Into the Lion's Mouth: The True Story of Dusko Popov: World War II Spy, Patriot, and the Real-Life Inspiration for James Bond

by Larry Loftis

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  Circumstances to follow would keep Jebsen on his mind. Throughout April Station X had intercepted several wireless messages regarding Dusko’s demand for $150,000. On April 12 Berlin notified von Karsthoff that Major Wiegand, the Paris chief negotiating with Popov, was not up to the task:

  In spite of the most precise directions which he was given for negotiating with IVAN it is noted that Wiegand is not capable of persuading IVAN to accept these proposals or to continue his work on a similar basis. From the recent correspondence one has the impression that IVAN is not being directed but doing the directing himself. IVAN’s present preliminary successes in no way justify a demand for such a large payment.

  Nevertheless, the Abwehr was unwilling to lose their slippery spy over a few escudos. A week later Berlin authorized Lisbon to release the initial $75,000. The second installment, the message read, was to be “handed over after HARRY’s oral report in Biarritz on 21/4.” Lisbon replied:

  JONNY is maintaining his objections. HARRY will arrive in Biarritz alone on 21/4 towards the afternoon. The first installment of the sum in dollars was paid to JONNY on 20/4 in accordance with your HIOB I of 20/4.

  On April 29 SIS London received through the diplomatic bag Johnny’s April 21 letter and $50,000. MI5’s monthly report to Winston Churchill—which included updates on significant espionage activities—contained information regarding but one British spy:

  The agent TRICYCLE has now returned from visiting his masters in Lisbon. He has once more succeeded in convincing them of his complete reliability and has extracted from them a large sum in dollars as an advance against future services. So far as the Germans knew, his reason for visiting Lisbon was that he is acting as the organiser of an escape route on behalf of the Yugoslav Government. This undertaking has now the cordial support of the German Secret Service, who hope to use it as a means of reinforcing their net-work in England. In practice, however, the effect will be the opposite, since the escapers are selected in London and sent from Yugoslavia by TRICYCLE’s brother, DREADNOUGHT. . . . Apart from his work for German Military Intelligence, TRICYCLE has now also established a connection in Himmler’s organisation [SD] to whom he has delivered a political questionnaire. . . . They appear to have the highest opinion of him and are taking steps to ensure that his work for them remains unknown to his other German masters.

  It was almost too good to be true.

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  That afternoon in Lisbon, Aloys Schreiber called Jebsen and asked him to stop by Schreiber’s office at six o’clock to go over details of the decoration. He asked Johnny to bring along his friend and houseguest, Moldenhauer, so that they could go over that agent’s previous mission. Jebsen and Moldenhauer arrived at six and after a brief discussion, Aloys called Johnny into another room.

  Earlier in the day, Dr. Schreiber had run two errands—to the pharmacy and to a variety store to purchase two large trunks.

  25

  D-DAY

  On April 30, 1944, Station X intercepted and translated a German message from Berlin to Lisbon:

  Extreme caution in flip matters. In particular whatever the course of events, WALL (Abwehr) must be prevented from learning of the collaboration planned.

  On May 4 they captured another. This one, “Most Secret,” from Berlin to Biarritz:

  As special machine cannot be provided to pick up J and W, they are to be sent to Berlin immediately under the closest supervision and with all measures for security. Responsible officer in charge is instructed to report time of arrival promptly so that they can be met at station in Berlin.

  The following day, May 5, Lisbon updated Berlin:

  FLIP taken by WALL to GEROLD (France) through BERN (Spain) on 29/4 as planned. . . . The fact that he has been taken has been kept absolutely secret. . . . The conversations we have had with FLIP served only the purpose of lulling him into a sense of security. QUETTING’S account of the agreement concerning FLIP reached between leiter STRAUCH . . . has naturally been kept secret. QUETTING requests you to arrange that FLIP is placed at HOFMEISTER’S disposal as soon as possible.

  Meanwhile, Ian Wilson met with Dusko on May 7 to give him a second letter from Johnny, and to tell him that MI6 Lisbon had just cabled: Jebsen missed his May 5 appointment and had not been at his house since April 29. Dusko could only wonder. It wasn’t like Johnny to miss a meeting, and he’d not said anything about going to Madrid or Paris. Suicide was out of the question, but maybe Johnny was spooked and went to ground. Or maybe he had gone to Biarritz after all and had no time to notify MI6.

