The Plantagenets: History of a Dynasty

by J. S. Hamilton

  Despite his absence, tensions between the king and his magnates remained high. Tournaments were banned and, in November, the king felt it necessary to send letters to six of the earls, specifically forbidding them to come to parliament in arms. In order to quell rumours, apparently widely circulated, that the favourite had not actually abjured the realm, the king commissioned two of the Ordainers, Hugh de Courteney and William Martin, to search for Gaveston in the south west. In fact, he was certainly gone, but it was not long before he reappeared in England. Although some of the chronicles date his return to Christmas 1311, Gaveston’s actual return took place in January 1312, and the reason for his illicit return was almost certainly the birth of his only legitimate child, a daughter Joan, who was born to Margaret de Clare on 12 January in York.

  Regardless of the reasons for Gaveston’s return, his presence with the king could hardly do other than provoke another crisis. Edward himself sensed this, issuing letters on 18 January 1312, declaring Piers to be a good and loyal subject whose exile had been decreed in contravention of the laws and customs of the realm. On 20 January, Edward wrote to various sheriffs ordering the restoration of all the favourite’s former lands. These letters were followed by a remarkable memorandum entered by the clerk who drafted them and clearly considered them illegal: ‘that these writs were made in the king’s presence by his order under threat of grievous forfeiture, and that he retained them after they were sealed’.

  Despite Edward’s later order that the Ordinances be observed insofar as they were not prejudicial to the king, his disregard for the Ordinances was clear even to his own servants, let alone to his baronial enemies.

  The magnates were not slow to respond to the challenge issued by Gaveston’s restoration to favour. While Piers was fortifying himself in Scarborough Castle, an assembly took place at St Paul’s in March, at which Archbishop Winchelsey solemnly declared Gaveston’s excommunication in accordance with the terms of the Ordinances. According to the chronicler Trokelowe, Thomas of Lancaster was chosen as the leader of the opposition at this time, and the various earls and magnates were assigned specific tasks. Gloucester was given responsibility for securing the south of England, Hereford for the east, Lancaster for Wales and the west, and Robert de Clifford and Henry de Percy for the Scottish marches. Pembroke and Warenne were charged with arresting the favourite. Anyone transgressing the terms of the Ordinances was to be excommunicated. As has been rightly observed, ‘the coalition of Earls and clergy, led by Lancaster and Winchelsey, was now stronger than it ever had been before or ever would be again’. 11

  In April, the king and favourite were once again together, moving north to the presumed safety of Newcastle, where they remained for 3 weeks, the length of stay apparently dictated by the fact that Gaveston had fallen ill. The unexpected arrival of an army led by Lancaster, Percy and Clifford in early May forced a hasty retreat, first to Tynemouth, then on to Gaveston’s stronghold at Scarborough. In their headlong flight, Edward and Gaveston abandoned vast quantities of jewels, horses and arms (and, according to one account, even the pregnant queen).

  Although Lancaster certainly seized this royal treasure, the tradition that he consoled the abandoned queen is a fabrication, in which events relating to her later flight from the Despensers in 1321 are conflated with the events of 1312. In reality, the queen also abandoned her own goods at South Shields, and she quickly made her way back to the king, who had left Gaveston at Scarborough and travelled on to York.

  Edward’s decision to separate himself from the favourite was to prove disastrous. Without the king’s presence, the magnates felt no hesitation in besieging Scarborough. Despite royal orders to desist, they would not do so and, on 19 May, Gaveston surrendered himself to the earl of Pembroke. A term of 3 months was set for negotiations to take place between the king and his baronial opponents.

  Preliminary discussions at York were followed by summonses for a parliament to be held in Lincoln in July. This meeting never took place, however, as in the interim the earl of Warwick intervened, seizing Gaveston from the earl of Pembroke at Deddington in Oxfordshire. Early on the morning of 10 June, Gaveston was awakened to the cry of ‘Arise traitor, thou art taken’. He was transported to nearby Warwick Castle and, according to the Vita, cast into prison and bound in chains.

