Cuba Libre: A 500-Year Quest for Independence
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Meanwhile, several US senators repeatedly charged that the Soviet deliveries included offensive weapons, perhaps even ballistic missiles. Kennedy responded to the charges on September 4 by asserting there was no evidence of “ground-to-ground” missiles in Cuba. He then warned, “Were it otherwise the gravest issues would arise.” Congress followed up with a joint resolution on October 3, approving the use of force against Cuba. The same day—nearly two weeks before the United States discovered the ballistic missiles—the commander in chief of Atlantic forces ordered that US warships be in place by October 20 in preparation for a blockade of Cuba.7
By establishing a limit of zero ballistic missiles in Cuba, Kennedy unwittingly created the circumstances in which he ultimately found himself engulfed. Once he learned about the missiles, he believed he could accept nothing less than their complete removal. As a result of the kind of Maginot Line that Kennedy drew in early September, he and his advisers—a group he dubbed the “Executive Committee of the National Security Council” or “ExComm”—then perceived Khrushchev’s action as a provocative test of US determination to resist Soviet pressure. Once they framed the Soviet action this way, it became a major national security threat because the credibility of US resolve was central to the strategy of deterrence. The ExComm erroneously surmised that Khrushchev believed Kennedy was timid and unsure of himself.8 They concluded that Kennedy’s seeming weakness had led Khrushchev to take the risk of sending missiles to Cuba, in order to give himself a “bargaining chip,” something he could later give up in negotiations with the United States over Berlin.9
Caribbean Crisis: The Soviet Perspective
Like US officials, the Soviets viewed the crisis principally as a clash between the two superpowers. But they preferred to call it the “Caribbean Crisis.” While Cuba’s security figured into their reasons for bringing the missiles there, the actual confrontation for them occurred on the high seas, in the Caribbean.10 But unlike the US narrative, the Soviet story of the missile crisis begins well before October 1962.
In his memoirs, Khrushchev suggests it dated from April 1961, when the United States failed to overthrow the Cuban government with the Bay of Pigs invasion. This is consistent with his claim that the primary reason for placing missiles in Cuba was to protect the revolutionary government from a US invasion.11 Khrushchev’s second motivation for deploying missiles to Cuba was to redress the significant imbalance in nuclear forces that favored the United States.12 In 1962, the United States had 5,000 strategic nuclear warheads; the Soviet Union had 300. It may have had as few as ten intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); the United States had more than 150 ICBMs, in addition to intermediate-range missiles in Europe that could reach the Soviet Union. In effect, the Soviets believed they could not credibly deter a US attack because they did not have the means to retaliate against US territory with nuclear bombs if the United States launched a first strike against the Soviet Union.
With thirty-six ballistic missiles based in Cuba that had a 1,400-mile range, and another twenty-four missiles each with a 2,800-mile range on the way, the Soviet Union would be able to compensate for its deficit of long-range missiles and have a credible deterrent. At the same time, it would provide a powerful disincentive for the United States to use military force to overthrow the Cuban government.
Soviet generals were more concerned than Khrushchev about the US-USSR nuclear disparity. But the Soviet premier was compelled to respond to their demands for a faster ICBM buildup than he wanted when they pointed to Kennedy administration plans to spend billions more on strategic forces, and to statements by US officials about the desirability of the “first use” of nuclear weapons.13
From the Soviet perspective, Khrushchev ended the crisis on October 28 because he feared that the two superpowers were moving precipitously close to the brink of nuclear war, not because he feared that the Soviet Union would suffer conventional defeat in a war.14 The incident that most provoked Khrushchev’s anxiety was the destruction of a U-2 reconnaissance plane over the eastern part of Cuba by a Soviet SAM.
