Don't Tell the Newfoundlanders

by Greg Malone

  Listen to the flowery sales talk … telling Newfoundlanders they are a lost people, that our only hope, our only solution, lies in following a new Moses into the promised land across the Cabot Strait.11

  Speaking of the planned delegation to Ottawa, Cashin predicted: “The joy bells will ring out when they arrive.”12

  As for Smallwood’s performance in the National Convention, Paul Bridle, the secretary to the high commissioner, sent this appraisal to Ottawa:

  Mr. J.R. Smallwood attempted to undermine the value of the U.K. Government’s assurance that it would continue to be responsible for Newfoundland’s financial stability. He painted Britain’s plight in hopeless terms and drew a dark picture of Newfoundland’s fate under her continued tutelage.…

  He apparently ran up against his fellow members’ pro-British instincts. He received practically no applause when he sat down.13

  Had Cashin been privy to the top-secret correspondence between the Department of External Affairs and the Dominions Office, he would have been able to substantiate his assertions. But his assessment, although shrewd and accurate, was not taken seriously in the patriotic, “pro-British” climate existing after the war, where the only information available came in the form of vague, official statements crafted in carefully ambiguous Oxbridge English by the mandarins of Whitehall and Ottawa. In this stultifying political climate it was left to commentators like Albert Perlin to interpret the official signals for the public:

  The attitude of the Dominions Office as represented by Lord Addison appears to have been wholly defensive, almost as if the delegation had come to raid a diminished treasure chest rather than to seek enlightenment on matters of grave consequence to the people of this island.

  … Remember that the Convention has been charged with the task of formulating an opinion on the financial and economic prospects of the country as a first step to the consideration of forms of government. Our affairs have been administered by the Dominions Office through agents in Newfoundland who were dignified by the collective title of Commission of Government. That has been the situation for fourteen years. In those fourteen years the people got what information the Commission was willing to give and not a jot more. That same Commission has been deaf to all appeals to reason in connection with fiscal policy. It had returned no answer to reasoned statements that debt reduction was logical and necessary. It has taxed how it pleased, when it pleased, and even when it was not necessary. It has taken small interest in urging our trade requirements. It could give none of the answers to the questions asked by the Convention which had at length to send a delegation to London to find them.

  Now this London delegation was not like the delegation that will go to Canada. It was not going to ask how much value was placed on Newfoundland’s assets as the first stage in selling our national identity to Canada and our industries to the domination of Ontario and Quebec. It went as representatives of Britain’s oldest colony to talk with representatives of the Mother country, kin to kin, and even then it went only to ask questions that should have been answered long before. It was not received in that spirit, by all accounts, and we prefer to take the opinion of the majority of five to that of the minority of two. For this the British people are not to blame even if the Dominions Office is. There seemed to be a predominating feeling on the Dominions Office side that this upstart delegation should be put in its place and sent home as soon as possible. May 31, 1947.14

  At this time the war had been over for barely two years. Newfoundland’s contribution to the Second World War was equally as generous and heroic as it had been during the Great War. Once again in 1939 it had sacrificed its young men and donated large amounts of money—and had done so more quickly than any other territory of the empire. The valour of the Newfoundland soldiers in battle was legendary, and in 1940 King George Vl was “pleased to assume the Honorary Colonelcy of the Newfoundland Regiments … the King’s appointment … also to apply to any other Newfoundland Heavy Regiment that may subsequently be formed.”15 When the first contingent of the Newfoundland Royal Artillery arrived in England for training, Sir Anthony Eden, the secretary of state for dominions affairs, welcomed them with these words:

  Newfoundland, whose sons have fought side by side with Englishmen since the days of the Tudors, responded at once to the call that echoed around the world last September. It was a call to your own hearts, a call for voluntary service in a noble cause, and your answer has been clear and firm. You may be sure that the spirit of Newfoundland, both as represented by those who have come across the Atlantic and by those who have remained at home, is not forgotten.16

  To Newfoundlanders who had given so much and so willingly to fight for Britain, it was unimaginable that the British government would deal in any manner other than honourably and fairly with their constitutional issues after the war. The British depended on that.

  Lord Addison had offered Newfoundland the minimum, but it was too much for Scott Macdonald, who was now convinced that the governor was trying to give the Commission of Government the advantage. The British had no such intention; rather, they believed that the modest guarantees the Dominions Office gave the Commission of Government would take votes away from the choice of responsible government in the referendum. It was unlikely that any one option would receive enough overall votes to win outright, so the three-way split would result in a second referendum between the top two options. In setting up the conditions for a run-off vote on Newfoundland’s sovereignty, many felt that the British had abandoned all sense of constitutional decorum. It was also felt that the second chance would favour Confederation, not least by providing more time to campaign. Scott Macdonald did not see it that way, however, and even indicated that Canada had been betrayed by the British. This concern, or paranoia, underlay the escalating conflict between the Canadian high commissioner and the British governor over the wording of the Newfoundland referendum ballot:

