The Oxford Handbook of the Second Sophistic

by Daniel S. Richter

  But whether we take Dio’s attack on Homer as sincere or sophistic, political allegory or literary frippery, representative of wider imperial views of Homer or a uniquely polemical approach has been a subject of intense scholarly debate. Most prominently, Kindstrand (1973, 141–162) argued for the Trojan Oration as a piece of pro-Roman propaganda based on the emphatic superiority of the Trojans (Or. 11.137–144) and a reference to the contemporary subjugation of the Greeks (150). Desideri (1978, 431–434, 496–503) refines this position by arguing that this mythic reworking reflects the new imperial world order, but both of these interpretations have been criticized for basing such an ideological weight upon a relatively small section of the overall text (Or. 11.137–150; Kim 2010, 88–90 with further references). Other possible interpretations include the Trojan Oration as a rhetorical exercise or parody of Homeric scholarship, but as Saïd (2000 177–180) suggests in her overview, all of these perspectives are possible, and this multifaceted approach opens up the range of challenges posed by the speech. Indeed, by eschewing easy classification and so problematizing its own relationship to the literary texts it tackles, the Trojan Oration exposes and probes key questions about the significance of Homer and the literary canon more generally for Second Sophistic writers.

  In these examples, however, Dio’s polemical arguments and challenges to identity have been positioned through and against canonical writers, situating them within literary traditions even as they challenge their conventions. While the orations discussed in this chapter so far have frequently been provocative and challenging, none have been yet so structurally, thematically, and contextually eclectic as Oration 5, often called the Libycus or Libyan Myth. This speech has often been seen to be closely connected to the Kingships, to the extent that Photius described it as dependent upon those four orations (165b41–2 Bekker), on account of a section of the Fourth Kingship where Diogenes, surprised that Alexander does not already know “the Libyan myth,” is said to narrate it (Or. 4.72–74). Since the myth is not included in the Fourth Kingship, it has been suggested that Oration 5 is a possible narrative variant or alternate ending of this former speech, but this cannot be confirmed (Whitmarsh 2001, 326). Despite this, “it is difficult to be certain about what this narrative is or what it does,” as Graham Anderson (2000, 155) says, largely because of Dio’s continual insistence upon the moral purpose of the speech and equally persistent obfuscation of what this moral is meant to be. In this speech, Dio describes a race of deadly half-women, half-snake hybrids who devastate the Libyan landscape (Or. 5.5–15) until Heracles appears and destroys the whole species (18–21). Dio interprets these acts as a moral allegory for the destructive nature of the emotions (16–18), but a final coda detailing the resurgence of the species challenges that interpretation (22–23). In many ways the reception of this speech is emblematic of attitudes toward Dio generally, as while some emphasize the sincerity of its philosophical morality (Blomqvist 1989, 169–179, 186–205), others instead focus upon the slipperiness of its sophistry (Anderson 2000, 154–157; Saïd 2000, 172–173). But as we have already seen throughout this chapter, Dio is remarkably resistant to such false dichotomies. Instead, the Libycus not only breaks down these kinds of dichotomies, but also demonstrates how even such a seemingly superficial work can explore Greek imperial identity and Second Sophistic culture.

  First, Dio actively sets philosophical utility and irrelevant myth in opposition by emphasizing his laborious attempts to graft a moral onto the otherwise useless Libyan myth (Or. 5.1–3), but he also undermines this dichotomy by repeatedly questioning the authority of both myth and moral. While the story’s antiquity is implied throughout the speech (Or. 5.5; Anderson 2000, 154–157), Dio repeatedly emphasizes that its value derives from the moral allegory he has attached to it (Or. 5.3, 16–18, 22–24). By oscillating between moral sincerity and mythic frivolity, Dio questions the source of the narrative’s authority, while simultaneously highlighting his own originality in crafting such a complex tale. Second, a tension between Greek and barbarian runs throughout the speech, as while the Libyan king cannot conquer the deadly Libyan women (18–21), the Greek hero Heracles alone can (23). This parallels the myth’s original uncultured state, which needs the application of a Greek allegory to civilize it, but the resurgence of the creatures and the deaths of Greek tourists in the speech’s coda directly challenge this interpretation. As in the Borystheniticus, this juxtaposition of Greek and barbarian draws the audience’s attention to their own position on this spectrum. Moreover, Dio’s suggestion that the original myth was composed enigmatically and metaphorically as a sign for those able to interpret its meaning correctly (3) invites the audience to wonder whether they should discern another meaning hidden under the myth’s superficial shallowness. Consequently, Dio’s seemingly disjointed and irrelevant Libyan myth implicates the audience within these questions about identity, philosophy, and sincerity, and questions the value of such sophistic flippancy. In the Libycus, therefore, Dio’s rhetorical role playing, blurring of the boundaries between moral philosophy and insincere sophistry, challenges to the constructed nature of Greek imperial identity, and interrogation of literary authority combine to actively explore his and his audience’s position within and relationship to the Second Sophistic.

