The Oxford Handbook of the Second Sophistic

by Daniel S. Richter

  Prinzivalli, E. 2010. “Origen.” In The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, edited by L. P. Gerson, 283–298. Cambridge.

  Ramelli, I. 2009. “Origen, Patristic Philosophy and Christian Platonism: rethinking the Christanization of Hellenism.” Vig. Chr. 63: 217–263.

  Runia, D. T. 1995. “Why Does Clement of Alexandria Call Philo ‘The Pythagorean’?” Vig. Chr. 49: 1–22.

  Schröder, H. 1934. Galeni in Platonis Timaeum commentarii fragmenta. Leipzig.

  Sedley, D. 1997. “Plato’s Auctoritas and the Rebirth of the Commentary Tradition.’ In Philosophia Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at Rome, edited by J. Barnes and M. T. Griffin, 110–29. Oxford.

  Sharples, R. W., and R. Sorabji, eds. 2007. Greek and Roman Philosophy, 100BC–200AD. 2 vols. BICS Supplement 94. London.

  Singer, P. N. 2014. “Galen and the Philosophers: Philosophical Engagement, Shadowy Contemporaries, Aristotelian Engagement.” In Philosophical Themes in Galen, edited by P. Adamson, R. E. Hansberger, and J. Wilberding, 7–38. BICS Supplement 114. London.

  Smith. A. W. 2012. “Origen (2).” In The Oxford Classical Dictionary, edited by S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, 1048. 4th ed. Oxford.

  Stover, J. A. 2016. A New Work by Apuleius: The Lost Third Book of the ‘De Platone’. Oxford and New York.

  Swain, S., and M. Edwards. 2004. Approaching Late Antiquity: The Transformation from Early to Late Empire. New York.

  Tarrant, H. 1983. “The Date of the Anonymous In Theaetetum.” CQ 33:161–187.

  Tarrant, H. 1985. Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy. Cambridge.

  Tarrant, H. 1993. Thrasyllan Platonism. Ithaca, NY.

  Tarrant, H. 2000. Plato’s First Interpreters. London.

  Tarrant, H. 2007. “Platonist Educators in a Growing Market: Gaius, Albinus, Taurus, Alcinous.” In Greek and Roman Philosophy 100BC–200AD, edited by R. W. Sharples and R. Sorabji, 449–465. London.

  Tarrant, H. 2010. “Platonism before Plotinus.” In The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, edited by L. P. Gerson, 1:63–99. Cambridge.

  Trapp, M. 1990. “Plato’s Phaedrus in Second-Century Greek Literature.” In Antonine Literature, edited by D. A. Russell, 141–173. Oxford.

  van den Hout, M. P. J., ed. 1954. M. Cornelii Frontonis epistulae. Leiden.

  von Staden, H. 1997. “Galen and the ‘Second Sophistic.’” In Aristotle and After, edited by R. Sorabji, 33–54. BICS Supplement 68. London.

  Whittaker, J. 1987. “Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Empire.” ANRW 2.36.1: 81–123.

  Winston, D. 2010. “Philo of Alexandria.” In The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, edited by L. P. Gerson, 1:235–257. Cambridge.

  Wooten, C. 1987. Hermogenes' On Types of Style. Chapel Hill, NC.

  CHAPTER 37

  THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION

  HAN BALTUSSEN

  PERIPATETICS in the Roman Empire shared with most literary movements of the time that they looked back to the writings of the classical past. But they did this, not so much to find stylistic examples (as literary pundits would), but to retrace and understand their intellectual forebears, whose thoughts and philosophical system they aimed to engage with, communicate, and live by. The evidence, while fragmentary, allows us to establish that teachers cultivated a scholarly approach to reading and authority, engendering an increasingly bookish culture of intertextual communication. These features and the idea that philosophy and scholarship could go hand in hand would define the specific nature of the Peripatetic tradition under the early empire.

  With the exception of one major figure, we know surprisingly little about the Peripatetics in the first and second centuries CE.1 Alexander of Aphrodisias, appointed teacher and champion of Aristotelianism in Athens around 200 CE, seems to have eclipsed many of his immediate predecessors and contemporaries. He became especially famous for his commentaries on Aristotle’s esoteric writings.2 About twenty prominent Peripatetics can be identified between the early first century BCE and the time of Alexander, yet for only three do we have extant works, all commentaries dating from the second century CE; for other Peripatetics we have fragments of their work or nothing at all.3 One work by a contemporary of Alexander, Aspasius, also survives almost complete, a commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. In the Aristotelian tradition under the empire the commentary played a crucial role, while it developed into a complex analytical tool for clarifying the works of Aristotle. It illustrates what the study of philosophy entailed at a time when the political and social landscape had changed dramatically and philosophical engagement with political and social problems had diminished.

