Cold War Hot: Alternate Decisions of the Cold War

by Tsouras, Peter

  Regardless of the actual cause of the event, what occurred is not in doubt. Two Goa missiles roared off the bow of the Soviet ship and hit the America, steaming 1,500 yards away. One missile hit an A-4 Skyhawk on the deck, detonating it and its armament. The other plowed into America’s hangar deck, setting off a series of explosions and a huge fire.

  The Cold War had turned suddenly hot.

  Background

  By 1967, the Cold War had been going on for more than 20 years. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it had been a difficult time. They were just now emerging from the Stalin and Khrushchev eras that had put them militarily and economically behind the West.

  Adding to their discouragement was a series of setbacks for the international communist movement. The United States had intervened in Vietnam, forestalling a promising takeover of the South. Communist forces in the Congo had been defeated. Several leftist leaders had been removed: Sukarno of Indonesia, Ben Bella of Algeria, and Nkrumah of Ghana. More recently, in April 1967, the left wing government of Greece had been overthrown. Worse, however, was the continuing dispute with the Communist Chinese over the philosophical and international leadership of the movement.

  The only place in the world that seemed to be going the Soviet way was in the Middle East. Problems and mistakes made by the West had opened the door for the Soviets in 1955 when they concluded an arms deal with the Egyptians. Their status improved dramatically when the United Kingdom, France and Israel had combined to attack Egypt in 1956 over the Suez Canal. The Soviets had become the major supporters of several key Arab states since that time, most notably Egypt and Syria.

  Egypt interested the Soviets on a global level. Through that country, they had a friendly association with an Arab leader of international stature, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, giving them political access to Africa and the Arab world. This access gave them the potential to affect a region crucial to the West, due to the region’s oil reserves. Although their chief nemesis, the United States, was not dependent on Arab oil, the Americans’ European allies obtained 80 percent of their oil from the Middle East.1 Their interest in Syria was primarily national, adding to the security of their southern flank.

  With their influence in the region on the upswing, the Soviets naturally looked to this area for a chance to embarrass, defeat, or at least degrade the West, and especially the United States.

  For the United States, international stability was the chief goal in 1967. Americans, too, felt that they were losing the Cold War. Economic woes and political squabbling were adversely impacting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). West Germany found itself unable to purchase new weapons or pay for the upkeep of its allied defenders. Great Britain was having to shift forces from east of Suez to meet its NATO commitments. And the year before, France had pulled out of full military participation in the alliance.

  In addition to these problems, communist insurgencies were springing up virtually worldwide, especially in Latin America. Communist-inspired riots disrupted Hong Kong. And the morass of Vietnam, despite 460,000 American troops, seemed no closer to a resolution, much to the growing displeasure of the American people.

  The Middle East, as noted above, was important to the West, and United States’ policy in the region was quite complex. It had brokered the deal that “settled” the Suez War, and established what came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, committing the United States to “preserve the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East” against aggression by anyone. Ties with conservative Arab regimes such as those of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait were pursued, along with substantial support for Israel. The chief problem in the region for the USA, other than the Soviet presence, was the declining relationship with the Egyptians. That relationship had been improving under President John F. Kennedy, but suffered under President Lyndon Johnson.

  There were many irritants between the two countries. America was unhappy with Nasser’s rhetoric and subversive actions against the conservative Arab regimes, including his backing of the revolution in Yemen.2 Nasser was unhappy with the American use of foreign aid, such as wheat and debt rescheduling, as a political lever. And there was clearly a personality conflict between the two presidents. The Egyptian leader distrusted Johnson for his pro-Israeli advocacy and his stand against Nasser’s brand of revolutionary Arab nationalism. Nasser felt certain Johnson was out to humiliate and destroy him personally.

  Unfortunately, the region, where the Soviets looked to turn their international fortunes around and the United States looked to maintain the status quo, was one of the most unstable in the world, fraught with internal and external strife among its nations, especially Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel.

