Von Richthofen: The Legend Evaluated

by Richard Townsend Bickers

  CHAPTER 18 - THE GREAT FIGHTER LEADERS IN 1939-1945

  In the Second World War the gift of leadership was abundantly apparent in the RAF, including the squadrons consisting of pilots and ground crew of various Commonwealth and European nationalities. This talent was also conspicuous among the Luftwaffe’s Staffel and Geschwader commanders. It is invidious to evaluate outstanding fighter leaders on the basis of the number of victories they scored; not only because opportunities varied between the various campaigns but also because the number of enemy aircraft a pilot shoots down is neither the only nor the most important criterion. What distinguishes a first-class leader from those less gifted is the overall grasp of a situation, the positioning of his force to the best advantage, the ability to predict the enemy’s tactics, to follow the course of a battle and to recall it afterwards at de-briefing. This is what is known today as situational awareness.

  The first of the most obvious differences between the performance of fighter pilots in the two wars is in the individual totals of aircraft shot down. In comparison with Mannock’s seventy-three victories, the RAF’s top-scorer, M.T. St J Pattle, was credited with forty-two. A South African who joined the Service in 1936, he operated in North Africa and Greece against predominantly Italian aircraft. During the last days of the Greek campaign some of the squadron’s records were destroyed and he was killed. It is estimated that his real total was around fifty. The RAF’s next most successful pilot was J.E. ‘Johnnie’ Johnson, with a confirmed score of thirty-eight; all were of high quality, one a Messerschmitt 110 and the rest Me 109s and FW 190s. In terms of difficulty, therefore, he ranks the higher, since many of Pattle’s kills were against considerably weaker opposition.

  The second glaring disparity is the vast numerical gap between the most successful RAF and German performers in the Second World War. Manfred’s eighty victories seem paltry in contrast with the leading aces of the next generation. The supreme German champion, Erich Hartmann, shot down 352 aircraft. Seven were United States Army Air Force P-51 Mustangs. All the others were Russian, mostly much inferior to his and flown by poorly trained pilots whom he might have hacked down in the same astronomical numbers if they had been flying the latest Messerschmitt. Altogether 106 Luftwaffe pilots scored 100 or over. Most of these fought the Russian Air Force, some throughout their war service, others during part of it. The RAF never fought any unskilled and poorly equipped enemy except in the early days of the North African campaign and in Greece, where some of the Italian aeroplanes they knocked out were second-rate, even though the pilots had been well trained.

  There is a significant and supremely relevant statistic common to both that is at variance with the general conception of air fighting. For the public at large, the assumption about fighter operations, particularly in the Second World War, when so much of it was carried on within the view of the population of England, Wales and Scotland, is of British pilots each shooting down German aeroplanes in large numbers. The exploits of a small number of the most successful among these, with victories in double figures, were reported by newspapers, on the radio and in cinema news reels. The general assumption was of a fairly even spread of personal victories over the six years of the war. The truth is that in both great wars, approximately five per cent of pilots shot down approximately forty per cent of the total bag. This, as Mike Spick has pointed out in The Ace Factor, is attributable to the higher degree of situational awareness (SA) with which this small number of star performers were blessed.

  It is well known that good eyesight is mandatory for Service aircrew. Nearly all outstanding fighter pilots have had exceptionally acute long-distance vision. This not only enables them to spot enemy aeroplanes before anyone else in their formation, but also contributes to their SA. The major exception was Mannock, with one good eye and one that was purblind.

  Luck plays a part as well as natural and acquired skills. Countless pilots have flown scores of sorties on which they did not see the enemy at all or at too great a distance or height to permit an attack. No amount of natural SA can make up for lack of opportunity.

  The RAF’s best fighter leaders all had high personal scores — that was why they were given command of squadrons and wings — but it is the doctrine they presented to their pilots and their own situational awareness that are most significant.

