Don't Tell the Newfoundlanders
Page 22
Before the Terms of Union could become law, an Act of the British Parliament was required, given the absence of a Newfoundland legislature. On second reading of the bill, Oliver Stanley, the official spokesman for the Conservative Party of Great Britain, noted: “The sole task of the House was to determine whether, in passing the bill, the House was carrying out the will of the people of Canada and of Newfoundland. There was no dispute about the will of the people of Canada, but I regret that matters were not so clear with regard to the people of Newfoundland.” He, concluded, however, that “a rejection from this House might lead to Canada withdrawing altogether from the proposal. It certainly might cause great feeling in Canada as to the extent of interference exercised by this House of Commons with Canadian affairs against the wishes of the people of Canada.”2
However, the extent of interference exercised in Newfoundland’s affairs did not seem to matter to most British parliamentarians any more than did the wishes of the Newfoundland people. Canada’s pride trumped Newfoundland’s rights. It was left to Sir Alan Herbert to speak for Newfoundland in the only Parliament other than Canada’s that voted on the union:
This house, without prejudice to the merits of the proposed union of the Dominion of Canada and Newfoundland, is not satisfied that the procedure preliminary to the introduction of this Bill has been constitutionally correct and just, is not persuaded that the will of Newfoundland has been established as clearly and unmistakably as is necessary for a surrender of sovereignty and a lasting change of status, and, observing that the terms of union have been debated in the Canadian Parliament for a fortnight but have not been debated in Newfoundland at all, declines to approve the agreement until it has been considered and approved in the Legislature of Newfoundland and an Address presented to His Majesty in accordance with Section one hundred and forty-six of the British North America Act of 1867.3
In support of his claim that the Canadian press also disapproved of the process, he quoted from the Globe and Mail:
The procedure by which it is now proposed to unite Newfoundland with Canada it is quite clear violates the British North America Act, it violates the 1934 agreement between Britain and the Island, and ignores or at any rate treats as of no consequence the sovereignty of Newfoundland.4
The transfer of sovereignty was not the sort of thing to be put before the electorate in a referendum, said Herbert, and, as for the “poor majority” for Confederation, he stated: “If there is a majority at all it should be two-thirds. Not a comma in the American constitution can be changed unless there is a two-thirds majority, and by the wise rules of the MCC, even the rules of cricket cannot be challenged without a two-thirds majority.… Does the right honourable government say that this is a proper majority whereby a dominion is to surrender its sovereignty?”5 He then challenged the government:
It is not too late, even now, to change the procedure. There could be a general election as early as this May in Newfoundland to elect a legislature, and a responsible Government of Newfoundland could then go to Ottawa and sign new terms of union—provided of course that the supporters of Confederation obtained a majority in the legislature.
On the other hand, suppose that the Federationists do not win—I believe that the fear that this might happen is at the root of the Bill—and I should not be surprised. Then responsible government will win, and Newfoundland will show that she is capable of running herself forever. So far as I know, her dollar situation is a dammed sight better than ours. She has a secure market for her forest products and her fisheries. Labrador may become another Alaska, because it has the largest iron ore deposits in the world waiting to be exploited, and they will be a terrific thing. Whoever runs them, Labrador will be an Old Age Pension for Newfoundland for a very long time. That is what I suggest. For the life of me, I cannot understand why even now the Government cannot say that this is the best way to do the business and why they cannot do the simple, honourable and constitutional thing.6
Sir Alan had fought diligently and passionately for Newfoundland’s constitutional rights in the British Parliament for almost the entire period of the Commission of Government between 1935 and 1949. He had come to love the country and its people, whom he praised as “the best tempered, best mannered people walking.” His affection for and dedication to Newfoundland is clear in his closing words: “I have done my best for these people, and I can do no more, but I do say this: if the policy of this Bill prevails, I for one shall not be sorry to go out from a Parliament which can so affront a proud, dignified, loyal white people, and the good name and honour of my own beloved country.”7
In St. John’s, three former members of the House of Assembly and three former members of the Legislative Council, including Judge W.J. Browne of St. John’s District Court and J.S. Currie, publisher of the Daily News, took out a writ in the Supreme Court against the members of the Commission of Government and its chairman, Governor Gordon Macdonald, claiming that the steps taken by the Newfoundland government to pass the National Convention Act of 1946 and the Referendum Act of 1948 were unconstitutional and illegal. The suit was heard by Justice Brian Dunfield, who rejected the claim. Similarly Justices L.E. Emerson and J.A. Winter, both former commissioners, rejected the claim on appeal. The appellants were granted leave to take the case to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, but the British Parliament acted to transfer Newfoundland sovereignty to Canada before the case could be heard.
