Into the Lion's Mouth: The True Story of Dusko Popov: World War II Spy, Patriot, and the Real-Life Inspiration for James Bond

by Larry Loftis

  Benton forwarded the information to London.

  At noon British Intelligence cabled back, asking for details about Jebsen’s danger, stating that “at all costs” Johnny should be prevented from sending his letter. The telegram further instructed that Jebsen must keep his position with the Abwehr, and that MI6 would provide him sanctuary only when they felt it necessary. London suspected that Johnny exaggerated his danger to rush the British into an unnecessary evacuation.

  The next day, September 24, Dusko cabled Johnny:

  CALM DOWN. MY GENUINENESS TOWARDS THE GERMANS MUST AT ALL COSTS BE SAFE-GUARDED. ALL YOUR ACTIONS MUST PRIMARILY BE DIRECTED TO THAT OBJECT TO PROTECT BOTH OUR FAMILIES AND FRIENDS. IT WOULD MEAN DISASTER FOR THEM IF YOU CAME OVER HERE NOW. YOU MUST THEREFORE AT ALL COSTS KEEP YOUR POSITION IN THE ABWEHR AT LEAST UNTIL I GET BACK.

  As Dusko and everyone in British Intelligence knew, if Johnny suddenly disappeared the Germans would suspect foul play not only with him, but with his principal agent, IVAN, and the entire Yugoslav network. Johnny would have to sit tight.

  Four days later Ian Wilson coordinated the flurry of telegrams and evaluated the risk. As MI5 feared, Johnny’s letter had already been leaked. “At once,” Ian wrote, Moldenhauer had disclosed the matter to an SIS informant. The breach didn’t sit well with Tar, and he sent a mitigating proposal to Masterman, Marriott, and Wilson. “Should Johnny Jebsen decide to throw his lot unconditionally with us,” Robertson wrote, he should contact Erich Schroeder, Lisbon SD chief, and present the following story:

  I have been approached by the British and have had several meetings with them . . . At these meetings the British proposed that (a) I should pass through as genuine intelligence British “Spiel” material. (b) I should disclose such German agents as I have cognisance of, and (c) I should continue in my capacity as an Abwehr recruiter and that I should recruit persons designated by the British I.S. who should then operate as double agents.

  Boldly suggesting that Jebsen approach the Germans for a triple-cross, Robertson’s quadruple-cross strategy was outlandish. But he was not done. Jebsen would say the British claimed that one in three Abwehr officers were in a similar position and were informing MI6 of all Abwehr matters. Johnny would then make an oblique (and false) reference to a Czech already double-crossing. The Germans would identify the agent as OSTRO,* and would assume that his case officer, Kammler, had also been turned. Robertson’s scheme would continue with Jebsen arranging a second meeting with Schroeder, but on the following morning they would find that Johnny had been “kidnapped and spirited away.”

  Unknown to Tar, the Germans had already discussed kidnapping Ruser, and were making their own plans for Johnny.

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  The following day Masterman, Marriott, Foley, and Wilson met to discuss Robertson’s idea and what to do. They could either secretly fly Jebsen to London and acquire his inside knowledge or, better yet, leave him in Madrid and operate him as a double. Foley informed them that MI6 was already referring to Johnny under the code name ARTIST, informally utilizing him as an informant. For now, the group decided, they would not implement Robertson’s proposal, but would seek more information on the extent of Johnny’s danger. His role as an Abwehr insider was extremely valuable, and one British Intelligence would not give up lightly.

  A week or so later, Kenneth Benton remembered, London transferred Johnny to Lisbon. “I was very sorry to have to part with ARTIST,” he wrote, “because he was an interesting and well-educated man and very good company.” In Lisbon, Benton added, Johnny informed MI6— “with a visible shudder”—“that the Gestapo had a trained hijack team, skilled in entering foreign countries, seizing a wanted man and smuggling him back across the frontiers without arousing suspicion.”

  The Ablege Kommandos, Jebsen explained, were experts in kidnapping and elimination. They were said to have a tasteless and fast-acting poison which could be added to any food or drink. After twenty minutes the substance left no trace in the body and the victim would clear an autopsy. Where poison was not practicable, shooting was adopted. In Spain, Johnny said, the Germans had full cooperation of the police and Falange.*

  While less formalized, the Abwehr had similar capabilities. That very year—1943—a snatch squad was ordered to kidnap a German driver who had been passing information to the British. A team of three was given the address of the man’s mistress in downtown Madrid and told when he would be visiting. Their instructions were to overpower the man and take him to Abwehr headquarters without commotion—in broad daylight.

