The Defence of the Realm
Page 132
66 Security Service Archives.
67 Macmillan memorandum, 28 June 1958, TNA PREM 11/2616/46. Walker, Aden Emergency, p. 22.
68 Of the four states of the East Aden Protectorate, consumed by rivalries with each other, only one joined the Federation. Walker, Aden Emergency, pp. 21–6, 35–6.
69 Ibid., pp. 25–6, 71–3, 78–9.
70 Ibid., p. 88.
71 Trevaskis to Sandys, 18 Dec. 1963, IOR R/20/D/27; Trevaskis to Sandys, 31 March 1964, Appendix 5, Trevaskis papers, part 1, Rhodes House Library, University of Oxford (documents cited by Mawby, British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates, p. 99).
72 Security Service Archives.
73 Security Service Archives.
74 Security Service Archives.
75 Security Service Archives.
76 Security Service Archives.
77 Security Service Archives.
78 Interim Report by Chairman of JIC Working Party, ‘Intelligence Organisation in Aden’, Annex to JIC/1061/65, TNA CO 1035/184.
79 ‘Intelligence Organisation in Aden’, 17 Dec. 1965, JIC(IAF)(65)3, TNA CO 1035/184.
80 Security Service Archives.
81 Security Service Archives. Service pressure succeeded in 1967 in securing the withdrawal of an Intelligence Corps manual on interrogation which it considered ‘ethically untenable’. Security Service Archives.
82 Walker, Aden Emergency, p. 278.
83 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
84 Security Service Archives. It was also suggested that the NLF had kidnapped the mother of the ‘houseboy’ of a British diplomatic couple in Aden and pressured him into planting the bomb by threatening to kill her if he refused. Walker, Aden Emergency, p. 221.
85 Crossman, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. 2, 5 Sept., 30 Oct. 1967.
86 See above, pp. 460–61.
87 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
88 Security Service Archives.
89 Security Service Archives.
90 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, p. 192. Almost certainly with Kennedy’s approval, the CIA was pursuing a number of inept attempts to bring about Castro’s assassination. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 274–6, 303–6.
91 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–63, vol. XII, pp. 544–5.
92 Macmillan, minute on Rusk to Home, 19 Feb. 1962, TNA PREM 11/3666; Home to Rusk, 26 Feb. 1962, TNA PREM 11/3666; Drayton, ‘Anglo-American “Liberal” Imperialism’, pp. 334–5.
93 Drayton, ‘Anglo-American “Liberal” Imperialism’, p. 338.
94 Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, p. 192. FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XXXII, editorial note.
95 Security Service Archives.
96 Security Service Archives.
97 Security Service Archives.
98 Security Service Archives.
99 Daniels and Waters, ‘The World’s Longest General Strike’.
100 US consul in Georgetown to Dean Rusk, 8 May 1963, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library; cited by Gallagher, ‘Intelligence and Decolonisation in British Guiana’.
101 Dean Rusk circular, 10 Oct. 1961, John F.Kennedy Presidential Library; cited by Gallagher, ‘Intelligence and Decolonisation in British Guiana’.
102 US consul in Georgetown to Dean Rusk, 1 May 1963, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library; cited by Gallagher, ‘Intelligence and Decolonisation in British Guiana’.
103 ‘Extract from SLO’s Trinidad letter of 20.8.63’, TNA CO 1036/173, s. 1/1. Cf. ‘SLO’s visit to British Guiana 11th–15th May, 1964’, TNA CO 1036/173, s. 6/6.
104 Security Service Archives.
105 Security Service Archives.
106 Security Service Archives.
107 Drayton, ‘Anglo-American “Liberal” Imperialism’, p. 337. Jagan, by then an advocate of a mixed economy, returned to power in 1992.
108 ‘Cheddi Berret Jagan’, Oxford DNB. On Castro’s response to the crushing of the Prague Spring, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive II, pp. 53–5.
