Barracuda 945 (2003)

by Patrick Robinson

  "May we presume you would not wish our acquisition of a nuclear submarine to become public knowledge?"

  "You may, Admiral. I would not even want it to enter an Iranian port or any other Islamic port."

  "And I must also assume you are recommending we have an accomplice in this operation, another country whose facilities we can utilize."

  "Of course. And the nation to whom we should turn for help is obviously China."

  "Are you also suggesting we purchase a nuclear boat from them?"

  "No. They do not have one good enough for our purposes."

  "Have you made any kind of study of the possibilities?"

  "Yes, of course. And our options are very limited. We plainly can't buy from the West because they wouldn't sell. China does not yet have sufficient technology. Which leaves India, Pakistan, and Russia. India and Pakistan are too afraid of each other to sell anything as critical as a nuclear boat. Which leaves, all alone, Russia, which happily will sell just about anything to anyone."

  "That may be so," replied Admiral Badr. "But Russia is a very strong signatory to all aspects of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They were among the first to sign it back in 1968. They don't approve of nuclear tests, underground or underwater, they have always voted to limit the spread of nuclear weapons of any kind, and they have never gone back on that. They even made certain mat Belarus, Kazakstan, and the Ukraine signed up for the NPT.

  "Certainly they've never sold a nuclear submarine to anyone. Nor have any of the Big Powers, the U.S.A., Great

  Britain, and France. It would be an earthshaking move if they suddenly sold a nuclear attack submarine to Iran."

  "That would depend largely on how it was done," replied the General. "I think an element of subtlety might be in order. We would not be involved in any way."

  "That might be difficult," replied the Admiral.

  "That would depend on how hard we seek out the Achilles' heel of each party," said General Rashood. "Russia is easy. They need money desperately and will sell just about anything to get it. Their biggest customer by far is China. You may assume what China wants, with its big checkbook and smiling face, China will get.

  "Their Navy already has nuclear submarines, which will assuage Russian conscience. If we want to buy a submarine, China will have to do it for us."

  "And why should they?"

  "Well, I think we are China's Achilles' heel. It is very hard for her to refuse us for several reasons:

  1. China understands the advantages of a full-scale Sino-Iranian partnership, which is already in place because of

  the pipeline from Kazakstan to the Strait of Hormuz.

  2. China does not want to disturb that friendship with Iran, since we guard the gateway to the Gulf, and without

  our cooperation it would be difficult for them to operate their new Hormuz refinery efficiently.

  3. Their partnership with Iran provides an excuse for their warships to roam at will in the northern Arabian Sea

  and in the Gulf itself.

  4. There are many oil and gas contracts coming up in the next two years all around the Gulf, and China knows

  that with our support and influence they have a very good chance of landing them.

  5. Under American pressure, the Chinese reneged on their contract over the C-802 missile, which was supposed to be supplied to Iran. They are fervently hoping it has been forgotten. I think this might be an occasion for a

  timely reminder that Iran has not forgotten. And China most certainly owes the Islamic State a very big favor."

  The Ayatollah looked very thoughtful, reminded as he had been of the still-vexed and still-simmering bad feeling between the two nations over the C-802.

  This sleek, jet black, near supersonic cruise missile was built by the China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation. But for its range of a little over eighty miles, it relied on an excellent French-built engine, manufactured by Microturbo in Toulouse. The entire saga took place over several months, but Iran was counting on this Exocet look-alike, ultimately to threaten ships moving through the Strait of Hormuz to the Persian Gulf. The C-802 had the capacity to carry the most sinister types of warhead, and the Americans were pressuring China not to fulfill the orders from Tehran.

  But Iran had a contract, with heavy front money, and ended up raging at the Chinese Ambassador and anyone else who might have been able to unclog the deal. Communications between Tehran, Beijing, Hong Kong, Toulouse, and Washington were almost blocking the airwaves at the height of the dispute. The National Security Agency in Fort Meade was eavesdropping on everyone. Admiral George Morris's men were the only people who knew precisely what was happening.

  Nonetheless, China saw the danger in alienating the Americans, and over several months, despite a great deal of very nifty footwork claiming things were beyond their control, they elected not to fulfill Iran's order for the missile.

  Iran hit back by stripping down one of the C-802s they did own, and going in for a spot of "reverse engineering"— rebuilding it from scratch with parts they made themselves. Thereafter, Tehran clammed up, and it was assumed by all parties they had found a way to manufacture their own cruise missile, without further recourse to China National Precision Machinery.

  There had been a lot of bad blood and mistrust. It was China that wished to repair the damage, and General Rashood had pinpointed an area where the Dragon of the East might wish to ingratiate itself with the Ayatollahs, perhaps even make amends by acquiring a nuclear submarine for them.

