, 113 ff., argues for the Via Latina, but the longer route is supported by E. T. Salmon, Phoenix, 1957, 153 ff., who attributes Livy’s mistaken route to confusion (by Valerius Antias) of Paelignian with Volscian Sulmo. See also Walbank, Polybius, ii, 121 ff. Traces of Hannibal’s sack of the temple at Lucus Feroniae (Livy, xxvi, 11) survive: R. Bloch, Rev. Phil., 1953, 75.

  X SCIPIO AND ROME’S OFFENSIVE

  1 NEW CARTHAGE AND SCIPIO. For this episode and Scipio’s Spanish and African campaigns see H. H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War (1930) and, more briefly, Scipio Africanus, Soldier and Politician (1970); also Walbank, Polybius. On the topography see Scullard (1930), 289 ff. This and Polybius’ account of the storming of the city abound in difficulties. Although Polybius had visited New Carthage and based his account on a letter from Scipio to king Philip V, his description raises many problems, some of which arise from his rationalistic outlook, which refused to recognize anything extraordinary either in nature or in the character of his hero Scipio. Thus the sinking of the waters in the lagoon may seem miraculous, but it was a miracle in the sense of a coincidence in time rather than a violation of natural law. Many parallels in history can be found, the most striking being that related in Exodus: ‘And the Lord caused the sea to go back by a strong east wind all the night and made the sea dry land’ (if the early account is disentangled from later miraculous elements, we find a perfectly natural explanation of the passage of the Red Sea; see H. H. Scullard, Expository Times, November 1930, 55 ff.). By Polybius’ time, and perhaps even during Scipio’s lifetime, popular tradition about Scipio was growing into a ‘legend’. This arose from Scipio’s exceptional personality and his apparent belief in divine help, especially from Jupiter in whose temple he used to commune (a very un-Roman habit). Polybius the rationalist might regard Scipio’s conduct as a way of winning popular confidence, but in fact his beliefs may have been genuine and he should not be dismissed as a hypocrite. On the ‘legend’ see R. M. Haywood, Studies on Scipio Africanus (1933); F. W. Walbank, Proc. Cambr. Phil. Soc., 1967, 54 ff.; H. H. Scullard, Scipio (1970) 18 ff., 235 ff.

  2 BAECULA. On the topography see Scullard, Scipio (1930), 300 ff.; (1970), 258 ff. and Veith, Schlachtfelder, iv, 503 ff. (the site suggested by Scullard is accepted by R. Thouvenot, Essai sur la province romaine de Bétique (1940), 89 7. 3). Scipio is sometimes criticized and Baecula minimized to a mere rearguard action (e.g. by Ihne, ii, 380), but for a defence see Scullard, op. cit., and B. H. Hallward, who writes (CAH, viii, 87), ‘the censure ignores the lesson of all campaigning in Spain’. R. C. Sanchez (Habis, 1975, 213 ff.) rejects the usual identification of Baecula with Bailen and seeks it west of Castulo south of the Baetis at Betula, but he does not offer any precise site for the battle.

  3 ILIPA. Date: Livy’s chronology is followed above, but many (e.g. De Sanctis, SR, III, ii, 496) transfer Ilipa to 207, because of the number of events to be crowded into 206 (for an attempt, however, to accommodate them all see Scullard (1930), 304 ff.). On the site of the battle and of the Roman and Carthaginian camps see Scullard, JRS, 1936, 19 ff. (cf. A. Schulten, Arch. Anzeiger, 1940, 113 ff.; 1943, 51). In line with his proposal to shift the campaigns of the elder Scipios and Publius further to the south-west (cf. p. 449 n. 14; and n. 2 above), R. C. Sanchez rejects Alcala del Rio as the Ilipa of the battle and seeks an Ilipa somewhere around Munda south of the Baetis, but is not very specific.

  4 MARCELLUS. Hannibal is said to have buried Marcellus with full military honours, though he kept his signet ring. He tried to capture Salapia by means of a forged dispatch sealed with this ring, but the trick miscarried and he lost 300 men, who on entering the city were cut off by the dropping of a portcullis. Marcellus, the ‘Sword of Rome’, had shown more initiative than most of his contemporaries, as attested by the annalistic exaggerations of his exploits. His faith is seen in his dedication of temples to Honos and Virtus, his appreciation of Greek culture in his sending the artistic treasures of Syracuse to Rome. For his portrait see Crawford, RRC n. 439.

  5 GRUMENTUM. On the topography of the fight at Grumentum see Kromayer, Schlachtfelder, III, i, 414 ff., and Atlas, col. 28, 9.