  “We were all in civilian clothes,” one of the kidnappers remembered. “Each carried a pistol and I also had a few tins containing cotton chloroform pads. . . . While W. waited in the car, ready to drive the captured deserter through the town quickly and quietly, I and the other man went into the house. . . . The door into the next room opened and there stood the man I was after. . . . A few shots rang out as I ran after him and tried to overpower him, but he crumpled up, killed by his own gun.”

  The snatch teams, however, were only the formal options.

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  Over the next few weeks Dusko worked on the escape route, where Britain, Germany, Yugoslavia, and Spain all spun in an unbalanced and invisible carousel. While Jebsen would have to work out the details on the German side, the broad picture was that Johnny would coordinate with Ivo in Belgrade and select up to a dozen people. Von Karsthoff, in turn, would work with Johnny and Ivo to select German agents to slip into the group. Johnny would coordinate with German authorities to arrange passage through France and into Spain. Dusko would meet the group in San Sebastian—twelve miles from the French border—where he would greet the German agents as old friends and pass them to the British Consul, who would arrange travel to England. Von Karsthoff would believe he was sending genuine German spies into the group, but Ivo, who would be handling final selection, assured Dusko and the British that all would be double agents.

  The missing link in the escape chain was Dusko’s visa to Spain. With the rise of a new Croatian state, relations between the Yugoslav government-in-exile and the Franco government were strained. British Intelligence had tried to get the Yugoslav charge d’affaires in Madrid to push Spain for Dusko’s visa, but he refused, distrusting Popov and working independently on his own route. The Yugoslav Legation in Lisbon tried to help but was also unsuccessful.

  Von Karsthoff told Dusko that the Abwehr had the power to deliver the visa, but the notion was dismissed since the British would realize Popov had received German help. If Dusko could contact some influential Yugoslavs in London, Ludovico suggested—friends of escapees—they could push the British into giving Popov a passport, with which he could acquire the Spanish visa. Dusko agreed.

  The last piece was the escapees themselves. They would have to be notified—in a fashion approved by the British and Germans—to prepare for the journey. Each escapee, it was decided, would receive the following notice:

  You will receive this letter through Dr. P. He is a friend of ours and he is in touch with us. He has an opportunity through some friends of his of helping you to escape from Yugoslavia and go to Spain. If you want to come over do exactly as Dr. P. tells you, even if it seems rather peculiar to you. In San Sebastian you will be met by a Yugoslav official who will send you on to England. In case you have not got the necessary funds for the tickets etc., Dr. P. will advance it to you. Keep all this very secret and burn this letter.

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  During this time Johnny had second thoughts about his double-cross. The stigma of being branded a traitor weighed heavily on him, as well as the danger to his wife if he were exposed. He suggested to MI6 that he wanted to break off communication, but the Madrid station told him that he’d taken an irrevocable step. They would, however, allow Jebsen to be an “unconscious” source, discreetly delivering information to TRICYCLE and other agents.

  Johnny agreed, with three conditions: (a) any
German agents in the UK who were uncovered by information supplied by Johnny were to be treated as prisoners of war rather than spies (who would be executed); (b) the British would use “utmost caution” not to expose Johnny, even indirectly; and (c) Johnny would have liberty to travel after the war. MI6, meanwhile, prepared for an emergency. Frank Foley contacted an SOE agent in Madrid and told him to be on standby for an evacuation.

  Johnny continued business as usual with von Karsthoff, and together they worked the German side of the route. On October 18 he submitted to the major a lengthy outline of how the operation would work. IVAN had received approval of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, he wrote, to slip through from Switzerland and Serbia to England specified Serbian officers. PAULA (Ivo) would purchase German alien passports to allow travel from Belgrade to France. The group would travel to Biarritz, where Johnny or an agent of his would receive them. The Yugoslav government would pay 4,000 French francs per escapee to bribe two Customs officials at the border. Johnny would escort the group to Madrid, where they would be handed over to the English. Von Karsthoff, Johnny, and PAULA would select German agents to include in the group, who would be treated no differently than the others. Neither the Yugoslav government nor the British suspected foul play, Johnny assured Ludovico.

