The Burning of Moscow

by Alexander Mikaberidze

  On 22 September Murat, with his advanced guard strengthened by Claparede’s division, advanced along the Ryazan road; he was supported by Poniatowski, whose Polish troops moved on the Tula road. Since the Russians had burned the bridge at the Borovsk ferry, Murat forded the river and proceeded towards Bronitsy.30 Finding no Russian forces in this direction, he then turned westward and dispatched scouts towards Podolsk. By the 23rd he had ascertained the true direction of Kutuzov’s march and reported it back to Moscow. Napoleon initially instructed Murat to press the Russians’ right flank, while Bessieres marched from Moscow against their front.31 The troops marched in miserable weather and one of them complained that ‘never in my life have I seen a muddier place nor wetter mud. We were in it up to the middle of our legs, in the middle of the road; [it was] impossible to walk along the roadsides.’32

  On 21–23 September Miloradovich informed the main headquarters about the enemy troops moving from Moscow and engaging his outposts. Without precise intelligence on the size of this force, and already in receipt of Rayevskii’s reports about Murat’s movements from the east, Kutuzov chose to avoid direct confrontation and pull Miloradovich back from Desna, which was occupied by the Allied troops. Meanwhile, Murat was already approaching Podolsk, where Poniatowski’s Polish troops awaited him.33 The news of the enemy advances from both north and east caused many in the Russian headquarters to assume that ‘Napoleon was attacking with all his forces our flank and rear’.34 Another council of war was held at the Russian headquarters, where some senior commanders urged attacking to seize the initiative and surprise the enemy. Bennigsen in fact instructed Miloradovich to launch an attack on Bessieres’ forces at dawn on 25 September, while Rayevskii was asked to ‘undertake a feint attack on the enemy facing him in order to distract his forces’.35 But the cautious Kutuzov demurred, arguing that if the Russians attacked so close to Moscow, they would have the whole Grande Armée, still a potent force, upon them at once and the army’s current condition could scarcely be relied upon to deliver more than a doubtful success. On the other hand, if the Russian army avoided combat, time was on their side as every day would ensure the steady increase of Russian numbers. Therefore Kutuzov forbade Miloradovich from engaging in a major battle and instead limited him to forceful reconnaissance. ‘Even if you find it convenient to attack the enemy, you must not pursue him too far and only limit yourself to reclaiming Desna.’36 Just an hour later Bennigsen, upset by Kutuzov’s reluctance to fight, jotted down a brief message cancelling the offensives altogether.37 Instead, General Alexander Osterman-Tolstoy was instructed to take command of a new corps de bataille (consisting of the 4th Corps and 2nd Cavalry Corps), which moved forwards to support Miloradovich’s advanced guard.38

  By 26 September Napoleon had learned with certainty that Kutuzov’s main forces were on the old Kaluga road. The appearance of Russian flying detachments on the old Smolensk road prompted him to move up strong cavalry reinforcements to guard the lines of communications.39 Then, as soon as he was informed of the position occupied by the Russian army, he ordered Murat, supported by Bessieres if necessary, to engage the Russian army and drive it away from Moscow. Napoleon was convinced that Kutuzov would choose to retreat as soon as he heard about the Allied advance. If, however, he chose to stand his ground, Napoleon was ready to lead the rest of the Grande Armée out of Moscow to attack the Russians.40

  Napoleon was largely correct in his reckoning. Had the commander of the Russian army at this time been Bennigsen rather than Kutuzov, it is likely that the Russians would have accepted battle; considering the difficulties the Russian army was experiencing, this might well have resulted in a French victory, profoundly affecting the outcome of the campaign. But unlike Bennigsen, Kutuzov understood that this was not the time for provoking Napoleon into a decisive battle. The wounds of Borodino had barely healed. Every day Kutuzov had to face the grim reality of ill-discipline and marauding in the Russian ranks, while thousands of soldiers were still unaccounted for after the march through and from Moscow. Like Barclay de Tolly, Kutuzov understood early on that time was on Russia’s side and each day gained without a battle in fact brought him closer to a triumph over the enemy. He was therefore unwilling to fight a major battle, and his reaction to the news of the French offensive was to order a withdrawal southwards at dawn on 27 September. The new round of retreating caused a lot of grumbling among both officers and the rank and file. The British commissioner Wilson was among the more vocal critics of Kutuzov,41 while Governor Rostopchin, impressed by what the Cossacks and Russian flying detachments were already accomplishing, could not hide his disdain for the commander-in-chief. ‘What is maddening’, he wrote to his wife, ‘is that our troops have everywhere the upper hand, but the general to lead them is missing … Kutuzov never shows himself, he eats and sleeps alone, he drags around with him a young girl dressed as a Cossack and he lets two scoundrels carry out his functions for him. At times the soldiers even call him a traitor …’

