World on Fire World on Fire World on Fire

by Amy Chua

  In addition to wealthy white former colonialists, Africa is also full of successful and in some cases market-dominant African minorities. This often comes as a surprise to Americans, who, because of the reality of our own inner cities, tend to associate “African” and “minority” with “poverty” and “economic backwardness.” But throughout Africa, for usually hotly disputed reasons, some indigenous ethnic groups have consistently prospered more than others.

  Kenya’s Kikuyus, who are concentrated in the fertile Central Province and the capital city Nairobi, provide a typically complicated example. The Kikuyus are a minority in the sense that they represent roughly 22 percent of the population. On the other hand, out of Kenya’s approximately forty African ethnic groups, the Kikuyu are numerically the largest. (Kenyans do not use the term “ethnic group,” preferring instead the English word “tribe” or its Swahili equivalent kabila.) Next in size are the Luhya, with around 14 percent of the population, the Luo (13 percent), and the Kalenjin (12 percent).

  As is often the case with ethnic statistics, however, these figures are somewhat misleading because there are cross-cutting cleavages within ethnic groups as well as complex, opportunistic relations between members of different ethnic groups. The Kalenjin, for example, comprise several smaller groups; President Moi belongs to one such group, the Tugen. Similarly, the Kikuyu, the powerful group of Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, embraces two highly competitive factions: the Kiambu Kikuyu and the Nyeri Kikuyu.14

  Despite these important qualifications, it remains the case that the Kikuyu view themselves, and are perceived by other Kenyans, as a distinct and distinctly successful group. Before colonization, Kikuyu territory stretched from Nairobi to the slopes of Mount Kenya. The British expropriated their land in order to produce cash crops (especially tea and arabica coffee), at the same time displacing nomadic groups like the Kalenjin, the Turkana, and the Maasai. Forcefully evicted from their homes, the Kikuyu became laborers and domestic servants on European farms or found employment in the cities. Many Kikuyu believe that as a group they suffered disproportionately under British colonization. Many non-Kikuyu disagree. In any event, as early as the 1920s, while the country was still under British rule, the Kikuyu emerged as a disproportionately urban, “capitalist” elite among Kenya’s indigenous tribes. The Kikuyu were also the driving force behind the country’s independence movement. In the fifties, the Mau Mau uprising was led principally by Kikuyu (although it was also a civil war among the Kikuyu), and as already noted, Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, was a Kikuyu.

  Under Kenyatta’s rule, which lasted between 1963 and 1978, the economic prominence of the Kikuyu intensified. In part this is because Kenyatta adopted ethnically biased economic policies blatantly favoring the Kikuyu, especially his own family members. One component of Kenyatta’s “Africanization” campaign, for example, was to transfer to the Kikuyu large tracts of the fertile, cash-crop-producing land formerly controlled by whites to the exclusion of other groups. By 1978, Kenya had developed an indigenous “capitalist bourgeoisie” that was predominantly Kikuyu.15 But the reasons behind Kikuyu economic success remain bitterly disputed.

  I recently posted on the web the following question: “Why have the Kikuyu been more economically successful than other Kenyans?” (In Kenya, the term “Kenyans” is still understood to mean black Kenyans.) Many Kenyans, including self-identified Kikuyus, Luos, and Kalenjin, responded. Here is a sampling of their comments.

  W: The Kikuyu, of which I’m one, have become successful economically due to various reasons. One, civilization came early to our community when the colonial settlers settled in our land and introduced the start of the Kenyan economy. Second, the Kikuyus have a different attitude. They like to invest and try ventures, however small they are. They believe that being a small business owner is better than being a manager here or there. . . . In my family, there is no one who is an employee. We believe that the worst offense you can do to yourself is to remain an employee. Rightly so, wealth is created by those who engage in business.

  K: IT IS OUT OF HARD WORK. HARD HARD WORK AND CONFIDENCE. THE SAME REASONS ALL OTHER PEOPLE BECOME STRONG ECONOMICALLY.

