The Defence of the Realm
Page 137
46 ‘Shared-out peanuts foiled poison plot, QC says’, The Times, 23 June 1981. Malcolm Stuart, ‘Poisoner who got it all wrong’, Guardian, 3 July 1981.
47 Security Service Archives.
48 Security Service Archives.
49 Security Service Archives.
50 Security Service Archives.
51 Security Service Archives.
52 Security Service Archives.
53 Follain, Jackal, pp. 160–61.
54 Security Service Archives.
55 On ASALA and the rival Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), see Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, pp. 76–7.
56 Security Service Archives.
57 Security Service Archives.
58 Security Service Archives.
59 An alleged accomplice was found not guilty.
60 The Times, 25 July 1983.
61 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 77.
62 English, Armed Struggle, ch. 5.
63 Security Service Archives.
64 Moloney, Secret History of the IRA, pp. 206–7.
65 Security Service Archives.
66 Security Service Archives.
67 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 392.
68 Moloney, Secret History of the IRA, p. 206. English, Armed Struggle, ch. 5.
69 Security Service Archives.
70 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 391.
71 See above, p. 651.
72 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
73 Security Service Archives.
74 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
75 Security Service Archives.
76 Security Service Archives.
77 Security Service Archives. The Working Party thought that the absence of public funds, other inducements and sanctions made many EKP owners (the majority in the private sector) reluctant to incur the sometimes heavy expenditure required to achieve a satisfactory level of protective security. It was also believed that the criteria used to identify EKPs were too inflexible and that the list (later simplified) was too large.
78 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
79 Security Service Archives.
80 The main committees on which the Service argued the case for improved protective security within Whitehall were the EKP sub-committees of the Official Committee on Terrorism (TO) and the Official Committee on Home Defence (HDO); the HDO sub-committee dealt with measures to protect EKPs in time of war and major international crises.
81 Security Service Archives.
82 Security Service Archives.
83 Bew and Gallagher, Northern Ireland, pp. 159–60.
84 Security Service Archives.
85 Security Service Archives.
86 Recollections of Sir Stephen Lander.
87 Security Service Archives.
88 Security Service Archives.
89 Security Service Archives.
90 Security Service Archives.
91 Security Service Archives.
92 Moloney, Secret History of the IRA, p. 209.
93 Security Service Archives.
94 David Pallister, ‘US court clears five of IRA gunrunning plot’, Guardian, 6 Nov. 1982.
95 Security Service Archives.
96 Security Service Archives.
97 Security Service Archives.
98 Security Service Archives.
99 Security Service Archives.
100 It was later concluded that the driver had made two previous, undetected arms deliveries. Security Service Archives.
101 A second Provisional who was unloading the container with McVeigh escaped. Security Service Archives.
102 Security Service Archives.
103 Security Service Archives.
104 Security Service Archives.
105 Security Service Archives.
106 Security Service Archives.
107 Security Service Archives.
108 F became once again a counter-subversion branch.
109 Security Service Archives.
110 Security Service Archives.
111 Information from MPSB.
112 Security Service Archives.
113 Recollections of an MPSB officer.
114 Recollections of an MPSB officer.
115 Security Service Archives.
116 Recollections of MPSB officer. On US intelligence on Libyan terrorism in the mid-1980s, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 483–4.
117 See above, p. 689.
118 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 632.
119 Security Service Archives.
120 Recollections of Sir Patrick Walker.
121 Security Service Archives.
122 Security Service Archives.
123 Security Service Archives.
124 Al Jahour’s assassin has yet to be identified. Security Service Archives.
125 Dobson and Payne, War without End, pp. 190–91. Security Service Archives.
126 Security Service Archives.
127 Security Service Archives.
128 Security Service Archives.
129 Dobson and Payne, War without End, pp. 191–2.
130 Ibid., p. 187.
131 See below, pp. 637–8.
132 Security Service Archives.
133 ‘Terrorists Jailed for Marita Ann Cache’, The Times, 12 Dec. 1984. Two other crew members, who were said to be unaware of the trawler’s mission when it sailed from Co. Kerry, were given five-year suspended sentences.
134 Security Service Archives.
135 Recollections of Sir Stephen Lander.
136 Recollections of Sir Stephen Lander.
137 Security Service Archives.
138 Security Service Archives.
Chapter 9: Counter-Espionage in the Last Decade of the Cold War
1 Media interest was provoked by the publication of Andrew Boyle’s book Climate of Treason, which told part of the Blunt story but, for fear of libel proceedings, referred to him as ‘Maurice’ and concealed his identity. On the media and Blunt’s exposure, see Carter, Blunt, pp. 468–82.