  The following day von Karsthoff notified Berlin of the plan, including Jebsen’s full report. He explained that the Franco–Spanish border agent would be “Carlos,” an Argentine employed by Jebsen’s firm in Hamburg. Noting that the operation was “very delicate,” the major added: “For safety’s sake attention is drawn to the possibility of endangering also Ivan I* in case of suspicion or failure of the slipping-through operation.”

  While von Karsthoff was carefully protecting Popov’s identity against the enemy, Robertson was incorporating Jebsen into the British fold. Informing him of Dusko’s upcoming trip to Lisbon, Tar asked Johnny to list his local Abwehr supporters. Jebsen identified four: von Karsthoff, two secretaries, and Dr. Aloys Schreiber.

  Dusko returned to Lisbon on November 10, this time checking into the Aviz. Given the significance and heightened danger of Popov’s work, Ian Wilson arrived two days later to assist if necessary. To their mild surprise, Dusko was received exceedingly well. In a report back to London on the twenty-first, Wilson quoted Jebsen: “SCHREIBER has written to Berlin that in his opinion TRICYCLE is absolutely reliable and should be given biggest and most secret tasks for big money.” Von Karsthoff appeared to concur. At one of their first meetings, the major gave Popov three new questionnaires and $15,000. Dusko deposited the money in the hotel safe.

  Jebsen, in turn, began his new role, feeding MI6 an ongoing stream of information about Abwehr officers and their positions on various matters. For the first time, it seemed, Johnny and Dusko were working in tandem; the former gleaning information, the latter planting misinformation.

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  The smooth sailing lasted less than a month. On October 26 Johnny informed MI6 that the Abwehr had an informant—“with a name something like Martins”—who worked in the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon. Weeks later Martins stopped by the British Embassy and confessed that he had been supplying cover addresses for two German agents in Britain, BALLOON and GELATINE. Martins knew their real names, too. The Germans had been using his firm, the Portuguese said, to send payments to the agents.

  The dilemma for Dusko was disconcerting: If Metcalfe and Gaertner stopped writing, the Germans would assume they had been arrested, and that Dusko’s arrest would follow. But if they continued to write, Martins would suspect they were double agents and would inform the Abwehr. If the former, the Germans would cut Dusko off; if the latter, his cover was blown.

  The British brainstormed. Wilson, Robertson, and Foley compared notes and came to a quick resolution. On November 28 London cabled Lisbon with a plan:

  MARTINS should be interviewed in person and told to carry on normally, but should be sworn to secrecy. He should be both complimented and frightened, but should be promised a reward if he carried out our instructions. The Germans should be encouraged to warn BALLOON and GELATINE to lay off the addresses.

  The following day Wilson reported back. Martins had been interviewed, he said, but “cannot be trusted to keep his mouth shut indefinitely if he continues to receive correspondence, which after a time he must guess is controlled.” Ian suggested shutting down Friedl’s correspondence and waiting to see what happened.

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  About this time Dusko went to the Aviz front desk to retrieve his package from the safe. A few moments later, the employee returned empty-handed. The safe was empty.

  The missing money had two possible explanations, Dusko knew: Either an employee had stolen the package, or the Abwehr was on to him. The former seemed unlikely, since an employee would not have known the package contained money. More importantly, how could he hope to have survived a hotel investigation? The only realistic explanation was the Germans. If Dusko’s cover had been blown, as Wilson feared, the Abwehr would have wanted to retrieve their $15,000. But how would they have gotten into the safe, even if they assumed he had stashed the money there?

  Unknown to Dusko, a man was working in the hotel who was not an employee; unknown to the hotel, he had a safe key.

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  TRUTH SERUM

  Some days later von Karsthoff returned the money, explaining that an overzealous agent had assumed the package contained diplomatic papers. Ludovico didn’t say how the man knew that Popov had placed something in the safe, and Dusko didn’t ask. Later that month Johnny told MI6 that the hotel agent was highly valued by the Germans, and until this incident he had been known only by Jebsen, Schreiber, and one other Abwehr officer. The man was not actually an Aviz employee, Johnny explained; the Abwehr paid him 2,000 escudos per month and the hotel allowed him to work there—“for camouflage purposes.” Johnny didn’t know his name, but he knew his role: When English guests checked in, the agent would retrieve their passports so the Abwehr could make copies. Otherwise, he lingered about to “supervise” foreigners staying at the hotel.

