The Republic and The Laws (Oxford World's Classics)

by Cicero

  ATTICUS: Yes, it’s all right with me, and so is the order in which you are treating the material.

  MARCUS: Commands shall be just, and citizens shall obey them quietly and without protest. Magistrates shall punish the guilty and unruly citizen by fine, prison, or flogging, unless an equal or higher authority or the people forbid it. The accused shall have the right of appeal to those quarters. When the magistrate has delivered or pronounced his decision, a trial shall take place before the people* to fix the fine or other penalty. In the field there shall be no appeal* against the decision of the commanding officer; whatever order is given by the officer in charge of the campaign shall be fixed and final. A number of minor magistrates shall be appointed to several areas, each with authority in his own sphere. In the field they shall hold command over those to whom they have been assigned, and be their tribunes. At home they shall watch over public funds,* ensure the security of prisoners, punish capital offences,* coin bronze,* silver, or gold in the public mint, judge cases* brought before them, and carry out whatever the Senate decides.

  6

  There shall be aediles, who shall look after matters in the city, including the food supply and official entertainments. For them this shall be the first step on the ladder* leading to higher office.

  7

  The censors* shall draw up a list of the population, recording ages, children, households and possessions; they shall watch over the city’s temples, streets, and aqueducts, and also the treasury and taxes; they shall divide the citizens and assign them to tribes; then they shall divide them according to possessions, age, and rank; they shall distinguish the sons of the cavalry and the infantry; they shall not allow men to remain bachelors; they shall regulate the behaviour of the citizens and not permit a disreputable person to remain in the Senate; they shall be two in number and shall hold office for five years; the other officers shall be annual; the post of censor shall always have occupants.

  There shall be a legal official, or praetor, to decide civil cases or to give directions for their decision. He shall be the guardian of civil law. Equal to him in power there shall be as many officials as the Senate shall decree or the people command.

  8

  There shall be two with royal power;* and from their leading, judging, and consulting they shall be called praetors, judges, and consuls. They shall hold the supreme military power and shall take orders from no one. To them the safety of the people shall be the highest law.

  No one shall hold the same office again until a period of ten years has elapsed. They shall abide by the ages laid down in the year-law.*

  9

  But when a particularly serious war or civil disorder occurs, one man* shall for a period no longer than six months hold power equal to that of the two consuls, if the Senate so decide. After being appointed under favourable auspices he shall be Master of the People. He shall have an officer to command the cavalry* with an authority equal to that of the legal official.*

  When there are no consuls and no master of the people there shall be no other magistrates. The auspices shall be in the hands of the Senate, and it shall from its number appoint a member with the power* to arrange for the due election of consuls through the Assembly of Centuries.

  Magistrates, with and without imperium* and ambassadors shall leave the city when the Senate shall so decree or the people so command. They shall conduct just wars in a just manner;* they shall treat the allies with consideration; they shall exercise control over themselves and their staff; they shall increase the glory of their country and return home with honour.

  No one shall be appointed ambassador* for the sake of conducting his private affairs.

  The ten officials whom the plebs shall appoint on its own behalf to protect it from violence shall be its tribunes.* What they forbid and what they enact through the plebs shall be binding. They shall be sacrosanct and shall not leave the plebs without tribunes.

  All magistrates shall have the right to take auspices and to 10 conduct trials. The Senate shall be made up of their number. Its decrees shall be binding. But if an authority equal to or higher than [the presiding magistrate] shall veto its decrees, those decrees shall be written out and preserved.

  10

  The [senatorial] order shall be of unblemished behaviour and shall set an example to the rest.

  When the people’s appointment of magistrates, judicial verdicts, and legislative decisions, positive and negative, have been made by vote, the details shall be disclosed to the aristocracy* and shall reflect the free choice of the people.

  But if anything needs to be attended to outside the scope of the magistrates, the people shall appoint someone to attend to it and shall confer on him the authority to do so.

  A consul, a praetor, a master of the people, a master of the cavalry, and any official proposed by the Senate for conducting the election of consuls, shall have the right to preside over meetings of the people and the Senate. And the tribunes appointed by the plebs shall have the right to preside over meetings of the Senate; they shall also bring before the plebs whatever is required.

  Proceedings with the people and in the Senate shall be conducted with decent restraint.

  A senator shall have a reason for his absence or else shall be liable to censure. A senator shall speak in his turn and at moderate length. He shall have a grasp of public affairs.

  Meetings of the people shall be free from violence. An authority equal to or higher than [the presiding magistrate] shall have the power to overrule.* But if any disturbance takes place during the proceedings, the responsibility shall rest with the presiding magistrate. Anyone who blocks a harmful measure shall be deemed a public benefactor.