  S [responding to K]: You are a sick puppy. If I remind you of Kamaliza [a Swahili name for “exterminator” and a nickname used by some Kenyans to refer to President Kenyatta], you will realize that your fathers and mothers had an unfair advantage vis-à-vis other Kenyans. During Kenyatta’s reign, he transferred all the “white settlers” land to Kikuyus. Please don’t give me that BS of I work hard and own my own business. If you don’t care to learn history then stop spouting ignorance. . . . You should at the very least stop corrupting this media with misinformation. Please acknowledge the sins of your ancestors, then propose solutions. Non-Kikuyus sat on the sidelines while Kamaliza and his Kikuyu henchmen raped the country, denying other Kenyans jobs and land. We are all hard working folks and don’t think for a moment that your likes have cornered the market on success, by virtue of being Kikuyu.

  J: This is what you say to a stranger, with no idea about Kenya and how Kikuyus got wealthy! You say that Kikuyus were outright thieves?! Next time check your words!!! I insist, Kikuyus are not thieves. They were aided to their wealth, but nobody makes it to financial success without help. That is why banks offer loans. The difference is that Kikuyus appreciate the little they have and have a drive towards enterprising like no other tribe in Kenya. I was brought up by my aunt, she fed us by selling the local brew, and now she owns a restaurant!! Am I not allowed to be proud of that??? She was never a relation of a certain minister and neither did she finish her formal education!! . . . You being a Kenyan should have some sensitivity on what you write!!! The Kikuyu bashing has to stop!! I am tired of everyone picking on Kikuyus because we happen to be the first at the top!!!!!!

  S: What I am trying to tell your kinsmen is that hard work is not a genetic trait of Kikuyus only. . . . You have to accept facts such as outright stealing favoring Kikuyus that was perpetrated by Kamaliza henchmen—like the series of Kikuyu Governors and department heads that were in charge of the Central Bank. Moi and his henchmen [who are Kalenjin] may be stealing now, but is he doing anything different from what Kamaliza did? You don’t have to defend Kamiliza because you are a Kikuyu.

  P: Guys, calling each other names IS NOT going to resolve anything. I suggest you respect each others opinions or positions, and stick with ONLY THE FACTS.

  M: It is as simple as having self-determination and being afraid of poverty. To be poor means being hopeless to a Kikuyu. You are not accorded respect by other men. They can even swindle your wife, they regard you like garbage. These are some of the reasons that make Kikuyus economically strong. It is like part of a culture of the people. But not anymore, not under Moi.

  However contested the reasons, at least one basic fact is not: Among black Kenyans, deservedly or not, the Kikuyu have for generations been disproportionately wealthy. Even today under President Moi, who has openly pursued pro-Kalenjin policies, the Kikuyu continue to have an unusually solid business and middle class. Kikuyu elite remain the owners of large tracts of valuable land, much of it handed to them under Kenyatta. Of the few black members of the Muthaiga Club, almost all are Kikuyu, who are fighting tooth and nail to keep out the emerging new Kalenjin elite.

  The Market-Dominant Ibo of Nigeria

  The Kikuyu are by no means an exceptional case. Disproportionately successful African minorities can be found in virtually every corner of the African continent. The Ibo, known as the “Jews of Nigeria,” for example, are famous the world over for being an unusually driven and enterprising “trader” minority. Within Nigeria, Ibo subcommunities dominate key economic sectors. Ibo in Nnewi overwhelmingly control Nigeria’s auto parts industry. Ibo operating out of Aba specialize in shoes and textiles. Ibo in Onitsha have long operated the country’s long distance transportation sector. (The Onitsha Market is the largest open market in Africa, perhaps in the world. Dominated
by Ibo, it has even inspired its own literature, the so-called Onitsha Market Literature: folk comedies, romances, poems, and plays, written by dozens of Nigerian writers living and working in Onitsha and published by printing houses in the marketplace.)16 Despite explicitly anti-Ibo economic policies in recent years, there is virtually no commercial sector in Nigeria without a strong Ibo contingent. “The Ibo are merchants,” a Nigerian lawyer explained to me. “They sell practically anything—electronics, clothing, tires, mattresses, you name it.”