109 Director E noted in 1971 that the cabinet secretary, Sir Burke Trend, had made clear there was ‘little if any possibility of MI5 representation [SLO positions] being restored whatever the circumstances. The policy henceforth was for MI6, where necessary, to represent both Services overseas, leaving MI5 to concentrate on the security of the home base. Once out of an overseas post, MI5 would not be given the money to get back. The heat was now on MI5 to liquidate its SLO posts in favour of MI6. Financial pressure would continue to be applied to this end.’ Security Service Archives.
110 Security Service Archives.
111 The DIB listed among the assistance it had received from the Security Service: training courses; special (i.e. technical) equipment; general security advice (e.g. on counter-sabotage); counter-espionage and intelligence; vetting inquiries and activities of Indians in the UK. Security Service Archives.
112 Security Service Archives.
113 Security Service Archives.
Chapter 9: The Macmillan Government: Spy Scandals and the Profumo Affair
1 Horne, Macmillan, vol. 2, p. 467.
2 Security Service Archives.
3 Security Service Archives.
4 This phrase was later quoted with approval by Harold Wilson in his Governance of Britain.
5 See above, pp. 433–4.
6 See below, pp. 488–90.
7 Security Service Archives.
8 Security Service Archives.
9 Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 103–5.
10 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive, pp. 532–3.
11 Recollections of a former Security Service officer. Security Service Archives. Wright, Spycatcher, pp. 130–31.
12 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
13 Security Service Archives. Wright, Spycatcher, pp. 130–31.
14 Security Service Archives.
15 Snelling, Rare Books and Rarer People, p. 208.
16 Recollections of a former Security Service officer. Security Service Archives. Wright, Spycatcher, pp. 136–7.
17 Security Service Archives.
18 Information from Professor Peter Hennessy.
19 Recollections of former Security Service officers.
20 Security Service Archives.
21 Recollections of former Security Service officers. Under the pseudonym ‘Elton’, Elwell later published much of the painstaking research which established Lonsdale’s real identity and his Russian family background in the Police Journal, vol. XLIV, no. 2 (April – June 1971).
22 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
23 Security Service Archives.
24 Security Service Archives.
25 Blake, No Other Choice, chs 2–5. Cf. Hyde, Blake. Though acknowledging his affection and admiration for his cousin Curiel, Blake unconvincingly downplays his influence on him. According to KGB General Oleg Kalugin, who in the mid-1970s was head of FCD Directorate K (counter-intelligence), Blake ‘already held far-leftist views’ at the outbreak of the Korean War (Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 141). For examples of other distortions in Blake’s memoirs, see Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 755–6 (n. 117); Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 217, 482–3 (n. 36).
26 Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 214–15.
27 Security Service Archives.
28 Security Service Archives.
29 ‘STARFISH [Blake] estimated that on average no more than ten per cent of his production was spoilt by bad photography . . . General information gained through gossip and personal contact was passed briefly and verbally at monthly contact with his RIS case officer. This type of information was necessarily brief, limited and not detailed.’ Security Service Archives.
30 Security Service Archives.
31 Security Service Archives.
32 Hollis noted on 10 April that ‘the Prime Minister had thought it right to make a short statement to the P
resident.’ Security Service Archives.
33 Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 256, 264–5.
34 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive, pp. 520–21. The whole of the agent network was not, however, identified in 1953–5. The Stasi reported that in 1958–61 Blake identified about 100 further agents. He is unlikely to have had detailed information on the S&T network. Maddrell, Spying on Science, pp. 145–7.
35 Interview with Sir Dick White, cited by Bower, Perfect English Spy, p. 268.
36 Cleve Cram, one of the CIA officers present at the meeting, later recalled to Christopher Andrew that he had suggested to Blake that they have lunch afterwards. Blake apologetically refused, pleading pressure of work (very possibly the need to photograph the meeting papers for the KGB).