  6 METAURUS. The battlefield is uncertain and the fixing of it affects the strategy attributed to Hasdrubal. Two main theories may be distinguished: (a) the Romans camped near Fanum Fortunae (Fano) and the battle was fought on the north of the Metaurus; then Hasdrubal’s march by night was an attempt to reach central Italy; (b) the Romans and Carthaginians camped near Sena Gallica (Senigallia) and the battle was fought south of the Metaurus; in this case Hasdrubal’s march was a retreat either to northern Italy or to reach a defensive position beyond the Metaurus. A third solution, that of Kahrstedt, seeks to cut the Gordian knot by rejecting the night march as an annalistic invention; the battle would then have been fought near the camps, but this is very improbable. Of the two main views the first has been adopted in the above text. The chief objection to it is that Livy places the camps at Sena; but this hardly excludes the district around Sena. It is impossible here to enter into the controversy, but the main exponents may be listed (for details see the bibliographies in Kromayer-Veith, Schlachtfelder, III, 424 ff., CAH, viii): (a) north of Metaurus, moving westwards from Fano: Vaudoncourt (La Lucrezia), De Sanctis (M. Sterpeti), Lehmann (Calmazzo), Tarducci (San Silvestro); (b) south of Metaurus. Pitalluga and Oehler and with slight variations Kromayer (San Angelo), Bottini Massa (Cerasa), Marcolini (M. Maggiore) and recently in two pamphlets, G. Rossi (Montebello) to which A. Bianchini has replied (Tombacchia and Vago Colle). Cf. G. Buroni, Le diverse tesi sulla battaglia del Metauro (1953), and Walbank, Polybius, ii, 267 ff.

  7 MAGO. J. H. Thiel, Roman Sea-Power (1946), 144 ff., suggests that in view of her available naval forces Rome was culpable in allowing Mago to land, as earlier Scipio was in allowing his escape from Spain.

  8 APEACE PARTY ? E. Meyer Meister der Politik, i, 101, 131 ff.; Kleine Schriften, ii, 353, n. 2) suggested that Fabius and his supporters were ready in 205 to compromise with Carthage and allow her to keep her African possessions in exchange for peace. W. Schur (Scipio Africanus (1927), 47) summarizes their policy as the freeing of Italy, the reconquest of the lost Po valley and its colonization by farmers.

  9 SOPHONISBA. The romantic story of her relations with Masinissa and her death is recorded by Livy, xxx.

  10 PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. A fragment of papyrus of the second century BC deals briefly with the negotiations of 203–202 (Catalogue of Greek Papyri, J. Rylands Library, iii, n. 491, ed. C. Roberts). The author is unknown but was nearly contemporary and possibly more pro-Carthaginian than other writers. See Walbank, Polybius, ii, 442; Scullard, Scipio (1970), 270.

  11 ZAMA. The decisive battle of the Hannibalic War, traditionally known as Zama, has more recently been dubbed Naraggara (e.g. by De Sanctis) or Margaron (by Veith), although this is only to exchange one uncertainty for another. The ancient accounts of the battle bristle with difficulties regarding the t
opography, strategy, tactics, numbers, chronology, etc. The account given in the text is based on the present writer’s views as expressed in Scipio Africanus (1930). For a criticism of some of these views, cf. P. Fraccaro (Athenaeum, ix, 1931, 428–38) who would seem to smooth over the difficulties in Polybius’ account somewhat too easily. Two traditions are extant, the better one of Polybius and Livy, the inferior one of Appian and Dio; the latter finds an advocate in Saumagne. In matters of strategy and tactics it is not chiefly the facts which are questioned, but the motives of the leaders. Polybius’ authority must be final in questions of fact, but it appears legitimate to assign motives from the data which he gives when he does not do so himself, or even to suppose that the motives he does supply may be wrong – for his account presents difficulties and contradictions which necessitate some criticism. The account given above adheres closely to Polybius in facts and attempts to avoid the supposition of a gap in the present text of Polybius (as Veith) or an alteration in his order of the movements in the battle (as De Sanctis).

  There were probably two towns named Zama in North Africa (a third at Sidi Abd el Djedidi north-west of Kairouan was probably not called Zama). Zama Regia was most probably Seba Biar, while this settlement may have declined and the Zama of the Roman Empire have lain at modern Jama: see Scullard, Scipio (1970), 271 ff. Provided the general neighbourhood of Zama can be established, the precise sites are less important for the campaign, since Zama was clearly only Hannibal’s camp before his final advance westwards to the battlefield. Similarly, Scipio camped at Naraggara (Livy; Polybius gives Margaron, which is otherwise unknown) but no suitable battlefield can be found there. The most probable site is that suggested by Veith Atlas, col. 40, Schlachtfelder, iv, 626 ff.) in the plain of Draa-el-Metnan some eight miles from El Kef and about half way between Naraggara and Zama (Seba Biar). A visit to this site has confirmed the present writer in his belief in its suitability on physical as well as literary grounds. Most of the modern literature on the subject is criticized by Veith, Schlachtfelder, iii, 599 ff. and iv, 626 ff., although he curiously neglects the valuable account by De Sanctis, SR, III, ii, 549 ff., 588 ff. which appeared before he published his fourth volume. For discussion of another site suggested by F. H. Russell (Archaeology, 1970, 122 ff.) see Scullard in Polis and Imperium, Stud, in Hon. of E. T. Salmon (ed. J. A. S. Evans, 1974), 225 ff. (where I have corrected the name of the hill on which Scipio camped from Koudiat el Behaima to Koudiat Sidi Slima).