The House passed the Act, but not without much anguish and even resentment. David Gammans, an expert in imperial affairs, charged that the government had “landed the House in an absolutely awkward and unenviable position.… As it is, the Bill will leave a very nasty taste behind it.”8
In January 1949 Major Peter Cashin wrote to Louis St. Laurent, the new prime minister: “I reiterate my statement that your Government has been in collusion with the British Government and the Commission of Government in Newfoundland during the past few years in order to bring about the union. I repeat that both yourself and Prime Minister King have acted dishonestly in this whole matter and I leave it to history to confirm this statement.”9
But nothing now could stop the machinery of empire. As the great day for transition from one empire to another drew near, Paul Bridle worried that the mood in St. John’s was less than celebratory: “Unless Joe Smallwood plans to have some celebration on April 1st, which I hope he will not do, the position will be that April 1st and succeeding days will pass off quietly and the transition of Newfoundland to a Province of Canada will be brought about so quietly it will hardly be noticed here at all.”10 Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, the British high commissioner, who had long experience on the Newfoundland file, though ever optimistic, was not sanguine in the short term: “There is a feeling in Ottawa that the errant and high-spirited son who is now at last joining the family after running wild for so long a period may prove to be both unruly and prodigal but that the sacrifice and inconvenience will be well repaid in the long run.”11
It is no crime to be a “high-spirited son,” but in Clutterbuck’s eyes the Newfoundlanders were not only children but “errant” and “prodigal” as well. Canada, as head of the “family,” was the grown-up father, taking on the “sacrifice” and “inconvenience” of the troublesome youth in the cause of the British North American family. A sympathetic Clutterback concluded, Canada would in the long term be “well repaid”—C.D. Howe and Mitchell Sharp would make sure of that.
The documents of union were signed in Ottawa on March 31, 1949. Smallwood insisted that the date be moved back a day so that the event was not solemnized on April Fool’s Day. But fate cannot be denied, and, as many Newfoundlanders suspected, Newfoundland became at once Canada’s newest have-not province and its Confederation an April Fool’s joke. The day was marked in Ottawa with a large official celebration, complete with bunting and fine speeches by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and Gordon Bradley. The music for the Newfoundland national anthem could not be found, but it didn’t seem
to matter. The band simply played the national anthem of Canada in its place.
In St. John’s there were no celebrations and no disturbances. The populace accepted the results of the referendum with restraint, but the day did not pass without appropriate respect or dramatic gesture. In the silent city the streets gradually filled with supporters of responsible government, all wearing black armbands to mark the passing of the country of Newfoundland.
13
ALL FOR THE BEST
The final words in the preamble to the Memorandum of Agreement between Canada and Newfoundland of December 11, 1948, state that the Terms of Union have been settled by “authorized representatives of Canada” and “authorized representatives of Newfoundland.”1 But are these words true? This official designation of “authorized representatives” goes to the heart of the Anglo-Canadian plot to deprive Newfoundland of its right to actual self-determination. The statement flaunts an equality between the representatives of both countries which was simply non-existent. The Canadian representatives were certainly authorized by the elected government of Canada with all the power necessary to confederate with Newfoundland. But who had authorized the Newfoundland delegation?