The United States had been sending two to four U-2s daily to take photos of the missile sites since October 16, and there had been no Soviet attempt to fire on the planes.15 But in the face of an expected US attack, Lt. Gen. Stepan Grechko, commander of the Soviet air defense in Cuba, requested permission from the Kremlin on October 26 to use “all available antiaircraft means” against US forces. He had not received approval on the morning of October 27 when Fidel Castro gave a rousing speech over the radio and ordered Cuban anti-aircraft to open fire on any US planes. In the exhilaration of the moment Grechko ordered three SAMs to be launched at a U-2.16
After he learned of the U-2’s downing, Khrushchev sensed he could no longer control events with verbal orders from Moscow. The one-megaton warheads for the ballistic missiles—each of which had a force more than sixty times greater than the US atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima—already had arrived in Cuba. In addition, the Soviets had shipped smaller nuclear warheads for more than 100 tactical nuclear and cruise missiles they had sent to Cuba. Unbeknownst to the United States, several of these cruise missiles were aimed at the US Guantánamo Naval Base.17
Moscow had ordered that the nuclear warheads not be mated to the missiles without direct authorization. Still, Khrushchev feared that in the event of an invasion, a local commander could overrule the order because Soviet ballistic missiles did not have permissive action links, essentially two “keys.” Moreover, the nearly 200,000 invading US forces would likely suffer enormous casualties if an errant general launched a tactical nuclear missile at them. The firewall that had prevented a nuclear war until then might be breached.
In a private letter on October 26, Khrushchev had offered to remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange for a US promise not to invade Cuba. Then he followed with a public message on October 27, which was more like an ultimatum. The Soviet Union would withdraw the ballistic missiles if the United States removed its comparable missiles from Turkey, a NATO ally. When Attorney General Robert Kennedy informed Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on October 27 that “time is of the essence”—because after the downing of the U-2 “there are many unreasonable heads among the generals, and not only among the generals, who are ‘itching for a fight’”—Khrushchev perceived that the world was at the brink of an unthinkable nuclear war.18 This compelled him to accept President Kennedy’s proposed compromise. The US president offered to accept the terms of Khrushchev’s first letter with a secret promise to extract the US missiles in Turkey within four months.
The Soviet leader also was concerned that Fidel might do something to increase the likelihood of a nuclear conflagration. The Cuban leader had sent a letter to Khrushchev early on October 27 (the message was dated October 26) warning that a US air strike or an invasion was likely in the next 24 to 72 hours. Castro estimated that an invasion was “less probable although possible.” He then advised ominously that if there were a US invasion, the Soviet Union should launch a nuclear first strike against the United States.
Fidel Castro’s Letter to Nikita Khrushchev, October 26, 1962*
Dear Comrade Khrushchev:
Given the analysis of the situation and the reports which have reached us, I consider that the aggression is almost imminent within the next 24 to 72 hours.
There are two possible variants: the first and likeliest one is an air attack against certain targets with the limited objective of destroying them; the second, less probable although possible, is invasion. I understand that this variant would call for a large number of forces and it is, in addition, the most repulsive form of aggression, which might inhibit them.
You can be assured that we will firmly and resolutely resist attack, whatever it may be.
The morale of the Cuban people is extremely high and the aggressor will be confronted heroically.
At this time I want to convey to you briefly
my personal opinion.
If the second variant is implemented and the imperialists invade Cuba with the aim of occupying it, the danger that that aggressive policy poses for humanity is so great that following that event the Soviet Union must never allow the circumstances in which the imperialists could launch the first nuclear strike against it.
I tell you this because I believe that the imperialists’ aggressiveness is extremely dangerous and that if they actually carry out the brutal act of invading Cuba in violation of international law and morality, that would be the moment to eliminate such danger forever through an act of clear legitimate defense, however harsh and terrible the solution would be, for there is no other.
It has influenced my opinion to see how this aggressive policy is developing, how the imperialists, disregarding world public opinion and ignoring principles and the law, are blockading the seas, violating our airspace and preparing an invasion, while at the same time frustrating every possibility for talks, even though they are aware of the seriousness of the problem.