  As with the Kikuyu, there are different theories about the reasons for Ibo economic success. Non-Ibo groups in Nigeria will sometimes attribute Ibo success to corruption or crime. It is a fact that Ibos are disproportionately represented not only in legitimate trade but also in fraud and drug trafficking in Nigeria—although in part this might be because the Ibo have in recent years been shut out from legitimate economic sectors. (Ibos are thought to be at the center of the international advance-fee-fraud scams, more popularly known as 419, which bilk Americans out of about $100 million a year.) On the other hand, many Nigerians, especially Ibo, believe the explanation is genetic. Some have suggested that the Ibo are a lost tribe of Israel; this theory appears to have been discredited.

  Other theories emphasize the unusually open and “achievement-oriented” character of Ibo society; similar arguments have been made for the Kikuyu.17 In addition, like the Chinese or Koreans, the Ibo have sophisticated social networks that are almost impenetrable by outsiders. Moreover, the Ibo are in a sense immigrants even in Nigeria, and according to some this experience has contributed to a stronger “work ethic.” Because of overpopulation and infertile soil in Iboland, which is located in the southeast, many Ibo migrated to the urban centers of northern and western Nigeria. Like the Chinese in Southeast Asia then, the Ibo effectively became landless migrants, arguably with a survivalist work ethic and higher “tolerance” levels for suffering.18 In any event, there is no denying the bottom line. The Ibo are a disproportionately dynamic, urban, and prosperous minority—not just in Nigeria, but everywhere they go. In West Africa it is often said that the banks in countries like Benin or Côte d’Ivoire would collapse if the Ibo withdrew their deposits. In the United States there are strikingly successful Ibo communities in Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles, and other major cities.

  Indeed, not only the Ibo but other Nigerian ethnic groups like the Hausa and the Yoruba have become the preeminent petty traders of West Africa. While the far more lucrative import-export business is dominated by Lebanese with ties to the global marketplace (to be discussed below), a stroll through the alleyways of any West African market makes clear that most goods bought and sold by the “mama benzes” and “marché mamas” aren’t exactly part of the technologized global marketplace. Rather they’re the products of West African, and particularly Nigerian, industry.

  Nigeria is the economic powerhouse among the West African states, with a towering industrial leg up on the other countries in the region. In part because of this industrial head start, Nigerians dominate petty trading throughout the cities and villages of West Africa. It’s not unusual to find Ibo selling auto parts in the most remote village markets of Benin, Togo, or Burkina Faso. Ibo merchants travel with their goods, ferrying the products of the Nigerian auto parts industry across the West African bush because they have the contacts, know the terrain, and can do it most cheaply.

  In the stalls of Marché Dantokpa in Cotonou, Benin, one is more likely to hear the merchants speaking Pidgin English, Ibo, or Yoruba (another Nigerian language) than French, the national language of Benin, or Fon, the language of the ethnic majority. The spillover from Nigerian industry ultimately ends up in markets like Dantokpa, not quite global but regional in reach, where the local equivalent of the Western-educated MBA is the Nigerian with family contacts on both sides of the border who uses her familiarity with the corrupt and often dangerous Nigerian highway to her advantage. At Dantokpa’s taxi station, cars leave regularly for Nigerian border towns, Lagos, and beyond. The Nigerians return burdened with cheap goods that eventually make their way, usually through Nigerian hands, to the smallest market towns in West Africa. Indeed, while West Africa has not yet undergone the homogenization (with an American face) caused elsewhere by global markets, it has seen a regional homogenization (with a Nigerian face): There may not be a McDonald’s on every corner, but in every West African market Nigerians sell the same goods from the same factories at the same prices. Hence, the ubiquitous plastic African sandals and housewares decorated with the faces of former Nigerian strongmen.

