The Republic and The Laws (Oxford World's Classics)

by Cicero

  Cicero’s Philosophical Education and Affiliations

  In his youth, Cicero had spent time in the company of Greek philosophers, both in Rome and in Athens. After a brief flirtation with Epicureanism, he became a follower of the Academic philosopher Philo of Larissa, who attracted him partly because of his interests in rhetoric. Philo was the latest representative of the sceptical turn taken by the Academy since Arcesilaus in the third century BC. Later, Cicero attended the lectures of another Academic, Antiochus of Ascalon, who had been a pupil of Philo but had abandoned scepticism, claiming to restore the authentic doctrines of the ‘Old Academy’ (i.e. of Plato’s immediate successors) as opposed to the sceptical ‘New Academy’. Antiochus argued not only that the true Platonic tradition did after all allow certain knowledge, but also that there was no difference other than in terminology between the doctrines of the Academy (as interpreted by himself), those of Aristotle and those of the Stoics.16

  In the later series of philosophical works,17 written in 45–44 BC, Cicero proclaims himself as an adherent of the sceptical methods of the New Academy. His version of scepticism, owed presumably to Philo, was a moderate one; far from insisting on absolute suspension of judgement in all circumstances, he allowed the wise man to assent provisionally to any view which seemed probable, while remaining open to contrary argument. The New Academics used several methods to combat rash claims of certainty. They emphasized the variety of possible viewpoints (diaphonia); they would argue successively on both sides of a question, or undertake to find arguments against whatever view was offered by the opponent. These methods were to provide Cicero with an excellent vehicle for objective exposition of the doctrines of the various schools.

  However, in the Republic and Laws his position is somewhat different. It is true that in the third book of the Republic he presents arguments both for and against justice in the Academic manner, recalling the opposing theses of Carneades (see note on R. 3. 8); but it is clear that he has changed the whole drift of Carneades’ arguments. There is no sceptical reservation of judgement. The whole debate is explicitly directed towards establishing the case for justice and refuting the opposing view. The speaker Philus, who puts the case against justice, does so unwillingly (3. 8), and the outcome is never left in doubt. Furthermore, in the Laws, Cicero explicitly keeps the sceptical Academy at a distance (1. 39) so that it will not disturb his neatly constructed theory of divine providence and natural law; and the views on the summum bonum given in L. 1. 54 ff. are explicitly in line with those of Antiochus.

  It has been thought, therefore, that he had at this time deserted scepticism in favour of the views of Antiochus;18 and a passage in a later work, the Academica (1. 13, cf. r. 43), has been taken to indicate that Cicero was at that time converted back from the ‘Old Academy’ (as interpreted by Antiochus) to the scepticism of Philo. But it may be going too far to speak of a change of allegiance. Rather, it seems that Cicero has here consciously and temporarily relinquished the stance of a sceptic, to which he would later return when his context and purposes demanded it. In some of the later dialogues it suited him to stress the difficulty of coming to a firm conclusion on the philosophical questions he was discussing, but this would not have been appropriate in the context of the Republic and Laws (cf. L. 1. 37). In fact, as Gorier has pointed out, there are also signs of the persistence of a sceptical attitude in the Laws: in L. 1. 54 Cicero stops short of confessing total allegiance to Antiochus, and in L. 1. 36 he proclaims his own freedom of judgement. A certain measure of distancing is effected, too, by the dialogue form. But we are left in little doubt as to the views of which Cicero wishes to convince us. Cicero here appears as a Roman consular speaking on his own authority about matters that lie well within his experience, and in the Laws he assumes the mantle of a legislator after the Platonic manner. The whole edifice of the Laws depends on certain assumptions about the nature of law, morality, and the order of the universe. Cicero realizes that these assumptions are open to sceptical attack. If challenged, he would be unable to claim certainty for them. But from a legislator’s point of view it was important not just that they should be believed, but also that they should not be called into question. Hence, for the time being, the sceptical Academy is respectfully asked to keep its distance.