  Neither Popov nor MI6 desired supervision by this man—whom the British had code named VIPER—but for the time being they’d have to live with a snake in their midst.

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  In mid-November Popov was meeting regularly with Jebsen and von Karsthoff, both giving him plenty to pass to London. Jebsen’s situation with the Gestapo and the SD had not improved, he told Dusko, and Major Munzinger had informed Johnny not to return to Berlin—even if Munzinger ordered it. Jebsen’s protection still lay with the Abwehr, but that status was now determined by an unusual source: Ivo Popov.

  Fully incorporated into the TRICYCLE net as double agent DREADNOUGHT, Ivo worked tirelessly in the underground, assisting in sabotage and counterintelligence. Dr. Popov’s intellect, charm, and powers of persuasion were making significant inroads in Abwehr leadership, and like Dusko, he made the most of the opportunity. Ian Wilson summarized the British windfall: “ARTIST describes TRICYCLE’s brother as having the most dominating personality of anyone he has met, and an exceptionally cool and keen brain in a crisis.” In a very short time Ivo “[has] gained a tremendous influence with the Abwehr officials he has met, and is extremely highly regarded by them. In fact he is now in a position where he is able to use his influence to help ARTIST rather than vice-versa.” So trusted was Dr. Popov that Munzinger stored 25,000 Swiss francs in Ivo’s name for safekeeping when Germany collapsed.

  Ivo’s rising status was due in part to the fact that he was one of the Abwehr’s chief sources of information on the activities of Draža Mihailovic, the Serbian general leading the Chetnik resistance guerillas. As agent DREADNOUGHT, however, he was feeding the Germans selected misinformation dreamt up by MI5.

  Dr. Popov’s influence was timely. When Colonel Hansen replaced Pieckenbrock as head of Abwehr I, Kammler had made a direct appeal to undermine Dusko and Johnny. Ivo met with the colonel shortly
thereafter, however, and, in Johnny’s words, “cooked him.” Hansen now believed in the genuineness of his two Lisbon agents, and suspected that Kammler was working for the Gestapo.

  Dusko, meanwhile, was using his considerable charm to keep von Karsthoff in tow. The major was enjoying happy days, driving a new Cadillac and entertaining at the Quinta de Condé, a sprawling farm near Cintra. At several meetings in late November, Ludovico expressed his pleasure in Popov’s work. Even amid warning signs, von Karsthoff was impervious, blinded by Dusko’s charisma and his ability to create answers and excuses on the fly. The major had even received a report which stated that IVAN was spending considerable time with Yugoslavs and the British and had “adopted a pro-British attitude.”

  Von Karsthoff congratulated him.

  The British-friendly veneer was necessary, Ludovico acknowledged, for Popov to accomplish his mission. Along those lines the major asked him to investigate Beatrice Terry, a woman staying at the Aviz who had caught the attention of VIPER. She was a British spy, von Karsthoff said, and had come from Chile on a Czech passport. The major described her as a tall blonde, “ugly but with sex appeal.” He also told Popov that when Dusko returned to London, he should set up his radio outside of London. “It would be a silly thing,” he said, “for you to be killed by German weapons.”

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  During this time Ivo had recruited into the double-cross network an old friend of his and Dusko’s, Marquis Frano de Bona. The de Bona family, like the Popovs, were well known Dubrovnik aristocrats, tracing their heritage in the city to the fifteenth century. Dusko knew Frano well, and Frano jumped at the opportunity to help defeat the Nazis. He went first to Belgrade for Abwehr debriefing and instruction by Munzinger, and then to Paris for wireless radio training. After several weeks he was given the code name GUTTMANN and cleared for duties as IVAN’s radioman in London. Munzinger asked Major Helmut Wiegand, the hard-drinking Paris chief, to coordinate de Bona’s transit to Madrid, but Wiegand sent a note to Johnny suggesting that the task would be difficult. Johnny was convinced, he told MI5, that Wiegand magnified the assignment’s complexity simply to schedule a trip to Madrid or Lisbon.