Don't Tell the Newfoundlanders

by Greg Malone

  This characterization of Newfoundland and Newfoundlanders was so reminiscent of the hated Amulree Report of 1933 that it caused an uproar in the Convention. After a long and heated debate the motion was deemed premature, and even those delegates who supported the idea in principle strove to distance themselves from Smallwood’s pejorative comments about Newfoundland.

  Scott Macdonald was furious:

  The reason for premature introduction of motion to send a delegation to Ottawa was that Mr. Smallwood, without any good reason, became apprehensive that someone, other than himself, might get the publicity that would be attached to introducing such a motion and rushed in with one of his own.

  There is no doubt that Smallwood’s indiscreet action has dealt a heavy blow to the cause of Confederation here. The motion was deplorably ill-timed, being put forward before reports had been received from various Committees studying the economic and financial position of the country. It was tactlessly presented, for instead of merely setting forth desirability of securing information on what conditions Canada might be prepared to offer, he made an impassioned plea for Confederation, in the course of which he painted a very dark picture of Newfoundlanders and their position. Moreover, one of the oldest and most respected members who is also President of the Fishermen’s Union, collapsed while making protest against Smallwood’s tactics, adding a dramatic touch to the Opposition’s stand.26

  The commentary by Albert Perlin in the Daily News did little to calm the high commissioner’s anxiety:

  Mr. Smallwood has allowed his zeal to outrun his discretion.… In defiance of the understanding that all delegates should work objectively towards the end the Convention was set up to attain, he has buttonholed members and others for private lessons in the virtues of Union with Canada, he has held meetings of groups of members at the Newfoundland Hotel to discourse them on the same subject, and what Mr. Harrington and Mr. Hollett said about promises of a free trip to Ottawa and a senatorship in the same city has been related by others with variations on the original theme.… Mr. Smallwood alleges he is the apparent victim of the conspiracy. But charges such as those made by Mr. Harrington and Mr. Hollett are not lightly made, and if Mr. Smallwood is the victim, it is of his own impatience.27

  Major Peter Cashin declared that the Convention had only two legitimate options to consider—responsible government or a continuation of the Commission of Government. In his view, the Convention might as well pass a resolution “to get a delegation to go to Moscow and ask Joseph Stalin what kind of government or terms he would give us.”28 In the end, Smallwood’s resolution was defeated 29 to 17. However, on November 4 Gordon Bradley introduced an amendment which stated that the Convention had the right and authority to ask Canada its position on Newfoundland joining Confederation. This amendment passed, signalling that a delegation to Ottawa was merely postponed. Scott Macdonald was thereupon moved to qualify his initial condemnation of Smallwood in his next “Top Secret” memo to Robertson: “While Mr. Smallwood’s initiative was clearly both premature and tactless, his failure has had the effect of bringing the Hon. Gordon Bradley and the group of which he is the leading spirit, to take a public stand on the Confederation issue.”29

  The Convention was off to a dramatic start. It was Kenneth Brown, the delegate from King’s Cove and president of the Fishermen’s Union, who collapsed during his impassioned condemnation of Smallwood’s unpopular resolution. Shortly afterwards, on November 16, Judge Cyril Fox, the chairman of the Convention, died suddenly. At the request of the delegates, Fox was replaced by Gordon Bradley, who had the most parliamentary experience of them all in the old House of Assembly. He was the third pro-Confederate chairman of the Convention, indicating that Scott Macdonald’s “highly organized team” was already well out of the gate.

  Ottawa was shifting into high gear in its effort “to take over Newfoundland,” as Prime Minister Mackenzie King had put it in 1940 to O.D. Skelton at External Affairs. Increasing resources were now devoted to the project. The Second Political Division at the department was already overseeing the Newfoundland operation under the leadership of Escott Reid. In the summer of 1946 King set up the Interdepartmental Committee on Canada-Newfoundland Relations; the committee consisted of senior government ministers and bureaucrats, with Louis St. Laurent, the new secretary of state for external affairs, as chairman. On November 7 that same year, Lester Pearson, the new under-secretary of state for external affairs, prepared a top-secret memo for the committee which focused on the fundamental constitutional problem with the scheme to take over Newfoundland:

  A serious difficulty in dealing with a delegation from the Constitutional Convention would be that they could have no authority to negotiate terms of Union since they would not be representing a government.…

  An “offer” from Canada to a delegation from the Constitutional Convention might, however, be misinterpreted in Newfoundland as indicating a strong desire on Canada’s part to annex Newfoundland and possibly as an attempt to take advantage of the present situation when Newfoundland has no responsible government which could negotiate terms.30

  Taking advantage of the situation in Newfoundland was, however, exactly what some key officials in External Affairs hoped to do. Pearson himself, and others within the department, did not approve of this approach and instead favoured negotiations with an elected Newfoundland government. This became the central problem that baffled and bothered almost everyone from Ottawa to St. John’s to London who took the time to consider the situation. It was the subject of long discussions between Clutterbuck and Pearson in Ottawa as they grappled with the question of how the unavoidable negotiating process might work:

