by Greg Malone
Both the Economic Union Party and the Responsible Government League refused to capitalize on sectarian divisions. Wick Collins, the secretary of the Responsible Government League, wrote that the league “had neither the intention nor the talent to engage in a war of deceit, vilification or ridicule.”22 Smallwood and the Confederates, in contrast, eagerly exploited religious bias as well as regional rivalries and class hatred in their all-out attempt to divide town from outport, Protestant from Catholic, and rich from poor. As Harold Horwood of the Confederate Party recorded: “The Religious divide in particular was considered as a split we could use to great profit.”23
At this point Governor Gordon Macdonald himself mounted the pulpits at St. Andrew’s Presbyterian Church and at Gower Street United Church in St. John’s to lend his moral and constitutional authority to the Protestant Confederate forces. At a Methodist Convention in the city he declared: “There is one denomination here [the Roman Catholics] which played a big part in the last referendum. It is time that the Protestant bodies should unite.”24 In the opinion of American Consul General Wainwright Abbott, the governor’s performance served only to inflame the Responsible Government League and “proved conclusively their charge that the British, at the instigation of Canada, had connived to ‘railroad’ Newfoundland into union with Canada.”25
Many people were distressed at the reopening of old sectarian rivalries. A.B. Butt, a Convention delegate, felt that during the second referendum campaign Newfoundland came closer to civil war than at any time in its history. The Catholics felt isolated by the political establishment and several prominent people told him before the vote that Newfoundland would be going into Confederation regardless, and that they had to do what they had to do.26
In an appeal to pro-British and Protestant sentiments on the Avalon Peninsula, Smallwood devised a new slogan, “British Union with Canada,” which he hoped would siphon off the Commission vote from the first referendum. The basic appeal of the second Confederate campaign, however, remained the same as the first—Canada’s new social programs, the Family Allowance and the Old Age Pension.
In the latter days of the race, Smallwood campaigned extensively by airplane in the remotest regions, bursting through the clouds to proclaim the new Gospel of Confederation through a loudspeaker.27 In many places the campaign took on Messianic overtones as Smallwood cheerfully delivered his message in biblical terms. Against this onslaught the Responsible Government League fought valiantly, but it failed to articulate a clear and compelling vision of Newfoundland under a renewed responsible government.
Paul Bridle continued to provide Ottawa with detailed accounts of the various campaigns right up to the last moment before the vote. In his long dispatch on July 19, he reported on C.C. Pratt, a prominent Newfoundland businessman and brother of Canadian poet and professor E.J. Pratt. In a passionate radio broadcast in favour of responsible government, Pratt had claimed: “If we vote ourselves into Confederation at this stage we have not got one vestige of bargaining power left. We shall be placed in the humiliating position of first having made a deal and then with our hands out ask Canada to adjust our difficulties as a favour and not as a right. As I see it, that is a position which a self-respecting people should avoid at all costs.”28
Writing in the Evening Telegram on behalf of the Economic Union Party, D.I. Jackman, its former leader, warned:
It seems as if speed is not needed at present in a hurried attempt at Confederation. If Newfoundland will first appoint their legal representatives, the present terms or even new ones will be considered in the future after a period of cooling off and a serious meditation on where Newfoundland’s best interests will be. There is no incompatibility in adjusting her best interests with those of Canada and the United States with a government of her own people, first.29
All the time, Joey Smallwood plied the airwaves and, in Bridle’s assessment, “once again showed his extraordinary capacity to appeal in a direct and simple manner to the common sense of the average person. In the latter part of his address, he demonstrated his equal skill as an uninhibited propagandist.”30 Besides enlisting the open support of Commissioners Pottle and Quinton in return for positions in the new provincial government, Smallwood, with McEvoy’s help, now recruited the third Newfoundland commissioner, Albert Walsh—all of whom provided a connection with the outgoing government and gave the Confederate cause added status, if not inevitability. When Governor Gordon Macdonald came out for Confederation and against responsible government, the veneer of impartiality was stripped away as the most powerful institutions and individuals—the Commission of Government, Joey Smallwood, and High Commissioner Charles Burchell, in addition to the governor—all united in support of Confederation.
Nevertheless, in Ottawa, two days before the vote in the second referendum, Mackenzie King and even Louis St. Laurent expressed serious misgivings about the prospects ahead. As the prime minister wrote in his diary: St. Laurent “personally feels, and I agree, that unless there is something more than a poor majority, we should not take the Province into Confederation … The estimate the Department [of External Affairs] have is that Confederation will carry, but with a very small majority.”31
The second referendum was held on July 22, 1948. Paul Bridle reported the final count:
Responsible Government ………………………………71,464 votes
Confederation with Canada ………………………………77,869 votes.32
Confederation secured 52 percent of the vote, with a little over 6,000 votes more than responsible government. The voter turnout was 150,000 out of a possible 176,000, some 5,000 voters fewer than in the first referendum.