  Every squadron commander drummed into his pilots the supreme importance of attacking from up-sun, from a greater height than the enemy, and of opening fire only when as close to the target as possible. When flying in pairs or multiples of pairs became standard in both the RAF and the Luftwaffe there was another rule to observe; the No. 2 must stay in position and follow his leader’s every move, always covering him from a surprise attack, warning him when to break if that were the only resort. Even the naturally brilliant shots, such as James ‘Ginger’ Lacey, the RAF’s top-scoring pilot in the Battle of Britain, ‘Pat’ Pattle, Adolf Gysbert Malan, Robert Tuck, ‘Johnnie’ Johnson, George ‘Screwball’ Beurling, Frank Carey, Douglas Bader, Colin Grey and others closed the range as much as they could rather than risk both missing the enemy aeroplane and wasting ammunition.

  At the beginning of the war, Hurricanes’ and Spitfires’ eight .303-inch Browning machine-guns were harmonised to converge at a distance of 450 yards, known as ‘the Dowding spread’. When Fighter Command first went into action its pilots found that they could not inflict enough damage to bring an enemy aeroplane down or even, sometimes, to hit it at all. The favoured harmonisation soon became 300 or 250 yards. ‘Ginger’ opted for 150; even though he was a fine shot, he believed in almost breathing down his adversary’s neck before he pressed the firing button.

  Douglas Bader is remembered all over the world because, despite both his legs having been amputated, he shot down at least twenty-three enemy aircraft and probably seven more. The RAF remembers and reveres him for his impeccable aircraft handling, brilliant fighting and his bravery, which although equalled was never excelled. Those who flew in Fighter Command during the Second World War mostly assess him the most inspirational fighter leader of the whole war. It was not only his airmanship, accurate shooting, dauntless spirit and authoritative personality that raised him to such heights, but also his high degree of situational awareness. He was also an innovator; the first in the RAF to adopt the finger-four formation and to advocate attacking enemy raids during the Battle of Britain in Wing strength. The argument about the merits of sending up three squadrons together instead of one at a time persists today despite the fact that there are few still alive to discuss it from personal experience.

  Douglas was misunderstood and misquoted at the time and has been ever since. The situation was that fighters in 11 Group of Fighter Command, which covered southern and south-east England, were the first to be ordered up when an air raid was reported approaching Kent or Sussex. The biggest formation was squadron strength. Often, by the time they had climbed high enough to intercept the raid it had already dropped its bombs. Douglas, who was in 12 Group then, which was immediately to the north of 11 Group, suggested that 12 Group should be scrambled as well, and in a Wing of three squadrons, not squadron strength, which was too small to be fully effective.

  Those who disagreed with this contended that to send a 12 Group Wing up when 11 Group was heavily outnumbered would be too late. The whole point of Douglas’s plan was to scramble them at the same time as 11 Group, so that they would be able to make altitude comfortably. If the radar warning was tardy, then 11 Group could be dispensed with, because they would not be able to climb high enough in the time available, and No. 12 alone sent to intercept the enemy. His opponents appeared to be deaf to this. The contra-argument did have a certain validity, namely that handling thirty-six aircraft was a cumbersome business, starting with the collision risk as they milled around forming up. Soon after the Battle of Britain, sweeps over France by Wings of three, four or five squadrons, escorting a dozen bombers, were frequent, flexible for the Wing leader to handle and collisions rare. In
fact, those who argued against Douglas heard only what they wanted to and affected not to have heard what he was actually saying. In any event, they lacked his intelligence and resented anyone of his rank propounding a procedure to them, who were one, two or more ranks senior.

  Underlying the opposing theories was another pungent complication; the amour propre of the air vice-marshals commanding the two groups. One did not want intrusion in his patch of sky. The other was eager to spread his sphere of influence. Those are the familiar irreconcilable factors in most joint endeavours.

  The same tributes to intelligence, courage and personality that have been paid to Douglas can be applied to ‘Johnnie’ Johnson; who did not score his first victory until 26 June 1941, by which time Douglas, who had first tasted blood on 1 June 1940, had fifteen on his score card. As leader of a Canadian Wing based at Kenley and later of another Canadian Wing which, as part of 2nd Tactical Air Force, played a prominent part in the invasion of France in 1944 and all the fighting that ensued until the armistice, he shone as one of history’s finest fighter commanders in every respect. His DSO and two bars and DFC and bar are evidence of that. In 1950 he served in Korea on attachment to the United States Air Force, which awarded him the US Air Medal and Legion of Merit.