  Top Secret.… Sir Alexander asked if we had given thought to the question of procedure. Mr. Pearson said that we had and that we wish to avoid a situation in which, on the one hand, a Newfoundland delegation would come to Canada making positive demands which could only lead to an inappropriate sort of bargaining or in which, on the other hand, we would present the Newfoundland delegation with a cut-and-dried offer which might give the impression that we are over-anxious to bring them in.… There is, he continued, the fundamental difficulty that a delegation from Newfoundland would not be representing a government and would have no power to negotiate. We might expect at least to be able to provide the Newfoundland delegation with the information which they would consider sufficient for the purposes of the Convention.…

  Sir Alexander said it was this part of the process which he himself found difficult to envisage very clearly. He said that, in arranging for the establishment of the National Convention, the Dominions Office had felt that their only acceptable course was to set up machinery which would enable Newfoundland … to determine its choice in accordance with the will of its people. In doing so they did not lose sight of the possibility that Confederation might be one of the alternatives which the National Convention might wish to consider. They had found it impossible, however, to foresee at all clearly how the issue might arise. He feels, he said, that it would be well to arrive at as definitely agreed terms as possible before the question is submitted to the people. However, he finds it difficult to see how this could be done unless the Commission of Government were brought into the discussions at some stage.31

  Clearly there were very serious constitutional problems with the process being improvised by the British in Newfoundland. However, despite all the difficulties the situation presented for them and the Canadians, not to mention the disadvantages for Newfoundland, the UK government never once considered employing the constitutionally correct procedure. It resisted all calls to return Newfoundland to the pre-1934 constitutional status and, instead, created the National Convention—to facilitate the transfer of Newfoundland’s sovereignty to Canada. Now, having constructed their constitutional golem, Clutterbuck and the British were at a loss just how to bring it to life and make it appear to negotiate.

  Political blocs began to form early on in the National Convention, largely in respon
se to Smallwood’s passionate partisan appeals on behalf of Confederation. To counter the sudden formation of the Confederate Bloc, the Responsible Government League was formed in December under the direction of F.M. O’Leary, a leading businessman and the sponsor of Smallwood’s radio show, The Barrelman. The League included many prominent Water Street merchants—the Bowrings, the Bairds, the Ayres—and professional men such as C.E. Hunt and Gordon Higgins. However, Major Peter Cashin, the spokesman for responsible government in the Convention, was not at first among them. He was as much distrusted by his fellow responsible government supporters as Smallwood was by his Confederates. His melodramatic style and histrionics reminded them of the old-style politics of the 1920s from which they were trying to distance themselves. As the time drew close to the referendum, however, they were compelled to join forces against the growing Confederate threat, but such divisions did not make for a strong, coordinated campaign from the League.

  Following the defeat of his first motion of October 1946 to send a delegation to Ottawa, Smallwood organized a second resolution in early 1947 asking the governor to canvas Newfoundland’s options on several fronts: possible economic ties with the United States, financial guarantees for responsible government or the Commission of Government from Great Britain, and more details about the terms for union with Canada. He arranged this package request with R.B. Job, an important fish merchant and a supporter of economic union with the United States. According to the deal between them, if Job supported Smallwood’s request to go to Ottawa, then Smallwood would support Job’s request to go to Washington. It seemed reasonable, but it was a trap set by Smallwood. Sir Gordon Macdonald, the British governor, would allow inquiries to Ottawa, but not to Washington. Cashin and Malcolm Hollett, another delegate for responsible government, knew well what would happen, so they voted against the resolution. It passed anyway. The governor, as expected, then informed the Convention that, as far as Job’s proposal went, any overtures to the United States were a “matter for negotiations between governments through regular diplomatic channels.” The jurisdiction of the Convention would extend only as far as Ottawa, where such negotiations might be as irregular as they could be.

  Both Smallwood and Scott Macdonald were naturally concerned about the formation of the Responsible Government League and, despite their initial disagreement about timing and tactics, they were closely allied at this point. It now seemed likely that the Convention would form two delegations, sending one to London to ascertain British financial commitments, if any, to a responsible government or to a continued Commission of Government; and the other to Ottawa to investigate the conditions that might be offered for Confederation with Canada. Both delegations were completely ignorant of the understandings, financial and otherwise, reached between the Canadians and British officials in October 1945. The strategic deployment of these two delegations was of the utmost concern to Prime Minister Mackenzie King and the Department of External Affairs, and on January 8, 1947 Macdonald sent a secret dispatch to King, outlining his recent conversation with Smallwood:

  Secret. Sir, I have the honour to report that, in conformity with your instructions, I had an informal conversation, on my return from Canada last evening, with the Honourable Gordon Bradley, K.C., Chairman of the National Convention, and with Mr. J.R. Smallwood, member for Bonavista Centre, the advocate in the Convention of Confederation with Canada.…

