Don't Tell the Newfoundlanders

by Greg Malone

  Scott Macdonald did not appreciate the psychological subtleties and vented his displeasure to St. Laurent and Mackenzie King:

  Confederation will not be put to the people specifically on the terms offered by Canada. Indeed it will be put before them in ambiguous and equivocal terms. Voters are to be left in the dark as to whether they would be voting for Confederation, if they should so vote, on the terms set forth by the Canadian Government as modified in discussions with representatives of Commission of Government or on different terms. Moreover the provision in the penultimate paragraph that the final terms of settlement must be left to the Commission of Government (in whom, by the very fact of voting for Confederation, the voter will have expressed lack of confidence) is, to say the least, a requirement that will give rise to considerable misgiving.18

  Gordon Bradley, the president of the Confederate Association, was of exactly the same mind as Macdonald. If these two informed and senior political leaders were confused about what the Newfoundland electorate was being asked to vote on, ordinary voters would surely be doubly confused. Yet the matter was important. It was the first issue on which the people of Newfoundland had been permitted to vote in fourteen years, and they would be making the complex and irrevocable choice of whether to transfer their sovereignty. The Canadians wanted the matter clarified for the voters; the British did not, preferring to keep the Newfoundland electorate confused and to fudge their way to the end.

  R.A. MacKay in Ottawa was equally displeased. On March 12 he wrote back to Macdonald:

  Secret and Personal.… As you know, our proposed amendment to the last sentence in the second-last paragraph of the despatch to the Governor was not accepted by United Kingdom authorities. Clutterbuck was instructed to come in and see us and explain why. He was in Tuesday and again Wednesday last. On Wednesday, Escott Reid and I had about twenty minutes with him on the Newfoundland statement. He was considerably on the defensive, explaining that the United Kingdom had wanted to assure the Newfoundland people just as we did that they would have some voice in arranging the final details of union and drafting their own constitution.…

  It was quite evident from Clutterbuck’s statement that the real pressure was coming from the Governor and possibly the Commission of Government who Clutterbuck seemed to think had been consulted. Considered in the light of your dispatch No. 106 of March 3rd, I am not at all sure that the Governor does not hope, in the event of a favourable vote for confederation, to re-canvass the whole basis of confederation. Clutterbuck said, however, that it had been made clear to the Governor that the Canadian Government meant what was said in the Prime Minister’s letter of October 29th about finance.19

  The Canadians were indignant that the British had not completely followed their orders in Newfoundland. Clutterbuck smoothed feathers and fears in Ottawa about the possibility of any Newfoundland participation in the negotiations, and Governor Gordon Macdonald was left to reassure the high commissioner in St. John’s. On March 15, 1948, Scott Macdonald reported to MacKay:

  Secret and Personal.… Having won his point, the Governor seemed to be more conciliatory now. In an interview I had with him yesterday, in which I emphasized again our position with respect to financial terms, he assured me that … in the event that Confederation should win a majority in the forthcoming referendum, there would be no disposition on the part of the Newfoundland representatives to reopen the financial aspects of the proposed basis of the union.… The Newfoundland representatives should not be allowed to defeat the expressed will of the people by stubborn insistence on conditions the Canadian Government may not be prepared to accept.20

  Scott Macdonald was still unconvinced and, in a closely following dispatch, he canvassed the issue once again with the governor:

  I further … expressed the view that it would be most unfortunate if, after a favourable vote, settlement could be deferred indefinitely, through the recalcitrance of the delegation that might be chosen. Sir Gordon stated, however, that there was no reason to fear any such outcome.… He would do his utmost to see that the representatives chosen were men who would understand that their duty was to see that the will of the people was carried out rather than men who might use their position to prevent full agreement being reached.21

  Sir Gordon was the head of the government of Newfoundland. Yet he is here giving entirely improper assurances to the government of Canada that the delegation from Newfoundland will be chosen to sign whatever terms Canada chose to offer, and that the negotiation process will be but a ceremonial show to legitimize what the British and the Canadians had already agreed on. If it was not treason in London, it certainly was in St. John’s. In any context it was a conflict of criminal dimensions and a fundamental breach of faith. A quite different slant was given to the Newfoundlanders. The governor’s words, however, were meant for Canadian ears only, and they had an immediate ameliorating effect. It was clear to Scott Macdonald that Sir Gordon felt himself to be in the driver’s seat for the referendum ride and, further, that he was confident of winning. And so the two conspirators patched up their differences and the referendum campaign finally began.

  9

  LIMITLESS FUNDS:

  THE FIRST REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

  It was very discouraging for us when Great Britain went against the decision of the National Convention on the Referendum. We realized then that the fix was in and that Britain and Canada were going to do everything in their power to make Confederation happen whether it was fair or not.

