The Defence of the Realm

by Christopher Andrew

  At the beginning of September Sir Alexander Cadogan, who had succeeded Vansittart as PUS in January, arrived back in the Foreign Office after a disturbed French holiday to find ‘enough in the Secret Reports to make one’s hair stand on end’. ‘It’s obviously touch and go,’ he believed, ‘but not gone yet.’ On 6 September Whitehall received the most direct warning so far. The German chargé; dșaffaires, Theodor Kordt, previously one of Van’s ‘private detectives’ and, in Cadogan’s view, a brave man who ‘put conscience before loyalty’, paid a secret visit to 10 Downing Street, where he was admitted through the garden gate, and warned Chamberlain’s close adviser, Sir Horace Wilson, that Hitler had decided to invade Czechoslovakia. Next day he returned to Number 10 and repeated the same message to Lord Halifax. Kordt called for a firm statement to be ‘broadcast to the German nation’ that Britain would help the Czechs resist a German attack.89 He failed to convince his listeners. On 8 September Chamberlain announced to an inner circle of advisers – Halifax, Horace Wilson, Simon and Cadogan a secret ‘Plan Z’ for him to visit Hitler in person to try to settle the crisis without war. To Vansittart, brought into the meeting at Halifax’s request after Plan Z had been announced, ‘it was Henry IV going to Canossa again.’ But Van had become a voice crying in the Whitehall wilderness. ‘We argued with him’, Cadogan smugly told his diary, ‘and I think demolished him.’90

  On 15 September the Prime Minister made a dramatic flight to Munich to parley with the Führer in his grandiose mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden. Le Matin caught the mood of both the French and British press when it applauded the courage of ‘a man of sixty-nine making his first aeroplane journey . . . to see if he can banish the frightful nightmare which hangs over us and save humanity’. Within Van’s entourage, Chamberlain’s attempts at appeasement by shuttle-diplomacy gave rise instead to the cynical ditty:

  If at first you can’t concede

  Fly, fly, fly again.

  On the day of Chamberlain’s first flight to Munich, Schweppenburg contacted Ustinov with an updated account of Hitler’s war plan, which the Security Service forwarded to the Foreign Office:

  It is Hitler’s intention to bring about the dissolution of the Czechoslovak state by all or any means . . . Secret mobilisation will have been developed by Sunday, 25th September, to a stage at which it is only necessary for Hitler to press the button to set the whole military machine in motion with a view to destroying the Czechoslovak state by force.

  It is part of Hitler’s plan that up to and until the 25th September every possible means should be adopted to put pressure on Czechoslovakia and the other powers . . . and if by that date he has not gained his object he intends to order the attack on Czechoslovakia on or at any time after that date.

  But Hitler did not need to ‘press the button’, although he seems to have been disappointed not to. After Chamberlain had made three round-trips by air and attended a disorganized four-power conference at Munich, the Prime Minister returned to a hero’s welcome in London on 30 September, brandishing an agreement which surrendered the Czech Sudetenland to Germany and meant, he claimed, not only ‘peace with honour’ but ‘peace for our time’. Jack Curry later recalled the ‘growing sense of dismay’ in the Security Service as the negotiations with Hitler continued: ‘When Chamberlain returned from Munich waving his piece of paper we all had an acute sense of shame.’91

  SIS saw things differently. Before and during the Munich Crisis, Quex Sinclair – probably to a greater degree than ever before – set out to influence government policy. SIS’s own policy was set out in a memorandum of 18 September entitled ‘What Should We Do?’, drafted by the SIS head of political intelligence Malcolm Woollcombe and personally approved by Sinclair. SIS argued strongly that the Czechs should be pressed to accept ‘the inevitable’ and surrender the Sudetenland. They should ‘realise unequivocally that they stand alone if they refuse such a solution’. Britain, for its part, should continue with a policy of calculated appeasement. It should not wait until German grievances boiled over and threatened the peace of Europe. Instead the international community should take the initiative and decide ‘what really legitimate grievances Germany has and what surgical operations are necessary to rectify them’. Some of Germany’s colonies, confiscated after the last war, should be restored. If genuine cases for self-determination by German minorities remained in Europe they should be remedied:

  It may be argued that this would be giving in to Germany, strengthening Hitler’s position and encouraging him to go to extremes. Better, however, that realities be faced and that wrongs, if they do exist, be righted, than leave it to Hitler to do the righting in his own way and time – particularly if, concurrently, we and the French unremittingly build up our strength and lessen Germany’s potentialities for making trouble.