  A quickly assembled conclave of earls and barons, led by Lancaster, Warwick and Hereford, debated his fate, and in due course sentenced him to death without any semblance of an actual trial. The sentence having been pronounced, Gaveston was taken on the road to Kenilworth as far as Blacklow Hill, within the lands of the earl of Lancaster, and there beheaded by a pair of Welshmen.

  Although Gaveston had been the focal point of baronial discontent with Edward II’s rule, his death had only a limited effect on resolving tensions in the kingdom. It is true that several of the earls (Pembroke and Warenne, for instance) quickly returned to the king’s council, and that the earls of Gloucester and Richmond acted as negotiators between the king and the other earls (notably, Lancaster, Warwick, Hereford and Arundel). With assistance from mediators such as Louis of Evreux, two cardinals, and even a pair of French lawyers dispatched by Philip IV, negotiations proceeded. A tentative settlement was arranged in December 1312, and a final pardon to those involved in Gaveston’s execution was issued in October 1313. But, in reality, following Gaveston’s death, Edward and his opponents were irreconcilable. Agreements were seemingly made only to be broken and, in particular, the rift between the king and Lancaster, sometimes temporarily healed, was to last until the latter’s death in 1322. It is also worth adding here that Gaveston’s corpse, which had been taken from Blacklow Hill to Oxford and finally to the Dominican house at Langley, remained unburied.

  This indicates that although – or perhaps because – he was powerless to extract revenge on his enemies, Edward had not yet come to terms with the loss of his Gascon favourite. He would neither forgive nor forget.

  The birth of an heir, the future Edward III, on 13 November 1312 at Windsor, may have helped the king to assuage his bitterness towards his foes, and it certainly occasioned much joy throughout the realm. For instance, the London annals recount the elaborate pageant arranged for the queen by the fishmongers in the following February: they processed to Westminster, dressed in fine robes bearing the arms of England and France worked in gold, and preceded by an ingeniously contrived ship whose raised mast and sail also bore the royal arms displayed in a great variety of ways. Carolling, they then processed on horseback before the queen as she journeyed to the royal residence at Eltham. 12 But, if there was great joy at the birth of an heir, other matters weighed heavily, especially the situation in the north.

  Writing under the year 1311, the author of the Vita Edwardi Secundi offered the following observation: ‘He who hunts two hares together, Will lose now one, or else the other.’ The reference was to the king’s difficulty in protecting Gaveston, on the one hand, and establishing control over Scotland, on the other. The first hare was now irretrievably lost, but perhaps it was not too late to snare the other. So it was that Edward II undertook the largest military campaign of his reign.

  On the eve of the death of Edward I, the cause of Robert Bruce in Scotland was nearly extinguished, but the passing of the old king revived it. The first years of Edward II’s reign proved to be crucial, as late in 1307, in the absence of any English opposition, Bruce was able to march north along the line of the Great Glen successfully confronting his Scottish enemies such as John Comyn, earl of Buchan, and William, earl of Ross. While some of the responsibility for the consequent reversal of Bruce’s fortunes can be laid at the feet of Edward II, his prosecution of the war between 1307 and 1314 was not without determination; and if his efforts in Scotland were sporadic and inconsistent, so was the support he received from his magnates. Nevertheless, by 1307, Bruce had evolved a military strategy that proved difficult for the English to counter. One major aspect of this strategy was the ‘slighting’ of castles. The Edwardia
n military machine that had reduced Stirling Castle in 1304 made it untenable for the Scots to base a defensive strategy on the possession of castles. Bruce, therefore, had destroyed his own castles at Ayr and Dumfries in 1306; his ally James Douglas of Douglasdale followed suit in 1308. Not only did the destruction of castles deny shelter and forward bases to the English, it also forced Scottish lords to choose sides, unable to sit behind the relative security of their own castle walls. Local communities, beginning in Galloway but spreading throughout Scotland and later northern England, shorn of even the limited security of these castle walls, were viciously harried and forced to pay protection money to Bruce, money used to fund the low-level guerrilla warfare that characterized these years.

