Caesar: Life of a Colossus

by Adrian Goldsworthy

  Caesar's portrait of Ahenobarbus is scarcely flattering, but our other sources were even less kind. It was claimed that he had decided to commit suicide and demanded that his physician supply him with poison. However, when he heard that Caesar was not executing his important prisoners, he immediately repented of his rashness and was delighted to be informed by his doctor that he had only taken a harmless draught. Domitius Ahenobarbus then went out to surrender to the man whose bitter opponent he had been for at least a decade. Altogether there were fifty senators and equestrians amongst the Pompeians who surrendered, probably on 21 February. Caesar had them brought before him, repeated the charges that he had been unfairly and illegally treated and forced into war, reminding some of them of personal favours he had done them in the past. After that, all were allowed to go free. Caesar had already followed the same policy earlier in the campaign, but never up to this point had so many or so distinguished a group received the benefit of his clemency. Ahenobarbus had brought 6 million sestertii of public money with him to provide pay for his troops. This was handed over to Caesar by the town's magistrates, but he ordered that it be sent back to his enemy, lest it be thought that `he was more restrained in dealing with men's lives, than their wealth'. The surrendered soldiers were asked to take an oath to him. Soon, these legions would go under Curio's command to fight for Caesar in Sicily and Africa."

  The clemency of Corfinium became famous, and his moderation formed a central part of Caesar's propaganda campaign. Everyone had expected him to behave like Sulla or Marius - or even, though few would dare to say it, like the Pompey who had earned the nickname of the `young butcher'. Instead his soldiers were kept under tight discipline, did not plunder and only fought when they were themselves resisted. Even his bitterest enemies were allowed to go free, although both Lentulus and Ahenobarbus went straight off to fight against him again. The overwhelming majority of people in Italy were apathetic to the issues about which the Civil War was being waged. Amongst the wider population both Pompey and Caesar were highly respected and seen as great servants of the Republic. If Caesar's legions had come marauding and slaughtering their way through Italy, then this might well have turned more of the population against him. His policy of clemency made practical sense. Armies failed to spring from the soil of Italy as Pompey had promised just a few months before. One senator acidly suggested that maybe it was about time the great man started stamping his foot. Very early on Pompey had decided that Rome was indefensible. At some point he reached the further conclusion that Caesar could not be beaten in Italy with two veteran, but possibly unreliable, legions, supported by the rawest of recruits. Instead he planned to shift the war away, taking his forces across the sea to Greece where they could be trained and a massive army gathered with the support of the eastern provinces. It was not a popular decision with other senators, and for this reason, as well as wanting to conceal his intentions from Caesar, he at first kept the idea to himself. The stand at Corfinium wasted the equivalent of three legions, but Pompey managed to concentrate the remainder of his forces at Brundisium (modern Brindisi). Merchant vessels were requisitioned and the process of shipping men and equipment over the Adriatic begun. It was a long and complex task, but Pompey had always excelled at organisation on a massive scale and set about the task with all his accustomed skill. 12

  Caesar arrived outside Brundisium on 9 March. He had six legions, the veteran Eighth, Twelfth and Thirteenth, along with some new recruits and presumably the cohorts from Transalpine Gaul, some of whom were soon to be formally converted into a legion, the Fifth Alaudae - the name meant the `Larks', probably from its distinctive feathered crest or shield design. Pompey had only a rearguard of two legions awaiting shipment. Caesar set his men to building booms to close off the narrow entrance to the harbour. The defenders put their own engineering skills to good use to prevent this. There were further attempts at negotiation, but none came to anything. Pompey once again refused Caesar's plea for a personal meeting. Then, when they were at last ready, the Pompeians evacuated the town during the night of 17 March. Pompey escaped with virtually all his men, apart from two ships that ran aground on the boom built by Caesar's men. The townsfolk - at last able to express their resentment against the Pompeians according to Caesar, but doubtless also through a keenness to avoid rough treatment at the hands of the legionaries - pointed out the traps built by the enemy to cause casualties amongst Caesar's men. Pompey had got away with a substantial force, around which he could in time build a great army. Then, when he was ready he could invade Italy from Greece just as Sulla had done so successfully. As Pompey so often declared, `Sulla did it, why shouldn't I?'13

