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29.See Schmitz 2004, 89.
30.See McClure’s (2003) study of Athenaeus 13, with her index, s.v. Alciphron, for extensive points of comparison between the two.
31.Rosenmeyer 2001, 298–307.
32.On Philostratus’s major works, see chapter 18 in this volume.
33.E.g., Anderson 1986, 273–277; Goldhill 2009. On Philostratus’s Atticism, see Schmid 1887–1897, vol. 4.
34.See Jones 2006, 2–7 and in more detail Penella 1979a, 23–29.
35.2006, 3–4.
36.See note 34 above.
37.See Kasprzyk 2013 for a detailed study.
38.There is however little evidence for her “circle”; for the arguments cf. Bowersock 1969, 101–109.
39.See Penella 1979b on Ep. 73; Hodkinson 2011, 110–111 compares its strategy for validating Philostratus’s new sophistic with that of Heroicus and Vitae Sophistarum. Cf. Miles 2004 on the continued presence of figures from the past in Epp. 66, 72, 73.
40.As a collection of ornate literary miniatures, they can be compared with the same author’s Imagines.
41.See Anderson 1986, 274–277; Rosenmeyer 2001, 322–338; Gallé Cejudo 2013, Goldhill 2009 for general studies.
42.See Hodkinson 2014, 469–470.
43.See Walker 1992.
44.Benner and Fobes 1949, 393; cf. Rosenmeyer 2001, 332–333; Goldhill 2009, 295–296; and see now Gallé Cejudo 2013.
45.See Hodkinson 2014.
46.On these impulses to epistolography in general, Hodkinson and Rosenmeyer 2013, 3–10. On the Paul-Seneca correspondence, probably fourth century CE, Kurfess 1965. Gibson 2012 and 2013 show that far more work is needed on the arrangement of ancient letter collections (not least in Greek), and that assumptions about biographical narrative as their main purpose are not always supported by the nonchronological order in which many evidently circulated in antiquity.
47.Reference to several discussions of this dating conveniently collected at Hodkinson 2013b, 323n1.
48.Düring 1951, 22–24.
49.Capelle 1896, 51–54.
50.Gösswein 1975, 29.
51.Russell 1988, 96–97: from second century Byzantium.
52.Köhler 1928, 5: Epp. 8–35, i.e., not those (1–7) attributed to Socrates.
53.Penwill 1978. For letters attributed to Epicurus, not discussed here, see chapter 34 in this volume, and Gordon 2013.
54.See, e.g., Poltera 2013 on Euripides and Costa’s commentary (2001) on Chion for engagement with the “Platonic” epistles in those texts; Morrison 2013 on the Platonic epistles themselves.
55.Goldstein 1968, 78; 265–266.
56.See Hanink 2010 on Euripides.
57.See Hodkinson 2007a, 283–288 for summary of the tradition.
58.See above, note 14.
59.Penwill 1978 argues well that this text deserves the label, although it forms two parallel narratives rather than a single one.
60.Holzberg 1994a; cf. Rosenmeyer 1994 and 2001, 234–252, focusing on Chion; Konstan and Mitsis 1990.
61.See notes 47–53 above for references on epistolographers’ dates.
62.Reardon 1989.
63.Morales 2011.
64.I discuss these aspects of Themistocles in a collection of studies of (other) ancient novels: Hodkinson 2007b.
65.See Hodkinson and Rosenmeyer 2013, 18–20; Whitmarsh 2013a, 169–170, 176; references at note 23 above.
66.See Harrison 1998, esp. 61–64; Bowie forthcoming.
67.Morgan 2013 (Phlegon), especially 314–319 on connections with the Greek novel; Hodkinson 2013b (Aeschines), especially 337–344 on connections with the Greek novel.
68.As I argue at Hodkinson 2013b, 339–340.
69.As argued in detail and very convincingly by Morgan 2013, 315–317.