The National Convention elected in Newfoundland in 1946 had authority only to “discuss” and “recommend,” and specifically not to “decide” or “negotiate.” Beyond that, only four of the seven delegates to Ottawa were elected delegates to that Convention. Albert Walsh, chairman of the delegation, was a commissioner in the Commission of Government that had been rejected in the First Referendum, while Gordon Winter and Philip Gruchy had simply been picked out of private life by the governor. The Newfoundland representatives were “authorized” by the Commission of Government and the British governor who chose them, and would be, as the Governor put it, “the right sort of people with whom the Canadians could deal.” None of them had any authority to sign over the sovereignty of their country to Canada. That authority was suddenly granted to them by the British government that had appointed them. The Terms of Union with Canada were accepted by that British government: “that the proposed Terms be reported, with recommendation for adoption by the Newfoundland delegation to the Governor in Commission, which will approve … and recommend that they be brought into effect by a United Kingdom statute.”2
The final Canadian terms were never debated, approved or ratified by any elected Newfoundland body, certainly not by the Newfoundland legislature. It had been suspended by the British in 1933, and it was kept suspended until Confederation with Canada was completed. This setup was confirmed by R.A. MacKay, the chairman of the Steering Sub-Committee of the Interdepartmental Committee on Newfoundland, on September 30, 1948, in his memo on the status of the Newfoundland Delegation: “The delegation last year consisted of the committee of the National Convention, and it was empowered only to enquire whether a fair and equitable basis of union existed. The present delegation will be expressly empowered to negotiate on behalf of Newfoundland. The word ‘negotiate’ is used in the Prime Minister’s statement of July 30, 1948).”3 MacKay might seem very proud of the inclusion of the word “negotiate,” but he continued: “The present delegation should, however, be regarded as representative of the Commission of Government[,] which has reserved to itself the position of principal in the negotiations.”4
The Dominions Office had ruled early on in this “bizarre experiment in dictatorship” that the secretary of state for dominions affairs was sovereign in all spheres over the Commission of Government in St. John’s.5 The Canadians were therefore negotiating not with any Newfoundland authority but with the British government. The improvised constitutional device of the National Convention and the appointed delegations had been merely a pseudo-democratic screen set up to conceal the real action between London and Ottawa. Although the Commission of Government “reserved to itself the position of principal in the negotiations” between Newfoundland and Canada, at no point in the long and painful process did the Commission of Government or the Commonwealth Relations Office ever question the Canadian terms. Never once did any of their officials say these terms were unfair or inadequate in any respect. The only opinion the British ever expressed about them was that they were “extremely generous,” even though it was known that the new province would not be able to exist under them. Clearly there were some British officials who sincerely believed that what they were doing in Newfoundland was the best possible solution. Without doubt, arranging for Newfoundland to enter into Confederation with Canada was a convenient and tidy resolution for the United Kingdom. True democracy, however, is rarely so convenient. When the Newfoundland electorate rejected Confederation in 1889, Governor Hill in Ottawa suggested to the colonial secretary, Lord Granville, that it should be imposed on Newfoundland. Lord Granville replied that the only way Newfoundland could join Canada was by action of the elected Newfoundland legislature, as laid out in the British North America Act of 1867. The Newfoundland Act of 1949 set the BNA Act aside and established a new precedent.