  Britain should try to ensure ‘that Germany’s “style is cramped”, but with the minimum of provocation’. Sir Warren Fisher, head of the civil service and chairman of the currently inactive Secret Service Committee, told Sinclair that ‘What Should We Do?’ was ‘a most excellent document’.92

  MI5 disagreed. B Branch followed the Munich Crisis by preparing a very different report on the intelligence from Putlitz and other German sources (none of them identified by name) which it had forwarded to the Foreign Office over the previous few years.93 On 7 November the note was handed to Kell, who personally delivered it to Vansittart. Van, who earlier in the year had been kicked upstairs to the post of (not very influential) chief diplomatic adviser to the Chamberlain government, forwarded the note to Cadogan, who made a few comments on it, then passed it to Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary.94 This unprecedented report represented probably the first (albeit implicit) indictment of government foreign policy by a British intelligence agency. Page 1 of the MI5 report included the provocative statement that, in view of the intelligence the Service had provided from ‘reliable sources’ over the past few years:

  There is nothing surprising and nothing which could not have been foreseen in the events of this summer in connection with Czechoslovakia. These events are a logical consequence of Hitler’s Nazi Weltanschauung and of his foreign policy and his views in regard to racial questions and the position of Germany in Europe.

  The report went on, with unusual frankness, to record the frustration of Putlitz (‘Herr Q’) at the failure of the British government to stand up to Hitler:

  Our intermediary [Klop Ustinov] has frequently found that, on occasions when the attitude or actions of the British Government have seemed to indicate their failure to see the real nature of what he describes as the Machiavellian plans of Hitler, [Putlitz] has given expression to the greatest exasperation and even to feelings of dismay. There have been times when he has said that the English are hopeless and it is no use trying to help them to withstand the Nazi methods which they so obviously fail to understand, but after reflection he has always returned to the attempt.

  . . . It is important to emphasise that the information which we have received from him has always proved to be scrupulously accurate and entirely free from any bias in the presentment of facts.

  Apart from Putlitz, the MI5 report placed most emphasis on the intelligence received from ‘Herr von S’, who had also called for a ‘stiff attitude on the part of Great Britain’ to resist Hitler’s demands:

  It need hardly be emphasised that in giving us . . . information Herr von S. has been risking his life. On the 28th September so strong was his desire to do everything possible to bring about the defeat of the Nazi regime in the event of war – that he was attempting, in spite of the immense difficulties in the way of rapid and safe communication, to send through information which he hoped would have given the British Air Force a few hours more warning than they would otherwise have received.

  Schweppenburg reported that, in the event of war, the German General Staff intended to launch ‘immediate aerial attacks’ against France and Britain. This information was confirmed to MI5 by ‘a [Nazi] Party source�
� in London.95 Curry later recalled that, though feeling ‘an acute sense of shame’ at the Munich agreement, ‘we felt too some relief that we were not to be subjected to an immediate aerial bombardment.’96 On this point Schweppenburg’s information, which perhaps derived from boasting by Göring, was wrong. The Luftwaffe was in no position to launch a serious air attack on Britain until it gained forward bases after the conquest of France and the Low Countries in 1940. The illusion persisted, however, until the outbreak of war in September 1939, reinforced by a series of subsequent intelligence reports from various sources, that the Luftwaffe would attempt an immediate ‘knock-out blow’ against London as soon as hostilities began.97

  British policy during the Munich Crisis, MI5 reported, had convinced Hitler of ‘the weakness of England’: ‘There now seems to be no doubt he is convinced that Great Britain is “decadent” and lacks the will and power to defend the British Empire.’ The aim of the report was to stiffen Chamberlain’s resolve by demonstrating that appeasement had encouraged rather than removed Hitler’s aggressive designs:

  Hitler . . . remarked in a circle of his friends and ministers: ‘If I were Chamberlain I would not delay for a minute to prepare my country in the most drastic way for a “total” war, and I would thoroughly reorganise it. If the English have not got universal conscription by the spring of 1939 they may consider their World Empire as lost. It is astounding how easy the democracies make it for us to reach our goal.’98

  Hitler, the Security Service correctly concluded, was only in the early stages of a massive programme of territorial expansion:

  It is apparent that Hitler’s policy is essentially a dynamic one, and the question is – What direction will it take next? If the information in the [report], which has proved generally reliable and accurate in the past, is to be believed, Germany is at the beginning of a ‘Napoleonic era’ and her rulers contemplate a great extension of German power.99

  In order to try to ensure that the MI5 report attracted Chamberlain’s attention, it was decided, at Curry’s suggestion, to include samples of Hitler’s insulting references to him.100 Halifax underlined three times in red pencil Hitler’s reported description of Chamberlain as an ‘arsehole’ (arschloch)101 and was reported to have shown it to the Prime Minister.102 According to Curry, the insult made, as he had intended, ‘a considerable impression on the Prime Minister’,103 who was known to be infuriated by mockery and disrespect.104 Hitler was also reported to have mocked Chamberlain’s trademark umbrella as a symbol of his feebleness and to be ‘very fond of making jokes about the “umbrella-pacifism” of the once so imposing British world empire’.105

  The impact of the MI5 report was heightened by evidence from one of its informants that George Steward, Number Ten press spokesman, had secretly hinted to Fritz Hesse, the press attaché at the German embassy, that Britain would ‘give Germany everything she asks for the next year’. On 28 November 1938 Kell called personally at the Foreign Office to show Cadogan the secret evidence. Cadogan could scarcely bring himself to repeat Kell’s message to Halifax, who, he believed, was ‘getting rather fed up’ and contemplating resignation, but decided he had to do so. ‘We must stop this sort of thing,’ he told his diary. When Halifax tackled the Prime Minister next day, Chamberlain appeared ‘aghast’. Cadogan suspected Sir Horace Wilson of complicity in the contact with Hesse, but he agreed with Kell that Steward should be ‘spoken to’ by Wilson. ‘This’, he believed, ‘will put a brake on them all.’106