  The Republic: Literary Form, Characters, and Setting

  In 55 BC, feeling perhaps-that his supreme oratorical gifts had not been given their due or even that they had failed him, Cicero turned first to an examination of the nature of oratory and its role in politics (the De Oratore). The genre of the Platonic dialogue suggested itself, partly as a means of presenting competing views, but also to draw attention to the reminiscences of Platonic ways of thinking that lay behind Cicero’s concept of the ideal orator. It was not unnatural that Cicero should be led on from there to consider more generally the nature of the res publica, and to define the nature of the ideal exponent of the political profession, the statesman or ‘best citizen’ (optimus civis).19

  The obvious literary model was Plato’s Republic. Cicero’s direct homage to the master was expressed in the lost section at the beginning of the work,20 and is embodied in the concluding vision of the cosmos and the afterlife (the Dream of Scipio) which reflects the Myth of Er at the end of Plato’s tenth book. Plato is directly quoted or referred to a number of times, sometimes for purposes of criticism. Cicero’s Scipio says (R. 2. 3, cf. 2. 51–2) that, rather than invent a city for himself as Plato did, he prefers to examine a real historical instance (the Roman constitution) which comes closest to the ideal; in 2. 21 Laelius criticizes Plato’s state as impractical; and the fragments of the fourth and fifth books indicate fairly clearly that Plato’s schemes for the abolition of marriage and private property were rejected. But it is a mistake to suppose that, because Cicero departs from Plato in certain specific ways, his Republic is in any deep sense anti-Platonic.21 Plato underlies the De Republica in a number of important ways: particularly the treatment of politics as a skill or art that can (theoretically) be an object of knowledge, the search for organic harmony in the state (especially at the end of Book 2), the analogy between state, individual, and cosmos ( T. 60; 6. 26), and the ideal of the philosophical statesman which was, it seems, described in the last two books, but which is also actually illustrated in the characters of the main speakers in the dialogue. Cicero’s Scipio is enough of a Platonist to regard philosophy and astronomy as the wise man’s true occupation, and to declare that one should under take political offices only out of a sense of duty or necessity, as Plato’s Guardians do (i. 26–9).22 In R. 1. 56–64, Scipio is made to present quite strongly the case for monarchy, Plato’s favoured mode of government, although the other interlocutors withhold their full assent and he himself states quite clearly that he regards the Roman constitution as superior. The Ciceronian ideal statesman bears at least some resemblance to a Platonic Guardian (alias philosopher-king) and also to the ideal statesman in Plato’s Politicus, who has true knowledge of the art of government. Even where Cicero is clearly drawing on later sources, the issues are often the same as those discussed by Plato: the theory of constitutions and the ways in which one type of constitution turns into another, the notion of justice and its defence against cynical pragmatism, and the intense interest in education and morals. Cicero, it can be argued, does not reject Plato, but brings him up to date and down to earth.

  Influences from Greek writers after Plato may also be divined. Cicero elsewhere mentions a dialogue by Aristotle also entitled Politicus (now lost) which dealt with the character of the ideal citizen or statesman.23 It is possible that Cicero did not have access to the Politics of Aristotle known to us, but some of Aristotle’s ideas may have reached him indirectly through Peripatetic philosophers such as Theophrastus and Dicaearchus.24 The discussion on justice in the third book explicitly owes a great deal to the New Academic philosopher Carneades, though its main lines are already present in Plato’s Republic. The historian Polybius, a portion of whose remarks
on the Roman constitution has survived, was used by Cicero as a source for factual information (R. 2. 27) and opinions (4. 3), and there is clearly a great deal in common between Cicero and Polybius as regards the framework of ideas within which they view the constitutional history of Rome, although there are some considerable differences in judgement and emphasis.25 But in general, as with the rest of Cicero’s philosophical works, it is probably a mistake to insist too much on the influence of lost Hellenistic writings. Cicero’s pride in his own authority as an experienced Roman statesman and in his own literary abilities was such that, while he might freely plunder Greek writings for facts and ideas, he is not likely to have followed them closely as regards the literary form, the presentation of his argument, or the opinions he expresses (cf. R. 2. 21).