  This morning, in the course of a general talk on the arrangements for the holding of the referendum on the future form of Government for Newfoundland, Sir Gordon Macdonald, the Governor, told me confidentially that during his visit to London it was agreed that the electors would not be asked to approve the retention of the Commission of Government indefinitely but for a term of five years only. In reply to my question … he stated that the Chairman of the delegation, Mr. Gordon F. Bradley, was not aware of the arrangement.…

  This is, of course, a decision of basic importance, more particularly when it is viewed in combination with the United Kingdom’s offer, already announced, to be responsible, as hitherto, for the financial stability of Newfoundland if the people of Newfoundland vote to retain the Commission for a further period. Newfoundlanders can hardly be expected to take so irrevocable a step as Confederation, with all the uncertainties and readjustments that it would involve, when they are presented with so favourable an alternative by the British Government. No one, of course, can forecast with complete assurance, least of all here where the physical means of contacting the elector and of gauging the trend of opinion is so limited, how an electorate will exercise its franchise. I feel convinced, however, as I pointed out in my despatches No. 106 of February 28th, No. 151 of March 22nd and on other occasions before the British Government’s plans were formulated, that with the scales weighted so heavily in favour of the Commission, there is not sufficient likelihood of Confederation winning a majority to justify the government engaging the prestige of Canada by entering the contest under these conditions.17

  For the second time, an indignant Scott Macdonald had issued this particular ultimatum. Escott Reid, the head of the Second Political Division in Ottawa, relayed Macdonald’s alarm to Lester Pearson:

  Secret.… It is evident, as we have long believed, that the Governor hopes to see the Commission of Government continued and appears to be taking definite steps to foster such a development. I find it a little difficult to understand why he has been so frank in telling Mr. Macdonald about his plans and I am wonde
ring if he may not wish to make the difficulties in the way of Confederation appear as formidable as possible in order that our own government might be discouraged from entering in a forthright manner into a contest in which its chances would not be particularly good.

  Whether this is so or not it strikes me that if, as the Governor states, there is an arrangement between himself and Lord Addison regarding Commission of Government being placed on the ballot for a specified period of five years, the United Kingdom’s attitude on the question of Newfoundland’s political future must be rather different from that which we have hitherto understood it to be. I would suggest, therefore, that after you have talked to Mr. Macdonald you might wish to discuss the matter with Sir Alexander Clutterbuck.18

  Peter Cashin was convinced that the British wanted to hang on in Newfoundland to get their hands on the cash surplus of between $30 and $40 million: when the surplus ran dry after about five years, they would hand the Island over to the Canadians. So rumours build and spread when motives are not apparent.

  As Scott Macdonald brooded over the five-year limit or extension for the Commission of Government, he again gathered with his Confederate forces to plan a strategy to undermine the perceived British agenda and turn it to their advantage:

  Secret. I have the honour to report that I had an informal discussion last evening with the Chairman, the Honourable Gordon Bradley, and the Secretary, Mr. J.R. Smallwood of the Newfoundland delegation to Ottawa, on a number of points respecting the forthcoming meetings.…

  On the substance of the discussions I found that they were deeply disappointed at the reply of the British Government, which we recognize places the projected campaign for Confederation under a tremendous handicap. They feel that it is now essential for them to delay the referendum and that, instead of trying to finish the discussions quickly and meet the timetable the Governor prefers, they should proceed with the discussions as leisurely as possible, adjourning from time to time to permit full exploration of particular subjects.… The general objective would be, without appearing to do so, to postpone the referendum till next year.

  Undoubtedly anything that would delay the holding of the referendum would be advantageous from the viewpoint of federation with Canada, for on so vital an issue people make up their minds very slowly and in this country the facilities for influencing opinion are so backward that the process takes longer than it would in a more highly developed community.19

  Macdonald, with the help of his Confederate team, continually sought to manipulate the proceedings of the National Convention for Canada’s advantage. In this case they succeeded in delaying the referendum until 1948—and the return of democracy to Newfoundland by a full year.

  Aside from keeping Newfoundland financially isolated and creating more time to sell Confederation, the other constant concern of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Canada-Newfoundland Relations as it contemplated the arrival of a Newfoundland delegation was once again, as Pearson had pointed out in his memo of November 7, 1946, the impediment of the peculiar legal hurdles they would have to overcome in their effort to draft Newfoundland into Confederation while its constitution was suspended. On June 11, 1947, the Legal Sub-Committee reported to the Department of External Affairs:

  Secret.… Unless an elected legislature is restored in Newfoundland, an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament will be required for the admission of Newfoundland into Confederation.…

  If it is deemed desirable that elected representatives of the Newfoundland people participate in the detailed negotiations with the United Kingdom and Canada as to the terms of federation and the provincial constitution subsequent to the referendum, the Newfoundland Statute providing for the referendum could continue the National Convention to act as the voice of Newfoundland in such negotiations.

  Another method of giving the people a voice in such negotiations would be to restore the former constitution of Newfoundland and to have a legislature elected thereunder.20

  This last alternative would obviously be the most correct and the simplest way forward—and the Canadian negotiators were determined to avoid it.