  All that time I was working in McEvoy’s office but it was becoming awkward. He was clearly working for the Confederates and I clearly was not. No one really knew at first who had put the advertisement in the Daily News announcing the formation of the Union with America Party. Scott Macdonald was the one who found out.1

  On February 5, 1948, Canadian High Commissioner Scott Macdonald sent a dispatch to Lester Pearson:

  I have the honour to refer to my dispatch No. 548 of November 26th, 1947, respecting the formation of the Union with America party. It has now been ascertained that the two moving spirits in the party are Mr. James Halley, a local lawyer who is the partner of Mr. J.B. McEvoy, Chairman of the National Convention, and Mr. Geoffrey Sterling [sic], Editor of the tabloid newspaper the Sunday Herald, which has a large and rapidly-growing circulation in Newfoundland.

  It is understood that the promoters of the new party have been putting considerable effort into organizing local groups and trying to outline a plan of campaign.… Mr. Jackman and one or two other members of the National Convention are sympathetic.…

  But while the Union with America party is not in a position to do anything worthwhile in the present campaign, there is no doubt of the very large latent interest in union with the United States as the best solution of Newfoundland’s difficulties. I feel certain that, if the Commission of Government is retained for a further period, it will be quite impossible to prevent this question being fully explored when the time arrives to set up an alternative form of Government. I doubt that the United Kingdom Government is fully aware of this situation or of the repercussions it could have. A new Administration in Washington might not discourage advances from Newfoundland and once Newfoundland began to negotiate terms of union with the United States, the question would very soon become a live issue in the British West Indies, British Honduras and British Guiana, more particularly as the officials and leading citizens in all of these possessions are much less to the Left than the Government of the United Kingdom. This is the danger involved in a further period of office for the Commission of Government. By its nature it cannot be more than a temporary expedient but its continuation now could raise problems of succession that could easily prove unmanageable.2

  Much was at stake in the game now being played out in Newfoundland. The fear of American influence always had a focusing effect on the mind of the high commissioner. He now informed Governor Gordon Macdonald that it was Jim Halley who had taken out the advertisement for the Union with Americ
a Party (also called the Economic Union Party) in the papers—and the governor passed the word on to Halley’s law partner, John McEvoy. “I stayed as long as I could,” said Halley, “to get as much information as I could, of course, but after the referendum was called I left McEvoy’s office and went to work on the campaign full time with Geoff Stirling and D.I. Jackman. Our greatest achievement was getting Ches Crosbie to lead the party. Ches Crosbie gave Scott Macdonald a lot to worry about.”3

  Faced with this first real threat to Confederation, Scott Macdonald carefully sized up his new enemy. On March 22 he reported:

  Mr. Chesley A. Crosbie, former member of the National Convention and prominent Newfoundland fish producer, announced on March 20th in a radio address that he has decided to lead “the Party for economic union with the United States.” Mr. D.I. Jackman, the former head of the Party, has given his allegiance to Mr. Crosbie.…

  Mr. Crosbie says that he believes that economic union with the U.S. would effect a fundamental solution for Newfoundland’s economic problem by developing two-way trade with Newfoundland’s largest potential market—particularly for fresh fish.…

  Mr. Crosbie is aggressive, ambitious and a man of means, willing to spend it in the pursuit of political power. He presents himself to the people as a man engaged in the fishing industry who is anxious to see all others engaged in the same industry enjoy the just fruits of their labours. In the elections to the National Convention he headed the polls in the district of St. John’s City West and secured the largest number of votes cast for any single candidate. In spite of the flimsy basis upon which Mr. Crosbie has launched his campaign, his words will almost certainly possess powerful appeal for uninformed fishermen who constitute the bulk of the electorate. The morning after his radio announcement about one thousand people called at his headquarters in St. John’s to sign on as members of his party and a considerable volume of telegrams is flowing in from outlying settlements.4

  There was no doubt that Ches Crosbie had caught the attention of the Canadians. Paul Bridle, now attached to Canadian High Commission in St. John’s, followed up with another dispatch on the Economic Union Party the following week: “It is claimed that 40,000 people have expressed the desire to join the party advocating economic union with the United States. This figure is almost certainly exaggerated.”5 “Mr. C.A. Crosbie … and Mr. D. Jamieson, his campaign manager, have recently given radio addresses. Mr. Crosbie developed his thesis that Confederation would jeopardize Newfoundland fisheries. The High Commissioner feels that Confederation is vulnerable on this score.”6 The fishery was the main concern of Newfoundlanders. It was the country’s chief employer and the source of its largest export. If “Confederation would jeopardize Newfoundland fisheries,” then it would jeopardize Newfoundland’s ability to survive. Bridle continued: “He also thinks that Mr. Crosbie’s program for economic union with the U.S. will gain many adherents among ‘gullible fisherfolk’ if it cannot be shown to be wishful thinking.”