  Egypt was in bad shape. Despite governmental stability—Nasser had been in power since 1952, although officially president only since 1956—the country stagnated under an enormous debt. Egypt owed more than $4.0 billion in foreign and domestic debt; international banks were no longer lending the country money, causing social programs to grind to a halt. Nasser’s overextended political and strategic commitments did not help. The war in Yemen, for example, tied down a large portion of Egypt’s military and cost nearly $60 million annually with no end in clear sight. Many of the problems in the region stemmed from Nasser’s personal quest for leadership in the nationalist Arab revolution. It put him at odds with most other Arab countries, as noted earlier.

  Syria had most of the same problems Egypt had and added extreme political instability to the mix. In its 21 years of independence, it had had 23 separate governments with eight military coups to make things more volatile. The last coup, in February 1966, saw the current leftist Ba’ath leadership take control, but they had already suffered two abortive coup attempts against them since taking power. Syria’s leaders tried to mask their instability with internal repression and an unrelenting focus on external enemies, especially Israel and the United States. The Syrians backed the Palestinian organization Fatah,3 including support for its raids across the border into Israel. Harsh rhetoric attacked Jordan and Egypt for cowardice in not supporting armed attacks against the Jewish state.

  The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was relatively stable, but it was the weakest of the three Arab states neighboring Israel. Under the rule of King Hussein bin Talal since 1953, the small country differed from the other two because of its considerable dependence on Western economic and military support. Its territories west of the Jordan River, commonly called the West Bank, virtually surrounded the split city of Jerusalem and made Jordan vulnerable to conflicts with Israel, which coveted the area. Its moderate stance toward the Jewish state and its western ties put Hussein and his country at odds with Syria and Egypt.

  And then there was Israel. The state was formed after the Palestine Partition plan, adopted by the United Nations on November 29, 1947, divided the old British mandate for Palestine into a Jewish state, Arab state, and the open city of Jerusalem. The United Nations plan started an armed conflict between Jewish settlers in the Mandate and their Arab neighbors. Israel declared independence on May 14, 1948, which resulted in an immediate invasion by Arab forces from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. United Nations intervention forced one cease-fire, but renewed fighting broke out. Against the fractured and uncoordinated Arabs, Israel actually gained territory before the fighting was stopped again. Significantly, no Arab Palestinian state was ever formed.

  In the intervening years, sporadic fighting continued, including the Suez War, which saw Israel take most of the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. Peace negotiations after that war gave back most of Israel’s territorial gains in exchange for guarantees from the United States. In 1965, Arab terrorist (or freedom fighter, depending on the outlook) raids across the border began and increased in intensity and ferocity. Israeli requests for UN action against the raiders and those that supported them were ineffective. Reprisal raids also failed to stop the attacks.4

  By mid-1967, Israel was caught in an economic re
cession and an internal debate on how to handle the Arab raids. The current dominant party in Israel’s Parliament, Mapai (Mifleget Poalei Eretz Israel or Israel Workers’ Party), led by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, favored a defensive strategy relying on deterrence with very specific events that would trigger military action. Mapam (Mifleget Poalim Hameuhedet or United Workers’ Party) supported military action only if the concrete support of a major power was obtained. Military activism, Mapam felt, would inevitably lead to placing Israel in the middle of the Cold War. Other parties, like Herut (Tenuat Haherut or Freedom Movement) demanded the government occupy territory to halt the raids and liberate all the lands of ancient biblical Israel.5