  FURTHER READING

  The most accessible text and translation of Dio is the five-volume edition of the Loeb Classical Library, edited and translated by Cohoon and Crosby (1932–1951). The final volume, Dio Chrysostom V: 61–80, also contains a number of testimonia to Dio, including those by Synesius, Photius, and Pliny, with Philostratus as the only notable exception. The articles in Swain 2000a provide a helpful introduction to major themes of Dio’s corpus, and the survey of Dio’s reception in Swain 2000b draws out key trends and concerns accessibly. Jones 1978 and Desideri 1978 are two of the most prominent monographs devoted to Dio, with the former taking a more historical and the latter a more political approach. The work of John Moles remains extremely influential, both for its subtle argumentation and detailed close reading: see 1978, 2005 on Dio’s rhetorical manipulation of his exilic biography, 1983, 1990 on the Kingships in particular. For excellent readings of Dio in larger volumes dedicated to imperial Greek literature more generally, see the relevant chapters in Swain 1996 and Whitmarsh 2001.

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Amato, E. 1995. Studi su Favorino: Le Orazioni Pseudo-Crisostomiche. Salerno.

  Anderson, G. 2000. “Some Uses of Storytelling in Dio.” In Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy, edited by S. Swain, 143–160. Oxford.

  Blomqvist, K. 1989. Myth and Moral Message in Dio Chrysostom: A Study in Dio’s Moral Thought, with a Particular Focus on his Attitudes towards Women. Lund.

  Brancacci, A. 2000. “Dio, Socrates, and Cynicism.” In Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy, edited by S. Swain, 240–260. Oxford.

  Branham, R. B. 1996. “Defacing the Currency: Diogenes” Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism.’ In The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy, edited by R. B. Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, 81–104. Berkley, CA, and London.

  Cohoon, J. W., and H. L. Crosby. 1932–1951. Dio Chrysostom: Discourses. 5 vols. Cambridge, MA.

  Desideri, P. 1973. “Il Dione e la politica di Sinesio.” Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino II: Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche 107: 551–593.

  Desideri, P. 1978. Dione di Prusa: Un intellettuale greco nell’impero romano. Messina and Florence.

  Desideri, P. 2007. “Dio’s Exile: Politics, Philosophy, Literature.” In Writing Exile: The Discourse of Displacement in Greco-Roman Antiquity and Beyond, edited by J. F. Gaertner, 193–207. Leiden and Boston.

  Elsner, J. “Describing Self in the Language of Other: Pseudo (?) Lucian at the Temple of Hieropolis.” In Being Greek under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic, and the Development of Empire, edited by S. Goldhill, 123–153. Cambridge.

  Gangloff, A. 2006. Dion Chrysostome
et les mythes: Hellénisme, communication et philosophie politique. Grenoble.

  Gleason, M. W. 1995. Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome. Princeton, NJ.

  Goldhill, S. 2001. “Introduction. Setting an Agenda: ‘Everything is Greece to the Wise.’” In Being Greek under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic, and the Development of Empire, edited by S. Goldhill, 1–25. Cambridge.

  Goldhill, S. 2002. Who Needs Greek? Cultural Contests in the History of Hellenism. Cambridge.

  Gowing, A. 1990. “Dio’s Name.” CPhil. 85, no. 1: 49–54.

  Highet, G. 1973. “The Huntsman and the Castaway.” GRBS 14, no. 1: 35–40.