  Dusko read the letter, touched by the close.

  28th April, 1944

  Dear Dusko,

  Last time already I could tell you that your standing in the eyes of the Abwehr was really what you wanted. I don’t remember if I pointed out that, in spite of the General Staff’s and Abw. I’s good opinion about your work, Department III still had some doubts about your genuineness.

  In the meantime your friend Schreiber had a conference with the III people in Spain for the purpose of calming them down and convincing them thattheir doubts were absolutely without any foundation. . . . So the new judgment of Department III is . . . that the last reports certainly proved the genuineness of Dusko. . . .

  A proof of the fact that Schreiber did not tell me stories is that I got another decoration and this time the K.V.K. First Class. First Class probably was given because you double-crossed them first-class! I feel a little bit ashamed of getting a decoration for the work you and Ian did. . . . I made up my mind to give it to Ian. . . . After all, he is an exceptional man and it is only in accordance with this that he, as a British intelligence officer, has the exceptional honour of getting a decoration with the swastika on it. . . .

  I hope you will give my love to all you can give it to without spoiling your, my, or anyone else’s cover. To you I can give my love anyhow, which I do. . . .

  Yours, as always,

  Johnny

  With Johnny’s disappearance and the assumption of foul play, J. C. Masterman circulated within B1A a memorandum entitled, “Effects of the Removal of ARTIST on Deception Plans.” He notified those receiving the document—Robertson, Marriott, Wilson, and Tomás Harris—that it was unknown why Johnny had fallen under suspicion. The assumption was that Johnny’s “unreliability” was due to his financial transactions, his “intrigues with the S.D.,” or his inquisitiveness regarding Brandes and OSTRO. “There is no proof that treason on the part of ARTIST in connection with TRICYCLE is part of the charge,” he wrote, but “under [torture] ARTIST may betray all.”

  Masterman suggested that the only way to find out if Dusko was compromised was to provoke a reaction through FREAK’s radio messages. If MI5 sent something to Belgrade regarding Yugoslav affairs, he thought, with a comment about TRICYCLE’s reliability, Berlin might bite.

  In the meantime, J.C. recommended that TRICYCLE continue to operate at a high level but avoid all questions dealing with Operation Fortitude. “Any change in his procedure would surely blow the whole network and expose most of our operations,” he warned. Masterman wondered aloud whether the other double-cross agents should continue deception efforts since if any were blown the Germans would read in reverse all radio traffic, collapsing the entire scheme.

  What the British had in their favor, however, was time.

  It would take considerable time, he figured, for the Germans “(a) to decide which of the agents were really controlled and which were not; (b) to decide which parts of their reports were true and which false; (c) to deduce therefrom what we wish [them to] believe.”

  Masterman’s recommendation was that if the situation had merely deteriorated, the double agents could be used to “fill the German mind with confusion” rather than pitch a complete deception plan. On the other hand, if TRICYCLE and GARBO were blown, British Intelligence would have to shut down all agents shortly before D-Day.
With the exception of Tommy Harris, GARBO’s supervisor, everyone agreed that Masterman’s observations and suggestions were on target. In a rebuttal to Robertson and Marriott that same day, Harris made his case.

  MI5 had totally missed the radio traffic suggesting that ARTIST would be kidnapped, Harris wrote, and, like Jebsen, had felt that there was no danger from the Gestapo or the SD. In fact, he went on, the kidnapping “was put into operation the same night that our confidence in him was at its height.” Illustrating how badly British Intelligence had misinterpreted the situation, Tommy added: “MS.S. [Most Secret Sources] appeared to support ARTIST’s belief that SCHREIBER was his ally and was fighting his battles against the suspicions of High Command, the Abwehr and the S.D. whereas SCHREIBER was in fact the man chosen to carry out his kidnapping.”