  The global marketplace has so far had minimal effects in West Africa, benefiting principally European and Lebanese expatriates and local political elites. But indigenous West Africans are connected in a vibrant regional marketplace, dominated by the Ibo and other ethnic groups from Nigeria. These groups have created ethnic enclaves in the region’s major cities that tend to be more ostentatious than the other neighborhoods, earning Nigerians a reputation as fierce hagglers and crafty traders. While wealth inequality is already stark in many cases, as globalization finally reaches African shores the disparities are likely to grow, enriching these groups that already know how to manipulate the markets.

  The “Ibo of Cameroon” and

  Other Successful Indigenous African Minorities

  In the same half-admiring, half-insulting way that the Ibo are called the “Jews of Nigeria,” the “aggressive and commercially vigorous” Bamiléké are known as the “Ibo of Cameroon.” Even before independence in 1960 the Bamiléké had come to dominate petty trading, retail, and transportation in Douala, Cameroon’s largest city and principal port. Today, the Bamiléké—the so-called “merchant tribe of Cameroon”—control most of the country’s commerce (except possibly in East Cameroon, where, historically, Ibo immigrants from Nigeria dominated). In addition to owning luxury hotels, breweries, clothing stores, and other large businesses in the major cities, small Bamiléké communities operate the local grocery stores and mom-and-pop businesses in almost every town. The Bamiléké are also the country’s financiers. Through a robust nationwide network of interest-bearing tontines, or local lending associations, the Bamiléké operate an informal capital market so efficient it constantly threatens to put government-owned banks out of business.19

  There are many other disproportionately wealthy black minorities throughout Africa, each with a different, complex story—some with horrible endings. In tiny Rwanda, the Tutsi minority were historically not particularly “entrepreneurial,” but they were a cattle-raising elite who for four centuries (the last one under Belgian colonial rule) dominated economically and politically over the country’s 80 percent Hutu majority. Meanwhile, in neighboring Burundi, where they comprise roughly 14 percent of the population, the Tutsi still control approximately 70 percent of the country’s wealth. Burundi’s capital Bujumbura—the only city and the only pocket of wealth in the country—is known as Tutsi Tinsel Town.20

  In Ethiopia, Eritreans long constituted a starkly successful merchant class, concentrated mainly in Addis Ababa. The examples get more obscure, but the pattern is the same. In Togo, the Ewe—fortuitous beneficiaries of a missionary education—were an economically advanced minority favored first by German and later by French colonialists. In Guinea, the 20 percent Susu are a disproportionately educated, economically (and at present politically) powerful tribe. In Uganda, the Baganda minority dominated economically over the rest of the country even before the British employed them to help rule the country. In Tanzania, the brown-toothed Chagga minority—the brown water they drink is staining—live on the fertile slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro and are not only wealthy coffee farmers but flourishing businessmen and bureaucrats.21

  With varying degrees of intensity, all of these African groups have been the objects of widespread resentment. In Uganda, for example, the politically dominant groups of the north have repeatedly subjected the economically powerful Baganda of the south to bloody purges. In Nigeria in 1966
, tens of thousands of Ibo were slaughtered indiscriminately by furious mobs. In Ethiopia, the relatively prosperous Eritreans were recently expelled en masse. In Cameroon, “la Probleme Bamiléké” has been called “the most critical source of inter-ethnic tension” in the country today, with hostility seething among Cameroon’s two hundred other tribes and even priests lashing out against Bamiléké “exploitation” of “the weak and the poor.”22 Finally, in Rwanda, the genocidal massacre of the Tutsi minority is inextricably connected with their historic economic dominance.

  The Indians of East Africa

  and the Lebanese of West Africa

  Most of the disproportionately wealthy African minorities discussed above do not dominate their respective economies to anywhere near the extent that, say, the Chinese do in Southeast Asia or whites do in southern Africa. (The Bamiléké in Cameroon and the Tutsi in Burundi may be exceptions.) Indeed, their relative advantage vis-à-vis other indigenous groups often pales by comparison to the much starker market dominance of nonindigenous ethnic minorities—not only descendants of former European colonizers but also so-called entrepreneurial “pariah” minorities such as Indians and Lebanese.