  Admiral Badr, however, still thought the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would prove to be a major stumbling block. "I realize that the Treaty only covers the matter of nuclear weapons, not nuclear power," he said. "But the nations that do have nuclear weapons are very sensitive about letting anyone else get their hands on them.

  "And a ship's nuclear reactor contains a substantial mass of uranium, the residue of which is weapons-grade U-235 from which nuclear bombs can be made. That's one reason no country with a nuclear submarine has ever even considered selling a ship, with its reactor room full of live uranium, to any other country. No one has ever purchased a nuclear submarine. Anyone who has one, built it."

  General Rashood nodded his understanding of the subject. Then he said firmly, "If we can persuade China to make an offer for two Russian nuclear boats, I would not expect them ever to enter a Chinese port, and most definitely not an Iranian port. I would expect them to make their journey either from the Baltic or from the Northern Fleet and find their way to one of the Russian bases on the Siberian coast, probably Petropavlovsk.

  "There would be no need for anyone to know they had even been sold. I don't think a regular submarine movement along the Arctic waters north of Russia, heading east, would even attract anyone's attention. They'd just think it was a straightforward Fleet transfer. The Russians do it all the time."

  "You mean our mission would leave from a Russian port?"

  "Correct. And not even they would know where we were going."

  "Well," said the Ayatollah, "this all sounds very intriguing. And so far I am not opposed to any of these advanced ideas. My only question is, do we have a crew that could handle such a submarine?"

  "We do have three commanding officers who have undergone several months of training in Russia—and I believe that a part of the course did involve working in a nuclear boat. . .Ben?"

  "Yes, it did. We found there were a lot of similarities anyway in a diesel electric. It's mainly the power plant that is different. We were shown the rudiments of how it works, and we were at various times shown in some detail the differences in driving these much bigger ships. But, of course, we were there to perfect our commands of the Kilos."

  "How long would it take a diesel electric Commanding Officer to learn to take a nuclear ship around the world?" asked the Ayatollah.

  "Probably nine months of intensive training. Maybe six months for a top man."

  "Like yourself, Ben?" asked th
e Ayatollah, smiling.

  "Thank you, sir," said Commander Badr, seriously. "Probably six months. Actually, I think a group of submarine officers could quickly become quite proficient at moving the ship around the oceans. Diving procedures, torpedoes, even missiles, navigation, gunnery, hydrology, air cleansing— they all operate on much the same principles. It's the nuclear reactor, sir. The toughest job on that boat is the Nuclear Engineer's. And he needs to have a half dozen men around him who know what they're doing. On a project like this, we might need a couple of Russian engineers on loan for a while."

  "Or even Chinese," said the Ayatollah. "They have trained men for nuclear boats. And they might be more sympathetic to our cause."

  "Sir," interrupted General Rashood. "I do not plan to tell anyone what our cause is. Certainly not a nation like China, which has already betrayed Iran once, entirely in its own interests, and may well find it agreeable to do so again."

  "Of course, General. Forgive me. It is taking me a little while to grow accustomed to a complete professional on an international level. I might say I am enjoying the experience."

  Admiral Badr smiled in obvious agreement, and added to the conversation by pointing out that his son, Commander Badr, would be working toward a full command on such a mission. "I do not think I am being biased by assuring the meeting that he is without question the most advanced of our submarine officers. And he has worked with the Russians."

  One of the hojjats nodded a very obvious assent to that remark, and addressed the Admiral by his first name. "Mohammed," he said, "you have brought your son up throughout his life to be an underwater warrior on behalf of this nation. And we are all very aware of that. My question is, does the General himself intend to accompany our team in person on such a highly dangerous mission? Or is he merely planning it? Down to the last detail, of course."

  "I intend to take overall command of the entire operation," replied the General. "I understand, of course, the submarine must have a CO and that he will be responsible for the safety of the ship and the crew. However, I will be in the number one position. As a point of clarification, I should like to record I would be privileged to have Commander Ben Badr as my number two. But on missions such as we anticipate, there can be only one overall Commander. And if that Commander is not me, then I will not be going."

  All eyes turned upon Ben Badr.

  "I should be honored," he said, "to serve as number two to the great Ravi Rashood, conqueror of the Nimrod Jail. It would be a learning partnership for both of us."

  "As a point of procedure," said the Ayatollah, "I must return to Tehran and present the case to His Holiness. It promises to be expensive and fraught with danger. And yet I accept the wisdom of the General—either we change our methods of operation and move up to a nuclear boat, or we retire from the fray until the United States comes up with a soft left-wing government.

  "Off the record, I can promise the Grand Ayatollah will not be in favor of the latter option. For he will be always mindful of the great Islamic ethos, which goes all the way back to the Prophet's journey from Mecca to Medina in 622, the ethos of hegira."