2 Security Service Archives.
3 I am grateful to Nicholas Wilkinson, one of the Cabinet Office official historians, for passing on this information from Blunt’s confidant, who does not wish his identify to be published.
4 Beves had first been wrongly identified as a likely Soviet mole in 1977.
5 Security Service Archives. While stationed at the Centre in the FCD Third Department (whose responsibilities included Britain), Gordievsky had learned, after the exposure in London of Blunt as the ‘Fourth Man’, that Cairncross had been the fifth. In 1981, while editing a history of the Third Department, he discovered that Cairncross’s achievements as a Soviet agent had been comparable to those of Philby, Burgess and Maclean.
6 Cairncross, who had already been named as a Soviet spy, was first publicly identified as the Fifth Man in Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, published in 1990.
7 See above, p. 542.
8 Security Service Archives.
9 Stonehouse, Ralph. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 522–3.
10 Security Service Archives.
11 Security Service Archives.
12 Chapman Pincher, ‘Minister Sold our Concorde Secrets to KGB’, Daily Express, 16 Jan. 2006.
13 Christopher Andrew, interview with Dame Stella Rimington, Sept. 2001.
14 Security Service Archives.
15 Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4.
16 Security Service Archives. Francis Pym, then Foreign Secretary, was also indoctrinated on 23 December 1982.
17 Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, pp. 349–50.
18 Security Service Archives.
19 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
20 Security Service Archives.
21 Security Service Archives.
22 Security Service Archives. See above, pp. 536, 657.
23 Gordievsky, Next S
top Execution, pp. 285–6.
24 Security Service Archives.
25 Security Service Archives.
26 Security Service Archives.
27 Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 286–7.
28 Security Service Archives.
29 Security Service Archives.
30 Pincher, Their Trade is Treachery.
31 See above, pp. 518–19.
32 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 27.
33 Security Service Archives.
34 Security Service Archives.
35 Security Service Archives.
36 Security Service Archives. See above, p. 578.
37 On Prime’s own assessment of the ideological element in his motivation, see above, p. 578.
38 By beginning its analysis in 1952, the brief omitted Burgess, Maclean and the main atom spies – all of whose motives were primarily ideological.
39 Security Service Archives.
40 Gordievsky originally supposed that KOBA was a codename applied by the Centre to the anonymous author of the letter; Security Service Archives. When he became resident-designate in the spring of 1985 and gained access to Bettaney’s letters to Guk, however, he discovered that Bettaney had signed himself ‘Koba’.
41 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 585–7. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 249–52.
42 Security Service Archives.
43 Security Service Archives. Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
44 Security Service Archives.
45 Security Service Archives.
46 Security Service Archives. The use of ELMEN meant that the reports did not go into the files used for other Gordievsky reports and thus restricted knowledge of the lead even further.
47 Security Service Archives.
48 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
49 Security Service Archives.
50 Security Service Archives.
51 Recollections of a former Security Service officer. Security Service Archives.
52 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
53 Security Service Archives.
54 Security Service Archives.
55 Security Service Archives.
56 Security Service Archives.
57 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
58 Security Service Archives.
59 On 27 July DG and Director K discussed the ELMEN case with Sir Robert Armstrong and the PUS at the Home Office, and reported that, though the case had been solved, there was still no evidence on which to base a prosecution. Security Service Archives.
60 Security Service Archives.
61 Security Service Archives.
62 Security Service Archives.
63 After returning from leave on 10 August, Gordievsky reported that G. F. Titov, head of the FCD Third Department (whose responsibilities included the UK), shared Guk’s view that Bettaney’s letters were a British provocation. Security Service Archives.
64 Security Service Archives.
65 Security Service Archives.
66 Security Service Archives.
67 Security Service Archives.
68 Security Service Archives.
69 Security Service Archives.
70 Security Service Archives.
71 Security Service Archives.
72 Security Service Archives. DDG made clear that Bettaney’s assumption was correct: there could be no offer of immunity from prosecution in return for a full confession.
73 Recollection of a former Security Service officer. Security Service Archives.
74 Security Service Archives.
75 Security Service Archives.
76 Security Service Archives.
77 Security Service Archives.
78 Security Service Archives.
79 Security Service Archives.
80 Security Service Archives.
81 Security Service Archives.
82 Security Service Archives.
83 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
84 Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 69–73.
85 Ibid., pp. 95–8.
86 Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, pp. 349–50. At the time CIA analysts were more sceptical. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 476–7.
87 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 582–605. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4. On US response to Gordievsky’s intelligence, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 476–7.
