Cuba Libre: A 500-Year Quest for Independence

by Philip Brenner

  Not only was Batista the leading candidate; for a time, he also was the only presidential candidate. In order to increase popular acceptance of the outcome, Batista asked Grau San Martín—who had returned from six years of exile in the United States—to run. Batista garnered more than 40 percent of the vote.

  With a kind of New Deal, social democratic program, the new president emphasized economic and agricultural reforms that he had promoted as military leader after the 1933 coup. He also nurtured Cuban ties with the United States, and imports of US products increased from about half to about three-quarters of all of Cuba’s imports between 1933 and 1940.2

  Perhaps more important, Cuban-US economic relations were shaped by two 1934 US laws. Under the Jones-Costigan Act, the US secretary of agriculture set a quota each year for foreign sugar producers. The percentage of the total allotted to each country was based on its average percentage of sugar sales to the United States from 1931 to 1933. This was unfortunate for Cuba, because its exports in those years hit historic lows. In theory, this circumstance might have enabled Cuba to diversify its dependency by trading more with Europe. But the other law, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, enabled the Roosevelt administration to “negotiate” an accord with Cuba that reduced tariffs significantly for US products and thus made European products uncompetitive. Taken together, the two laws ensured that Cuba would remain dependent on the United States and relatively poor.

  Notably, the presidential-like residence of the US ambassador in Havana symbolized US-Cuban relations before 1959 (see figures 6.1 and 6.2). Built in 1942, the sixty-five-room estate still sits on 5.25 acres in what had been a wealthy Havana suburb. Its sculpted gardens are punctuated by baroque fountains and sit adjacent to a large swimming pool and tennis courts.3

  Figure 6.1. Entrance to the sixty-five-room residence of the US ambassador. Photo by Carlos A. Ortega Murias.

  Figure 6.2. Dining room in the residence of the US ambassador. Photo by Philip Brenner.

  A Reliable US Ally in World War II

  As World War II approached, Batista swore “whole-hearted” allegiance to the Allies. He told foreign correspondents before the presidential campaign that “Cuba desires and hopes to maintain her neutrality . . . but the United States can count on us as a factor in its plans for the defense of the Caribbean.”4 Indeed, the Roosevelt administration was certain that the new Cuban president was a solid, dependable ally who would protect US interests.

  Even before Batista was inaugurated on October 10, 1940, Cuba played an ignominious role in the lead-up to the war. The Nazi German government allowed a vessel of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, the SS St. Louis, to leave Germany bound for Cuba with 938 passengers, virtually all of them escaping Jews. The ship anchored in Havana harbor on May 27, 1939. But Nazi spies and corrupt Cuban officials—combined with ineffective efforts by US diplomats—blocked the passengers from disembarking. It became known as the Voyage of the Damned. The vessel sailed next toward Florida, but President Roosevelt chose not to expand immigration quotas as he contended with isolationists, anti-Semites in Congress, and public opinion hostile to increasing immigration. The St. Louis returned to Europe, where US officials quietly tried to arrange for the passengers’ safety. Some received asylum in Britain. But those sent to France, Belgium, and the Netherlands soon found themselves again in German hands when the German blitzkrieg overtook those countries in 1940.5

  Batista’s governing alliance, which included support from the Cuban Communist Party, focused on good relations with labor unions in the cities, the creation of local health centers, and a number of political reforms. Two prominent members of the communist party even served for a time in Batista’s national unity cabinet. One was Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, who became Cuba’s vice president in 1976; the other was Blas Roca, who would become a key strategist in the revolutionary government two decades later.

  The war had a positive effect on a few sectors of Cuba’s economy but negative effects on most. Between 1940 and 1944, the disparity between the urban working and the rural poor increased. Trade with Europe essentially stopped when maritime commerce collapsed, and the number of tourists overall dropped by 90 percent. Cuba’s only safe and reliable trade partner was just north across the Florida Straits. With the resulting dependence on the US market, Cuba’s trade deficit with the United States grew and so did US domination of Cuban industry and commerce.6 Meanwhile, the US Navy used Cuban port facilities for secure transit of military supplies.