  In short, Harris didn’t trust the Double-Cross Committee or B1A to determine whether GARBO had been blown, or would be blown. Tommy had his own idea. If MI5 decided to use GARBO “for the purpose of further implementing FORTITUDE, a task on which to date he has hardly embarked . . . I consider he could only be so used with any degree of safety” if radio traffic—which could be proved untrue—was sent through TRICYCLE, while counter-balancing traffic—which could be proved true—was sent by GARBO.

  Without knowing whether Popov had in fact been blown, Harris was suggesting affirmative action to prove that agent IVAN was controlled in order to secure Pujol’s position. But if Berlin had proof that Popov was a double, Harris surely knew, Dusko could expect an assassination or kidnapping attempt if he left Britain.

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  On May 9 Station X intercepted another German signal from Lisbon to Berlin:

  DORA has arrived.

  Connecting this message to earlier ones, the code breakers at Bletchley Park notified Wilson the next day to tell him of DORA and the “J” and “M”* message. Ian drafted two quick memoranda to Robertson, Masterman, and Marriott, pointing out that in Johnny’s last meeting with MI6, on April 28, Jebsen had mentioned that Moldenhauer was staying with him. Moldenhauer was the “M” of the message, Wilson assumed, and presumably had been kidnapped as well. Because Moldenhauer knew about Johnny’s true intentions, Ian warned, his abduction doubled the exposure of GARBO and the TRICYCLE net.

  Since Popov couldn’t know about “Most Secret Sources”—ULTRA—Ian was in the awkward position of keeping from Dusko knowledge that Johnny was in a Berlin prison. So far as Popov knew, Jebsen had simply missed his appointment. The dilemma that had to be decided by B1A and coordinated with Dusko, Wilson pointed out, was how agent IVAN should handle receipt of the $75,000. The Abwehr had not mentioned the money in their last radio messages and perhaps were waiting, too, to see if Jebsen had passed it along before the kidnapping. If they knew Johnny had sent it, they would expect Popov to reply with confirmation. But if Dusko signaled receipt and Jebsen had given the Abwehr no indication of handing it off, Popov’s cover would be blown. It was a bit of a coin flip, but Ian figured that from the German viewpoint, Popov would not have known of Jebsen’t receipt of the money. For the time being, MI5 would not mention the money in IVAN’s radio traffic.

  With D-Day looming, and the prospect of Dusko’s cover hanging in the balance, Wilson and MI5 could only wait. The following day Ian received evidence that his assumption was correct. Frank Foley notified him that MI6 had no indication from Johnny that—from the German perspective—he was to have notified IVAN of receipt of the money. Dusko could make no reference to funds, then, unless the Abwehr mentioned it first.

  That afternoon the Germans played their hand. MI6 Lisbon informed London that a Gaspar de Oliviera, a senior officer within the espionage section of the PVDE, had asked the British for information about Dusko Popov. Frank Foley assumed the inquiry was on behalf of the SD and asked Tar how he wished to respond. Robertson suggested playing it by the book: Popov visited Portugal from time to time as a Yugoslav diplomatic courier, and the Passport Control Office had been instructed to give him a visa to the UK upon application.

  On May 12 an SIS agent repeated to Oliviera, through a local contact, the innocuous information. The Germans were waiting. No sooner than the contact had recited Popov’s role as a Yugoslav diplomat, Oliviera handed him a report.

  It indicated that Dusko was either a British or Russian agent.

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  As of mid-May, Dusko knew nothing about Johnny’s imprisonment, or the “British or Russian agent” report. Unable to determine Johnny’s fate or whereabouts, Dusko’s thoughts turned to his brother. On May 17 he told Ian that if MI5 didn’t have immediate use for him, he’d be prepared to parachute into Yugoslavia to try to contact Ivo, or at least find out if Ivo was still free in Belgrade. B1A declined. The TRICYCLE net was moving ever closer to the German furnace and Popov wouldn’t be the bellows.

  About this time, one of General Mihailovic’s sources notified MI6 that FREAK had been charged with “accusations.” Until British Intelligence could determine his status, Robertson felt, Dusko’s radio would have to fall silent. Wilson allowed a few messages on May 18, but the next scheduled transmission, on the twenty-second, would not be sent. With D-Day two weeks away, the radio dialogue was delicate, and Ian decided that silence would trigger the least consequences.