  *

  The Germans learned the same rules and in the same way. As for gunnery, the Me 109E was armed with two MG17 7.92mm machine-guns with 1,000 rounds each above the engine, or one MG17 with 500 rounds and, firing through the propeller hub, a MG FF 20mm cannon. Both marks also had two MG FFs in the wings. The destructive power of a cannon shell was formidable and effective at a greater range than a bullet.

  There was another important factor, the application of one of the facets of situational awareness; when possible, to take time selecting a target so as to catch the enemy by surprise instead of charging into a fight without first making sure your intended victim was not the bait in a trap. Manfred had been cautious in this way, but Lothar never. Even at the instant when a formation, not just a single aircraft, was about to engage another, there could be time to make a reasoned choice.

  The first masterly fighter leader and tactician in the Luftwaffe was Werner Mölders. During the Spanish Civil War that began in 1936 and continued into 1939, Germany and Italy each sent an air component to fight for the Fascists; the former’s was known as the Condor Legion. The USSR sent air support for the Communists. Mölders commanded a Me 109 squadron, shot down fourteen hostiles and gained valuable experience. He is credited with having invented the finger-four formation of two pairs of fighters in line abreast, which he found much more efficient than a V of three or diamond of four.

  However, another German pilot in the Second World War, Oberleutnant Otto Stammberger, Stotto to his friends, who flew Me 109s and FW 190s, shot down a Spitfire and six B-17s and was wounded, says, ‘The great innovator and leader in tactics was Oswald Bölcke. He propagated the finger-four formation, with the accompanying aircraft on his flank. But this idea was not carried straight through to WW2; the German fighter pilots in Spain snatched it up and developed it as the “four flight”, the ideal formation.’

  This attribution of the origin of the finger four to Boelcke appears to have been generally forgotten outside Germany, although Johnny Johnson mentions it in The Story Of Air Fighting; but Mölders is a worthy inheritor of the credit for having originated the bright idea, even if it is not entirely merited.

  Stotto continues, ‘In our day, Richthofen was idolised, but today’s youth have forgotten him!’ He also says ‘Richthofen had the best chance to shoot down enemy aircraft. As leader of a formation, he saw them first, was closest and attacked first.’ It is implicit that he was also protected by the others; and if the formation chanced on a singleton, it was he who attacked it.

  Mölders was the first to surpass Manfred’s total and the first to score a century of victories — including those in Spain and seventeen French fighters and bombers. His talent for leadership, organisation and as a tactician and teacher was outstanding. He was conscious of the traumatic effect on a novice of being badly frightened in action, by being ‘jumped’ by the enemy or seeing his comrades go down, perhaps in flames. One of his maxims was ‘It is most important for a young fighter pilot to gain his first victory without undergoing a great shock.’

  He became General of Fighters in 1939 at the age of twenty-eight with his score at 115. On 22 November 1941 he was killed when the Heinkel 111 in which he was a passenger crashed.

  He was succeeded as Commander of the German fighter force by Adolf Galland who, happily, survived the war, in which he reached the rank of Lieutenant-General, and has been described as by far the best known German fighter pilot and leader of the Second World War.

  Although Galland also went to Spain with the Condor Legion, he was disappointed by having to fly Heinkel 51 biplanes, superannuated fighters that carried four 50 kg bombs and were being used for ground attack, in which he flew 300 sorties. His report on this experience so impressed the German Air Staff that he was given command of a squadron of Heinkel 123 dive bombers. Determine to fly modern fighters, he enlisted the collusion of a medical officer, complained of deafness caused by flying in an open cockpit, and soon found himself snug in the enclosed cockpit of an Me 109E.

  Clever, with a receptive mind, brave and conscientious, the burden of high office was imposed on him at the age of twenty-nine. Between 12 May 1940 and 8 November 1941 he scored 103 victories, which included five French Air Force machines and three Belgian. He ended the war still fighting.