70.Létoublon 2003, Robiano 2007, Repath 2013, and Rosenmeyer 2001, 133–168 and 1994.
71.See above on V A. Rosenmeyer 2001, 169–192; Whitmarsh 2013a and 2013b on the Alexander Romance’s letters.
72.On letters in Josephus, see Olson 2010 and 2013.
73.On this letter, see Bär 2013, Ní Mheallaigh 2008, and Rosenmeyer 2013, 66–68.
74.See Bowie 2013, 71–72; Ceccarelli 2013, 183–264; Rosenmeyer 2001, 39–44 and 61–97; Rosenmeyer 2013.
75.See Bowie 2013; Gera 2013; Ceccarelli 2013, 101–180; Rosenmeyer 2001, 45–60.
76.See Ní Mheallaigh 2012 and especially Ní Mheallaigh 2008 on the authenticating functions of the letters in Dictys Cretensis and Antonius Diogenes; also Merkle 1994 and 1996 on Dictys and Dares, Morgan 1985 and 2009 on Antonius Diogenes. Summary of Antonius Diogenes in Reardon 1989.
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1.On the association between rhetoric and sorcery, see also Gorgias fr. 11.10 DK, Whitmarsh 2001, 241–242.
2.For an introduction to Seneca’s philosophical writings, cf. Inwood 2005; to Musonius, Rufus, cf. Van Geytenbeek 1963; and to Marcus Aurelius, cf. Hadot 1998 and Van Ackeren 2012. For Epictetus, see below.
3.Hence my approach here differs from that of Whitmarsh 2001, esp. 141–180 and chap. 4, which focuses on the similarities.
4.This chapter is partly based on an earlier publication, Reydams-Schils 2011.
5.For a general overview of Epictetus’s teachings, see Bonhöffer 1890, 1894; Hadot 1998; Long 2002.
6.As in Epictetus Diss. 4.1.132–143, 4.5.37, 4.12.12; cf. also 1.29.34–35, 2.9.15–16, 2.10.29–30, 2.16.2, 3.3.17, 3.20.18. On this topic, cf. the excellent analysis by Colardeau 2004 (reprint of 1903), 165–195 and Bénatouïl 2009, 134–155.
7.As in Diss. 1.16.20, 1.2.35, 3.1.36, 3.7.1, 3.8.7; on this aspect of Epictetus, cf. Long 2002, 121–125 and Bénatouïl 2009, especially 134–155.
8.Or. 1.50; 61–62; 3.13–16; 12 (see below); 13; 19.1–2; 45.1; 50.8. Some sources claim that Dio wore a lion skin, like Heracles; Phot. Bibl. cod. 209, followed by Sudas s.v.
9.On this topic, see Schofield 2007, 71–86, pace Billerbeck 1978.
10.As in Epictetus Diss. 3.12.16, 3.14.4, 3.23, 4.8.15–16, 4.11; cf. also Musonius Rufus 16 Lutz/Hense. Epicurus shared this criticism, cf. GVE 54.
11.Cf. Hahn 1989 and Zanker 1995; on Dio specifically, cf. Nesselrath 2009.
12.Cf. also Diss. 3.21.22, 24.80, 26.13; Plutarch also uses this topos, as in De prof. virt. 80e–81d, but he focuses on the need to combat pride.
13.In the conflict with Suillius Rufus, cf. Tac. Ann. 13.42–43, 14.52; Cass. Dio 61.10.1–6, 62.2.1.
14.Cf. Frede 1997.
15.On the contrast between Epictetus and Dio, cf. also Long 2002, 121–125. One could also examine more closely in this context Apuleius and Maximus of Tyre. On this topic, see Trapp 2007.
16.Cf. Rutherford 1989, 181–188.
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1.The details of Philo’s philosophical development are complex and controversial; but this much would be generally agreed. See Brittain 2001, Lévy 2010.