  An English expedition was not forthcoming in 1308 because of the political upheaval that surrounded the coronation and Gaveston’s return into exile. In the absence of meaningful English opposition, Bruce was able to seize the north-eastern port of Aberdeen, while his allies ravaged Galloway and massacred the English garrison of Robert Clifford at Douglas in Lanarkshire. In fact, the English did not mount a Scottish campaign until 1310–1311, and that campaign was itself undermined by the continuing political controversy that had by then resulted in the appointment of the Lords Ordainers. Not only did the Ordainers refuse to serve in person in this Scottish campaign, they viewed it as an oblique – if not direct – attack upon themselves. The threatened removal of the chancery, treasury and both benches to York, for instance, although it had been previously undertaken by Edward I, was now seen as an attempt to deny them the sort of expert assistance they required, not as an effort to shore up the military campaign in Scotland. Short on money, and with little to show for his efforts, in the summer of 1311 Edward abandoned the campaign, returning south in July. His withdrawal was followed almost immediately by savage Scottish raiding into northern England in August and again in September. In the following year, Bruce was able successfully to besiege Dundee and, in the confused situation that surrounded the pursuit, capture and execution of Gaveston, to march into England once more, burning Hexham and Corbridge, and raiding Durham.

  Throughout 1313 and into 1314, the northern counties of England bought truces from the Scots at very steep rates. Perth fell in January 1313, followed by Dumfries in the following month. During the summer of 1313, the Isle of Man was taken by the Scots. In the autumn of 1313, Robert Bruce boldly proclaimed that he would disinherit all those who did not come into his peace within 1 year.

  This fundamental threat to the remaining Scottish supporters of the English cause – dwindling fast as Roxburgh was lost in February 1314 and Edinburgh in March – and not just the specific threat to Stirling Castle, must be what finally provoked Edward II into mounting a new Scottish campaign.

  The army that Edward II raised in 1314 compared favourably with those of his father. Although exact numbers are impossible to calculate, a figure of 10,000 infantry supplemented by perhaps 2,000 cavalry is not unreasonable. Even without the personal participation of the earls of Lancaster, Warwick, Arundel and Warenne, who argued that the campaign was invalid, not having been decided upon in parliament as required by the Ordinances, the magnates of England were well represented. The king was accompanied by the earls of Gloucester, Pembroke and Hereford, as well as by numerous prominent knights, especially those from the king’s own household. The Scottish army at Bannockburn was composed primarily of infantry, and probably amounted to only about half the size of the English force, but they seem to have been well armed and, in the event, proved to be better disciplined than their English adversaries.

  The two armies met in the vicinity of Stirling, although the exact location of the battlefield is still the subject of debate. There is agreement that the field was bordered on one side by the trees of the New Park and on the other side by marsh.

  More questionable is whether or not Bruce had preselected the site of the battle, and having done so prepared the ground by having his men dig and cover pits in order to confound a cavalry charge. Most modern commentators agree that if Bruce did choose to give battle, in doing so he took an uncharacteristic risk. His decision to fight at Bannockburn certainly surprised the English.

  The English army had made good speed from Berwick to the neighbourhood of Stirling – too good according to the author of the Vita, who accuses the king of advancing ‘not as if he was leading an army to battle but as if he was going [on pilgrimage] to St James’s’. Having reached the vicinity of Stirling on the afternoon of Sunday 23 June and come into contact with the Scots, Edward must be faulted for his inability to establish and maintain an effective command structure within his army. Indeed, rather than instilling a united sense of purpose in his army, he sowed dissension among his commanders by naming the earl of Gloucester as constable in preference to the earl of Hereford, who was both hereditary constable of England and a more experienced soldier.

  In a series of preliminary encounters on the eve of the battle, the English fared poorly. The English vanguard encountered the Scots and made an undisciplined charge in which Sir Henry de Bohun very nearly ran down Robert Bruce, who instead clove the English knight’s head in two with his axe, greatly inspiring his soldiers through this act of personal courage and skill. In the ensuing disorder, the earl of Gloucester was unhorsed, and the English were forced to retreat, not without casualties. Meanwhile, another cavalry detachment, led by Sir Robert Clifford and Sir Henry de Beaumont, was heavily defeated by a Scottish schiltron under the command of the earl of Moray in a separate engagement near St Ninian’s kirk.