  ROME

  For the moment Caesar could not follow The Pompeians had gathered up and taken most of the merchant ships from the region, and it would take a long time to collect and bring vessels from elsewhere. Caesar was not inclined to wait, sitting on the defensive and handing the initiative back to his opponents. It was now spring, the opening of the proper campaigning season when armies found it easier to operate. The bulk of his own army - some seven legions along with numerous allies and auxiliaries - was still north of the Alps. Pompey's best legions were in the Spanish Peninsula, cut off from their commander and led by his legates. At the moment they were still passive but it was unlikely that this would last forever, especially if Caesar massed all his forces and prepared for a seaborne invasion of Greece. He did not need a fleet of ships to reach Spain, neither would the enemy forces there have much difficulty marching on Gaul or Italy. In contrast it would take many months for Pompey to form and train an army, so that there was no real prospect of his trying to invade Italy from Greece during 49 BC. Yet Pompey was not inactive and he and his allies planned to cut off the food supplies going to Italy from the provinces. Defeating the armies in Spain would deprive Pompey of his best troops and weaken him, even if it would not be the decisive encounter of the war. It was beneficial and, most important of all, it was possible. Without hesitation Caesar decided to attack the Pompeians in Spain. He joked that he was going to fight `an army without a general', and that then he would deal with `a general without an army' when he went to confront Pompey in Greece. In the meantime Curio would go to secure Sicily and ensure that it continued to ship its surplus crops to Italy. Another force went to take Sardinia.14

  Caesar had military control of all of Italy, for not a single walled town or city resisted him. He was eager to hasten to Spain since time was not on his side, and as every month passed Pompey would only continue to grow stronger. Most of the magistrates had gone with his opponents, as had some distinguished senators. Many more remained in Italy but had yet to commit themselves to either side. Caesar wanted the Senate to meet and hoped to give every impression that the organs of the State continued to function even at this time of crisis. His enemies claimed that they represented the true Republic. Caesar wanted to challenge this and show that the State continued to function in Rome, where it was supposed to be, and so to make clear that his cause was legitimate, that he did not fight against the Republic, but against a faction that had usurped power. As a result he wanted as many senators as possible to attend the meeting that was called for 1 April. Cicero was still in Italy, and in a series of letters Caesar's associates tried to persuade him to attend. The orator had worked hard to avoid the situation developing into war in the first place and had been dismayed by the militant enthusiasm he had seen in others. When war began, he was appalled by the speed with which Rome was abandoned, and then even more disgusted when he realised that Pompey planned to evacuate Italy altogether. Cicero felt an old and deep loyalty to Pompey as a man, and from the beginning his instinct and judgement had dictated that whatever happened, he must in the end be on the same side. Pompey had often disappointed him, not always giving him the praise he wanted, forming the alliance with Crassus and Caesar and, most of all, abandoning him to his fate when Clodius had forced Cicero into exile. Nevertheless, the deep affection remained, along with the hope th
at the great man would one day live up to what the orator believed was his full potential to be a force for good within the Republic. Yet since his return from exile Pompey and others had encouraged him to develop a friendship with Caesar. Apart from the warm correspondence, the involvement in Caesar's building plans and Quintus' service in Gaul, Cicero himself had received a major loan from Caesar. In the months leading up to the war this had greatly exercised him, as he had no wish to be seen as having been bought by Caesar, still less of fighting against him in order to avoid the debt."