You have been and continue to be a tireless defender of peace and I realize how bitter these moments must be, when the outcome of your superhuman efforts is so seriously threatened. However, up to the last moment we will maintain the hope that peace will be safeguarded and we are willing to contribute to this as much as we can. But at the same time, we are ready to calmly confront a situation which we view as quite real and quite close.
Once more I convey to you the infinite gratitude and recognition of our people to the Soviet people who have been so generous and fraternal with us, as well as our profound gratitude and admiration to you, and wish you success in the huge task and serious responsibilities ahead of you.
Fraternally,
Fidel Castro
* * *
* National Security Archive, Accession No. CU00754; official translation by Cuban Council of Ministers.
In Khrushchev’s mind, the Cuban leader had “lost his bearings.”19 (It is possible that Khrushchev had not actually read Castro’s letter, but was frightened by a cable from Soviet ambassador Alexander Alexseev that summarized the letter before it was completed.) The Soviet premier advised Castro on October 28 “not to be carried away by sentiment . . . by provocations, because the Pentagon’s unbridled militarists . . . are trying to frustrate the agreement and provoke you into actions that could be used against you.” In a letter two days later, he told Castro that “you proposed that we be the first to launch a nuclear strike against the territory of the enemy. . . . Rather than a simple strike, it would have been the start of a thermonuclear war.”20
Conflict Averted but Crisis Endures: The Cuban Perspective
Cuban historians tend to locate the start of the missile crisis in 1961. Government leaders anticipated that Kennedy would retaliate against Cuba after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Castro remarked in 1992 that “Girón, the Bay of Pigs, was undoubtedly the prelude to the October crisis, because, for Kennedy, this was a severe political blow.”21 Their expectations were on the mark. A covert assassination plan was already under way.22
In August 1961, after the OAS meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, White House aide Richard Goodwin met with Che Guevara. They sat on the floor, lotus-position style, each smoking a Cuban cigar. Goodwin reported to Kennedy that Guevara had proposed Cuba and the United States find a “modus vivendi”—a way of living together. Toward that end, Guevara also declared that Cuba “could agree not to make any political alliance with the East.”23
The young Kennedy aide reasoned that Guevara’s outreach was due to Cuba’s failing economy and Soviet unwillingness or inability to help Cuba sufficiently. Given these circumstances, he judged Cuba was vulnerable, and therefore the opportunity was ripe for the United States to mount a concerted attack to overthrow the revolutionary government, using “economic pressure,” “military pressure,” increased covert activities, and “propaganda.”24 Kennedy followed up in November 1961 by authorizing Operation Mongoose, the largest CIA covert operation until that time. Forty-one years later, Philip Brenner asked Goodwin if he was embarrassed or chagrined by the advice he gave President Kennedy. Without a shred of remorse, Goodwin shrugged and said, “It was the Cold War. That’s how we thought then. We all did.”
Mongoose involved a multifaceted operation explicitly intended to overthrow the Cuban government. Major General Edward Lansdale, a famed guerrilla fighter, became the operational director. In a meticulously detailed plan, he estimated that the operation “aims for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962.” He also noted that it probably would require the use of US military forces.25
Operation Mongoose
Authorized on November 30, 1961, by President Kennedy, Operation Mongoose was a plan explicitly intended to “overthrow the Communist regime and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.”* It included:
Terrorism: The CIA organized Cuban exiles to deliver supplies and weapons to counterrevolutionary forces inside Cuba for the purpose of bombing stores, blowing up infrastructure such as electric lines and power plants, sabotaging factory machinery, burning fields, contaminating exports, and attacking literacy brigade teachers.
Isolating Cuba Politically: Beginning with a January 1962 vote in the OAS, which suspended Cuba’s membership, the United States attempted to make Cuba a pariah in Latin America.
Economic Warfare: In February 1962, President Kennedy invoked the authority granted to him by Congress to establish an embargo on all transactions between Cuba and the United States, including food and medicine. The United States also pressured European allies to cease trading with Cuba.