  The English army spent an uncomfortable night. Much of the army had not yet seen, let alone engaged, the Scots; but now they worried about a night attack, and attempted to make the best of the wet conditions in which they had bivouacked.

  Nevertheless, the English numbers were such that Bruce was reportedly planning a withdrawal until Sir Alexander Seton deserted the English cause, disgusted at the lack of discipline and leadership, and urged the Scottish king to attack the dispirited, and disorganized, English force. In the main battle on Monday morning, Edward II was amazed to see the Scottish schiltrons advance to offer battle.

  When the earl of Gloucester advised delaying the battle for a day, in order to rest the troops and horses, the king accused him of cowardice and treason. Stung by such criticism, Gloucester led the English vanguard in another impetuous charge against the Scottish spearmen. He was quickly cut off and just as quickly cut down. Joining him in death in this futile charge were the steward of the king’s household, Sir Edmund de Mauley, Sir Payn Tibetot, Sir Robert Clifford and Sir John Comyn, son and heir of Bruce’s murdered rival.

  A Scottish attack on the main English army also had devastating effects. The English archers, who had been unable to deploy on the Scottish flanks in time to be effective, were quickly dispersed by a cavalry charge. Soon the battle had become a mêlée and a rout. The earl of Pembroke, along with Sir Giles d’Argentein, compelled Edward to leave the field. Whatever else his failings as a commander on this day – and they seem to have been several – none could question his personal courage. Resisting the call to withdraw, he had one horse killed under him before his bodyguard could move him out of danger. Some 500 knights accompanied him to Stirling Castle, but he was denied entrance and was forced to make great haste on his way to Linlithgow and ultimately back to Berwick. Others were not so fortunate. The earl of Hereford, the earl of Angus and his kinsman Sir Ingram de Umfraville, Sir Maurice de Berkeley, Sir John de Segrave and Sir Anthony de Lucy, were all admitted to the castle but then betrayed and imprisoned at Bothwell Castle. They at least escaped with their lives, which was not the case for countless English soldiers, for the king’s withdrawal from the field had signalled a general panic and had transformed a defeat into a catastrophe.

  The author of the Vita compared the disaster at Bannockburn to that which had befallen the French a decade earlier at Courtrai, in the famous battle of the Golden Spurs. In fact, this was far more damaging fo
r, unlike Philip the Fair, who quickly avenged the death of Robert of Artois, Edward II was to prove unable to punish the Scots for his calamitous defeat. Although Edward would refuse to make peace and recognize Bruce’s legitimate right to rule in Scotland, the remainder of the reign saw military setbacks such as the loss of Berwick, near-continual Scottish raids in the north of England, and an inability to launch a major campaign north of the border.

  Perhaps the true impact of Edward II’s defeat at Bannockburn in 1314 can be measured by the subsequent burial of Piers Gaveston. Since 1312, his corpse had remained unburied at Langley. Part of the delay may have been occasioned by the matter of Gaveston’s excommunication under the terms of the Ordinances, but by the autumn of 1314 the king seems to have obtained a posthumous papal pardon for his favourite. More likely, the real reason for the delay was Edward’s reluctance to acknowledge the implications of Gaveston’s execution for his own royal authority. He was apparently biding his time until he could reassert his majesty and compel his enemies to witness the burial of Gaveston with all possible splendour and magnificence. Now such a revenge no longer seemed attainable.

  On 3 January 1315, the body of the late earl of Cornwall was finally interred. The service was presided over by the archbishop of Canterbury, Walter Reynolds, and attended by the bishops of Winchester, London, Worcester, and Bath and Wells. Fourteen abbots were present, as well as the king’s half-brother, the young earl of Norfolk, and the man who had inadvertently released Gaveston to his doom, the earl of Pembroke. Also present were the mayor of London, many royal officials and many household knights. Gaveston was dressed in cloth of gold at a cost of £300 and considerable sums were spent on food and wine for those present. But notably absent from the funeral were the men responsible for Gaveston’s death, particularly the earls of Lancaster, Warwick and Arundel. For the present, it appeared that the king would not be able to extract his vengeance. After the funeral, he withdrew from prominence, and the years that immediately follow are marked by the ascendancy, and failure, of Thomas of Lancaster.