  It was to these same “gullible fisherfolk” that Macdonald and Bridle hoped to sell Confederation, even if it threatened their livelihood. Bridle concluded on a more positive note from the Confederate camp:

  Mr. Gordon Bradley, leader of the Confederation movement, also spoke over the radio recently. He argued the futility of Newfoundland endeavouring to secure economic union with the U.S. He said that it is contrary to established United States commercial policy, which is of a non-discriminatory character; that there would be strong opposition to such a move on the part of U.S. fishermen; and that the U.S. would be unwilling, merely to please Newfoundland, to discriminate against countries such as Canada which buy vastly more U.S. products than does Newfoundland.7

  The Evening Telegram described economic union with the United States as “wishful thinking,” though the Daily News thought that a trade agreement with the southern giant was inevitable. Still, Crosbie and his new party did have legitimate reasons to believe that some form of economic union with the United States was possible. When, at the beginning of the war, the Leased Bases Agreement was signed, giving large tracts of territory and jurisdiction in Newfoundland over to the United States “free of all consideration,” Cordell Hull, the US secretary of state, had released a statement to the Evening Telegram in St. John’s:

  There is one message to Newfoundland which I am definitely authorized to give. It is that: when the present emergency is over, the United States will be disposed to consider sympathetically the commercial relationship between Newfoundland and herself with the view to the development of mutual trade. The Newfoundland Government of the day will be very willing, I feel assured, to co-operate in that study.… We are assured that the United States desires closer economic relations with Newfoundland and we hope the day may not be far distant when this prospect will be realized.8

  And in 1941 John D. Hickerson, the US expert on Newfoundland (and also assistant chief of the State Department’s European Affairs division and secretary of the American Joint Board on Defense), reiterated that “the Bases Agreement did constitute a ground for expecting closer economic relations between the two countries.”9

  By now the relationship between the Canadian high commissioner in St. John’s and the British governor had deteriorated to the point that Ottawa felt a fresh face would be better able to deal with the governor on the tricky issues arising out of the referendum process and the constitutional manoeuvring that followed. Scott Macdonald’s continuing belief that the governor wanted to stay on in Newfoundland for another five to ten years had brought the two men into several divisive arguments. The intense and bitter haggling over the wording of the ballot paper had used up the last reserves of good will between them, and Governor Macdonald let it be known to Whitehall that he found the attitude of the Canadian high commissioner threatening. A word is often sufficient to the diplomatically sensitive if not wise, and the Canadians, who enjoyed the upper hand but had no desire to offend the British in any way that might jeopardize their goal in Newfoundland, or indeed their own relationship with the motherland, thereupon appointed Paul Bridle as acting high commissioner to replace Scott Macdonald.

  Bridle was already in St. John’s as secretary to the High Commissioner’s Office. Scott Macdonald had done a superb job working with Smallwood to create a strong Confederate organization around the Island. But he was both too vocal and too visible for Lester Pearson, who worried that Macdonald’s outspoken manner and hands-on management of the Confederate campaign with Smallwood would become public and embarrass Canada—which had often declared publicly that it had no wish to interfere or influence the Newfoundland referendum process. Bridle, able and expert though he was, did not have the same seniority to preside over the final takeover of power. In due time the ever-cautious Mackenzie King called Charles Burchell back yet again from Australia to secure the Newfoundland deal.

  Scott Macdonald never forgave Pearson and St. Laurent for his transfer. On May 12, 1948, seven weeks before the referendum vote, he sent this last defiant dispatch to External Affairs:

  The outlook in general is good. In leaving Newfoundland to take up my new post in Brazil, I see no reason the revise the forecast in my Despatch No. 210 of May 6th that Confederation, barring some unforeseen development, will head the poll.

  During the week the Commission of Government announced the extension to the 1948 season of the arrangement adopted last year to convert dollars to sterling obtained by the fish sales in Europe. It is emphasized that the arrangement is designed to safeguard the position of the fishermen and to avoid the need for heavy expenditure on relief. The announcement, a copy of which is attached, emphasizes that this arrangement will apply only to the 1948 production and that it will not be possible in subsequent years. This blunt warning will go a long way to show Newfoundlanders the inability of the Commission to ensure financial stability and support and, though tardy and adventitious, is a fairly effective substitute for the statement of its inability to provide further financial assistance whi
ch I have frequently urged should be made by the British Government.

  Another question is the difficulty of establishing a satisfactory Provincial Budget that will enable Newfoundland to carry on the services devolving on it as a Province. The discussions … revealed a weakness in the terms themselves that was not generally appreciated when they were formulated.”10

  The debate on the Canadian terms in the National Convention had in fact revealed that these conditions were financially unsound, and the Convention was correct in refusing to allow Confederation to appear on the ballot on the basis of those terms. Scott Macdonald had been truculent about the Convention’s rejection and had characterized the delegates as ungrateful. Lord Addison and Alexander Clutterbuck had both declared the terms to be “exceptionally generous,” but, ultimately, everyone would have to agree that they were in fact unworkable. Back in Ottawa the high commissioner was debriefed by the prime minister on May 19: “… had a talk of some length with Scott Macdonald who thinks Newfoundland almost certain to come into Confederation but agrees with me it is going to be a source of trouble for some time to come. The only thing to do to save the Island from drifting into the hands of Americans. Specially important to Canada.”11