  At Liddell’s request, Curry also prepared a brief, updated digest of Putlitz’s intelligence to present to the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, who was part of Chamberlain’s inner circle of foreign policy advisers. Hoare was the first former MI5 (and SIS) officer to become a cabinet minister,107 but had little sympathy with the current views of the Security Service on the perils of appeasement. Curry accompanied Kell on a visit to the Home Secretary – partly to support the Director, partly because, when Secretary of State for India in the early 1930s, Hoare had praised a book by Curry on the Indian police. They received a frosty welcome from the Home Secretary. When Kell reminded Hoare of his previous acquaintance with Curry, there was no flicker of recognition. The Director then handed over the digest of Putlitz’s intelligence. According to Curry’s later recollection: ‘As Hoare read it, the colour faded from his cheeks. He made a few brief comments, showed no desire to have the matter discussed or elaborated, and dismissed us.’ Curry believed that Hoare had been shocked by Putlitz’s insistence that ‘if we had stood firm at Munich, Hitler might have lost the initiative.’108 In reality, the Home Secretary was not so much shocked as in denial. Even in early March 1939 he was still looking forward to a new European ‘golden age’.109

  Klop Ustinov reported that Putlitz was ‘extremely disconcerted’ by the Munich agreement, complaining that, in passing on, at great personal risk, intelligence about Hitler’s plans and intentions, he was ‘sacrificing himself to no purpose’.110 In January 1939, Curry and Ustinov arranged a secret meeting for Putlitz with Vansittart in the hope of reassuring him. According to Putlitz’s account of the meeting, Van told him:

  Well, Putlitz, I understand you are not too pleased with us. I know Munich was a disgraceful business, but I can assure you that this sort of thing is over and done with. Even our English forbearance has its limits. Next time it will be impossible for Chamberlain to allow himself to be bamboozled by a scrap of paper on which Hitler has scribbled a few words expressing his ardent desire for peace.

  Vansittart promised Putlitz asylum if he ever decided to defect.111

  Curry was told, probably by Vansittart, that MI5’s intelligence from Putlitz and other German sources ‘contributed materially – if only as a minor factor – towards Mr Chamberlain’s reformulation of policy’, including his decision in April 1939 to introduce conscription.112 Curry was well aware, however, that, in general, MI5 intelligence had only a limited impact on Number Ten:

  I do not wish to attach too great importance to our reports. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had available to them a mass of information obtained from foreign statesmen and experienced and well informed officials in our Embassies and Consulates abroad. These no doubt furnished a fuller and better-informed assessment of the whole situation than Putlitz could offer from his somewhat restricted point of view . . .

  None the less Putlitz’s intelligence was ‘so far as we knew unique in that it gave us inside information based on German official documents and the remarks of Hitler and some of his principal followers’.113 Putlitz was certainly far better informed than the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Nevile Henderson, who was, Cadogan believed, ‘completely bewitched by his German friends’, and reported myopically that the German compass was ‘pointing towards peace’.114

  The Prime Minister was equally misinformed. ‘All the information I get’, wrote Chamberlain cheerfully on 19 February, ‘seems to point in the direction of peace.’ Vansittart pointed emphatically in the opposite direction.115 Next day he sent Halifax a report, probably based chiefly on intelligence from Putlitz,116 that Hitler had decided to liquidate Czechoslovakia. By early March Van was predicting a German coup in Prague during the week of the 12th to the 19th.117 Kell called at the Foreign Office on 11 March ‘to raise [Cadogan’s] hair with tales of Germany going into Czechoslovakia in [the] next 48 hours’. That evening Cadogan’s private secretary, Gladwyn Jebb, rang up with further ‘hair-raising’ reports from SIS of a German invasion planned for the 14th. On 13 March SIS reported that the Germans were about ‘to walk in’. Neither Chamberlain nor his Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, was yet convinced by the intelligence warnings. Halifax could still see no evidence that the Germans were ‘planning mischief in any particular quarter’. But he added as an afterthought: ‘I hope they may not be taking, even as I write, an unhealthy interest in the Slovak situation!’ The German interest by now was very unhealthy indeed. On 15 March Hitler’s troops occupied Prague and announced the annexation of the C
zech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovakia became a vassal state. Van was bitter about the rejection of his warnings. ‘Nothing seems any good,’ he wrote morosely when he heard the news from Prague, ‘it seems as if nobody will listen to or believe me.’ Cadogan admitted to his diary that he had been wrong and Vansittart right: ‘I must say it is turning out – at present – as Van predicted and as I never believed it would.’118 On 18 March Chamberlain finally acknowledged to the cabinet that ‘No reliance could be placed on any of the assurances given by the Nazi leaders’119 – a conclusion which the Security Service had put formally to the cabinet secretary almost three years earlier.120