Military Intimidation: The US military was directed to develop contingency plans for intervention in Cuba, in case a civil war erupted. This led to more extensive than usual navy exercises in the Caribbean, including one against a fictitious island named ORTSAC, that is, CASTRO spelled backward.
* * *
* FRUS, 1961–1963, volume X, Document 291, January 18, 1962. Also see US Senate Select Committee. Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 1975), 139–69; Jacinto Valdés-Dapena, Operación Mangosta: Preludio de la invasion directa a Cuba (Habana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 2002).
Largely because of his expectation of a US invasion, Fidel sought a military treaty with the Soviet Union under which “an attack on Cuba would be the equivalent to an aggression against the USSR.” But Khrushchev refused to bring Cuba into the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet-led military alliance of Eastern European communist countries. Instead, in May 1962 he offered to send ballistic missiles to Cuba. Cuba had not asked for such weapons, which Fidel said were “not indispensable . . . here to defend Cuba.”26
In fact, Cuban officials took a calculated risk in accepting the emplacement of ballistic missiles on the island. The decision made Cuba a US strategic target in the event of a major war. In addition, there was the potential that Cuba would be perceived in Latin America as nothing more than an outpost of the Soviet Union.
But the benefits of the decision seemed to outweigh the costs. The ballistic missiles and associated Soviet military personnel would surely deter a US invasion, Cuban officials reasoned. Cuba’s close collaboration with the Soviets also would serve as an endorsement of Cuba’s call for a hemisphere-wide revolution, which Fidel had voiced in the February 1962 Second Declaration of Havana.27
While Castro wanted to make the missile agreement public, Khrushchev refused to do so. In June, he told Castro’s emissaries, Che Guevara and Emilio Aragonés, that revealing the plan in advance would lead the United States to intervene in Cuba. The Soviet leader wanted to confront his adversary with a fait accompli in November 1962, on the 45th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.28
Ultimately Khrushchev’s position became a sour
ce of Cuban anger and distrust. In 1968, Castro said, “we believe that the whole problem should have been dealt with in a different manner: Cuba is a sovereign, independent country, and has a right to own the weapons that it deems necessary. . . . From the very outset it was a capitulation, an erosion of our sovereignty and our right to respond to that campaign.” However, he acquiesced in the secrecy, explaining that in 1962 he believed the Soviets “had a much better grasp of the overall situation than we did and therefore we left the decision to them.”29
Once the United States discovered the missiles, Castro was far less accepting of supposedly superior Soviet tactical prowess. Anticipating that Kennedy’s October 22 address would be about Cuba, Castro ordered a rapid mobilization of the island’s forces before the speech was delivered. “The Nation on a War Footing,” was the headline emblazoned across the next day’s Revolucion, the official government newspaper. As nearly 400,000 Cuban soldiers and militia members prepared for a US invasion over the next few days, Castro counseled Soviet generals about the placement of SAMs and about the need for anti-aircraft weapons to defend them.30
Castro’s intended message in his October 26 letter to Khrushchev was quite different than the Soviet leader’s interpretation. He explained to Khrushchev on October 31, 1962, that he was offering the Kremlin the same sort of tactical advice he was giving Soviet generals in Cuba. “I did not suggest to you,” he wrote, “that in the midst of the crisis the USSR attack, but rather that in the aftermath of an imperialist attack, the USSR act without vacillation and certainly not commit the error of allowing the enemy’s chance to discharge against her a nuclear first strike.”31
Castro assumed, incorrectly but understandably, that the United States knew the Soviet nuclear warheads for both the ballistic and tactical nuclear missiles had reached the island. He reasoned that if the United States launched an invasion—not only air attacks on the missile sites—it would be expecting the Soviet military to respond with nuclear weapons. Given those conditions, he calculated that the United States would use nuclear weapons as an adjunct to the invasion, perhaps even attacking the Soviet Union first.