  As the 1944 election loomed, Batista’s only hope of maintaining some power resided with his prime minister, Carlos Saladrigas, because the 1940 constitution did not permit consecutive presidential terms. Although Batista threw his support behind Saladrigas, voters swept Grau San Martín into office in a landslide victory. Grau, the ousted president of the one-hundred-day revolutionary government and candidate of the Auténtico Party, was a much different man from the firebrand who left the country in 1934. This time around he was determined to cater to US interests. He reduced taxes on foreign investment and foreign corporations operating in Cuba, and lessened restraints on US businesses operating on the island. He also removed Communist Party members from the government and repressed their labor organizations. (During the war, the Communist Party changed its name to the Popular Socialist Party [PSP].)

  A Façade of Prosperity

  After World War II, sugar maintained its position as the bedrock of the economy. By 1948, sugar production had risen to a new high of 5.8 million tons and accounted for 90 percent of Cuba’s export earnings.7 In addition, the tourism and cigar industries started to take off as Cuba’s economic profile began to evolve.

  US businessmen also sought to capitalize on the island’s proximity and friendly business climate. Standard Oil of New Jersey (then known as Esso and now ExxonMobil) and Texaco established refineries on the island and shipped the output to the rest of the Caribbean basin. Havana became the regional sales headquarters for the hemispheric operations of several companies and advertising agencies. As the number of visitors began to increase, Cuban officials proudly announced an investment of $5 million to make further improvements in tourist facilities.8

  Unfortunately, the surface appearance of a thriving economy masked a problematic core. Starting with Grau, presidents padded the government payroll with Auténtico Party patronage seekers who had been previously shut out of public jobs. Corruption grew in the postwar years, making a few Cubans wealthy and helping American businesses gain an even more secure foothold.

  Carlos Prío Socarrás, who had been Grau’s prime minister, won the 1948 election for president. Known as the “cordial president,” he demonstrated little intention or ability to control the increasing US business domination of Cuba’s economy, which returned only meager sustenance to it. Moreover, in order to forestall any trouble from Washington, Prío continued Grau’s practice of systematically removing PSP members from the Cuban labor movement, which vitiated the energy of some of the unions that were most effective.

  This did not stop workers from striking for better wages and conditions. The Ministry of Labor reported 102 strikes and hundreds of disputes involving workers and businesses between January and August 1951. There were also spontaneous demonstrations, some of which turned violent. In rampages that involved looting and even murder, rival “action groups” became as much criminal street gangs as political organizations.

  Widespread impunity for such actions had an effect on Cuba’s economic climate, which raised concerns among American business leaders. “Despite the country’s prosperity and its manifest opportunities for investment, only a few new industries have been established by local capital during the last few years,” the New York Times reported in January 1952. It added that “the National Association of Industrialists repeatedly has warned the Government that economic development cannot be carried out until relations between capital and labor are stabilized.”9


  Political scientist Jorge Domínguez well describes a pervasive feeling throughout the island by 1951 that the Cuban political “system was somehow not legitimate.” The constitution, he explained, “was honored in the breach”; presidents bypassed Congress and the Supreme Court; “corruption was pervasive.”10 Only Senator Eduardo Chibás, the founder of the Ortodoxo Party, had been able to arouse popular hopes. Although Chibás had lost to Prío in the 1948 election, he was untarnished by scandal. With a passionate eloquence, he appeared every Sunday on the radio to rail against President Prío and government corruption.

  On August 5, 1951, Chibás opened his live broadcast by denouncing Prío as the most corrupt president in Cuban history, and he finished with an appeal: “Last Sunday . . . I presented to the people irrefutable proof of the immense corruption within Prío’s regime. . . . But my wake-up call perhaps was not strong enough. . . . People of Cuba, wake up! This is the final wake-up call!”11

  He then took out a gun, shot himself in the stomach, and died eleven days later.