  Hunter, R. 2009. “The Trojan Oration of Dio Chrysostom and Ancient Homeric Criticism.” In Narratology and Interpretation: The Content of Narrative Form in Ancient Literature, edited by J. Grethlein and A. Rengakos, 43–61. Berlin and New York.

  Jones, C. P. 1978. The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom. Cambridge, MA.

  Jouan, F. 1977. “Les thèmes romanesques dans l’Euboïcos de Dion Chrysostome.” Rev. Ét. Grec. 90: 38–46.

  Jouan, F. 1993a. “Les récits de voyage de Dion Chrysostome: Réalité et fiction.” In L’invention de l’autobiographie d’Hésiode à Saint Augustin, edited by M.-F. Baslez, P. Hoffmann, and L. Pernot, 189–198. Paris.

  Jouan, F. 1993b. “Le Diogène de Dion Chrysostome.” In Le Cynisme Ancien et ses Prolongements, edited by M.-O. Goulet-Cazé and R. Goulet, 381–397. Paris.

  Kim, L. 2008. “Dio of Prusa. Or. 61, Chryseis, or Reading Homeric Silence.” CQ 58: 601–621.

  Kim, L. 2010. Homer between History and Fiction in Imperial Greek Literature. Cambridge.

  Kindstrand, J. F. 1973. Homer in der Zweiten Sophistik: Studien zu der Homerlektüre und dem Homerbild bei Dion von Prusa. Uppsala.

  Moles, J. L. 1978. “The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom.” JHS 98: 79–100.

  Moles, J. L. 1983. “The Date and Purpose of the Fourth Kingship Oration of Dio Chrysostom.” Cl. Ant. 2: 251–278.

  Moles, J. L. 1990. “The Kingship Orations of Dio Chrysostom.” In Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar 6, edited by F. Cairns and M. Heath, 297–375. Leeds.

  Moles, J. L. 1995. “Dio Chrysostom, Greece, and Rome.” In Ethics and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday, edited by D. Innes, H. Hine, and C. Pelling, 177–192. Oxford.

  Moles, J. L. 2005. “The Thirteenth Oration of Dio Chrysostom: Complexity and Simplicity, Rhetoric and Moralism, Literature and Life.” JHS 125: 112–138.

  Ní Mheallaigh, K. 2008. “Pseudo-Documentarism and the Limits of Ancient Fiction.” AJPhil. 129: 403–431.

  Porter, J. I. 2001. “Ideals and Ruins: Pausanias, Longinus, and the Second Sophistic.” In Pausanias: Travel and Memory in Roman Greece, edited by S. E. Alcock, J. F. Cherry, and J. Elsner, 63–92. Oxford.

  Ritoók, Z. 1995. “Some Aesthetic Views of Dio Chrysostom and Their Sources.’ In Greek Literary Theory after Aristotle: A Collection of Papers in Honour of D. M. Schenkeveld, edited by J. G. J. Abbenes, S. R. Slings, and I. Sluiter, 125–134. Amsterdam.

  Russell. D. A., ed. 1992. Dio Chrysostom: Orations VII, XII, XXXVI. Cambridge.

  Saïd, S. 2000. “Dio’s Use of Mythology.” In Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy, edited by S. Swain, 161–186. Oxford.

  Salmeri, G. 1982. La politica e la potere saggio su Dione di Prusa. Catania.

  Salmeri, G. 2000. “Dio, Rome, and the Civic Life of Asia Minor.” In Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy, edited by S. Swain, 53–92. Oxford.

  Sidebottom, H. 1996. “Dio of Prusa and the Flavian Dynasty.” CQ 46: 447–456.

  Swain, S. 1994. “Dio and Lucian.” In Greek Fiction: The Greek Novel in Context, edited by J. R. Morgan and R. Stoneman, 166–180. London and New York.

  Swain, S. 1996. Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World,AD50–250, Oxford.

  Swain, S., ed. 2000a. Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy, Oxford.

  Swain, S. 2000b. “Reception and Interpretation.” In Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy, edited by S. C. R. Swain, 13–50. Oxford.

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  Trapp, M. 1995. “Sense of Place in the Orations of Dio Chrysostom.” In Ethics and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday, edited by D. Innes, H. Hine, and C. Pelling, 163–175. Oxford.

  Trapp, M. 2000. “Plato in Dio.” In Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy, edited by S. Swain, 213–239. Oxford.