  The precise reasons for the dominant position of Alexander are impossible to unravel, but two points may help us to understand better this state of affairs: Alexander’s quality of exegesis is indeed impressive due to its breadth and his eye for detail—which is why later commentators regarded him as “the commentator par excellence.”4 They even referred to him as “the commentator,”5 while using his work to further their understanding of the founder of the Peripatos. In addition, other philosophical schools had more emphatically put their stamp on the popular imagination due to primary interests that engaged more closely with the moral concerns of the wider population. Since the Hellenistic period, ethics had become the core business of philosophy, and it would seem that the immediate successors of Aristotle were “betting on the wrong horse” (physics), a perception which lingered for much of antiquity and after.6

  37.1 PERIPATETIC PRESENCE IN THE LATE REPUBLIC AND EARLY EMPIRE

  Our knowledge of the Peripatos in the early empire is determined by its decline in the late Republic, as is suggested by a striking gap in our evidence between 225 (Lyco) and 155 BCE (Critolaus) as well as the absence of any writings down to the first century BCE. The philosophical schools of the Hellenistic era—Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, and Epicureans—all had their followers among Romans. Although early contact with Greeks in south Italy had resulted in an interest in, and admiration for, Greek cultural achievements among the Roman elite families (we can think of the philhellene Scipio Africanus in the late third century), first contact with Greek philosophers in Rome famously occurred when an embassy from Athens came to Rome in 155 BCE (Cic. De or. 2.155), impressing some Romans and annoying others, in particular traditional aristocrats such as Cato the Elder (Plut. Cat. Mai. 22.4–23.4). This event was followed, somewhere between 86 and 82 BCE, by the transport of Aristotle’s library to Rome by Sulla after he had captured Athens (84 BCE).

  By this time, knowledge of Peripatetic philosophy had become patchy. In Hellenistic times, anthologies and collections of philosophical views were created, summarizing ideas for didactic and practical reasons; another form, the compendium, not only summarized but also restructured and reorganized knowledge. In other words, selection, compression, and canonization occurred.7 Nicolaus of Damascus (first century BCE) wrote a wide-ranging compendium which survives in Syriac, summarizing the natural philosophy and metaphysics of Aristotle.8 Such works, together with contemporary responses (whether hostile or sympathetic), inform us about the interest in philosophy and how summaries could replace the original works.

  The revival in the first century BCE, then, seems linked to the recovery of esoteric works which had been unavailable or neglected, and followed early efforts by Lucretius (105–65 BCE) and Cicero (106–44 BCE) to familiarize the Romans with Greek philosophy. But Greek philosophers also intensified their work on the newly imported “treasures,” a substantive collection of Aristotle’s writings. Many Greek intellectuals had moved to Rome already under the late Republic.9 The crucial step forward seems to have been an “edition” of Aristotle’s esoteric works in a thematic arrangement by Andronicus of Rhodes (middle to second half of the first century BCE)—in some accounts the eleventh successor to Aristotle as head of the Peripatos.10 Whether or not he produced the first “edition” of Aristotle’s works, his
efforts did set a new agenda for reading the corpus, and may have led to its status as a fixed “canon.”11 As a result, the renewed study of Plato’s and Aristotle’s ideas in the early first century led to the emergence of a more scholarly exegesis. Now the (Alexandrian) techniques of editing and assessing manuscripts seemed to combine with philosophical analysis of the arguments and ideas presented in the texts.12 Philosophers would make good use of, and build on, the accumulated knowledge and arguments to engage in debate.