  XI ROME AND GREECE

  1 THE HELLENISTIC WORLD. General works on this period include CAH, vii–ix; W. W. Tarn and G. T. Griffith, Hellenistic Civilisation, edn 3 (1952); M. Cary, A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 BC, edn 2 (1951, repr. 1963); E. Will, Histoire politique du monde hellénistique, vol. i, 323–223 av. J.-C. (1966), vol. ii, 223–30 (1967); M. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, 3 vols (1941). On individual states see E. R. Bevan, The House of Seleucus (1902); E. R. Bevan, A History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty (1927); E. V. Hansen, The Attalids of Pergamum, edn 2 (1972); P. Fraser, Ptolemaic Alexandria, 3 vols (1972); P. Fraser and G. E. Bean, The Rhodian Peraea (1952); H.H. Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (1957); F.W. Walbank, Philip V of Macedon (1940). A. Aymard, Les Premiers rapports de Rome et de la confédération Achaienne (1938), Tes Assemblées de la fédération Achaienne (1938); R. Flacelière, Les Aitoliens à Delphes (1937). See also J. A. O. Larsen, Greek Federal States (1968). R. M. Errington, The Dawn of Empire (1971) outlines Rome’s policy towards the Greek world.

  2 THE SYRO-MACEDONIAN PACT. The attempt of D. Magie (JRS, 1939, 32 ff.) to reject this pact as a fabrication of Rhodian propaganda, designed to frighten Rome, which deceived both Rome and Polybius, is not very convincing. It has been revived by R. M. Errington (Athenaeum, 1971, 336 ff. and The Dawn of Empire (1971), ch. x). In any case the report of the pact, whether it was fact or fiction, will have had the same effect on the Senate and have played the same part in precipitating Roman intervention. The pact is accepted by H. H. Schmitt, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Antiochus des Grossen (1964), ch. iv (this book deals with various aspects of Antiochus’ reign, but not primarily with his relations with Rome).

  3 CHIOS AND LADE. On the chronology of events see Walbank, Polybius, ii, 497 ff.

  4 THE AETOLIAN EMBASSY. Appian (Mac., 4, 2) places the embassy in 201–200 when the Senate would have welcomed it. This is to be corrected to 202 (rather than rejected as an annalistic invention, as proposed by E. Badian, Latomus, 1958, 208 ff.). De Sanctis (SR, IV, i, 39) places the embassy before Zama, when the Senate would naturally wish to avoid eastern complications; Holleaux (CAH, viii, 152, n. 1) places it after Zama, in which case Philip may have derived an unwarranted hope from the Senate’s attitude. See also Livy, xxxi, 29, 4, on which see J. Briscoe, Livy, xxxi–xxxiii (1973), 130; he dates it to 201, but before the Rhodian and Attalid embassies.

  5 THE PEOPLE AND WAR, Livy (xxxi, 6 f.) places the consuls’ proposal for the declaration of war at the beginning of the consular year and then recounts a second appeal which resulted in the declaration. Mommsen pointed out that the latter occurred in the summer of 200, not in March. But the assumption that the two appeals were made in quick succession makes it difficult to explain the sudden change in the people’s feelings. De Sanctis (SR, IV, i, 32 n.) rightly separates the two appeals, placing one in March (as Livy), the other in midsummer (as chronology demands). See A. H. McDonald and F. W. Walbank, JRS, 1937, 187 ff.; E. Bickermann, Rev. Phil., 1935, 171 ff. and Cl. Ph., 1945, 139 f.; J. P. V. D. Balsdon, JRS, 1954, 37 ff. J. W. Rich, Declaring War in the Roman Republic (Collection Latomus, vol. 149, 1976), 73 ff. and 107 ff., sticking closer to Livy, argues that only a short interval (a month or so?) intervened between the two meetings and that there was no direct link between the war vote and the embassy to Macedon: the instructions given to the legati were to inform the Greeks and Philip that the Senate had passed a senatus consultum which set out the terms on which it was ready to remain at peace with Philip. The formal indictio belli was therefore not delivered by Lepidus to Philip at Abydus, but was conveyed to a Macedonian post in Illyria after Galba had crossed the Adriatic. This view, like all others (!), involves difficulties. For the question of the state of the calendar in 200 BC see Rich, 75, n. 58.