  The Ayatollah looked up, saw a somewhat quizzical look on the General's face, and spoke, as if to him alone. "Hegira may be just a little advanced while you are studying, my son. But its concept is the clear command of the Koran that our people must not live in oppression from those of other faiths.

  "They must remake their lives elsewhere, where Islam is dominant—Dar-Ul-Islam. If required, they may have to fight, to convert a non-Muslim territory, Dar-Ul-Harb, into Dar-Ul-Islam. But there can be no compromise. The Grand Ayatollah will not agree to sit back and abandon the conflict. Because the Koran forbids it."

  It was almost midday now, and the Admiral suggested they break for prayer and then lunch, which would be served downstairs. He suggested that General Rashood and Ben might like to stroll down to the jetties and back for a breath of hot but fresh air, and a chance to become better acquainted.

  The two officers, of similar age, jumped at the chance, as Ben put it, "to get out of a roomful of mullahs and outlaws." At which point Ravi considered he was probably the right type.

  They walked down the grand staircase of the Iranian Navy and into the heat of the day, both wearing white shirts and shorts, with long socks and lace-up shoes. Ravi wore no insignia.

  The first thing Commander Badr said was, "You know, Ravi, you really remind me of someone."

  "I do? I thought I was unique."

  "You nearly are. But we had a submarine officer here helping us plan an operation during the last couple of years, and he was exactly like you. A sailor, rather than a soldier. . . tough, strange, brilliant man . . . name of Ben Adnam. Commander Ben Adnam."

  "Was he an Iranian?"

  "No. He was an Iraqi, but he had somehow served undercover in the Israeli Navy for many years. His rank was Israeli. But he was a Muslim, very much on our side."

  "Yes. I see the similarities."

  "Oh, I was not referring just to background, Ravi. I was referring to methods of operation. The way you both absolutely know what you are saying before you speak. The way you understand the weak points of other nations. And you both have the same assurance, a kind of certainty that your views are correct, that to take a different course of action would be folly. But above all, you both have a code of caution, which is more prevalent than your obvious daring."

  "That's probably why we're both still breathing," said Ravi.

  "I am not sure that Ben is still breathing," said Commander Badr. "His mission was very dangerous. And we had no further use for him after it was complete. He accomplished all that we had hoped, but then he disappeared, as we assumed he would."

  "Did you work with him yourself?"

  "Very much. I was a kind of disciple. He was here in Bandar Abbas for several months, and my father put me very close to him, to see his methods and to observe his knowledge. He knew more about submarines than anyone I ever met. Taught me a great deal."

  "Are you now as good as he is?"

  "Close. We spent a lot of time together. And he was a natural teacher. He trained in Great Britain for a while—that's the toughest CO course in the world. He told me he'd finished first in the Class, and I believe him."

  "Had he been on projects against the West, or was he strictly an Israeli submarine officer?"

  "He would never discuss specifics with anyone. But my father believed he was responsible for destroying the U.S. carrier, the Thomas Jefferson."

  "No kidding!"

  "Yes. He was quite a man. And you know, there's something he told me I've always remembered. He said, 'On any classified mission, in any submarine, you will assume that every man's hand is turned against you. If you spot an enemy, on the sea or in the air, you will assume immediately that he has also spotted you, and will come after you. Always take instant evasive action, no matter what you are doing.'"

  "Sounds good to me. I like him already."

  They walked on toward the ships, but they were moving slowly in the heat, and after ten minutes they turned back, toward the air-conditioning in the Admiral's Headquarters.

  "Do you really think we might get a hold of a nuclear boat?" asked Commander Badr.

  "I think so. The Russians are always ready to sell to the Chinese. And the Chinese will want to cooperate with Iran. I think there's every chance, so long as we come up with a master plan that will hold China virtually blameless."

  "And do you think we could mount an attack against the oil/power infrastructure of the West Coast of the United States?"

  "Oh, yes. I'm sure we could. And I think we'd get away with it, so long as we remain covert. It will drive them mad."

  "Mad enough, Ravi, for them to increase their defenses against such acts."

  "Keep stretching them. That's the way. Until they decide it's just not worth retaining their global role."

  "Or until they do decide to make someone pay."

  "That's when we do not want to be pr
esent, Commander. When the Great Satan gets really mad, rush for cover, that's my only advice."

  They walked back in silence, two men with much on their minds. Lunch was served—fried prawns with delicious spiced rice—and the conversation was animated, while the most hawkish members of the Islamic Fundamentalist movement considered the views of the former SAS Commander.

  Back in the meeting, the Ayatollah began by saying, "I believe we are all in sympathy with the perceptions of General Rashood and I intend to relay them to His Holiness. If we receive an agreement in principle, I will appoint a delegation to make the journey to Beijing to discuss the matter with our Chinese colleagues.