Before the debate on the Newfoundland Act in the British parliament in March 1949, Sir Alan Herbert received a summary of the situation in Newfoundland prepared by the Conservative Party. The conclusion read, “The verdict is likely to be the right thing done in the wrong way.”6 The majority of the written commentaries on Newfoundland’s union with Canada in 1949 have concluded that, despite collusion, deception and impropriety, it was “all for the best.” As Peter Neary put it: “Arguably, Newfoundland found greater independence within the loose structure of Canadian federalism than it could ever have achieved on its own.… All this, of course, means nothing if one believes as an article of faith that Newfoundland was a victim of an Anglo-Canadian plot.”7 But the entire point of the Anglo-Canadian plot was to deprive Newfoundland of regaining self-government and of representing its own interests with Canada on its own authority. Whether the delegates would have negotiated better or worse terms is simply not the point. As a people, Newfoundlanders had the right to self-determination, not British or Canadian determination. To say that manipulation of the democratic process in Newfoundland by Britain and Canada was “all for the best” would have us accept that the end does justify the means and that might makes right, and gives comfort to the same condescending and paternalistic attitudes which informed the Amulree Report and led to the destruction of Newfoundland’s democracy and reputation in 1933. Self-determination is, after all, the only protection against the actions of even well-meaning outsiders and autocrats. Commissioner Thomas Lodge, in condemning the entire British scheme in Newfoundland, concluded: “The [Amulree] Royal Commission had been misled in concluding that Newfoundland’s ills had stemmed from corrupt and spendthrift administrations rather than from economic causes beyond her control. From this misconception sprang all other errors in judgment on the part of the British Government.”8 History requires that, rather than trusting blindly in the motives of even benevolent dictators, we examine their actions with a jaundiced eye.
We cannot know whether Newfoundland would have been better off as a province of Canada than as an independent country. What we can know is the truth about how it was done—or we can at least come closer to it. That truth was kept from the Newfoundland and Canadian public for almost half a century, and it needs now to be acknowledged—to change minds and to improve attitudes.
In June 1947 Clifford Clark, the deputy minister of finance, remarked to American diplomat Joshua Harrington that he was afraid Newfoundland as a Canadian province would be “a little Ireland,” full of “disgruntled people.”9 He was not alone in his concern, and, not surprisingly, there has been discontent ever since on both sides. Given the way the deal was made, it would be incomprehensible if there were not. In all my research on this theme, I have read and heard nothing good about the way Newfoundland’s entry into Confederation was handled. The most commonly used words or phrases to describe it are “underhanded,” “dishonest,” “patronizing,” “improper,” “shabby,” “badly done” and “an unh
oly deal.” Whether the process was legal and binding may still be open to debate, and, if it were to be declared strictly legal, it would be so only because Great Britain wrote the law and could make it so. They could unilaterally void one law, the British North America Act of 1867, by writing another, the British North America Act 1949, and vary the terms of the Newfoundland Act of 1933 without the consent of the original party to that agreement.
It was this particular legal action that troubled Kenneth Wheare and other constitutional experts. After the Imperial Conference of 1926, the parliament of Great Britain could no longer pass laws affecting the dominions without the consent of the parliaments of those dominions. Newfoundland’s dominion status was in suspension, and the parliament of Great Britain could not pass the British North America Act 1949 to irrevocably change the status of the Dominion of Newfoundland without the consent of the parliament of Newfoundland. The right of the British parliament to pass such an Act, and the legality of the Act itself, are issues that have never been adequately resolved.
In returning responsible government to Newfoundland, there would have been no winners and no losers, merely the fulfillment of a contract and an occasion of great satisfaction and rejoicing. An elected Newfoundland government would have been a powerful body. By the calculations of the Finance Committee of the National Convention and an analysis by the Daily News, among others, an independent government in 1949 would have had a surplus of over $40 million, an expectation of reasonable prosperity for the near future, and no desperate need to join up with anybody. Alexander Clutterbuck and Philip Noel-Baker at the Commonwealth Relations Office presumed that an independent Newfoundland would soon run into financial difficulties. This view was not shared by Lord Beaverbrook, who had already stated publicly that a restored Dominion of Newfoundland had excellent prospects for financial prosperity. In addition, an elected Newfoundland government would have been in a very different position to address many issues not considered in the talks in Ottawa in 1948.