  Cicero had not welcomed his posting as governor of Cilicia, but had taken care to perform his duties well. In a campaign against the tribes of Mount Amanus he - or in truth his more experienced legates - had won a minor victory. Though scarcely a military man, the orator was desperately eager to be awarded a triumph for this success. In 50 BC the Senate had voted him a public thanksgiving, a common preliminary to the greater honour. Cato had opposed the motion and later primly informed Cicero that this was because he felt it would be better to honour him for his good and honest administration, since this was of far more worth to the Republic. Curio had at first also been hostile. Days of thanksgiving prevented public business from being conducted and he may have been worried that Caesar's opponents would seek to gain advantage through manipulating the calendar in this way. However, Caesar swiftly instructed the tribune to back the claim and in the end the motion passed easily. Salt was rubbed into the wound when Cato successfully put forward a vote awarding twenty days of thanksgiving to Bibulus, who had campaigned in the same mountains as Cicero, which bordered Cilicia and his own province of Syria. Cato's sonin-law had achieved little and had in fact suffered at least one serious defeat. Granting him an honour at all was questionable, but one of this length was absurd, yet presumably it was felt that he should be granted a number of days surpassing those ever given to Pompey and only equalled by Caesar. Cicero accepted the hypocrisy necessary for success in politics. His predecessor in Cilicia had been Appius Claudius, who had plundered the province for his own gain. Privately Cicero described his actions as those of a `wild beast', but he was invariably scrupulously polite, even warm, in his dealings with Claudius himself. Nevertheless Cato's actions left a bitter taste. Caesar wrote to Cicero after the vote congratulating him, doubtless encouraging his hopes for a triumph, and crowing over his old adversary's double standards. 16

  Cicero was in a difficult position when the Civil War began. He had not yet laid down his proconsular imperium for he could not do this until he celebrated his longed for triumph. Therefore he was still attended by lictors and had the right to command troops. Much as he disapproved of the attitude and behaviour of Pompey, Cato, Domitius Ahenobarbus and their associates, he did not feel that he could side against such men or fail to support the legally elected consuls of the year. He was given the task of raising troops, but soon gave this up as impractical and played no active part in the campaign. Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon he thought an appalling crime, but his attitude softened a little when he heard of the clement treatment of the captured Pompeians. Cicero wrote to commend him, especially in the case of Lentulus, who had supported him in 63 BC. Cut off from Pompey at Brundisium - admittedly Cicero made no great effort to reach him since he hated his strategy of leaving Italy - he waited events at one of his country villas. In early March, probably before Brundisium fell, Caesar had written a brief letter to the orator, urging him to:

  have no doubt that I have many times been grateful to you, and look forward to having even more reason to be grateful to you in the future. This is no more than you deserve. First, though, I implore you, since I expect that I shall swiftly come to Rome, that I may see you there, and draw on your counsel, goodwill, dignity, and assistance of every kind. I will close as I began. Please excuse my haste and the brevity of this

  Cicero responded on 19 March, writing to ask exactly what Caesar meant by his `goodwill' and `assistance'. He repeated his willingness to work for peace, as long as this protected `our mutual friend Pompey', for the Republic would benefit most if the two men were reconciled. On the 26th Caesar wrote again, thanking Cicero for commending his clemency, and noted that `there was nothing further from my nature than cruelty'. Again Caesar urged him to come to Rome, this time saying that he wanted his `counsel and resources'. Another incentive was the presence with the Caesarean army of the orator's son-in-law Publius Cornelius Dolabella, and Caesar assured the orator of the favour in which the young man was held. Two days later the two men met at Formiae. Cicero was determined not to be used and staunchly resisted the pressure to come to Rome:

  He kept saying that my refusal was a condemnation of him, which would make others less likely to come, if I did not go. After a lot of talk, [Caesar said] `Well come then, and talk about peace.' `As a free agent?' I asked. He said, `Should I tell you what to say!' `In that case,' I said, `I will argue that the Senate cannot approve your taking an army to Spain or transporting one to Greece. And more than that,' I went on, `I shall deplore Cnaeus' [i.e. Pompey's] fate.' So then he said, `I really do not want you to say that.' `That's what I thought, but I do not want to go there, because I will either have to say that and more besides, about which I cannot hold my tongue, if I am present, or else I cannot go.'