2.The thought of Antiochus, too, is difficult to interpret beyond this very general level; for a variety of perspectives, see Sedley 2012.
3.See Hankinson 2010, Schofield 2007, and, in opposition to these on a number of points, Bett 2000, chap. 4. Again, there is general agreement on this basic description, but considerable disagreement on the specifics.
4.Swain 1997, 178–179.
5.For details, and defense of both the text and Gellius’s credibility, see Holford-Strevens 1997, 213n96.
6.E.g., Anderson 1993, Whitmarsh 2005.
7.I have discussed this in Bett 2013.
8.See Fish 2011 for a valuable corrective.
9.See Smith 1993; for the reference to his age, see 150, 368.
10.House 1980, 238. See also Floridi 2002, 3–7.
11.David Sedley has argued that this is a much broader phenomenon; see Sedley 2003. He cites several other authors besides Sextus—Diogenes Laertius, Seneca, Plutarch, Diogenes of Oenoanda, and Philodemus—who also treat the history of philosophy as ending in the early first century BCE, and he connects this with the demise of Athens as the center of
philosophy, and the related dispersal of school libraries to other parts of the Greco-Roman world. After this, he argues, philosophy—at least, as viewed by its practitioners at the time—becomes largely a matter of “recovering and understanding the wisdom of the ancients” (36). While I find Sedley’s argument generally cogent, I do not think it sufficient to explain Sextus’s silence about his own time. For Pyrrhonism, as Sedley himself notes, was never an Athenian school; besides, whatever may be true of the other authors Sedley cites, Sextus clearly saw himself as a participant in an ongoing philosophy, which was a rival to other philosophies, rather than as a preserver of ancient wisdom. While the character of his summaries of the views of other schools may very well be due to the phenomenon to which Sedley draws attention—he is drawing on sources that themselves treat those schools as not continuing to innovate beyond the early first century BCE—this does not eliminate the mystery of his apparent lack of interest in what was going on around him, philosophically speaking. Nor does it explain his similar lack of knowledge of and interest in the recent history of rhetoric, to which I turn in the next paragraph; for Athens did not have the same kind of monopoly on rhetorical teaching and theory, prior to the early first century, as it had on philosophy.
12.Aristotle actually speaks of this part as directed to praise or blame (Rh. 1.9). But by far the greater portion of his attention is given to the former.
13.I thank the editors for raising this point and encouraging me to reformulate my presentation in light of it.
14.The best example from Philostratus’s Lives of the Sophists is perhaps his story of Alexander “Clay Plato” and Herodes Atticus giving successive speeches to audiences including each other, and exquisitely adapting their presentations so as to impress each other (VS 572–574). But Philostratus makes frequent reference to individual sophists’ skill at extemporaneous speaking; see, e.g., VS 519 (Scopelian), 527 (Lollianus of Ephesus), 612 (Hermocrates).
15.This is not the only place in Sextus where a connection is suggested between Aenesidemus and Heraclitus. For recent discussions of this perplexing topic, see Hankinson 2010, Polito 2004, Schofield 2007.
16.On this relations between Pyrrhonism and the medical schools, see most recently Allen 2010.
17.Annas and Barnes (1994) 2000, 54n221, say that Diogenes Laertius 9.72 ascribes to the skeptics themselves the view that skepticism and the philosophy of Democritus are similar. This is a mistake. The autous, “them,” of 9.72 has the same reference as the enioi, “some people,” of 9.71; Diogenes, like Sextus, attributes this claim of similarity to an unnamed group.
18.Holford-Strevens 1997.
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1.Cf. Anderson 1993, 173; Boys-Stones 2001, 149; de Lacy 1974; and Fowler 2010 and forthcoming; Trapp 1990.
2.Cf. Maximus 11.8. Cf. Gal. On the Doctrines of Hippocrates 9.5, where Phdr. 265c–265e is quoted.