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  CHAPTER 15

  FAVORINUS AND HERODES ATTICUS

  LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS

  THE straddling of the boundary between the philosopher and the sophist (understood value-neutrally as the show-orator) is by no one better illustrated than by Favorinus of Arelate in Gallia Narbonensis (the modern Arles). He is treated as a philosopher not only by his admirer Aulus Gellius, who constantly calls him Favorinus philosophus, but by Philostratus, who accords him only a brief account (VS 1.8) as being rather an eloquent philosopher than a sophist proper, and by Galen, who took him seriously enough to write three books in answer to him (On the Best Education and two lost works, For Epictetus and Against Socrates); but his rival sophist M. Antonius Polemon, in a poisonous pen-portrait, states that he was called a sophist (Physiognomy A20, p. 378 Hoyland 2007 at n. 159; for the identification see Anonymus Latinus, p. 582 Repath 2007), and the Byzantine lexicon entitled Suda makes him a philosopher who leaned more to rhetoric.

  Favorinus’s date of birth is not on record; however, his rivalry with Polemon, who was born in 88 CE, suggests that they were not very far apart in age; and since Herodes Atticus could call either man his teacher as occasion served, there is no need for Favorinus to have been much older. He was ethnically Gaulish as he himself states, but evidently born a Roman citizen since not even Polemon casts aspersions on his status; although most inscriptions from Arelate are in Latin, his cultural allegiance was Greek. As a young man he was a pupil of Dio Chrysostom and belonged to Plutarch’s circle in Delphi, appearing in his Sympotic Questions and receiving the dedication of his treatise On the Primal Cold; in turn he would entitle one of his philosophical treatises Plutarch, or the Academic Disposition, and write on several of the same subjects, as also on some treated by Dio. He seems also to have spent some time in Asia Minor, becoming the favorite orator of Ephesus even as Polemon was of Smyrna (Philostr. VS 1.8.3); this civic rivalry, which in a later generation attached itself respectively to Aelius Aristides and Hadrian of Tyre (VS 2.25.2), was replicated by the two sophists’ supporters in Rome, and brought about a personal enmity that showed neither man at his best.

  According to Philostratus (VS 1.8.4) Favorinus’s oratory charmed his listeners, even those who did not understand Greek, with his high-pitched voice, his expressive look, his rhythmical delivery, and the singsong of the closing sentences—a regular affectation of such speakers that disgusted critics and delighted the public. It may be possible to gain some idea of his vocal style, as well as some insight into his personality, if we imagine that the great castrati had been trained for oratory instead of opera, for he appears to have suffered fr
om a congenital condition, perhaps Reifenstein’s syndrome with cryptorchidism, that conferred secondary female characteristics and infertility without impairing potency; Polemon indeed accords him a vigorous and varied sex life.

  Even at Rome, Favorinus spoke mainly in Greek, although Gellius represents him as highly knowledgeable, though not infallible, in Latin and in Roman law; but being a Gaul who conducted himself like a Greek was one of the three paradoxes that Favorinus claimed to embody (Philostr. VS 1.8.2). It was through his education that he made himself a Hellene, as he made himself a man (Gleason 1995, 131–158), though not to the total exclusion of mockery; but he could also make play with his outsider’s status when that suited his argument (Whitmarsh 2001, 167–178). Another paradox was that though a eunuch, he had been tried for adultery; from an allusion in Lucian (The Eunuch 10) it appears that he was caught in bed with an ex-consul’s wife, but acquitted of adultery by a medically ignorant jury. This may have been the occasion of the third paradox, that he quarreled with an emperor and lived to tell the tale. The emperor was Hadrian, to whom he had dedicated a philosophical treatise and at whose court he had for a time been foremost amongst the alternately pampered and humiliated intellectuals; the Princeps relished their company but relished demonstrating his superior learning even more. (It must also have amused him that it was he, not the philosopher, who wore the beard.) Having firm views on the correct use of language, he once rebuked Favorinus for using a word that lacked proper authority; when Favorinus, having given him best, was faulted by his friends for not standing his ground, since the word was perfectly defensible, he replied that it was bad advice to deny superior learning in the lord of thirty legions (Hist. Aug. Hadr. 15.12–13).