The Burning of Moscow

by Alexander Mikaberidze

  Forty portable mills left Paris by post on 6 September. It is now 6 October. So they should have passed through Vilna. I have exhorted you to inform yourself on the progress of this convoy. It is my intention that you shall withdraw one of these mills to serve as a model. Have it operated under your eyes, and let me know how much [corn] it has ground in 24 hours and how many men successively have done this work. I want you to have fifty of these mills constructed at Vilna on the basis of the one you use as a model. As soon as you have had two or three made, you will send one by post to Warsaw and Konigsberg. In the same way you will send one more to Minsk for fifty more copies to be made. I assume there are workmen in the countryside who will do it promptly. You must also send one to [Macdonald] to have some made on this model at Mittau.81

  As the days passed, and it became clear that Lauriston’s mission had failed, Napoleon summoned Caulaincourt once more. Their conversation is quite revealing about the emperor’s misconceptions. ‘Emperor Alexander is stubborn,’ he grumbled. ‘He will regret it. Never again will he be able to obtain such good terms as I would have made now.’ Napoleon spoke of inciting the Poles to rise ‘en masse’ to defend themselves against the Russians and look after their ‘particular interests’. He claimed that Alexander was endangering himself by insisting on continued hostilities. ‘I am going to attack Kutuzov. If I beat him, as is probable, Alexander runs grave risks. But he can stop it by a single word. Who can tell what will happen in the forthcoming campaign? … I have learned much from this war; my army is getting to know the country and the troops confronting them. There are incalculable advantages.’ He envisioned establishing winter quarters at Moscow and Kaluga, or withdrawing westwards to winter around Smolensk and Vitebsk. ‘Russia will be lost,’ he believed. ‘Having offered all the concessions that I can be expected to make, I shall have no choice but to pursue the interests of my system, to pursue the great political aim which I have set for myself. If Emperor Alexander ponders this, he would realize that he could go a long way with a man of my character.’ Caulaincourt, probably weary from voicing the same arguments over and over again, reminded the emperor that the Russians were hoping to ‘lull’ him into a false sense of security and were well aware that the French were in no bargaining position and faced insurmountable ‘difficulties’. At the words ‘lull’ and ‘difficulties’ the emperor became irritated. ‘What do you mean by ‘difficulties?’ Caulaincourt replied:

  The winter, Sire, is a major difficulty to begin with. The lack of stores, of horses for your artillery, of transport for your sick and wounded, the poor clothing for your soldiers. Every man must have a sheepskin, stout fur-lined gloves, a cap with ear-tabs, warm boot-socks, heavy boots to keep his feet from getting frost-bitten. We lack everything. Our smiths do not even have the proper heavy horseshoes used here in winter. How can teams of horses be expected to haul our artillery across ice? And then there is the question of our lines of communications. It is still unseasonably warm now, but what will it be in two weeks’ time when winter sets in?

  The emperor listened with growing impatience. ‘So you think I intend to leave Moscow?’ he inquired. ‘Yes, Sire,’ Caulaincourt replied but Napoleon quickly interjected: ‘I have decided nothing yet. I could hardly be better situated than where I am now, at Moscow, to sit out the winter.’82