  Days later, on May 25, General Eisenhower’s office called. A Colonel H. N. H. Wild from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHEAF) sent a note to Colonel Robertson asking if Tar would let him know how TRICYCLE would be used after D-Day, “in the event of no further evidence coming to light.” Tar put off responding to Colonel Wild, and it was fortuitous; further evidence did come to light. On May 28 Robertson received MI6’s translation of the Lisbon secret police report. It contained numerous red flags about the bon vivant diplomat:

  Said to be a lawyer. . . . Is attaché in the Yugoslav Foreign Office with residence in London. Often travelled between Lisbon and Madrid, and his own Legation was doubtful as to his real nationality. Suspected of being Bulgarian or Russian (according to whether his name spelt with “ov” or “off”). Visa granted by authority of the Portuguese Embassy in London marked “in transit for Egypt” where he did not go. His interests are in Lisbon and Madrid, and it cannot be ascertained whether he is a British or Russian agent. . . .

  His category of attaché alone surely does not permit him to live in expensive apartments at the Hotel Aviz or at the Palacio Hotel Estoril. He gives us the impression of belonging to some secret organization with branches in Lisbon and Madrid. It is known that he has close connection in Lisbon with the BAILONI’s [sic]. . . . They receive no official subsistence but live in great luxury giving expensive receptions and dinners attended by diplomats and military attachés. . . . One of the daughters left for Lisbon under the subject’s influence. The mother and the remaining daughter installed themselves at the Quinta dos Grilos at Carnaxide.

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  Dusko’s status as a bona fide German agent was hanging by a thread, and Tar, understandably, folded the intelligence tent. In a letter back to Eisenhower’s office on the twenty-eighth, Robertson told Colonel Wild, “I am not in a position to prepare an appreciation on the employment of TRICYCLE after D. Day, nor indeed do I think any useful purpose would be served were the preparation of such an appreciation to be possible.”

  Days before D-Day, then, neither the British nor the Americans knew the status of TRICYCLE. Only one person knew Popov’s true position—whether the Germans still believed in him—and whether the lies about the invasion pitched by him would hold.

  Johnny.

  Around this time, Popov remembered, Robertson and Wilson stopped by the Clock House. “Dusko, Artist has been arrested,” Tar said. “Jebsen was kidnapped by the Gestapo. . . . They invited him to tea at the embassy and put knock-out drops in it. Then he was given an injection, placed in a large trunk, and driven that way to Madrid in a motorcar with diplomatic plates. From there he was taken to Biarritz and then fl
own to Berlin. He’s in the Gestapo prison in Prinz-Albrechtstrasse.”

  Robertson’s information was mostly correct, although there was no banquet and the knock-out occurred differently. When Dr. Schreiber called Jebsen into a separate room on April 30,* Aloys testified after the war, he told Johnny that he had orders to conduct him to Berlin—by force—since Jebsen had refused to attend the Biarritz meeting. Johnny bolted for the door, Schreiber said, and Aloys caught him and knocked him out. Meanwhile, another agent—Karl Meier—overpowered Moldenhauer in the adjoining room. When Johnny recovered, Schreiber told both men how he planned to sneak them across the border, and according to Aloys, both men submitted (perhaps at gunpoint) to an injection.

  With Jebsen and Moldenhauer drugged and sleeping inside ventilated trunks, the kidnap party left Lisbon at 9:00 p.m. and crossed into Spain sometime after midnight. The following day they crossed the French border, also about midnight. A day or so later, Jebsen and Moldenhauer were flown from Biarritz to Berlin in Colonel Hansen’s personal plane.

  When Dusko heard Tar’s report, he knew Jebsen’s fate; Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse was notorious for torture and execution.

  “He won’t talk, not Johnny.”

  Wilson chimed in, saying that at the moment Lisbon believed the net was not compromised. The Gestapo had taken Jebsen in because of his financial dealings, but Johnny was under “reinforced interrogation.” If Jebsen talked, Wilson warned, Dusko and every agent Jebsen had passed to him would be blown; the entire Operation Fortitude deception would go by the board.

  Robertson could take no chances. Dusko and MI5 simply had to wait and see how the Germans responded.