  Presiding magistrates shall observe the auspices and obey the official augur; when bills have been read, they shall keep them on file in the treasury; they shall not take a vote on more than one question at a time;* they shall inform the people about the matter at issue and allow them to be informed by magistrates and private citizens.

  They shall not propose laws directed at private individuals.* They shall not propose a motion involving a citizen’s life* except through the chief assembly* and those whom the censors have enrolled in the citizen body.

  They shall not accept gifts* or give them when seeking or holding or having held office. If a person transgresses any of these rules, the penalty shall fit the crime.

  The censors shall preserve the true meaning of the laws. On leaving office, men shall give a report of their acts to the censors; by doing so, however, they shall not be any the less liable to prosecution.

  The law has been read. ‘Depart* and I shall order voting-tablets to be distributed.’

  12–47. Comments on the laws

  QUINTUS: How succinctly, Marcus, you have drawn up a scheme of all the magistrates for our inspection! But they are almost identical with those of our own country, even if you have introduced a little novelty.

  12

  MARCUS: That is a very perceptive point, Quintus. We are, in fact, talking about the harmoniously mixed constitution which Scipio praises in those books and prefers to all others—a type which could not have been achieved without such a system of magistrates. For bear in mind, the state is defined by its magistrates and those who are in charge, and each type of government is identified by the way those officials are organized. Since our constitution was given the most sensible and well-adjusted form by our ancestors, I found little or nothing to change in the laws.

  ATTICUS: Well then, will you do the same for us with the magistrates as you did with religious law at my instigation and request—that is, explain why you regard your system as the best?

  MARCUS: I’m happy to oblige, Atticus. I’ll present the whole topic as it has been investigated and discussed by the most perceptive Greek thinkers. I shall also bring in our laws as I did before.

  13

  ATTICUS: That’s just the kind of presentation I’m looking for.

  MARCUS: Now I said a good deal on thi
s subject in my earlier books, as I had to, since I was trying to discover the best kind of state. But there are some points about magistrates which are relevant to this topic—points examined first by Theophrastus and then, in greater detail, by Diogenes the Stoic.

  ATTICUS: Really? Such matters were also handled by the Stoics?

  MARCUS: Well no; only by the one I have just named, and subsequently by that great and deeply learned man, Panaetius. The older Stoics supplied perceptive theoretical discussions of the state, but did not offer, as I am doing, a practical guide for communities of citizens. It was rather from the Academy that all those well-known writings derived, starting with Plato’s. Then Aristotle in his exposition illuminated the whole area of politics, and so did Heraclides of Pontus, starting likewise from Plato. Theophrastus, a pupil of Aristotle’s, spent a great deal of time, as you know, on that kind of subject, and Dicaearchus, another of Aristotle’s pupils, gave useful service in this field of study and research. Later, following Theophrastus, Demetrius of Phalerum, whom I mentioned earlier, led political theory in a striking manner out of the quiet seclusion of the scholar’s study, not just into the dust and heat of the day, but into the line of battle and the actual conflict. I could mention many great statesmen who were quite learned, and many excellent scholars who were not particularly experienced in politics; but apart from Demetrius, who can easily be found to have excelled in both spheres, being a major figure in scholarly research and also in governing his country?

  14

  ATTICUS: I fancy such a man* can be found—and from the three of us at that. But do carry on as you began.

  MARCUS: So then, these thinkers inquired whether there should be just one magistrate in the country who would be obeyed by everyone else. That, I understand, was the view of our ancestors after the expulsion of the kings. But as the monarchical type of state, though once admired, was later rejected, not so much because of monarchy’s faults as because of a monarch’s,* clearly if one magistrate is to rule over all the others, only the name of king has been abandoned; the institution itself will remain in being. Hence it was not without good reason that in Sparta Theopompus appointed ephors* to oppose the kings, and here we appointed tribunes to oppose the consuls. A consul has the right, laid down in the legal code, that he should be obeyed by all the other magistrates, except a tribune. The latter was appointed subsequently to prevent the recurrence of what had happened before.* The presence of an official who was not to be bound by the consul’s authority was the first step in the reduction of consular power. The second was the fact that the tribune lent his support, not only to other magistrates, but also to private individuals who flouted the consul’s authority.

  15

  16

  QUINTUS: What you are talking of was a great calamity. For with the birth of the tribunate the weight of the aristocracy diminished and the sheer force of the masses gathered strength.

  17

  MARCUS: Not so, Quintus. Was it not inevitable that the consular power on its own should appear rather arrogant and oppressive? After a moderate and sensible balance had been achieved . . .[There is a gap in the text here. The fragment from Macrobius printed below apparently belongs to Cicero’s comment on the law quoted in section 9 above, namely ‘they shall treat the allies with consideration’.]... Who will be in a position to protect the allies if he cannot grasp the distinction between what is in the country’s interest and what is not? (Macrobius, De Differentiis et Societatibus Graeci Latinique Verbi, in H. Keil, Grammatici Latini v. 620, 644.)