  Roman-era emphasis on the commentary flows from the fact that upon his death Aristotle’s esoteric writings were not a fully edited corpus, but a multitude of research and lecture notes which had an implicit coherence, but no explicit systematized narrative. His immediate successors, who were his students and collaborators, were familiar with his ideas and did not require elaborate help to come to grips with the conceptual complexity of the treatises. Subsequent generations of Peripatetics had to work harder at understanding his writings. Andronicus’s textual exegesis and criticism seem to arise from considering a number of specific criteria to assist new readers, in particular the question of coherence and authenticity (Ammonius On Arist. De interpr. 5.24–26.4): persuasiveness of the arguments, elegant exposition of the doctrine, and similarities with other esoteric writings (pragmateiai). These three points, useful as they may seem, may not be originally his.13 However this may be, the later tradition shows how such questions could become part of the reading practices to establish the text and determine if works were genuine.14

  Andronicus is also reported to have written an exegesis to the Categories, as did his student Boethus (Philoponus, in Cat. 5.18–19; according to Simplicius it was a “word-by-word exegesis,” in Cat. 30.2). These explanatory notes would be taken up by philosophical exegetes in later centuries, as we know from Simplicius (on Boethus, see in Cat. 1.18, 13.15–17). Such early exegetical works were often concerned with parts of a treatise in response to problematic passages, terms, and concepts (such as the ἀπορίαι, “puzzles,” by Lucius and Nicostratus; see Simpl. in Cat. 1.19–20). This form of exegesis with a narrow focus on short passages may seem isolated and devoid of wider purpose. But the continuous commentary was not far behind: between Andronicus and Aspasius (early second century CE), a shift occurred from partial exegesis to writing explanatory comments on complete works. The pedagogical context explains much about the nature of the philosophical commentary and must be kept in mind when assessing its predominance in the school’s annals.

  This brief account of the genesis of ancient “commentary” shows that it is quite different from its modern scholarly counterpart. Comments were made from a particular viewpoint and arose from classroom activity. Significantly, the formal scholarly commentary was coming of age in the second century CE.15 Aristotelian commentary is best represented for this era by the works of Aspasius the Peripatetic (first half of second century CE), Adrastus of Aphrodisias (first half of second century CE), and Alexander (late second to early third century CE).16

  37.2 PERIPATETICS IN THE SECOND SOPHISTIC: ASPASIUS, ADRASTUS, ALEXANDER

  For our purposes, an important distinction should be made in the Roman era between committed Peripatetics (e.g., Adrastus, Aspasius, and Alexander of Aphrodisias, to name the prominent figures) and more eclectic thinkers, who keenly adopted some aspects of Aristotle’s thought, but rejected others. The first group would be self-declared adherents of Aristotelian ideas, who broadly agree with the Aristotelian outlook. (They will defend him, but may still criticize him on specific points; see below, section 37.2.1, “Aspasius.”) Members of the second group could belong to a range of domains outside philosophy—no doubt the result of the increasing eclecticism and thematic convergence among schools of thought, in particular in ethics.17 One example of eclecticism is the historian Strabo, who studied with the Peripatetics Xenarchus (Geogr. 14.5.4) and Boethus of Sidon (Geogr. 16.2.24); yet his views seem to align more with the Stoics. Another is the famous physician Galen (129–ca. 216/17CE; see below section 37.3, “An Aristotelianizing Author in the Second Sophistic”), who adopted a select set of scientific and epistemological ideas from Aristotle, but considered many of his empirical views ill-informed or plain wrong.18 He also offers tantalizing details on Peripatetic thinkers in Rome around 160–180 CE, referring to one by the name of Eudemus (not to be confused with the second-generation Peripatetic from Rhodes), who played the role of patron and introduced Galen to the court of the emperor (Marcus Aurelius), and another named Flavius Boethus, an important aristocrat with a keen interest in Aristotle.19

  It is against this background of accumulative research activity surrounding the Aristotelian works and the increasingly scholarly nature of philosophical activity that we need to see three Peripatetics in the early empire.

  37.2.1 Aspasius

  Aspasius (ca. 80–150 CE) remains a somewhat elusive figure. We know that he lived and worked in the first half of second century CE and his commentaries on Aristotle are the earliest surviving examples. He wrote commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, Metaphysics, Physics, De sensu, De caelo, the Categories, and On Interpretation.20 The evidence for these works suggests that they were extensive and detailed, often a line-by-line interpretation. In some instances, our knowledge of their existence depends on one passage only, but the evidence for these seven works is reasonably firm.21 His interest in Aristotle’s ethics fits the imperial context, where the debate focused on moral perfection and the means to reach this goal, and signals the shift away from the school’s early focus on physics. His work was known to and used by Galen, Alexander, Boethius, and Simplicius. As Barnes notes, the few points considered by some to undercut his allegiance to the Peripatetic school are not conclusive.22