3.Cf. Lucian: A Literary Prometheus 5–6; cf. also The Parasite, The Parasitic Art, and A Feast of Lapithae (and not just Lucian, of course; for the dialogue in Late Antiquity, primarily in a Christian setting in Greek, cf. e.g., Cameron 2014, 3: “Sometimes these elements derive from Platonic models, especially the Republic and the Symposium, in an exercise of imitation, or rather of intertextuality. In general, though with some exceptions, the Platonizing elements are literary/rhetorical rather than philosophical.”) Cf. Aelius Aristides To Plato: In Defense of Oratory (Behr’s 1986 title).
4.Cf. Dio Chrys. Or. 36. Cf. Fronto: e.g., the so-called Erôtikos logos (Add. 8 van den Hout 1954).
5.Cf. Lucian, A Slip of the Tongue in Salutation 4. Cf. Hermogenes, On Types of Style (Wooten’s 1987 title) 2.10, Rabe 395. First- and second-century lexicographers and rhetoricians, such as Diogenianus (Hesychius of Alexandria’s [fifth- or sixth-century CE] source), and Aelius Dionysius and Pausanius (both early second century CE); for discussion, cf. Dickey 2007, 46–49, 88–90, and 99.
6.For example, Clement’s Exhortation to the Greeks 6, where Plato is lauded for (sometimes) hitting on the truth.
7.Glucker 1978, 110–111.
8.E.g., Plutarch’s Ammonius in Athens, Albinus in Smyrna, Ammonius Saccas in Alexandria. Later in this time period (in the 170s CE), Marcus Aurelius established four chairs of philosophy in Athens, including a Platonic chair; these were added on to Vespasian’s Greek and Latin chairs of rhetoric in Rome.
9.For the various uses of the term Πλατωνικός in the second century, cf. Glucker 1978, 206–225; cf. also Gerson 2013, 4, where he notes that at Cicero ND 1.73, the interlocutor Velleius refers to a pupil of Plato as Platonicus.
10.Cf. Plut. Quaest. Plat. 1001b–c, De Animae 1013c–1024c; cf. Ti. 30a, 52d–53b.
11.Dillon 1977, 60 and 232–233.
12.Ammonius is thought not to be associated with the Platonic Academy; cf. Jones 1966, 211 and 213n35; Glucker 1978, 124–128.
13.How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend 70e and Table-Talk 719f; on the term, cf. Glucker 1978, 124–128.
14.Cf. Stover 2016 for a newly published work that is argued to be the missing third book of On Plato. Not all agree on that attribution; cf. Moreschini 2017.
15.For Apuleius’s Platonism, cf. Fletcher 2014.
16.On the Diagnosis of the Soul’s Passions (8 = V.40–41 Kühn). I take the διά phrase as an explanation as to why the time was short with the Platonic student lecturer, not why Gaius himself, presumably a recognizable name to Galen’s audience, wasn’t the instructor; cf. the translation of Harkins 1963 for the latter interpretation.
17.On My Own Books 19.16 K.
18.In Albinus (chap. 4), the instructional dialogues are divided into: physics (Timaeus), logic (Cratylus, Sophist, Statesman, Parmenides), politics (Republic, Critias, Minos, Laws, Epinomis, and ethics (Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium, Letters, Menexenus, Cleitophon, and Philebus).
19.In the Cod. Par. gr. 1962, f.146v is recorded a Notes of Gaius’ Lectures in seven books (now lost). Albinus and Gaius are sometimes paired together: Proclus’s commentary on the Timaeus refers to the opinions of “Albinus and Gaius” (in that order), Proclus’s commentary on the Republic (2.96.10–15) refers to the Πλατωνικοί Albinus and Gaius (in that order).
20.Cf. Ioppolo 1993.
21.AN 4.1.14 and 18; 20.21.1 and the reply to 21 by the responder who mentions isti disputationum vestrarum iacademici; citations from Ioppolo 1993, 183.