  We happen to have particularly clear evidence for the progress of Cicero’s work on the Republic from a letter of November 54 BC.26 He had at first envisaged a dialogue in nine books, between Scipio and his friends, set during a nine-day holiday in 129 BC. He tried out the first two books on a friend named Sallustius (probably not Sallust the historian), who suggested recasting the work so that Cicero himself spoke in his own person, in order to appear more authoritative than the speakers in a fictional dialogue would, and to enable direct discussion of contemporary events. Cicero eventually followed a plan of this kind in the Laws; but for the Republic he evidently reverted to something more like the original scheme. The dialogue in its final form comprises six books of conversation between Scipio, Laelius, Philus, Manilius, Sp. Mummius, and four younger men, arranged in pairs of books with a preface to each pair written in Cicero’s own person. The work appears to have been dedicated by Cicero to his brother, Quintus.27

  The choice of characters and setting is of some significance. Scipio Aemilianus, destroyer of Carthage and Numantia, was the most glorious figure of the mid-second century BC and appealed to Cicero’s tendency to idealize the great statesmen of the past. Although his rise to power had been an extraordinary one in which popular favour had often overridden the letter of the law, Scipio never appeared to threaten the stability of the Roman state in the way that the later generals, Marius, Sulla, Caesar, and Pompey did. In the last year of his life, the year in which the dialogue is set, he had represented the interests of the Italians and allied communities in their opposition to the agrarian commission set up by Tiberius Gracchus.28 Cicero regarded the conflicts over the Gracchan redistribution of land as the beginning of the end for the Roman Republic, and he had himself, as consul in 63, pursued the same kind of policy when he opposed the land bill of the tribune Rullus; it was therefore natural that he should admire Scipio, whose premature death (perhaps murder—at least Cicero thought so) just after his political victory in 129 left behind a hero’s memory.

  Scipio was also well known for his patronage of writers and intellectuals, and could be presumed to share some of their interests. Polybius the historian says himself that he was among Scipio’s closest associates, and it was not in any way unrealistic for Cicero to make Scipio talk about constitutional theory in terms which are clearly very similar to those used by Polybius. Cicero took considerable pains to ensure historical accuracy in the settings of his dialogues. On the other hand, one may expect a certain measure of imaginative idealization in the portrait; the Scipio of the dialogue is designed to be exemplary rather than precisely realistic, and the question of the relationship of the portrait to the historical Scipio is not only difficult to answer in detail but also largely irrelevant to the appreciation of the work.29

  The characters in the De Republica are well-defined individuals; in this respect, at any rate, the dialogue form is more than a mere literary convention. While Scipio is an idealist and a theoretician, his friend Laelius, in real life less distinguished and nicknamed Sapiens perhaps more on account of his political caution than because of his philosophical leanings,30 is more practical and down-to-earth. In the opening conversation (1. 19), Laelius calls the discussion back from astronomical speculation to practical politics in a way strongly reminiscent of Socrates. Manilius is the venerable legal expert (1. 20). Philus is a man of great personal rectitude who nevertheless takes on the defence of injustice for the sake of the argument, as an Academic philosopher might do (3. 8). Mummius is a confirmed conservative and anti-democrat (3. 47). Tubero, Scipio’s nephew, is an eager student of philosophy who is the first to arrive at the house of Scipio, and raises the question of the portent of the double sun (i. 14). The other young interlocutors, Rutilius, Fannius, and Scaevola, are less clearly characterized, at least in the extant portions of the text; but this may well be because of the strong precedence accorded to seniority among the Romans, which is reflected also in Cicero’s other dialogues.31 Another feature of dialogue technique that should not be overlooked is that the characters are able to change their minds: Scipio in 3. 43 signals a change from his position of the previous day.

