by Greg Malone
(photo credit 1.21)
Welcome to Canada! The formal celebration on Parliament Hill to mark Newfoundland’s entry into Confederation could well be mistaken for a day of national mourning.
(photo credit 1.22)
The last edition of the Daily News published in the country of Newfoundland. The headline of this souvenir edition, “God Guard Thee Newfoundland,” is a refrain from the Ode to Newfoundland. In the end there was only prayer.
(photo credit 1.23)
10
A POOR MAJORITY:
THE SECOND REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN
In late June 1948, during the tense period between the first and the second referendum, Commonwealth Secretary Philip Noel-Baker recalled Governor Gordon Macdonald to London to determine the constitutional steps that would be taken between the final vote and the handover of power to Ottawa. The contingency plan—the return of responsible government—was a simple and straightforward matter. The 1934 letters patent would be revoked and a general election held for the new government to take over on January 1, 1949.1 The other path led through murky and uncharted constitutional territory where they must blaze their own trail. These top-secret meetings also included Sir Eric Machtig from the Commonwealth Relations Office; Albert Walsh, the commissioner of justice in Newfoundland; Norman Robertson, the Canadian high commissioner to London; and M.H. Wershof of the Canadian High Commission Office in St. John’s.
Having brushed aside the return of responsible government, the British North America Act and all legal means at hand for Newfoundland to join Canada, the two conspiring countries were again faced with the tricky, still unresolved question of how exactly they could accomplish the union in the absence of a Newfoundland government. As Robertson thought about several issues under consideration, he wrote in a telegram marked “Secret” to External Affairs in Ottawa: “The next question is, by what legal process is union to be accomplished. The Commonwealth Relations Office said … the United Kingdom Government would be most anxious to avoid putting the terms of union through the Parliament of the United Kingdom once there has been a satisfactory vote for confederation [and that] the terms of union are … of no concern to the United Kingdom.”2
Although the terms of union were of primary concern to Newfoundland, the Islanders would not be permitted to debate or negotiate them. As Robertson continued: “The solution, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Governor think … is to amend S.146 of the B.N.A. Act to provide that the Commission of Government of Newfoundland, fortified by the result of a referendum, should be competent to make the address to His Majesty which, as S.146 now reads must be made by the non-existent “Legislature of Newfoundland.”3 Even though earlier in the telegram he insisted that “the Commission of Government has been rejected by the voters, [and] the sooner it is ended the better,”4 he now suggested that the outgoing administration should still be asked to perform one final constitutional convolution. Even a defeated dictatorship “should be competent” to assume the authority of a “non-existent legislature,” it seemed. The request to amend section 146, and dispense with the need for a Newfoundland government would have to come from the Canadian government, the other party in the negotiations—and officials there were only too happy to oblige.
In this way, in the shady underworld of international intrigue, the Anglo-Canadian plot progressed to rob Newfoundlanders of their right to represent themselves in any union with Canada. That left only the problem of the referendum to sort out—and the plotters felt less confident in this area: “The Governor of Newfoundland and the Commissioner of Justice [Albert Walsh] said that in their view there is no chance of a big majority for confederation, certainly not more than three thousand (3,000) and very probably much less.”5 Governor Macdonald was fearful that “a decision to proceed with Confederation in [the] face of a very narrow majority might indeed lead to disturbances in Newfoundland and particularly in St. John’s, where a large majority of the population strongly favours Responsible Government.” He insisted that, “in view of the political conditions in Newfoundland, there should be no undue delay in establishing a new government.”6 Commissioner Walsh cautiously attempted to slow the machinery: “If the majority is very small,” he warned, “it would not be wise to base upon it an irrevocable constitutional change.”7
Two years earlier, in the spring of 1946, after one of his many meetings with Governor Gordon Macdonald, Scott Macdonald had reported to External Affairs that the governor had informed him “that both Prime Minister Attlee and the Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs had told him confidentially that they regarded Union with Canada as the best thing that could happen to Newfoundland and would be happy if it could be brought about with a large majority of the people.”8 In fact, Governor Macdonald had stated that a two-thirds majority would be necessary to transfer sovereignty, and the Canadians, especially Prime Minister Mackenzie King, felt the same way. But in July 1948, as they prepared for the possibility of a small majority in the second referendum, the British and the Canadian officials had to decide exactly how small that majority could be and which of them would make that decision. It was a “hot potato” neither of them wanted to handle. As External Affairs put it: “Secret.… Should any question arise as to the size of the majority for union which would be required by the Canadian Government, the U.K. Government should be informed that this was primarily a matter for decision by the U.K Government.”9 And from London, Norman Robertson wrote to St. Laurent on July 2: “Secret.… On the United Kingdom side it has been made clear that they would regard any majority for confederation, however small, as binding and that, if the decision were solely for them, they would arrange for confederation, even though the majority were as small as one.”10
It was certainly a long way from Attlee and Addison’s “large majority” to a “majority as small as one,” but the British felt confident of bridging the gap. The voters in Newfoundland had no inkling of this change in attitude. But the British had only a few cards left to play. They could see the end of their responsibilities to Newfoundland, and they were determined to get out at all costs.