  Batista Returns with Martial Law

  The dramatic suicide provided Batista with the opportunity he sought when he returned to Cuba from Florida in 1950. But the depth of his unpopularity in the 1952 presidential election was evident from poll data. Batista was in third place despite the lack of enthusiasm the other candidates inspired. Roberto Agramonte y Pichardo, a mild-mannered psychology professor at the University of Havana and conventional Ortodoxo functionary, had replaced Chibás as the party’s standard bearer and was running neck and neck with Carlos Hevía, the Auténtico candidate.12 Counting on the public’s disdain for the political system, Batista engaged disaffected junior military officers to stage a coup three months before the scheduled June vote. Declaring martial law, he shut down Congress and canceled the elections. Prío fled to Mexico City and then to Miami, where he spent the rest of his days. One of the Ortodoxo candidates seeking a seat in the House of Representatives was Fidel Castro Ruz, a twenty-four-year-old lawyer who had been favored to win.

  Nearly twenty years after his first taste of power, Batista was back in office. But his military takeover was not popular and he governed with an unyielding hand and brutal force. Reports of human rights violations soon became abundant as opposition to the new regime arose quickly. University students and other opponents tried to mobilize popular anger by staging a general strike, and some later plotted with dissident army officers to stage a countercoup. The government discovered the plans, jailed plot leader Professor Rafael Garcia Barcena along with more than one hundred others, and sent several others into exile.13

  Batista’s coup had not fazed Washington, which recognized the new government seventeen days after the former president seized power. But the United States conditioned approval on three demands, which Batista easily satisfied: a clampdown on open activity by communists, the pledge of a favorable climate for US investors, and the promise of elections in the near future. Cleverly, one of Batista’s first acts was to break Cuba’s diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.14 In a November 1954 presidential election, Batista ran unopposed. He won handily.

  If there were any concerns in Washington about his iron rule, Batista assuaged them by frequently restating his government’s basic anti-communist stance. On the second anniversary of his coup, for example, he emphasized three key themes—anti-communism, stability, and elections. “We remain firm in our aim to preserve order and to solve the political problem of Cuba by electoral means,” he declared.15 As he spoke, soldiers and police surrounded the University of Havana, smashing a student demonstration against the regime.

  With stability for foreign investment guaranteed, Batista moved on a number of fronts in an effort to “modernize” Havana. US-managed hotels flourished with attractive rates. Prominent among them were the Nacional (see figure 6.3), the Sevilla Biltmore, and the Presidente. When the Rosita de Hornedo (now called the Sierra Maestra) opened in 1955, it featured exclusive prices for foreign high-rollers. Pan Am and Eastern Airlines established frequent flights between Havana and New York, Chicago, and Miami. The West India Fruit and Steamship Company expanded its passenger operations in the early 1950s, offering passage for thousands of passengers and hundreds of cars across the Florida Straits every day.

  Figure 6.3. Hotel Nacional. Photo by Philip Brenner.

  The government rushed to complete an international airport at Varadero Beach, about ninety miles east of Havana on the northern Cuban coast. Eventually, the project included a highway that would link the cities, and officials discussed plans to remake the quiet palm-tree retreat in the image of Miami Beach. Honeymoon packages were promoted at top Havana hotels, and the government designated special English-speaking tourist police to help Americans get around the city. The goal was to convert Cuba into North America’s winter playground.

  Playground of the Western World . . . for the Few

  A Gangster’s Paradise

  At the same time, Batista encouraged the growth of casino gambling. By the end of 1955, all of the major hotels featured or were in the process of establishing posh gaming operations.16 The government charged gaming fees and claimed that the greater part was distributed to charities, many of which were managed by Batista’s wife, Marta Fernández de Batista. In reality, according to journalist Ann Louise Bardach, “Batista was reported to be pocketing more than $1 million from the gambling casinos every month and he maintained Swiss bank accounts with deposits in the hundreds of millions.”17