37 Security Service Archives.
38 There is no credible evidence to support claims that the intelligence generated by Operation GOLD was muddied by significant amounts of KGB disinformation. The best accounts of the Berlin tunnel operation, based both on material made available by the SVR and on declassified CIA files, is Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, ch. 11 and appendix 5, and Stafford, Spies beneath Berlin, which correct numerous errors in earlier accounts.
39 Security Service Archives.
40 Interview with Sir Dick White, cited by Bower, Perfect English Spy, p. 268.
41 Security Service Archives.
42 Horne, Macmillan, vol. 2, p. 457.
43 William H. Stoneman, ‘Red Spy Served British 8 Years’, Washington Post, 5 May 1961.
44 See below, p. 565.
45 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 518. West, Matter of Trust, pp. 115–19.
46 Security Service Archives.
47 See above, p. 398.
48 Security Service Archives. Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
49 Horne, Macmillan, vol. 2, pp. 460–61. The defection of Philby to Moscow in January 1963 and the revelation that, despite being cleared by Macmillan in the Commons eight years earlier, he had been a major Soviet spy caused the Prime Minister further annoyance.
50 Brook was more sympathetic to the Service than the Prime Minister. Largely as a result of the counter-espionage cases of 1961–2, he approved the recruitment by the Service of an additional 50 officers, 150 other ranks and 100 secretarial/clerical grades. Security Service Archives.
51 Schecter and Deriabin, Spy Who Saved the World. (The authors were the first to gain access to many of Penkovsky’s debriefs.) Bower, Perfect English Spy, p. 274.
52 In May 1961 Hollis, the DDG (Mitchell), Director D (Furnival Jones) and three other members of the Security Service were indoctrinated into both YOGA (Penkovsky’s identity) and RUPEE (his intelligence product). One further YOGA and RUPEE indoctrination followed in July. In 1961–2 some further staff were given RUPEE indoctrination only. Security Service Archives.
53 Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 290ff. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive, pp. 238–41.
54 Horne, Macmillan, vol. 2, p. 466. When published in 1989, Macmillan’s description of Mitchell caused resentment among Service veterans. One recalls Mitchell as a ‘civilised, humane man’, considerate in his treatment of junior colleagues.
55 See below, p. 509.
56 Security Service Archives.
57 Security Service Archives.
58 Security Service Archives.
59 Security Service Archives.
60 Interview with Ward by Warwick Charlton, Today, 11 May 1963.
61 Security Service Archives.
62 Security Service Archives.
63 Security Service Archives.
64 Security Service Archives.
65 Security Service Archives.
66 Security Service Archives.
67 Security Service Archives.
68 Security Service Archives.
69 Security Service Archives.
70 Security Service Archives.
71 Security Service Archives. Ward later gave a similarly inflated account of his role during the Cuban Missile Crisis to the writer Warwick Charlton, who published it in Today on 11 May 1963.
72 Scott, Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, pp. 104–7.
73 Security Service Archives.
74 Security Service Archives.
75 Knightley and Kennedy, Affair of State, ch. 1.
76 Introduction by Lord Denning to 1992 reissue of The Denning Report.
77 Security Service Archives.
78 Security Service Archives.
79 Christopher Andrew, interview with Sir Dick White, 1984.
80 Security Service Archives.
81 Security Service Archives.
82 Security Service Archives.
83 Security Service Archives.
84 Pearson, Profession of Violence, pp. 115–16, 120, 122.
Chapter 10: FLUENCY: Paranoid Tendencies
1 Golitsyn did indeed possess intelligence, whose importance he exaggerated, about the Cambridge ‘Ring of Five’; though Philby did not realize it, he did not have information which clearly identified Philby as a member of it.