  Later in the evening I had a further and more extended conversation with Mr. Smallwood.… I suggested to him that, from his point of view, there would be a good deal to be gained if the dispatch of a delegation, assuming that the Convention will agree to it, could be postponed for three or four months. Mr. Smallwood was disappointed but apparently not very much surprised.… He stated that he would use all his influence to prolong the present discussions and postpone raising the question of sending a delegation to Canada. At the same time he pointed out that the feeling among the members of the Convention … was very definitely in favour of pushing on and coming to a conclusion.… Some extension might … be secured by raising points that had not hitherto been covered.… He also agreed with my suggestion that the task of correlating the economic and financial information contained in the various reports was a very important and intricate one and might well … keep the discussion going in the Convention until perhaps the beginning of March, though that would be the best that could be hoped for in the circumstances. A Resolution might then be put forward that an enquiry be addressed to the Government of the United Kingdom to ascertain whether, and if so to what extent, that Government might be prepared to continue to make itself responsible for the finances of Newfoundland in the event that the country retained the Commission form of Government, or, alternatively, adopted Responsible Government. If it could be arranged that nothing be done pending a decision on this basic question, a further period could be gained and perhaps the matter of sending a delegation to Ottawa postponed till after Easter. He did, however, feel that it would be most difficult to keep members of the Convention from forcing the pace and coming to definitive decisions before that date and in this I must say that, knowing something of the present feeling of members, I share his apprehension.32

  If Smallwood was not taking his marching orders from Charles Burchell, Canada’s high commissioner in 1943, he certainly was from Scott Macdonald at the beginning of 1947. This incidence of Canadian attempts to manipulate the agenda of the Newfoundland National Convention is noteworthy because of its success. Macdonald and the Canadians wanted the delegation to go to London first, to gain Ottawa more time, and a nervous Macdonald sent this note to Lester Pearson in Ottawa, who relayed it to Robertson in London: “The important thing at this stage is that the United Kingdom Government agree to receive a delegation and not head them off by an offer to reply to any questions … by correspondence … anything that could be done to ensure this result would be worthwhile.”33 Macdonald had reason for alarm. Eric Machtig at the Dominions Office and Alexander Clutterbuck, the British high commissioner in Ottawa, did not want any delegation from Newfoundland in London at all. Now that Britain had “run away from this responsibility” and had nothing for Newfoundland in the way of support, it had withdrawn psychologically as well, causing a complete turnaround in attitude at Whitehall.

  On March 4, 1947, Norman Robertson, now the Canadian high commissioner in London, wrote to Pearson regarding his conversation with Machtig:

  The Dominions Office fear that the presence of a Newfoundland delegation in London might provoke a demand from both sides of the House of Commons for assurances of assistance and support for Newfoundland comparable to the Colonial Development Fund Scheme, which might be difficult to resist.

  For reasons such as these, Machtig is inclined to argue … that our ultimate interest might be better served if the delegation went first to Canada.

  … Machtig fully appreciates that his Government will have to consider procedure in respect to Newfoundland developments in close concert with ours and take Canadian advice before determining what further instructions are to be given to the Governor [of Newfoundland].34

  “Canadian advice” was quick in coming. On March 13 Macdonald sent this vehement telegram to Pearson:

  Immediate. Secret.… The weakness in the programme they advocate is that it disregards the facts of the situation. The decision of the National Convention taken on February 28 is that a delegation should go to the United Kingdom first to ascertain what financial and other assistance they may hope to receive in the future from the United Kingdom and that no delegation shall go to Ottawa until delegation from United Kingdom has returned and reported its findings to the Convention.… The logic of the whole position is that a delegation go to the United Kingdom first and, in any case, any attempt to exercise pressure in the other direction would only defeat its object.…

  Years or decades hence a further opportunity may arise to bring Newfoundland into the Dominion. But it is not likely. For reasons I have outlined many times—the grow
th of further vested interests; the development of Labrador; the increase of American influence … make union with Canada yearly more difficult.… There is no likelihood that I can foresee of Canada and Newfoundland growing gradually closer together over the years and, in any case, Newfoundland could not be secured on more favourable terms later than it can now.

  In my view, the setting has been arranged in a way that gives us the greatest possible prospect of success and nothing should be done to disturb it.35

  Lord Addison ultimately accepted Scott Macdonald’s advice. The Newfoundland Commission of Government, it seemed, now had a Canadian commissioner in addition to the three British commissioners, three Newfoundland commissioners, and the British governor. Smallwood, for his part, delayed the introduction of his resolution to send a delegation to Ottawa until March, after an assiduous examination of all committee reports. The week before, on February 28, by prior arrangement, Malcolm Hollett had introduced a resolution to send a delegation to London. Both resolutions passed.

  On April 1, 1947, Gordon Bradley, the chairman of the Convention, read out Canada’s reply to the Convention’s request to send a delegation to Ottawa:

  His Excellency the Governor has been informed by the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland that the Canadian Government will be happy to receive a delegation from the National Convention of Newfoundland at a mutually convenient date. The Canadian Government is of the opinion that the questions to be discussed with the delegation are of such complexity and of such significance for both countries that it is essential to have a complete and comprehensive exchange of information and a full and careful argument by both parties of all issues involved so that an accurate appreciation of the position may be gained on each side. The Canadian Government is confident that the friendship and cooperation which have marked the relations of our two countries should provide a firm basis for the discussions. The delegation from the National Convention will be warmly welcomed in Ottawa.