22.Cf. Ioppolo 1993, 192; on Favorinus, cf. also Opsomer 1998 and Holford-Strevens 2003, 98–130.
23.De Lacy 1978–1984.
24.E.g., against his being thought of as a Platonist, cf. Chiaradonna 2009, 252; for the designation, cf. Finamore 2007, 15–16.
25.In particular from Eusebius Preparation for the Gospel, Calcidius’s commentary on the Timaeus, and Origen C. Cels. There are a number of references in much later Platonists, principally Proclus in his commentaries on the Cratylus (85), Republic (2.96 and 128), and the Timaeus.
26.Dillon 1977, 363; fragments include Eusebius Preparation for the Gospel 11.10, 18, 22.
27.Cf. Eusebius, Migne, PG 11.22 (Numenius): “But Plato represented these things as true differently in different places; for in the Timaeus specifically he wrote the common inscription on the Demiurge, saying, ‘He was good’; but in the Republic he called the good the idea of Good, meaning that the idea of the Creator was the Good, because to us he is manifested as good by participation (μετουσίᾳ) in the First and only [Good].”
28.Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, i. 22; Eusebius, Praep, evang. 11.10; Suda, s.v. Numenius.
29.Cf. Migne, PG 9.7, 14.5; also cf. Boys-Stones 2001, 140.
30.Cf. Migne, PG 11.10.
31.Cf. Tarrant 2007, 452.
32.Cf. Dillon 1977, 264 for translation and discussion.
33.Göransson 1995 for discussion.
34.Cf. Tarrant 2010, 80.
35.Cf. Dillon 1993, xiv, and 2010, 81.
36.Cf. 36.1.
37.Migne, PG 14.5.
38.Cf. Opsomer 1998.
39.Simplicius commentary on the Categories 30.16ff., 32.19ff.; cf. Dillon 1977, 251.
40.Proclus commentary on the Republic (2.96, 11 = fr. 35); Porphyry On the Cave of the Nymphs (10 = frr. 30–33).
41.Timaeus: commentary on the Timaeus (1.276.31ff.; 381.26ff.; 431.14ff. etc.); Phaedrus: commentary on the Timaeus (3.247.15).
42.Cf. Galen On My Own Books (13, SM 2:122.13). For fragments of the Timaeus synopsis: Kraus and Walzer 1951; for fragments of the Timaeus commentary: Schröder 1934.
43.Cf. Mansfeld 1983.
44.Dillon 1977, 262–264, for discussion.
45.Bastianini and Sedley 1995, 254; Tarrant 1983.
46.Opsomer 1998, 35–36.
47.Cf. Bastianini and Sedley 1995.
48.Cf. Ramelli 2009; for the view that there were two different Origens: cf. Smith 2012.
49.Plot. 20 (quoting Longinus): “For those that have not written, there are among the Platonists Ammonius and Origen, two teachers whose lectures I myself attended during a long period, men greatly surpassing their contemporaries in mental power; and there are the Platonic Successors at Athens, Theodotus and Eubulus.”
50.Cf. Boys-Stones 2001, 151; regarding Platonism, cf. Dillon 2010, 99; for variations of early Christianity, cf., e.g., Brakke 2010.
51.In fact, Philo Byblius, Eusebius tells us, “on seeing the disagreement among the Greeks,” carefully composed three books bearing the title Paradoxical History. On this topic, cf. Boys-Stones 2001, 151–175.
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1.With Sharples 2010a, viii, I try to avoid the ambiguity inherent in “Aristotelian” and use “Peripatetic” as the label for self-declared followers of Aristotle and the views they express. “Aristotelian” will be used for Aristotle’s doctrines, even if adopted by non-Peripatetics (see also section 37.3, “An Aristotelianizing Author in the Second Sophistic,” below).
2.Of these commentaries, several survive today. See section 37.2, “Peripatetics in the Second Sophistic: Aspasius, Adrastus, Alexander,” and Sharples 1987.