  But Napoleon was being disingenuous with his grand equerry. After days of waiting for a Russian response to his peace overtures, he had at last realized that it was necessary to adopt decisive measures. Further offensive operations were clearly out of the question. He explained to his trusted aide-de-camp Narbonne that until now he had been obliged to wait in Moscow to see what effect ‘those two thunderbolts, the battle of Moscowa [Borodino] and the taking of Moscow, would have. I had reason to believe in a peace. But whether it comes or not, there is a limit for us.’ He now faced two choices: he could take the army, ‘which has largely rested up’, back to Lithuania and Poland, where it would take up comfortable winter quarters. Or he could follow the advice of Secretary of State Daru – which Napoleon called ‘the lion’s advice’ – of rallying his troops, collecting provisions and hunkering down for the winter in Moscow.83 Daru argued that it would be easier to feed the army in Moscow and to secure its communications than to risk marching back to Smolensk. The city still offered sufficient means of subsistence, including plenty of corn, rice, vegetables, spirituous liquors and salted provisions. But remaining in Moscow entailed several major challenges. While troops could be sufficiently well fed, the army was desperate for forage for the horses that were already dying of inanition. Losses had already weakened the cavalry, artillery and transport in a season that was far from being the least favourable of the year. Furthermore, Moscow was hundreds of miles away from the heartlands of the French Empire, and maintaining communications over such vast distances was a challenging task. In the face of attacks by the hostile local populace, not to mention roaming Cossack and partisan detachments, Napoleon would have to commit considerable resources to guarding his lines of communications. By October the Allied convoys were already so threatened that the emperor had to specify that no convoy should leave Smolensk without an escort of 1,500 men of both infantry and cavalry. ‘The cavalry and artillery of each convoy must march together, bivouac in square battalion round the convoy, and not separate from it under any pretext whatsoever; that the commander of the convoy must bivouac in the centre – that every commander who shall neglect these instructions will be punished as negligent and culpable of the loss of the convoy.’84 General St Sulpice, commander of the dragoons of the Guard, was tasked with keeping open the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow, one of the most threatened sectors in the long line of communications, and was obliged to dispatch strong patrols to accompany each courier travelling along the route.85 The thought of what would happen in Paris or the rest of Europe if, in spite of all his efforts, there should some week be no news about his whereabouts, would have certainly preoccupied Napoleon. ‘One must not be away from home too long,’ he told his companion. ‘I feel Paris calling me even more than St Petersburg tempts me.’86 More importantly, what advantage would he gain by being in Moscow at the commencement of the succeeding spring? Emperor Alexander had already rebuffed his repeated attempts to open negotiations and there were no signs of a Russian willingness to compromise. The situation in Moscow was becoming increasingly precarious. Throughout October the Russian army was daily strengthening its positions on the banks of the Nara river and the various flying detachments, dispersed round Moscow, became more enterprising. In the villages surrounding the city popular anger was already spilling out into a guerrilla war that targeted isolated Allied detachments as well as lines of communication. The Grande Armée’s detachments and convoys on their march to and from the army were routinely attacked on the main road to Smolensk, despite the presence of the escorts. The Cossacks, reinforced by newly arriving recruits from the Don and other regions, kept the roads into Moscow under close watch, attacking Allied foragers in the vicinity of Moscow and frequently launching daring raids into the city itself. On one occasion, a young seminary student, who had survived the devastation of Moscow by cleaning stables for the French troops, was sent as servant to a squad of hussars quartered at the extreme end of the city. He noticed, one evening, an individual looking through the lighted windows, watching all that went on inside the house. ‘What are you doing there?’ he cried. The stranger stepped back quickly, then approached the young man; leading him into the garden, he questioned him, and showed him the Cossack uniform under his caftan of coarse cloth. He wished to find out whether the hussars were numerous, whether they all slept in the same room, and where they deposited their arms and horses, and he enjoined the most absolute secrecy. Two days afterwards the seminarian was awakened by an extraordinary commotion as a Cossack detachment raided the place, killed all the hussars and escaped with their weapons and horses.87 There were many similar cases and the Allied troops deployed on the outskirts of the city, and especi
ally near the barrier gates, were particularly vulnerable to Cossack raids. One Muscovite recalled seeing a group of ‘seven enemy men, virtually unarmed and looking more like batmen or footmen, loading a wagon with their possessions. Suddenly a Cossack flew into the yard and, within just a few seconds, he slew all of them with his lance, jumped off his horse, searched the corpses and then galloped away.’88 At the Novodevichii Monastery Semen Klimych recalled that the French troops billeted there held daily roster calls that revealed the unending loss of men. ‘This continued for three weeks and rarely did a day pass [without loss of life], causing them to complain in broken Russian to the priests, “Russian Cossack, devil, eat French.”’89 Some Russian troops managed to infiltrate into Moscow and rallied local residents. Among them was Alexander Figner, a young man of medium height, with a round face and pale complexion, who spoke half a dozen languages and virulently hated the French. ‘Contempt for any and all dangers and unmatched gallantry revealed his unwavering intrepidity and presence of mind,’ recalled one of his comrades. After sneaking into Moscow in late September, Figner

  rallied people of various backgrounds who still remained in Moscow and organized armed detachments to kill enemy soldiers; he ambushed them amidst the flames in the streets and inside homes and commanded his men so efficiently that the French were killed everywhere, especially at night. And so, accompanied by just a handful of gallant lads, Figner began to kill the enemy inside the city itself, amidst the horrors of burning and plunder. In the flaming ruins of the Russian capital the French faced a methodical and clandestine war from this courageous avenger, but they searched for him in vain. Even though they had him before their eyes, they still could not find him. In daylight, wearing plain peasant clothes, he walked between French soldiers and served them however he could so he could listen to their conversations. At night, he attacked them with his gallant lads and by morning the streets were covered with the bodies of the killed Frenchmen.90