  6 AN EMBASSY TO EGYPT. Livy (xxxi, 2 and 18) says the embassy went in the summer of 201 to Egypt to report the defeat of Hannibal and to ask the king to remain friendly to Rome if she should be forced to fight Philip. Chronology demands that the embassy started in 200; hence an annalistic error is generally assumed, e.g. by De Sanctis (SR, IV, i, 23) and Holleaux (CAH, viii, 161, n. 1). The latter remarks: ‘It is to be observed that Hannibal’s defeat happened a year before’. But it is also to be observed that the peace was only officially concluded in that year (201). May there not be a confused reference in Livy to an earlier embassy sent in 201 by the Senate (on the pretext of announcing Hannibal’s defeat) to ascertain the attitude of the Great Powers to one another? If the personnel of the two embassies was the same, confusion would easily arise.

  7 ATHENS AND ROME: CEPHISODORUS. The influence of Athens on Roman policy has been variously assessed. The view of E. Bickermann (Rev. Phil., 1936, 59 ff., 161 ff.; cf. also D. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor (1950), 744 ff.) that the Peace of Phoenice was a koine eirene which included Athens and that therefore Philip’s subsequent attack on Athens involved Rome in a legal obligation to aid Athens since Rome had guaranteed the security of all the signatories, has been rejected by J. A. O. Larsen (Cl. Phil., 1937, 15 ff.) and by McDonald and Walbank (JRS, 1937, 180 ff.). The view in the Livian tradition (e.g. Livy, xxxi, i, 10) that Athens appealed directly to Rome for help before the summer of 200 (which De Sanctis attempted to defend against the criticism of Holleaux) may be rejected: see F.W. Walbank, Philip V, 311 ff. In any case such an appeal would not have affected the legal aspect of Roman diplomacy, though it might have influenced Roman sentiment. Further light, however, has been thrown upon an Athenian appe
al during the summer of 200 by the publication of a decree in honour of the Athenian statesman and ambassador, Cephisodorus (see B. D. Meritt, Hesperia, 1936, 419 ff. and A. H. McDonald, JRS 1937, 198.; cf. Pausanias, i, 36, 5). If Cephisodorus reached Rome just before the second meeting of the Comitia (McDonald, who originally placed the arrival after, now agrees that it was before: contrast JRS, 1963, 189 with JRS, 1937, 198), his appeal, while not affecting the legal aspect of Rome’s procedure, would have afforded the Senate an additional argument with which to persuade the people to declare war; at the same time it would help to explain the impression which the Athenian appeal made on the later annalistic tradition.

  8 SOCII ET AMICI. On these see Matthaei, Cl. Qu., 1907, 182 ff.; A. Heuss, ‘Die Volkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der römischen Aussenpolitik in republikanischer Zeit’, Klio, Beiheft 31 (1933); T. Frank, Roman Imperialism (1914), 147 ff., 160, n. 19 and Cl. Phil., iv, 122; W. Dahlheim, Struktur und Entwicklung des röm. Volkerrechts im dr. und zweit. Jahrhund. v. Chr. (1968), 248 ff. E. Badian (Foreign Clientelae (1958), 69), however, thinks that the term socius et amicus may be older than the second century, and stresses (68) the growing influence of the concept of clientela on the earlier idea of amicitia ‘until the Romans could no longer imagine the co-existence of genuinely equal states: her amici could only be her clients’. Rome was gradually extending her diplomatic categories.

  For the view that Pergamum was an ally, not merely an amicus of Rome see J. A. O. Larsen, Cl. Phil., 1937, 17. The early history of Rome’s relations with Rhodes is uncertain: Polybius (xxx, 5, 6) notes that in 167 BC they had been in political association for nearly 140 years, i.e. since c. 306. Holleaux, however, argued that Polybius’ text should be emended to ‘40’ and that relations began only at the end of the third century. This view is criticized at length by H. H. Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (1957; on which cf. A. H. McDonald, JRS, 1958, 184 ff. and P. M. Fraser, Cl. Rev., 1959, 64 ff.). Even if formal amicitia had not existed since 306, some friendly contacts may have been made before c. 200, but certainly there was no treaty (foedus), while amicitia, as Heuss has shown, should be interpreted in a looser way than Holleaux had postulated. The relations of Rome and Rhodes in the second century are also examined by E. S. Gruen, Cl. Qu., 1978, 58 ff.