On July 16, a diffident Lester Pearson responded to Robertson in London:
Important. Secret.… It would appear that in the event of the majority being too small to justify proceeding with Confederation, the United Kingdom would like to place full responsibility for the decision on the Canadian Government. We should like if possible to avoid this since it might well prejudice any later chances of Confederation. If you have an opportunity, would you please stress with the C.R.O. that, while we appreciate their view that Canada should have the deciding voice as to whether Newfoundland should be accepted in the event of a very small majority, we hope that if circumstances require that this course be taken, the United Kingdom will appreciate the desirability of at least endorsing Canada’s position in the matter.11
The Canadians required the backing of the United Kingdom to carry off this constitutional coup. Both empires would put their credibility on the line, hold their noses if need be, and sign off on the deal. On July 12, after Governor Macdonald had returned to St. John’s from his secret meetings in London, Noel-Baker drafted a dispatch to confirm that “the London meetings were designed to ensure as far as possible that you and I were in agreement as to the action which will have to be taken.”12 The following day, a nervous Sir Gordon replied to Noel-Baker: “It would be advisable to have within a day’s outing of St. John’s a Cruiser or Destroyer on Friday night July 23rd [the day after the vote]. We should need to know how to contact the ship to inform the Commander, as soon as possible, as to whether it was necessary for him to sail into St. John’s Harbour. I am sorry that one is unable to be more definite, but you know the difficulty, especially as the whole matter is to be kept top secret.”13 For the moment at least, Governor Macdonald’s accustomed bluster and air of invincibility wavered before the spectre of the crowd’s fury at the outcome he was to announce. Tensions were running high in both British and Cana
dian camps as they approached their final play—one they now knew full well would not be a clear victory “beyond all possibility of misunderstanding.”
The Canadians were optimistic, perhaps overly so, because they continued to ignore the major financial difficulties for Newfoundland as the tenth province of Canada. R.L. James, the finance commissioner for the Commission of Government, was well aware of the problems, however, and discussed them with Paul Bridle, who was still the acting Canadian high commissioner in St. John’s. On June 21 Bridle wrote to MacKay as the secret meetings in London were getting under way:
Secret and Personal. The points mentioned by Mr. James were as follows: …
It appears that the Newfoundland provincial government will be unable from the outset to balance its budget. The gap between revenue and expenditure is difficult to estimate, but in Mr. James’ opinion, it is likely to be considerable.…
I told Mr. James that I was rather surprised to find he anticipates a substantial provincial deficit at the outset [and that] we had ourselves anticipated that the provincial budget would come very close to balancing in the first three years of the union.…
… He also made the point that the Newfoundland Provincial Government, unlike the existing provincial governments, would have to meet the cost of such essential and expensive services as education, public health and road construction almost entirely unaided by local government.…
… Mr James’ main point is that, no matter how much one may reduce expenditures, a certain number such as those he mentioned would inevitably have to be carried on by any Newfoundland Government, be it an independent government or a provincial government.…
Mr. James’ fundamental assumption regarding the provincial budget is so similar to that of those critics of Confederation who would be the first to demand better terms that I felt in talking to him I must defend our position.… It seemed that … his appraisal of the budgetary aspects of the terms would inevitably reinforce any predisposition on the part of Newfoundland representatives to seek better terms.…
The rather nice question of the degree of control which the Newfoundland Government [the British Commission of Government] would have over the delegation arises here of course.… At the same time, it is relevant here to recall that some two weeks ago the Governor remarked to me that there would be no difficulty at all in appointing suitable representatives and finalizing the terms.14
The high commissioner answered his own key question about the degree of control the Commission of Government would have over the Newfoundland delegates. Less than a fortnight later Norman Robertson, in London, after his talks with Governor Macdonald, confirmed in a “secret” telegram with External Affairs: “The Governor has already decided whom he would ask to be on the Newfoundland delegation which would go to Ottawa to discuss and settle with the Canadian Government the full terms and arrangements. The anti-confederation people would be represented on it but most of its members (5 out of 7) would be pro-confederation.”15
The Canadians were concerned not with the considerable financial shortfall for the new province, but only with selecting a delegation from Newfoundland to accept the deal. The governor’s control over this delegation was crucial. Governor Gordon Macdonald used his constitutional authority and position as head of government in Newfoundland to guarantee Newfoundland’s acceptance of Canada’s Terms of Union before they were negotiated or even voted on. This abuse of office by an appointed official of a government freshly defeated at the polls constitutes a serious offense against the people of Newfoundland and casts grave doubt on the legality of the final constitutional arrangements between Newfoundland and Canada.