  As the Committee on Newfoundland considered the arrival of a delegation from the National Convention in St. John’s and what its own proposals might be, in June 1947 it produced another exhaustive account of the merits and demerits of association, Benefits from Union with Newfoundland, which was as usual preoccupied with Labrador, the United States, and the cost of the Island:

  1. The Dominion would be enlarged by about 163,000 square miles, an area larger than Sweden and three times the size of the Maritime Provinces. The population of Canada would be increased by about 321,000 people of English and Irish extraction with a relatively high birth rate.

  2. Newfoundland has always imported a wide range of Canadian goods. It ranks eighth on Canada’s list of customers (countries ranking higher are, in the main, countries presently in receipt of large credits from Canada). Newfoundland’s imports from Canada rose from almost $10,000,000 before the war to about $40,000,000 annually at present.…

  8. On the other hand, should Newfoundland turn to the United States, the economic concession in which it is most interested would be entry of Newfoundland fish into the U.S. market.… If Newfoundland were successful in obtaining a substantial market for its fish in the United States, there is little doubt that it would hit very hard the market there for Canadian fish, resulting in perhaps a loss of as much as $20,000,000 annually to Canada, the burden of which would fall entirely upon the Maritime Provinces and Eastern Quebec.…

  10. In Labrador … a very large deposit of high-grade ore has been found which, in view of approaching exhaustion of present U.S. sources of supply, may in future prove to be of very great importance and, if proven and developed, might yield the government as much as $2,000,000 in revenues. In addition, a substantial amount of waterpower is available in Labrador, the largest single undeveloped site at Grand Falls being capable of over one million continuous horsepower, which would compare favourably with horsepower currently developed by the Ontario Hydro Electric Commission at Niagara.…

  13. Should Newfoundland remain outside Canada, the present United States ascendancy in the Newfoundland-Labrador region will almost certainly increase and might very well lead to a virtual withdrawal from the area by Canada in favour of the United States. Although it may be argued that Canada would have little to lose by such a development from the point of view of defence, this would inevitably point to absorption of Canada within the United States orbit. This absorption might hamper Canadian air communication with the United Kingdom and Europe and would certainly make Canada’s freedom of action on her north-eastern borders almost entirely dependent on the goodwill of the United States.21

  On the financial cost to Canada of union, J.R. Baldwin, the secretary for the Interdepartmental Committee on Canada-Newfoundland Relations, concluded in a secret memo:

  1. … The federal government could collect in Newfoundland enough revenue to cover the cost of extending ordinary federal services to Newfoundland. This cost has been estimated at about $19,700,000 while probable federal revenue is $20,200,000.

  This amount proved to be a gross underestimation of revenues from the Island:

  1. … Assuming no debt, no capital expenditures, present levels of services and no railway costs in the provincial budget, the remaining deficit in the provincial budget … might run as low as $300,000 and as high as $3,500,000 depending on the extent and speed with which the provincial government developed new sources of revenue. In the early years it would almost be certainly closer to the latter figure.22

  Even at this early stage it was apparent to the Canadians that the new Province of Newfoundland would run deficits. But they seemed satisfied that a stripped-down provincial government could manage, while they would secure more than adequate revenue to cover the cost of federal services. Their minds were filled with dreams of Labrador, the pot of ore at the end of the rainbow after the constitutional storm w
as over.

  While the bureaucrats in Ottawa brought the expertise of their various departments to bear on Canada’s concerns, C.E. Hunt in St. John’s, in a special feature in the Daily News on the eve of the delegates’ departure, looked at the presumed benefits to Newfoundland and found that:

  Confederation would not increase our commerce. Our remoteness from the centre of Canada would be to our disadvantage. Undoubtedly many of our industries would wither, thereby creating much unemployment. Not even the argument that, being then Canadians, we could have access to the mainland would be sufficient solace to those who do not wish to be compelled by adverse conditions to leave this island.

  … Not so long ago Senator James P. McIntyre stated in the Canadian Senate: “The idea of Confederation was initiated in Ontario and Quebec. The Maritime Provinces had established a satisfactory trade among themselves; their market was close at hand and easy of access and traffic with that market was mainly by sea. Certain inducements were held out to the Maritimes to consent to Confederation. The New England market would be lost but a better and more profitable market—that of the central provinces—might be substituted therefor. The coal of Nova Scotia was to find a market in Toronto; the fish, lumber and agricultural products were to find a market in Quebec and Montreal. As time went on, it turned out that the coal of Nova Scotia did not find a market in Toronto and the fish, lumber and agricultural products did not find a market in Montreal. In the meantime the New England market had been lost.23

  7

  WARM WELCOME:

  THE NEWFOUNDLAND DELEGATION TO OTTAWA

  On June 24, 1947, the Newfoundland delegation arrived in Ottawa. Gordon Bradley, the chairman of the Convention, was again leader of the group, with J.R. Smallwood as secretary. Scott Macdonald had high hopes for this mission and wrote to Louis St. Laurent with clear enthusiasm: “This is an excellent delegation.… If we desire to take advantage of it, we have in this delegation the best opportunity we have ever had to bring Newfoundland into the Dominion.”1