  Napoleon was well aware of these challenges and understood the benefits that departing from Moscow could bring. Withdrawing towards Vitebsk (if not all the way back to the Duchy of Warsaw) would bring the Grande Armée closer to its reinforcement and supply depots in Prussia and Poland, and shorten the lines of communication, making them easier to defend. It could spend the next few months in winter cantonments, regrouping and preparing for the next stage of the war in the spring. But besides the purely military aspect, the emperor also had to consider the political implications of his actions and, in this regard, he was convinced that leaving Moscow without any tangible gains, not even an armistice, would have the appearance of acknowledging defeat and thus could undermine his standing in Europe. According to Ségur, Napoleon told Daru, ‘As if I do not know that from a military point of view Moscow is of no value! But Moscow is not a military position, it is a political position.’ He then argued that ‘in political measures we ought never to recede, never to retrograde, never to admit ourselves to be wrong, as it lessened our consideration; that, even when in error, we should persist in it, in order to have the appearance of being in the right’.91

  So, throughout early October Napoleon insisted on staying in Moscow. For a week or more his companions listened to the emperor ‘in his intimate circle conversing, acting and issuing orders all on the presumption that he was going to stay in Moscow’.92 To this end, Napoleon continued to strengthen the city’s defences, including enhancing the Kremlin93 and fortifying some principal convents,94 as well as the approaches to the city.95 He raised a new (dismounted) cavalry brigade to ‘guard the defences of the Kremlin and the city’.96 He ordered that ample provisions of ammunition should be prepared for the army and that the surplus should be carefully managed so as to last the troops the five or six months that winter was expected to last in this region. The long network of posting stations connecting Paris to Moscow – so crucial for maintaining control over the vast empire – was reinforced to ensure the daily arrival of couriers.97 Napoleon continued holding military parades in the courtyard of the Kremlin, ordered the construction of large new baking ovens98 for the troops and mills for the preparation of flour, and sent out strong detachments to collect cattle and forage for the long winter ahead. On 6 October Napoleon instructed Eugène to push his forces towards Dmitrov and Kline, where he was supposed to issue proclamations reassuring the peasants of his intentions and collect necessary provisions. Napoleon hoped that by ‘not pillaging and paying [for everything] with money’, the 4th Corps would find ‘plenty of resources’ in this region.99 Similarly, the 1st Corps was allowed to expand its reaches beyond Moscow,100 while the 3rd Corps was ordered to move further westward, where it eventually advanced as far as Bogorodsk,101 where Ney’s men spent several days ‘constructing barracks round this small town as if they intended to pass the winter there’.102

  Even Napoleon’s closest companions believed that staying in Moscow for the winter was the emperor’s favorite idea. ‘For some time even those most closely in his confidence’, noted Caulaincourt, ‘entertained no doubts on that score. Seeing the season so far advanced without any preparations made for our departure, I too ended by doubting whether we would evacuate Moscow voluntarily. It seemed to me impossible the emperor would even think of a retreat when the frost set in, especially as no measures had been taken to protect the men nor any steps taken to enable the horses to cross the ice.’103 However, even though he was still in two minds about attempting a retreat, Napoleon was also keen to find a way he could accomplish it without political repercussions. In early October he devised a manoeuvre which, whilst it carried him towards Poland by an oblique march towards the north, would have made him appear to be not in retreat but rather carrying out an offensive movement. In a lengthy memorandum, Napoleon outlined his thoughts on this subject, showing how clearly he appreciated the difficulties of his situation. He first offered a broad overview of the situation across the entire theatre of war. ‘The enemy is marching on the road from Kiev. His object is evident – he seeks reinforcements from the Army of Moldavia. To march against them would be to march in the direction of their succour, and to find ourselves deprived of any points d’appui during winter cantonments. Moscow, having been burned and deserted by its inhabitants, must not be taken into account; that city cannot contain our sick and wounded; the resources found there, once exhausted, no more will be forthcoming …’ So Napoleon urged breaking the stalemate through vigorous action. The question was, which way? Advancing further eastwards was clearly pointless: the Russian army had already manoeuvred itself to Tarutino, southwest of Moscow. Therefore, ‘should the army fall back to Smolensk,’ the emperor wondered, ‘would it be wise to seek engagement with the enemy, and to risk losing, in a march which would resemble a retreat, several thousand men in the presence of an enemy acquainted with the country, having a large number of secret agents and a numerous light cavalry?’ Napoleon expected the Russians to have established themselves at a strong position, possibly already fortified, and received continued reinforcements. ‘Although the French army is victorious,’ the emperor argued, a retrograde movement would place it at a disadvantage. ‘We might dispute terrain and lose 3,000–4,000 wounded, but it would look like a defeat. A withdrawal of 100 leagues, with subsequent losses and events, would allow the enemy to claim it as a success and portray us as beaten.’