  In the increased tensions of the region, all sides looked to their armed forces to provide security and deterrence. Egypt had the largest armed forces in the Middle East, equipped exclusively by the Soviet Union. The Egyptian military had some 210,000 troops backed by 1,300 tanks (including some 450 of the Soviet T-54/55 main battle tanks with 100mm cannon), and over 400 combat aircraft. Of particular concern to the Israelis were the 30 Tu-16 medium bombers in Egypt’s arsenal. This twin-engined subsonic bomber was capable of carrying a 9,000kg payload or two standoff Kennel missiles, each with a 1,000kg warhead. To Israel’s north, Syria could muster 63,000 troops with 750 tanks and 127 aircraft, including 15 Tu-16s. In November 1966, Egypt and Syria momentarily put their animosity aside and signed a Soviet-sponsored defense pact, agreeing to work together in the event of an Israeli attack. However, the two countries disagreed on exactly what would constitute an “attack.” Thus the pact was more show than reality. To the east, Jordan fielded ten brigades with 50,000 infantry and 280 US M48 Patton and British Centurion tanks.

  To deter this multi-directional threat, a fully mobilized Israel could field 250,000 troops, 1,000 tanks, mostly M48s, Centurions and retooled Shermans, and about 300 combat aircraft, primarily French built Mirages and Super Mystères.

  On April 7, 1967, a small border clash near the Sea of Galilee escalated into an engagement between Israeli and Syrian tanks, artillery and aircraft, leading to the destruction of six Syrian MiGs and a flyover of Damascus by the victorious Israeli jets. The incident sparked a renewed attack by Syria on Egypt for not becoming involved to help its defense pact partner. The charge was echoed by Jordan, further embarrassing Nasser. The incident played a key role in the ensuing crisis.

  The April clash also triggered an internal crisis within Syria, threatening once again the Ba’ath government. Subsequent Soviet actions started a chain of events that threatened a world war.

  The Crisis

  The aftermath of the air clash over Syria provided the Soviets with an opportunity to help their Middle East clients and create another trouble spot for the West. Syria was again facing an internal crisis, and Israel was threatening major retaliatory action against them for continued Fatah raids. On May 13, 1967, through three different diplomatic channels, the Soviets warned Egypt’s government that Israel had massed significant forces on the Syrian border and was about to invade to overthrow its government.6

  Soviet leaders calculated they could heighten tensions enough to get the United States actively involved economically, politically and possibly even militarily, on the side of Israel, thus suffering a major loss of influence among the Arab nations. The fictitious threat would also allow Syria’s leaders to regain complete control of their country through an outside threat, deter Israel from any real plans against that country, and involve Egypt in a way that would enhance its Soviet ties. They calculated that the tensions should not result in a shooting war between Israel and the Arab nations, as had happened when the threat had been used before.7 But they were also confident that if fighting did break out, Arab military forces, with their Soviet equipment, could handle the armed conflict. Indeed, a hard-fought Arab loss could make Nasser even more dependent on Soviet aid and less hostile to communism.8 Finally, they were certain that the tensions would not bring US and Soviet forces into direct conflict.

  Nasser reacted strongly to the information. Without waiting for proof that the threat actually existed, he ordered troops into the Sinai to threaten Israel’s southern border. Some of his immediate reaction was based on the charges of cowardice that his Arab neighbors had been leveling at him after the April clash over the Sea of Galilee. Advance troops were on their way the following day, with an armored division right behind.

  The Israelis reacted moderately. They denied the accusation—a denial backed up publicly by UN observers—and offered to take their Soviet Ambassador on a tour of the suspected concentration sites. The Soviets turned down the offer, stating baldly that they knew what they knew and did not need proof.

  By May 16, Egypt had 30,000 troops and 200 tanks in the Sinai. Israel limited its own military movement as it felt the Egyptian force was purely defensive and was no immediate threat. Arabs outside Egypt, however, reacted jubilantly—accolades from other governments poured in, and the Arab media blared approbation of Nasser’s move.

  Fueled by the accolades and exhilarated by his sudden rise to heroic stature, Nasser made an impulsive decision on May 16 to demand that the United Nations Emergency Force withdraw from its positions. The UNEF had been patrolling the Sinai since the Suez War as a deterrent to renewed fighting. In making this decision, Nasser did not discuss it with any of his high level advisors nor did he discuss it beforehand with his Soviet sponsors.