  That day there were several brisk encounters between the Russians and the Allied troops in the environs of Desna and Podolsk.42 Brandt, whose Vistula Legion had been attached to Murat’s advanced guard, recalled that ‘we were on the move at an early hour on the 27th and soon closed with the enemy, who unmasked a considerable body of cavalry. There followed a series of skirmishes in which artillery played the dominant part. The Russians retreated when they saw we were about to launch a general assault.’43 Nevertheless, the Russian rearguard actions revealed the relative weakness of the enemy forces and Kutuzov, who was closely following the events, at one point even pondered counterattacking Murat.44 However, this idea was quickly abandoned when Russian reconnaissance reports indicated a strong position near the town of Tarutino. ‘This simple message caused Kutuzov to order the withdrawal to resume, which greatly upset Bennigsen,’ observed one of Kutuzov’s orderlies.45

  Over the next few days the Russian army slowly retreated to Tarutino, where it arrived on 2–3 October and took up a new position; entrenchments were immediately put in hand to protect it. Meanwhile, Miloradovich fought a series of rearguard actions at Chirikovo and Voronovo,46 where Rostopchin had already set on fire his magnificent estate, and retreated to Spas Kuplya, 10 miles north of Tarutino. The 4th and 7th Corps were drawn back towards the main army, covered by the 8th and most of the cavalry. Early on 3 October Murat and Poniatowski marched on two separate roads from Voronovo and sought to flank Miloradovich near Spas Kuplya.47 Brandt recalled that ‘throughout the whole of 3 October we continued our march hard on the heels of the Russian rearguard’.48 Despite Miloradovich’s resistance,49 Murat was able to capture Spas Kuplya on 4 October but the Russian 4th (Osterman-Tolstoy) and 7th (Rayevskii) Corps successfully crossed the Chernishnya river, half-way to Tarutino, and Miloradovich, protected by Korff’s cavalry, held firm upon the river until night.50 The 2nd, 3rd and 4th Cavalry Corps (the first two now amalgamated) and some Cossacks remained to observe the French north of the Nara. By then, Murat’s offensive power had exhausted itself, and he halted, disposing the bulk of his force along the Chernishnya, with his outposts at the village of Vinkovo.51

  The Tarutino Camp

  Over the next two weeks the reorganization of the Russian army proceeded energetically at Tarutino. In the preceding three months of campaigning, especially the bloody battles at Ostrovno, Smolensk and Borodino, all the regiments had been grievously weakened, and some were practically destroyed. Kutuzov’s immediate task, therefore, was to rebuild his army. Shattered units were either dissolved or sent back into the interior to reform. The veterans of the combined grenadier battalions were split up and distributed into new units, and recruits were then drafted in to bring the new units up to strength. To maintain each unit’s cohesion and battle readiness, only recruits who had received some training were brought in. Since horsemen could not be trained as readily as infantry, the Russian cavalry received far fewer reinforcements and many of its regiments remained in a greatly reduced condition. The R
ussian artillery remained in admirable order, while the irregular cavalry, especially the Don Cossacks, saw the influx of dozens of new regiments. The Russian army at Tarutino experienced little or no privation as supplies of food were plentiful. Forage after a time grew scarce in the immediate neighbourhood but the horses remained in excellent condition. The only item in short supply was dry fuel, and to obtain it the villages within the Russian lines were almost entirely demolished.

  The three weeks spent at Tarutino had naturally had a profound effect on the army. By late October the strength of the Russian army, which counted just 75,000 men upon its arrival at Tarutino,52 had risen to 105,000 regulars, including 12,000 cavalry and nearly 20,000 Cossacks, with an artillery train of some 650 guns excellently appointed and horsed. The regular cavalry remained organized in four corps: Lieutenant General Prince Golitsyn I received the command of the Cuirassier Corps, while the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Corps were given to Major Generals Baron Muller Zakomelski and Vassilchikov respectively. Baron Korff continued to command the 2nd, which was increased to eight regiments of dragoons, and one or two of light cavalry. The various army corps still retained their old leaders, except the 3rd, which was now commanded by General Stroganov. At the same time some changes were made in the higher command. On 24 September Prince Peter Bagration, grievously injured at Borodino, had passed away. Four days later Kutuzov announced the merger of the 1st and 2nd Western Armies into a single army that was placed under the command of Barclay de Tolly.53 However, after reaching Tarutino Barclay de Tolly, who had been deeply offended by the insulting attacks made upon him throughout July and August, and whose relations with some senior commanders were rather strained, departed from the army. Miloradovich practically took the place of Bagration, while General Tormasov, who had commanded the 3rd Army of Observation, was brought in to succeed Barclay. The Russian army was divided into an advanced guard led by Miloradovich, the Corps de Bataille under Tormasov, six flying columns and six irregular detachments.54