2 Security Service Archives.
3 See above, pp. 350–51, 433–4; below, pp. 488–9.
4 Security Service Archives.
5 Security Service Archives. Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
6 Security Service Archives.
7 Security Service Archives.
8 Wright, Spycatcher, p. 170.
9 Security Service Archives.
10 Security Service Archives.
11 Security Service Archives.
12 Security Service Archives.
13 The same D Branch officer recalls taking FJ to task a year or two later about his accusations against Mitchell. FJ conceded that he had been wrong. Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
14 Security Service Archives. Wright later claimed that Hollis secretly seconded him to work with Martin on the Mitchell investigation. There is no evidence in Security Service files to confirm this claim; Security Service Archives.
15 Wright, Spycatcher, pp. 315–16.
16 Security Service Archives.
17 Security Service Archives.
18 Security Service Archives.
19 Security Service Archives.
20 Security Service Archives.
21 Horne, Macmillan, vol. 2, p. 466. See above, p. 483.
22 When Home became prime minister, his successor as foreign secretary, Rab Butler, was also briefed, on 18 October 1963. Security Service Archives.
23 Security Service Archives.
24 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
25 Security Service Archives. Cf. Wright, Spycatcher, p. 268.
26 Security Service Archives.
27 Wright, Spycatcher, pp. 200–201.
28 Security Service Archives.
29 Security Service Archives. On Cumming’s early career in MI5, see above, p. 136.
30 Security Service Archives. Reports on the PETERS case in July and shortly before he retired in September both concluded that he was guilty, though – as Trend later noted – the second report reached that conclusion ‘perhaps rather less confidently than the first’; Security Service Archives.
31 Security Service Archives. See above, p. 494.
32 Security Service Archives.
33 Security Service Archives.
34 Security Service Archives.
35 Security Service Archives.
36 Security Service Archives.
37 See above, pp. 436–7.
38 Security Service Archives.
39 Security Service Archives.
40 Wright, Spycatcher, p. 233.
41 Security Service Archives. Though Martin’s suspension was not officially announced within the Service, he gave his account of how it came about to a number of colleagues.
42 Security Service Archives.
43 Security Service Archives.
&nb
sp; 44 Security Service Archives.
45 Wright, Spycatcher, pp. 213, 233–4.
46 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
47 Security Service Archives.
48 Security Service Archives.
49 Security Service Archives.
50 Security Service Archives.
51 Security Service Archives.
52 Security Service Archives.
53 Security Service Archives.
54 Wright, Spycatcher, pp. 295–7, 301–2.
55 See above, p. 510.
56 Wright, Spycatcher, pp. 320–23.
57 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
58 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
59 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
60 Wright, Spycatcher, p. 324.
61 Security Service Archives.
62 Security Service Archives.
63 Security Service Archives.
64 Security Service Archives.
65 Security Service Archives.
66 Mangold, Cold Warrior, p. 155.
67 Personal recollection by the programme presenter, Christopher Andrew.
68 Security Service Archives.
69 Security Service Archives.
70 Wright, Spycatcher, p. 316.
71 Security Service Archives.
72 Security Service Archives.
73 Wright, Spycatcher, p. 331.
74 Security Service Archives.
75 Security Service Archives.
76 Rimington, Open Secret, p. 100.
77 Security Service Archives.
78 FJ wrote to Golitsyn:
You are invited by the Heads of both Services to visit the UK in order to assist them with problems of penetration of British Intelligence.
. . . On the basis of their past research the Security Service intend to provide you with briefs covering the individuals who have fallen within their field of scrutiny in the context of penetration. These briefs will cover a wider area than the limited proposals discussed between yourself and Mr Wright in November last year. Each case will be identified by a serial number but the full names of the individual concerned will be supplied on request . . . The briefs which will be supplied initially will be prepared in summary form . . .
Memorandum of Understanding [with Golitsyn], May 1970, Security Service Archives. There is no indication that Golitsyn was ever allowed to see the original Records of Service.
79 Recollections of a former Security Service officer. Wright’s account of this episode is inaccurate and, characteristically, puts Wright himself at centre-stage. Wright, Spycatcher, pp. 316–17.