  After considering whether it would be feasible to return by the same route that had brought him to Moscow, the emperor asked himself:

  What is the object to be fulfilled? First, to place the emperor as near France as possible, and to give the country confidence that the emperor during his winter cantonments is in the midst of his people. Second, to quarter the army in a friendly country, close to its magazines. Third, to place ourselves in a position to back up the emperor’s negotiations for peace by threatening St Petersburg. Fourth, to sustain the honour of our arms at the height to which it has been raised by this glorious campaign.104

  The Emperor then indicated a series of movements c
alculated to fulfill these goals. He envisioned two army corps launching an offensive northwards to St Petersburg. St Cyr’s corps would secure Polotsk and threaten St Petersburg from the southwest. It would be supported by Marshal Victor’s 9th Corps, which was supposed to be at Velikie Luki within nine days; Victor would coordinate his actions with St Cyr.105 Further west, Marshal Macdonald would remain in the vicinity of Dunaburg and Riga, protecting the Grande Armée’s extreme left flank. Once Victor had secured Velikie Luki, Napoleon would march his army westwards out of Moscow, moving beyond the Dvina and closer to Polish lands.106 Such plans were probably drawn up early in October, as on the 9th the emperor confided to Maret, ‘Everything leads me to believe that when the last half of November arrives, that is to say, the real season for winter quarters, I will take position between the Dvina and the Dnieper to be closer to my reinforcements, to rest the army and to attend to many other pressing issues.’107

  Thus, even while still professing his intention to stay in Moscow, Napoleon began to take measures to prepare the territory between Moscow and Smolensk for a possible retreat of the Grande Armée. He gained a sense of urgency after the daily estafette from Moscow to Paris was attacked and captured near Moscow on 12 October, and more messengers were intercepted by the Russians over the next two days. These attacks underlined the gravity of the situation for Napoleon, who had already started making inquiries about the status of major supply depots in the rear and frequently complained about his subordinates’ failure to follow through on his orders.108 ‘Have I not said and said again a hundred times to bring up all the clothing which is in Danzig to Kovno and Vilna?’ he wrote to Maret. ‘So write to Danzig that my orders must be carried out.’109 He paid particular attention to the grand supply depot at Minsk, where vast supplies of provisions had been already amassed, and more was still expected. On 14 October the emperor instructed Maret to send rice collected from all over Europe to Minsk.110 Heavy transports and artillery were no longer allowed to pass beyond Smolensk,111 while thousands of wounded and sick were slowly taken westwards. Moving them represented a major challenge and in early October Intendant-Général Dumas informed the emperor that it would take forty-five days to evacuate all the wounded left behind at Mozhaisk, the Kolotsk Monastery and Gzhatsk. Startled by this claim, Napoleon replied, ‘The accounts of the Intendant-Général appear to me to be wrong. I can scarcely believe that it will require forty-five days to remove the wounded, for I will only remark that if nothing is done during these forty-five days, some must die and some recover; therefore, it can only be the remainder that are to be removed, and experience has proved that three months after a battle only a sixth part of those wounded remain. Thus, reckoning six thousand wounded, there would only be, at the end of three months, one thousand to remove.’ He was furious at the commissioners of war and administrative officials for failing to provide accurate reports on circumstances in their hospitals, and demanded they ‘establish precisely how many patients’ were convalescing between Moscow and Vyazma. ‘In all circumstances, I need to be aware of sacrifices that might have to be made if [military] operations require abandoning these institutions.’ Therefore, all patients had to be assessed and separated into three groups depending on the severity of their condition.112 The emperor then requested some 200 transports from the 1st and 3rd Corps to deliver flour, alcohol, wine and medicine and evacuate the wounded, starting with the most seriously wounded.113 The same day he instructed Minister of War Clarke to dispatch a couple of hundred additional physicians to the army ‘because there is a great need for them here’.114 On 6 October Napoleon ordered Junot to use transports at the cavalry depot in Mozhaisk to start removing the wounded to Vyazma, while General Baraguay d’Hilliers was tasked with transporting them further west to Smolensk. For this purpose, both generals were ordered to ‘scour the country for ten leagues round and collect a large number of transports necessary for the said evacuations’. They were also permitted to employ military transport that carried flour supplies to French hospitals. ‘My intention’, declared the emperor, ‘is to have not a single wounded man remaining at Ruza, the Kolotskii Monastery, Mozhaisk or Gzhatsk within the next eight days … This is of the utmost importance.’115