88 ‘Russian Ignored Bettaney “Letter Boxes”, Jury Told’, The Times, 11 April 1984. Report of the Security Commission, May 1985, Cmnd 9514.
89 Security Service Archives. As a Line KR officer, Guk was not really au fait with Line PR work.
90 Security Service Archives.
91 Security Service Archives.
92 Security Service Archives.
93 Security Service Archives.
94 Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 270.
95 Security Service Archives.
96 Security Service Archives.
97 Security Service Archives.
98 Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 310–11.
99 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 461.
100 Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 310–11, 317–18. Gordievsky’s appointment as resident-designate was complicated by premature announcement of it at an FCD conference in January 1985.
101 Security Service Archives.
102 Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 318–19.
103 The instructions from the Centre to the London residency on the £8,000 payment to DARIO are published in Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 61–3.
104 Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 315. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 34. Gordievsky was informed about the recall of the illegals after his return to Moscow by an FCD colleague who was unaware that he was under suspicion.
105 Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, ch. 1. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 28–35.
106 Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 346.
107 Security Service Archives.
108 Security Service Archives.
109 Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 350–52. Leila Gordievsky and their two daughters, Anna and Maria, were finally allowed to leave Russia after the failure of the hardline coup of August 1991.
110 Security Service Archives.
111 Security Service Archives.
112 Security Service Archives.
113 Security Service Archives.
114 Security Service Archives.
115 Security Service Archives.
116 Security Service Archives.
117 Security Service Archives.
118 Security Service Archives.
119 Rimington, Open Secret, p. 186.
120 Security Service Archives.
121 Security Service Archives.
122 Security Service Archives. On 19 November 2005 the Czech newspaper Dnes reported that Jelínek was to publish his memoirs.
123 Security Service Archives.
124 Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, pp. 349–50. On Gordievsky’s meetings with Margaret Thatcher, see Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 368–72.
125 Security Service Archives.
126 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive, pp. 548–53.
127 See above, pp. 583–5.
128 Security Service Archives.
129 During the early 1980s statistics on Soviet S&T were obtained by a French agent in FCD Directorate T, Vladimir Vetrov (codenamed FAREWELL). Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive, pp. 618–20.
130 Security Service Archives.
131 Security Service Archives.
132 Security Service Archives.
133 Security Service Archives.
134 Security Service Archives.
135 Security Service Archives.
136 Recollections of a former Security Servic
e officer.
137 See above, pp. 583–5.
138 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
Chapter 10: Counter-Terrorism and Protective Security in the Later 1980s
1 Rimington, Open Secret, pp. 219–20.
2 Security Service Archives.
3 Security Service Archives.
4 Security Service Archives. On the attempted assassination of Argov, see above, pp. 690–91.
5 Security Service Archives.
6 Der Spiegel, 14 Oct. 1985. ‘Abu Nidal, a hired gun who turned on himself’, The Times, 20 Aug. 2002.
7 Security Service Archives.
8 The Service acknowledged in 1988 that it had still not discovered whether Abu Nidal had established ‘a structure’ in Britain. Security Service Archives.
9 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive II, pp. 144, 259. The JIC reported in October 1989 that there had been no report of ANO involvement in ‘any international terrorist attacks’ since an attack on a Greek cruise ship fifteen months earlier. Security Service Archives.
10 See above, p. 730.
11 Security Service Archives.
12 Security Service Archives.
13 See above, pp. 648, 691.
14 Frank, Indira, pp. 480–83, 492–4, 498–9.
15 Security Service Archives.
16 Security Service Archives.
17 Security Service Archives.
18 Security Service Archives.
19 Moloney, Secret History of the IRA, pp. 3–6.
20 Security Service Archives.
21 Taylor, Provos, pp. 277–8.
22 Security Service Archives.
23 Information from Sir Stephen Lander.
24 Security Service Archives.
25 Recollections of Sir Patrick Walker.
26 Taylor, Brits, pp. 251–3. Taylor concludes, ‘If there had been a “Brit” conspiracy to get rid of Stalker (which I do not believe), then appointing Colin Sampson as his successor, in the expectation that he would collude in a cover-up, was a major mistake. This is one of the main reasons why the conspiracy theory does not hold water.’
27 Bolton, Death on the Rock, pp. 189–91.
28 Security Service Archives.
29 Eckert, Fatal Encounter, pp. 13–14.
30 Ibid., p. 11.
31 Security Service Archives.
32 Security Service Archives.
33 Eckert, Fatal Encounter, pp. 14, 19, 21.
34 The Windlesham/Rampton Report, pp. 103–7. Unsurprisingly, given the sudden, confusing and shocking nature of the shootings, there were differences in witness accounts.
35 See above, p. 000.