US consul general Wainwright Abbott wrote to the State Department on August 2:
Had it not been for the success of the governor in obtaining the aid of the United Church, the Orangemen, two of the Commissioners and a few other prominent citizens [Walsh and Outerbridge] at the last moment, the result would probably have been different. Mr. Joseph Smallwood attracted a large following with his promises of family allowances; but he repelled a great many of the more substantial class by his extreme claims and by his injection of class hatred and regional differences into the campaign. The new men who came out at the last moment reassured more conservative voters and cast an aura of respectability about the Confederate party which had been lacking before. Having made use of Smallwood’s undoubted organizing and demagogic talents, these new accessions to Confederation are now faced with the problem of how to get rid of him, which they privately state they wish and intend to do. He is reported to have an almost hypnotic influence over the audiences which he addresses, and the more conservative elements may well find that it is easier to release a genie from a bottle than to persuade him to return.33
In the somber atmosphere in St. John’s following the final results, Bridle wrote to St. Laurent: “I am convinced that something of the meaning of Confederation has entered the minds of the mass of the people of Newfoundland.… If one were to single out one Newfoundlander more responsible than others for this development, one would name Mr. J.R. Smallwood. He is known in this country as the ‘Apostle of Confederation.’ ”34
The Canadians had reluctantly recognized their saviour. There were no riots in St. John’s, but nerves were still on edge at Government House. Frank Graham of Imperial Oil, a friend of the vice-regal family, said that the governor and his wife lived in dread of attack.35 As for the destroyer Governor Macdonald had requested be sent to St. John’s, “if only because the safety of the Governor and Commissioners may come into question,”36 Lord Hall of the Admiralty informed Noel-Baker that no destroyer was near enough to answer the call in time. It is perhaps unfortunate the destroyer was not available to sit in St. John’s harbour so that the populace who had contributed so magnificently to the recent war could see the guns pointed at them and obtain a clearer perspective of their place in the events unfolding around them. If this was the shotgun that was thought necessary to en
force the union, it was not required. All the newspapers, including the Sunday Herald, called on the people to unite and work together for the success of the new Province of Newfoundland.
The Responsible Government League immediately went on record to oppose the procedures as unconstitutional. On July 25, three days after the vote, the secretary of the league wrote directly to Mackenzie King:
Personal. Responsible Government League, speaking with the force and backing of more than 70,000 voters representing 48 percent of those voting in the July 22nd Referendum, vigorously protest any procedure other than negotiation conducted through properly elected government for inclusion Newfoundland in Canadian Federation.… We dispute constitutional right commission government to determine what is satisfactory majority because commission was totally repudiated in first referendum and has subsequently prejudiced its position as impartial arbiter this vital matter through intervention by two of its members [Pottle and Quniton] as spokesmen for confederate cause.… Consummation of confederation before negotiation of terms or understanding of financial and economic impact on Newfoundland people and industry is neither sound nor just and creates source of bitter controversy in future.37
On July 30, in his response to a request from the league to send a delegation to Ottawa, Mackenzie King felt compelled once again to state: “The Canadian Government has at no time intervened in any way in the determination of the procedure to be followed in Newfoundland.”38 Aside from such denials, Canada, now confronted with the reality of the “poor majority,” said nothing at first. Observing Canada’s silence, Sir Eric Machtig at the Commonwealth Relations Office in London wrote an agitated note to High Commissioner Alexander Clutterbuck in Ottawa:
Immediate. Secret and Personal.… I have today received private letter from Gordon Macdonald dated July 23rd. He asks that this should be treated as very private mainly, of course, because he does not wish anyone in Newfoundland to know that he has written in this way.…
The result of the referendum would give Confederation at least five thousand majority.… I consider it a fine achievement.…
In my personal opinion there is only one course for the Canadian authorities, namely, to accept the decision and to ask for a delegation of authorised representatives [to] be appointed, and to state that such a delegation would be received at an early date.…
There must be no hesitation on the part of the Canadian authorities. Any sign whatever of hesitation will be fatal.39
The vote was five thousand times better than a majority of one, and certainly good enough for the British to brazen it out, but the Canadians were unused to such bold action. Mackenzie King remained doubtful about the “fine achievement” and questioned whether a majority of barely 52 percent would be accepted as enough to transfer sovereignty. Jack Pickersgill, who would later become Newfoundland’s federal minister in Ottawa during the Smallwood administration, was prepared for these doubts. He reminded King that in the last two federal elections, the prime minister had won his own seat by an even smaller majority. That argument proved sufficient to convince King and, on July 30, he declared in a statement: “The result of the plebiscite in favour of union between the two countries is ‘clear and beyond possibility of misunderstanding.’ ”40 He then repeated for the third time that “this result was attained without any trace of influence or pressure from Canada.”41
11
THE RIGHT SORT OF PEOPLE:
THE SECOND DELEGATION TO OTTAWA
In St. John’s, the three Newfoundland commissioners, Herbert Pottle, Herman Quinton and Albert Walsh, were now all squarely in the Confederate camp. Governor Gordon Macdonald informed them in conversation soon after the referendum that “the whole effort here should be to overcome the criticism that the terms were unnegotiated.” The other challenge, he reminded them, was the composition of the Newfoundland delegation to go to Ottawa: “The Newfoundland Government [the Commission] on its part would do its utmost to ensure that the members of the delegation were the right sort of people with whom the Canadian Government could deal.”1