  UN Secretary-General U Thant, in a very controversial decision,9 sent the order to pull out to his commander in the field, Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye, who began the UNEF withdrawal on May 19. By that time the Egyptian force in the Sinai had grown to 70,000 troops and 700 tanks. The UNEF withdrawal and the size of the Arab force created the potential for offensive action against Israel, which responded to the threat by mobilizing its military.

  The Soviets were surprised by Nasser’s order to the UNEF and somewhat discomfited by the growth in the military forces facing each other. But the crisis was still within the limitations they had planned and their primary target, the United States, was starting to take serious notice of the situation. President Johnson and his administration had limited themselves to simple messages of restraint to both sides early in the crisis. But with the withdrawal of the UNEF, they began to watch the region more carefully.

  Egypt continued to put troops into the Sinai and by May 22 had four full divisions at the border. With no overt Israeli reaction, other than mobilization, and continued adulation from Arab countries, Nasser moved impulsively again. Assuming the United States was too involved in Vietnam to take any role in the Middle East and assuming Israel would not act for fear of the Soviet Union, on May 23, he announced that the Strait of Tiran was closed to Israeli shipping and strategic goods.

  The Strait of Tiran was an 800–1,000 yard channel lying between Egypt and two rocky islands, Tiran and Sarafir, at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba. The gulf itself was 100 miles long and ended at the Israeli port of Eilat. Although it had been 18 months since an Israeli flagged ship had passed the Strait, Eilat did contribute some $3 million in monthly imports and exports to the Israeli economy, representing about 5 percent. However, nearly 90 percent of Israel’s oil imports, an obvious strategic commodity, came through the Strait.

  But closure of the Strait was more of a political challenge than an economic one to the Israelis. The blockade of the Strait had been a significant cause of Israel joining with Britain and France in the Suez War and its opening had been the only real result that had remained of Israel’s victory over Egypt in that conflict. Golda Meir, in a 1957 speech to the United Nations, had stated baldly that:

  “Interference by armed forces with ships of the Israeli flag exercising free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and through the Strait of Tiran will be regarded by Israel as an attack entitling it to exercise its inherent right of self defense… and take all measures as are necessary.”

  Nasser’s action caught everyone by surprise, especially the Soviets.
But he had not simply triggered a potential casus belli for the Israelis; he had changed the complexion of the crisis for the United States. The US had virtually guaranteed free passage of the Strait in the settlement of the Suez War. Johnson assumed that the Egyptians were acting under direct orders from the Soviets and sent a strongly worded message to President Kosygin on May 23, stating that the “blockade is an extremely grave matter, challenging the commitment of the United States and would be met with its fullest opposition.”

  In fact the commitment of the United States was anything but clear. The Eisenhower Doctrine, established in 1958, had committed the United States to maintaining the territorial integrity of all Middle East nations against aggression. An aide-memoire in February 1957 promised force if US ships were denied free passage of the Strait, but only to join with others to defend the rights of other nations’ ships. Complicating the matter even more was the fact that, although America had written defense agreements with 42 other nations, it did not have such an agreement with Israel. All that was recognized was a strong moral commitment to the Jewish state.

  The closure of the Strait forced Israel into a major internal crisis. With a well-advertised casus belli in place, most Israelis demanded military action, if only to make their military deterrence credible. Eshkol, and especially Foreign Minister Abba Eban, disagreed, feeling Israel needed to secure Western support first. Grudgingly, the rest of the cabinet went along. Eban left for the Western capitals that day.

  Eban’s trip was just one of the major diplomatic moves being made by all sides. U Thant met with Nasser and Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad. Both Egyptians stressed that closure of the Strait removed the last vestige of Israel’s 1956 aggression and was an action well within their rights since they considered themselves at war with Israel. Nasser, however, agreed in principle to a two-week moratorium on enforcing the blockade to allow negotiations to proceed. US Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson and retired Ambassador Charles “Yost, sent by President Johnson, heard much the same thing.