  Throughout the first two weeks of October the two sides maintained an unofficial armistice. Senior officers from both sides frequently visited the outposts and each occasion became ‘a battle of politeness between the French and Russian generals’, as Tascher described it in his diary. The encounters between Murat and Miloradovich were particularly fascinating, for there never was a man better qualified to treat with the famously flamboyant Gascon than Miloradovich, whose manners, tone of voice and gestures branded him the ‘Russian Murat’. The two met on more than one occasion and always sought to outdo the other. General Yermolov recalled, ‘If it were possible to forget we were enemies, the meetings would have seemed like an entertainment at a local fair,’ recalled one Russian general. ‘Murat appeared either dressed in the Spanish fashion or in unbelievably ridiculous costumes, with a velvet hat and flashy pantaloons; Miloradovich – on a Cossack horse, with a whip in his hand, and three bright scarves, which did not match, wrapped around his neck and flapping in the winds. There was no third man like them in either army.’55 On one occasion Murat asked Miloradovich ‘to let his cavalry forage to the right and left of his camp without being disturbed’. ‘Nay, would you wish,’ replied Miloradovich, ‘to deprive us of the pleasure of taking your finest cavaliers of France, comme des poules?’ ‘Oh then, I shall order due measures of precaution,’ said Murat, ‘and march foraging columns with infantry and artillery on their flanks.’ ‘That is what we desire,’ replied Miloradovich. ‘We are impatient for an encounter.’ The following night and morning (8/9 October) the Russian outposts captured almost a hundred cuirassiers and carabiniers, prompting a gleeful Miloradovich to send a special notice of the capture to Murat.56

  During these impromptu meetings the Russian officers were often pleasantly surprised by their opponents, and by their prognoses for the war and calls for peace. The Allied officers believed that it was only a matter of time before peace was signed, and some even thought that Franco-Russian forces would then embark on a joint expedition to India. ‘We are expecting to leave soon,’ noted Boniface de Castellane on 5 October. ‘There is talk of going to India. We have such confidence that we do not reason as to the possibility of success of such an enterprise … We are accustomed to the infallibility of the emperor and of the success of his projects.’57 To escape the harsh reality, young Sergeant-Major Thirion of the 2nd Cuirassiers and his comrades dreamt of

  taking up winter quarters in the Ukraine … In the spring the Russian and French armies would march together to conquer Turkey. Each of us already saw himself a pasha. We made it a duty in advance to restore their liberty to numerous victims shut up in harems. Instead of being herded together waiting for their despotic shepherd to select a favourite, it would be they who would toss a handkerchief amid our squadrons. Each of us wanted to bring a beautiful slave back to France. One fancied a Greek, another a Circassian, still others a Georgian, and some pined for a daughter of the Caucasus. Our discussions of the beauty of our future slaves and the chateaus in Turkey helped us to pass a very dreary, very painful time in this camp we had named the ‘Camp of Famine’, a title it merited all too well since we lacked for everything. No tents, no shelter, simply sleeping under the open sky on a little straw, eating horseflesh, drinking river water from the infected stream.58

  On at least one occasion Marshal Murat himself expressed the desire to see the war ended, and similar sentiments were expressed by other French generals as well. During one meeting General Armande La Houssaye (of the 3rd Reserve Cavalry Corps) told General Korf, ‘We are really tired of this war: give us passports and we will depart.’ Korf answered, ‘General, you came without being invited; when you go away you must take French leave.’ La Houssaye smiled but replied gravely, ‘Is it not a pity that two nations who esteem each other should be carrying on a war of extermination? We will make our excuses, our apologies if you insist, for having been intruders, and shake hands upon our respective frontiers.’ ‘Yes,’ said Korf, ‘we believe you have lately learned to think us more worthy of your esteem than you did; but would you, General, continue to do so if we let you withdraw with arms in your hands?’ ‘Parbleu!’ sighed the French general. ‘I see that there is no talking to you about peace now, and that we shall not be able to make it.’59

  Such conversations only motivated the Russians to fight on. ‘That the enemy is in dire circumstances is revealed by the fact that the French are begging for peace, undoubtedly offering us every potential advantage,’ wrote one Russian officer. ‘During our various negotiations at the advance outposts the French generals and Murat, the King of Naples, tell us directly that they do not wish anything as much as peace to end the war. One of them even told us, “Just give us a pass and we will get out of here at once, leaving everything as it was before and accepting peace.” He would not have dared to speak about this if this were not what Napoleon desired as well.’60 Johann Friedrich von Uxküll noted in his diary that ‘an armistice is being discussed; that would be bitter. Our motto must be either exterminate them or perish, for the enemy is a Hydra that sooner or later will be reborn if a single head is left.’61

  The relative tranquillity of the front line could be deceptive. Russian flying detachments and Cossacks constantly prowled the countryside in search of isolated Allied troops or patrols. The official Journal of Military Operations reveals that dozens of Allied soldiers were captured and delivered to the Russian camp on a daily basis.62 ‘We hold a position that is, by nature, advantageous and has been reinforced so much that the enemy will not dare to attack us and disrupt the peaceful stay which is necessary to prepare the newly arrived troops,’ wrote one officer in mid-October. ‘Meanwhile, our detachments constantly harass the enemy, targeting all roads connecting Moscow to the provinces … and delivering hundreds of prisoners every day. If one counts losses inflicted by our detachments and peasants, the enemy’s daily casualties can be estimated at more than 500 men per day.’63