  ‘They shall return home with honour’ [9 above]. Nothing apart from honour should be brought home by sound and honest magistrates from enemies or from allies.

  18

  Again, it is surely obvious that nothing is more discreditable than that a man should serve as an ambassador for anything other than the sake of his country. I say nothing about how they have behaved and still behave—those who use the position of ambassador as a means of chasing legacies or debts; for that may be a vice of human nature. But what, I wonder, is actually more disgraceful than a senatorial ambassador without any responsibility, any instructions, or any official duties? As consul I would have abolished such ambassadorial appointments with the support of the full Senate (even though they were clearly to the senators’ advantage), had not an irresponsible tribune* of the plebs intervened to stop me. I still managed to reduce the duration of such appointments, which had been unrestricted, to one year. So the abuse remains, even though a time-limit has been imposed.

  But now, if you don’t mind, let us leave the provinces and return to the capital.

  ATTICUS: We don’t mind, but those who are travelling around in the provinces won’t like it at all!

  MARCUS: Still, if they obey these laws, Titus, they will find nothing more delightful than the capital and their own homes, and nothing more tedious and stressful than a province.

  19

  Next comes a law which endorses the power of the tribunes of the plebs—a law existing in our own state. No need to argue about that.

  QUINTUS: But I do wonder, Marcus, what you think of that power. It seems to me pernicious; for it came into being at a time of sedition,* and its effect is to promote sedition. If we care to recall its origin, we see that it was born when the citizens had recourse to arms, and key points in the capital were occupied and placed under siege. It was quickly put to death,* as hideously deformed children* should be, according to the Twelve Tables. But somehow or other it soon came back to life, returning even more ugly and horrible than before. What damage did it not cause! First, in keeping with its unholy nature, it tore away every mark of honour from the Senate; everywhere it made the lowest equal to the highest, causing turmoil and confusion. Even when it had demolished the venerable power of the aristocracy it still did not rest. I say nothing of Gaius Flaminius and events which now seem antiquated because of the lapse of time; but what rights did the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus leave to the best type of citizen? Five years before that, the plebeian tribune, Gaius Curiatius, the lowest and foulest creature in existence, threw the consuls Decimus Brutus and Publius Scipio,* those great and admirable men, into jail—an outrage without precedent.

  20

  Take Gaius Gracchus. Through his tribunate, and through those daggers which he claimed to have tossed into the forum to make the citizens fight like gladiators with one another, did he not overturn the entire state of the country? I need not mention Saturninus,* Sulpicius, and the others, whom the country could not beat off without taking up the sword. But why should I cite things from bygone days which others endured rather than recent examples known to ourselves? Was there ever anyone so audacious and so hostile to us as to aim at subverting our position,* who did not for that purpose sharpen the dagger of some tribune against us? When wicked and desperate men failed to find such a weapon in any household, or indeed in any clan, they felt obliged, in the country’s hour of darkness, to cause confusion among the clans.* It was a remarkable fact, which will redound to our eternal credit, that no tribune could be found who was willing, for any bribe, to turn against us, except one who had no right to be a tribune at all.

  21

  What devastation he caused—devastation which could only have been caused by the madness of a filthy beast lacking any vestige of sense or any prospect of success, and inflamed by the madness of a mob! That is why, in this instance, I strongly approve of Sulla, who by his law stripped the plebeian tribunes of their destructive power,* leaving them only the right to give assistance. As for our friend Pompey, in all other matters I invariably sing his praises, loudly and unstintingly; but I say nothing about his policy on the tribunes’ power, for while I am reluctant to criticize, I refuse to praise him.

  22

  MARCUS: You discern the faults of the tribunate very clearly, Quintus. But in criticizing any institution it is unfair to neglect its good points while picking on and listing its bad points and defects. On that principle even the consulship is open t
o attack, if you collect the misdemeanours of certain consuls whom I forbear to name. I admit there is an element of evil inherent in the office of tribune; but without that evil we would not have the good which was the whole purpose of setting it up. ‘The plebeian tribunes’, you say, ‘have too much power.’ Who’s arguing with that? But the crude power of the people is much more savage and violent. By having a leader it is sometimes milder than if it had none. For the leader knows he is going ahead at his own risk, whereas the surging mass is blind to the risk it is running. ‘But sometimes it is whipped up.’ Yes, and often it is calmed. What set of officials 24 is so wild that not one in ten has any sense? Why, Tiberius Gracchus himself came to grief because he overrode the vote of a tribune and even had him deposed. What brought about his downfall if not the fact that he removed from office a colleague who was blocking* his programme?