  From time to time, Batista made a show of policing the casinos’ “razzle-dazzle,” which is what they called the fleecing of American tourists at the gaming tables. Early in his dictatorial rule, when the appearance of fixing threatened to undermine Cuba’s popularity with tourists, Batista pledged reforms and designated one of the fixers as his special “adviser on gambling reform.” The choice was Meyer Lansky, a lynchpin for syndicates in New York, Chicago, and Las Vegas, who had been operating in Cuba for at least a decade.18

  In fact, on December 22, 1946, the chiefs of several prominent US organized crime syndicates had convened at Havana’s oceanside Hotel Nacional and essentially divided up their opportunities for gambling, money laundering, and related businesses. Among them were Lansky and Charles “Lucky” Luciano, who had been a major Chicago underworld figure until his 1936 conviction for prostitution and racketeering. But in 1946, he was out of jail because of his connections with gangsters who ruled the waterfront at key US ports. The federal government had paroled Luciano from his long prison sentence to assist US counterespionage efforts against German spies by reporting on the departure of troop transport ships during World War II. When Cuba deported him to Italy in 1947, Santo Trafficante, Jr., the mob boss of Tampa, took Luciano’s place. (In the 1960s, Trafficante would be involved in US Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.19)

  The gangsters went on a spending spree after Batista’s 1952 coup, opening nightclubs and casinos and building a racetrack and new hotels. In 1957, Trafficante unveiled the fourteen-story Hotel Deauville along Havana’s seaside roadway, and Lansky opened the opulent Riviera. Costing $14 million, the Riviera’s twenty-one floors housed 440 rooms, a casino, a cabaret, and two restaurants.

  However, US organized crime in Cuba stayed away from sex trafficking. As journalist T. J. English notes, “The trade never was as lucrative as narcotics or gambling—businesses that tended to metastasize and create other businesses.”20 Prostitution was left to Cuban entrepreneurs, who made their own contribution to Havana’s reputation as a vice capital in the Batista years. In the 1950s, prostitution was the second largest occupation for women, after teaching.

  With Batista in charge of the government, organized crime had found what they believed was their paradise. Closer to New York and more pleasant than Las Vegas, and with a friendly government that the crime bosses could control, Cuba provided a haven where the criminals imagined they could
center their worldwide operations with impunity. But they had not reckoned with one factor that led to their undoing. Most of the people who lived in Cuba did not benefit from either Batista’s rule or the mob’s exploitation.

  The Other Cuba

  Memories of Cuba’s wealth in the 1950s and myths about its advanced development die hard. Exiles who left Cuba shortly after the 1959 revolution have described for so long the comfortable lives they led that it has seemed to many US listeners that comfort was the norm. In a 2012 meeting with former US government officials visiting Havana, a recently arrived US diplomat pointed to the former mansions near the US Interests Section (now the US embassy) building and said that these were evidence that the revolution was “not about poverty,” because there was “a lot of wealth” in the country.21

  Superficially, the US diplomat was correct. In the 1950s, Cuba “was far from underdeveloped when compared with much of the rest of the world,” as political scientist Richard Fagen observed.22 Its per capita gross domestic product was eighth in Latin America, ahead of Brazil’s. Its literacy rate was 76 percent, fourth best in the region.23 But Fagen added, “Aggregate statistics do not, of course, tell the whole story. Despite the comforting averages and national comparisons, Cuba was characterized by vast inequalities in the distribution of goods, services, and opportunities.”24

  Consider that while only 26 percent of Cuba’s population lived in Havana, the city had 60 percent of the country’s doctors and 62 percent of the dentists. Havana had one hospital bed for every 195 inhabitants, but the eastern province of Oriente had one bed per 1,870.25 The disparities in literacy and the availability of schools between urban and rural areas were even more stark. In 1956, only 50 percent of children between the ages of five and fourteen attended school. The 1953 census revealed that 25 percent of the population over ten years of age had never been to school.26 Sixty percent of the country’s secondary schools were private, which made secondary education unaffordable for most Cubans. Middle- and upper-class Cubans sent their children to private schools or to the United States. In addition, as historian Alejandro de la Fuente reports, “Some of the best schools in the country . . . were American and open only to whites” and the best religious schools were “Spanish and equally discriminatory.”27