Earlier that year, on February 9, in response to a question posed by the Evening Telegram on how the actual union of Canada and Newfoundland should be effected in the event of a Confederate victory in the coming referendum, J.B. McEvoy, the past chairman of the National Convention and new leader of the Confederate Party, had written:
If the Office of Commonwealth Relations decides that Confederation is to go on the referendum ballot paper, it should go on only in principle and not on the basis of the present terms which are unnegotiated.
If the people favour Confederation in principle, this would mean that the question of Responsible Government would be erased, and the Commission of Government would be retained temporarily and empowered to negotiate final terms of Confederation with the Canadian Government.
The result of these negotiations would be submitted to the people, who would then vote for or against union on the basis of the new negotiated terms.
In effect, this would mean two referendums.
The present terms of Confederation were received by a delegation hampered by their lack of power, and the people should not be asked to make an irrevocable decision based on the unnegotiated terms which this delegation received.16
McEvoy naturally presumed that the Newfoundland public would have the right to vote on and ratify the Terms of Union after they were negotiated, not before. But in the Alice in Wonderland world of the constitutional process created by the British in Newfoundland, it took McEvoy some time to realize that up was actually down, and he later apologized for his too logical assumption. After the first referendum vote and a lengthy talk with the Canadian high commissioner, he came to an entirely different opinion. As Bridle reported to St. Laurent on July 17:
[Mr. McEvoy] said that in February of this year he had stated in an interview with a newspaper reporter that he felt that Newfoundlanders should vote in the referendum on Confederation in principle only, a final decision being postponed until a later date. When, however, the British Government decided otherwise, he applied himself to a study of Confederation and of the terms offered in the same way that he had investigated the proposal for economic union with the United States. He arrived at the conclusion that Confederation is the best course for Newfoundland and that, even though the terms have not been negotiated, it would be impossible to effect any material change in them.”17
While now adopting Canada’s novel position and its terms of union, McEvoy still acknowledged fully that those terms had never been negotiated and that the elected delegates from the National Convention had never possessed the mandate in their terms of reference to negotiate anything. McEvoy’s apology was accepted, but the damage to his future political ambitions had been done.
On June 21, the same day that Bridle informed MacKay of the bad news in R.L. James’s report, Smallwood and Bradley wrote to C.D. Howe about a significant “new group of Confederates.” McEvoy had been able to poach Commissioners Herman Quinton and Herbert Pottle from the Commission of Government, but the most significant catch were several of the hated and much-vilified Water Street merchants, in particular Sir Eric Bowring, Sir Leonard Outerbridge, and the Monroes, senior and junior. These men, Smallwood noted, “would bring to the cause what it has hitherto lacked, namely the respectable element of society.” The result, he predicted, would be “a comfortable majority for Confederation.” Following immediately on this positive message, he informed Howe that the Confederate side needed “at least another $20,000. We need it quickly.”18
The second referendum was more desperately engaged and dirtier than the first. Smallwood had got through to Ches Crosbie, Geoff Stirling and others and effectively neutralized the Economic Union Party. Jim Halley, C.E. Hunt, D.I. Jackman and the rest carried on, but the party was no longer a major force behind the Responsible Government League.
The League itself redoubled its efforts, sending out teams to canvas across the Island. However, these workers did not have nearly the reach of the Confederates, who already had well-organized teams in place and enough money to hire Confederate agents in every district. That was significant because many illiterate voters had to indicate to the returning officer or the poll clerk which way they wished to vote. Polls with only Confederate officers—and there were many—played a decisive role in delivering a Confederate vote. One shocked voter wrote to F.M. O’Leary of
the Responsible Government League on July 29:
Honestly, I believe this referendum crooked in strong Confederate centres where illiteracy is great. I may be wrong, but I have a feeling votes were illegally marked in stations where poll officials were both Confederates and where no Responsible Government agent was present.… Cannot understand why Magistrate was not allowed to open ballots [in] my presence [so] that I could check count and compare with that reported by message from various stations. This [is all] most undemocratic[,] and I vehemently protest conduct and procedure of this referendum.… There was nothing [to] prevent an ardent Confederate deputy [from] mark[ing] illiterate ballots for Confederation where we had no agent.19
Responsible Government League voters in Champney East and other outports later complained that their votes had not been counted in their community totals.20 The Responsible Government League also worked without any external support, while the Confederates enjoyed not only tactical support from the Canadians, the Commission of Government and the British but even more Canadian money, this time augmented by contributions from local businessmen shopping for senatorships. On orders from Smallwood, no receipts were kept.
The religious card had been played with some apparent success in the first referendum. The Confederates condemned the power of Rome in St. John’s in the person of Archbishop Roche, who presumed to require a return to self-rule before there could be any consideration of Confederation. In his opinion, the population was not sufficiently informed of the implications of Confederation to make an irrevocable decision in a plebiscite.21