  Finally, although the inspiration of the dialogue is Platonic, the setting is entirely Roman. Socratic dialectic did not come naturally to the hierarchically-minded Romans or to the rhetorically-minded Cicero. Although dialectical argument is occasionally used to good effect, as for example in R. 1. 56–64, the exposition more often recalls the connected discourses of Socrates in many parts of Plato’s Republic. The tone of the conversation is urbane and relaxed; and if the characters compliment each other in a way that may seem laboured to modern taste, that should be seen as reflecting the courtesies of a more formal age than ours.

  The Purpose of the Republic, and Cicero’s Subsequent Career

  Cicero’s Republic is not a political manifesto. The genre of the Platonic dialogue itself suggests an exploration of issues rather than a dogmatic exposition, and the second-century setting precludes direct comment on contemporary events. But certain points are made with unmistakeable conviction. The superiority of the Roman Republican constitution is asserted with great emphasis by Scipio in R. 1. 70, and by Cicero as participant in the dialogue in L. 2. 23, while Cicero as author insists, in the preface to R. 5, on the degenerate state of contemporary Rome. At the same time, alternative viewpoints are given their due. The prominence accorded to the arguments for monarchy in Book 1 has suggested to many interpreters that they represent Cicero’s real opinions, but the context shows that they are merely being given an airing. The same is true of the parallel arguments for aristocracy stated just before, although scholars still sometimes quote them as though they were Cicero’s authentic views. In the Philus-Laelius debate it is made quite clear which side we are supposed to approve of, although one cannot help wondering what the consequences would have been for modern views of Cicero if parts of Philus’ speech had survived out of context.

  Cicero set the dialogue in the past in order to avoid offence (Q. fr. 3. 5. 2); the fact that offence would otherwise have been given shows that he intended the work to be relevant to contemporary politics. At the time of writing, traditional modes of government were manifestly not working. The role of the Senate was a subject of controversy, mob violence and gang warfare were increasing, and eventually (in 52) a temporary solution to the disorder was found by granting Pompey extraordinary powers as sole consul.32The arguments about monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, presented with a careful appearance of theoretical objectivity by Cicero, should be seen against this background. His conclusion that the existing Roman constitution is the best is not mere unthinking nostalgia, but is put forward after a full consideration of the alternatives. It amounts to a conclusion that radical constitutional change (as opposed to the relatively minor changes proposed in the Laws) was not the answer. Cicero is also criticized for trying to apply the theory of the Greek city-state to an imperial capital, but such criticisms would not have been so readily made if we possessed the whole of Book 3; it is clear from the fragments that one of the central issues in the debate on justice was the relationship between Rome and her empire.

  Because so much of what survives of the Republic is devoted to c
onstitutional theory and history, it is often assumed that this is what the work was largely about. But the discussion of constitutions occupied somewhat less than a third of the whole dialogue. The third book was about justice, the fourth about education and morals, and the fifth and sixth about the character of the ideal statesman. Cicero himself may have regarded this last part as the most important, as he refers to it several times in subsequent letters.33 There has been considerable controversy as to the exact implications of the phrase rector rei publicae,34 but there is no good evidence that Cicero meant it as anything other than the name of an occupation or profession, i.e. ‘politician’ or ‘statesman’ pure and simple. Earlier Latin had no exact word or phrase to express this concept, and Cicero had to coin one (in fact he uses several variants on the phrase). Once this is seen, it becomes clear why the constitutional part of the Republic is over so early. What ultimately matters is not the (obviously necessary) constitutional framework within which the politician operates, but the profession of politics itself and the quality of its practitioners. Cicero was concerned not just to encourage political participation, but to present politics as a branch of knowledge which needed to be studied and mastered, and which aimed at the greatest good not of the politicians themselves but of the governed. He used the medium of the literary dialogue to make an appeal to the patriotic sense of the Roman ruling class, and his ideal of the wise and just statesman is by implication an indictment of current politics and politicians. In a letter to Atticus (8. n) written in February 49, just before the outbreak of civil war, he is still more explicit. Neither Pompey nor Caesar, he says, has given a thought to the proper aims of the statesman as defined in the Republic; each only wants power for himself.