The British Commission of Government was primarily concerned with meeting Canadian demands, not with getting the best terms for Newfoundland. In light of the continuing criticism that the terms had not been negotiated, R.A. MacKay advised Louis St. Laurent:
Secret.… I feel strongly that any public announcement of the Government’s intention to go ahead should indicate that we are prepared to “negotiate” on the basis of the terms with an authorized delegation from Newfoundland, rather than merely to “complete the final arrangements,” which would indicate merely dotting i’s and crossing t’s. One important factor in the vote for Responsible Government was undoubtedly the resentment of Newfoundlanders against being treated as a colony, their self-respect demanding that they should handle their own business. From the standpoint of Newfoundlanders who feel this way, negotiations by a Responsible Government would no doubt be the ideal, but I think they would be prepared to settle for negotiations by a representative group, most of whom presumably would subsequently accept responsibility by standing for election.2
If there was going to be a show of negotiation, the word “negotiate” would have to be mentioned. In light of Governor Macdonald’s many assurances that “there would be no difficulty at all in finding suitable representatives and finalizing terms” and that, as far as the delegation went, “most of its members would be pro-Confederate” and all would be “the right sort of people with whom the Canadian Government could deal,” Prime Minister Mackenzie King felt emboldened to accept MacKay’s advice in his final statement. It read: “The Government will also be glad to receive with the least possible delay authorized representatives of Newfoundland to negotiate terms of union on the basis of my letter of October 29, 1947.”3
Following King’s statement, Governor Macdonald announced his selection for the delegation to Ottawa. Albert Walsh was appointed as chairman, J.R. Smallwood as secretary, with Gordon Bradley, J.B. McEvoy, Philip Gruchy, G.A. Winter and Chesley Crosbie as members. To quote Jim Halley:
The Referendum on Confederation was a wrenching experience for Newfoundland. Families and communities were torn apart in the fight to save our nationhood and control our own destiny. We’d fought the war and now we were being denied the very rights we had fought for and won.
My father, Thomas Halley, was also a lawyer and his friends and colleagues were indignant when the Governor appointed the final delegation to Ottawa. It was such a sham. Who gave them the authority to negotiate away our sovereignty? They wanted to know where their authority came from. So the cry went up of “a fix.” It made a lot of people angry and desperate. It was a very frustrating feeling to see all this unfolding in front of you, all of it unconstitutional and against the wishes of the National Convention but there was nothing we could do to stop it short of riot.4
All the delegates were Confederates, with the exception of Winter and Crosbie, whose appointment was a testament to his popularity and influence. No one was chosen from the Responsible Government League. Winter was perhaps best described as neutral, and, as he confessed later, he was entirely mystified as to why he had been plucked out of private business life and appointed to negotiate Newfoundland’s Terms of Union with Ottawa. Philip Gruchy too had not been a member of the National Convention. He was the token out-of-town delegate and, as vice-president and general manager of the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Co., his chief concern was to secure the same tax concessions for his paper mill in Corner Brook as it now enjoyed under British rule. The governor had no worries about these two men, but, as the only non-Confederate in the delegation, Crosbie’s actions were watched carefully by Governor Macdonald and Paul Bridle in St. John’s. As Bridle wrote to External Affairs on August 26:
In my despatch No. 386 of August 5th … I reported Mr. Crosbie’s open letter in which he advised his supporters to remember the urgent necessity of uniting and working together for the good of Newfoundland.…
It will
be noted that, whereas in his telegrams to his committees Mr. Crosbie said that he felt compelled to agree to serve on the condition that he reserve the right to withdraw from the delegation if he regarded the terms as unsound or unfair, in his letter … to the Governor he limited himself to saying that he reserves the right to object if he regards the terms as unsound or unfair.”5
The second delegation to Ottawa was better prepared than the first and, before its departure, it held a number of meetings to gather information for the “negotiations” in Ottawa. However, what emerged as the major stumbling block was the budget for the new province. As the minutes from one meeting state: “Provincial Deficits. It was noted that the Budget under consideration envisaged a deficit of over $5,000,000 for each of the first two years of Confederation at least and, in the opinion of some members, this constituted adequate grounds for a request for increased financial assistance from the Canadian Government to enable the Province to bridge this gap.”6 For his part, Smallwood thought there was little chance of the delegation being successful in any request for increased financial assistance. The prime minister had said in his telegram to the governor, and repeated many times after, that the “financial terms were as far as his government could go.”
In the intervening months the Canadians had become aware of some glaring omissions and mistakes in the calculations of 1947. As another set of minutes stated:
Errors in Estimates of Revenues.
It is clear that certain of the estimates of probable federal revenues contained in annex IV of The Terms of Union are seriously in error. Estimated revenues from tobacco and liquor taxes are only a fraction of what they should be and customs duties and import taxes are probably much too low also. When these estimates were prepared we did not have access to consumption figures in Newfoundland and greatly underestimated the appetites of this island people.7