  Having antagonised both Göring and Hitler, he was relieved of his appointment hut kept his rank and, in January 1945, took command of Germany’s second jet squadron, JV44, flying the Me 262. Among the lieutenant-general’s pilots were two colonels, a lieutenant-colonel, three majors and five captains. The sixteen others were lieutenants and second-lieutenants. In April 1945, he fired a salvo of 24 rockets at 16 USAAF Marauders from 600 yards and destroyed one. On 26 April a Mustang took him by surprise, wounded him and sent his aircraft down. For a fleeting instant his SA must have lapsed.

  *

  The most successful American fighter pilot was Richard Bong, with forty victories in the Far East Theatre of Operations. Close to his score came Thomas McGuire with thirty-eight and David McCampbell with thirty-four. In Europe, the highest USAAF scorers were Frances Gabreski with thirty-one, Robert Johnson with twenty-eight and George Preddy with twenty-six.

  Dick Bong modestly used to say that he was a poor shot when he first flew in action but improved with experience. This is true of many with high scores. The opportunities for his compatriot fighter pilots operating in Europe were limited by their comparatively short operational tours of 200 hours and the nature of their duty, which was to escort bombers on daylight raids that entailed very long flights and therefore relatively few sorties. Further, their orders during the first many months were to stay in formation and not break away to initiate attacks when they spotted enemy fighters.

  Wing Commander Lance Wade DSO, DFC, an American who began flying in 1933 and owned his own aeroplane, must be mentioned here. He joined the RAF in 1940, shot down twenty-five German and Italian aircraft in North Africa and Italy, and was killed in 1944 in an air accident.

  Again, it was a high degree of situational awareness as well as marksmanship that distinguished these men.

  CHAPTER 19 - THE KOREAN WAR

  In June 1950, communist North Korea invaded democratically governed South Korea and began a war that lasted for three years. China provided the aggressors with USSR-built fighter aircraft, mainly MiG 15s, which were flown by Russians and Chinese as well as Koreans. To help the South, the USA sent fighter squadrons equipped with the F-80, F-84 and F-86; also piston-engined P-51 Mustangs for ground attack. Australia contributed a Meteor 8 squadron, hut the air superiority war was to be between fast jets and this early type was too slow, so was also engaged in ground support. RAF Sunderland flying boats patrolled the coasts and open sea. RAF ni
ght fighting experts served as advisers on night intruder operations.

  Essentially, fighter-to-fighter combat was still the same as it had been in 1914-1918: the aeroplanes were armed with guns, not homing missiles, so the pilots had to estimate the amount of deflection to allow, fly accurately and foil their opponent’s aim by evasive action. They also had to spot and identify their targets visually, not on a radar display, as has been possible for day fighters in later wars. There was another link with the Second World War: several of the American pilots had fought in it. Among them was Frank Gabreski, with twenty-eight victories in Europe already to his name, who gained six and a half more. The top ace was Joseph McConnell Jr, with sixteen. Next came James Jabara, who made fifteen kills.

  The main difference between air fighting in 1939-1945 and 1950-1953 was that both speed and rate of climb had increased by some fifty per cent. Obviously, this meant that mental and physical reactions and actions had to be faster than ever before.

  It also meant that the effect this had on radius of turn seldom allowed more than one shot at the enemy, as well as lost opportunities of a kind that seldom occurred in either of the Great Wars. An instance of the latter happened early on when four F-86s flying north suddenly saw twelve MiGs flying south below them: it was too late to turn and get within shooting range. Another difficulty was the amount of punishment that big, strong jets could suffer without being brought down. The original 50mm guns of the F-86 were the same as those in American fighters five years earlier. Eventually, these were replaced by 20mm cannon.

  Whereas both World Wars had seen the growth of fighter formations in battle increase from one squadron to Wings comprising three, four or five squadrons, operations over Korea saw a diminution in formation size. The enemy continued to fly in twelves, but the basic USAF unit was a pair and two pairs usually operated together, but not exactly in the old finger-four. The first element of two was ahead of and 1,000 ft below the second pair, No. 1 leading with No. 2 100 yards astern and to one side, guarding the rear. No. 2 seldom fired his guns unless so ordered by the leader or was separated from the others. The second pair were similarly positioned in relation to each other. When they entered the area in which they expected to meet the enemy, they all adopted the new fluid-four, which meant that the upper pair was higher above the lower pair and more widely spread than on the approach.