  In his surviving commentary on ethics books 1, 2, 4, 7, 8 (dated to ca. 131 CE), Aspasius discusses standard questions regarding fate, choice, and the virtues. For instance, he claims that each human being is the “source and cause of the things he does” (Commentary to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 74.10–15 Heylbut). Virtue and vice both depend on us (Comm. to Nic. Eth. 76.11–16), but Aspasius denies that they admit of degrees, claiming that “the perfect virtue consists of all virtues, both the practical and the theoretical” (Comm. to Nic. Eth. 8.25–26).23 Aspasius also comments on the love between parents and children (Comm. to Nic. Eth. 177.31–33) and shows awareness that children should love their parents more than parents their children, because the object of love is of more value. When he adds, “this does not happen,” he sounds a critical note, aware that this may contradict comments elsewhere, yet stops short of pressing Aristotle any further.24 The master should not be exposed on every detail.

  37.2.2 Adrastus of Aphrodisias

  Adrastus (ca. 80–150 CE) came from Aphrodisias, a thriving city in Caria (now southwest Turkey) and a center of philosophical activity. The prosperity of the city was partly due to imperial privileges.25 Adrastus’s broad engagement with Aristotle’s works is clear even from the limited evidence of short references and his one surviving work on ethics (e.g., Porph. Plot. 14.13). We know of works on the arrangement and titles of Aristotle’s works, thanks to the meticulous reports in the introductions to the sixth-century commentaries by Simplicius on Aristotle’s Categories (in Cat. 16.2–3, 18.16) and Physics (in Phys. 4.11–15, 6.4–9). The view held by Aristotle’s immediate successor Theophrastus—that the Physics fell into two parts and that books 1–5 were about principles of nature (Simpl. in Ph. 923.7–8; cf. 1358.8–10)—is also attributed to Adrastus (in Phys. 6.4–10). Galen used Adrastus’s treatise on the Categories, on which he wrote a commentary himself (Libr. Propr. 19.43.1 K.). A century later, Porphyry quotes his commentary on the Timaeus (Commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics 96.1–6). And there are works on music and harmonics26 and on the style and history of Theophrastus’s work On Dispositions.27 Such as it is, this evidence indicates that Adrastus was a philosopher with scholarly interests, concerned with questions of arrangement and structure of Aristotle’s works
—a feature that fits the concerns of his time as well as the Peripatetic mold.

  37.2.3 Alexander of Aphrodisias

  Like Adrastus, Alexander came from Aphrodisias. His teachers were Aristotle of Mytilene, Herminus, and Sosigenes.28 Until recently we had no precise dates for Alexander’s working life, since his dedication of On Fate to emperors Septimius Severus and Caracalla allowed only an estimate between 198 and 211 CE (the death of Septimius Severus).29 Our knowledge was supplemented in 2004 by epigraphic evidence from Aphrodisias with publication of a honorary inscription dedicated to his father (also a philosopher) which confirms his status as diadochos and provides his full name, which he shares with his father: Titus Aurelius Alexandros.30 Arguably the commentator par excellence, at least in the Aristotelian tradition, Alexander became the model for the running commentary on Aristotle’s esoteric writings for several centuries. His appointment to the chair of Peripatetic philosophy in Athens was significant—one of several chairs set up by emperor Marcus Aurelius (Philostr. VS 2.2 [566]). Given the quantity of his surviving commentaries and treatises, his ideas and the formal features of his work, praised by later commentators, can only be briefly outlined here.31 His decision to comment almost line by line by choosing lemmata (short passages) had its precedent in Aspasius (and Boethus). Though clearly an Aristotelian, his attitude to Aristotle remains critical, while aiming to reach a coherent interpretation where possible.

  Alexander’s works are probably the best example for how philosophy was now an exercise in textual interpretation, and no doubt became influential because they “were detailed, sensible discussions of the text and not overly partisan or obsequious in their interpretation.”32 They were used in the third century by Plotinus (Porph. Plot. 14.13–14) and continued to attract the attention of Aristotelian and Platonist commentators alike. But Alexander also wrote his own philosophical works, some in the form of prose treatise, while others are problem-oriented (called problêmata in Greek or quaestiones in Latin). Thus his influence was pervasive as an Aristotelian thinker and commentator.33