  Caesar urged Cicero to think the matter over. The latter was convinced that Caesar had no great love for him at present, but felt that he had regained some self-respect. There was a definite hint of menace when Caesar concluded by saying brusquely that if Cicero would not advise him, he would seek guidance from others. The commander's officers were a motley crew in the orator's opinion, making the threat seem more ominous."

  The Senate met on the appointed day, summoned by the tribunes Antony and Cassius, and convened outside the formal boundary of the city so that the proconsul Caesar could attend. In itself this was proper, although subsequently Cicero at least was unwilling to accept it as a proper meeting rather than an informal gathering. The turnout was poor, and most notable of all was the absence of distinguished men. Even so Caesar used this as a public opportunity to repeat his grievances - that all he had wanted was the right to exercise privileges granted to him legitimately by the tribunes, but that Pompey's attitude had changed over time. It was the bitter hatred of his personal enemies who had forced him to war. More practically Caesar requested that senatorial envoys be sent to negotiate with Pompey and effect a reconciliation. Caesar declared his own ambition was to display the same gifts in `justice and equity' as he displayed in action. The motion was approved, but no one was willing to go. Always a popularis, Caesar did not confine his attentions to the Senate. Antony summoned the Concilium Plebis to vote on a number of measures. Before the meeting Caesar addressed a gathering of the people, again explaining his actions and blaming his opponents for the war. He assured them that the city would continue to receive the grain it needed, and even promised to give every citizen a gift of 300 sestertii. As in the Senate, the reception seems to have been muted. The memories of the vicious reprisals inflicted by Marius and Sulla still lingered and the way the war would develop was unclear. In the Commentaries Caesar claims that Pompey had threatened to treat even those who stayed in Italy as if they had sided with Caesar. In the end, most people of all classes felt no strong attachment to either side, wanted to be neutral and simply hoped to survive the Civil War unscathed. Some were convinced by Caesar's words and attitude, but most remained wary. The only open resistance to Caesar came from one of the tribunes, Lucius Caecilius Metellus, who began by hindering him in the Senate.19

  The main confrontation came when Caesar decided to make use of the State Treasury. The conquest of Gaul had made him wealthy, but he had never been one to hoard his money and had spent freely to will the loyalty of his army and men like Curio and Aemilius Paullus. He was now faced with the cost of supporting a truly enormous war effort. In just a few months he had added three new legions and numbers of recruits to the ten legions, independent cohorts and auxiliaries that he had
controlled at the start of the year. In time additional forces would be raised. All of these men had to be paid - it was especially unwise to give any cause for discontent to soldiers who had once served with the enemy. More than that these armies needed to be equipped and fed. In Gaul Caesar had relied heavily on allied communities to supply him with food, but the conditions of civil war were different. Not all provincial and allied communities would side with him, but it was important to avoid treating those who did not too harshly, for in the end he must hope to win them over to his cause. Where necessary Caesar would have to pay for a good deal of his armies' requirements. Crassus had boasted that only a man who could raise an army from his own resources could truly call himself rich. Caesar was rich, but he was now being called upon to fund a conflict on a massive scale, and no individual possessed that much money.

  However, when he went to the Treasury - or perhaps sent men, since this would otherwise have meant crossing the boundary of the city - Metellus stood in front of the doors and imposed his veto. The Treasury was housed in the Temple of Saturn in the Forum. The consuls had left the door locked and barred, taking the key with them, but the soldiers ignored the tribune and chopped it down with axes. In Plutarch's version blacksmiths had to be summoned to perform this task, and there was a confrontation between Caesar and Metellus outside the building. As the tribune repeatedly tried to halt the work, Caesar's temper flared up and he threatened to kill him. As Metellus at last backed down, Caesar declared that it was harder for a man of his natural clemency to make such a threat than it would be for him actually to do the deed. The man who had proclaimed that he was championing the rights of the tribunes in January was now as ready as his opponents had been to override and threaten one of these magistrates. He had never hidden the fact that his greatest aim was to protect his own dignitas. Now that war had come the only way to do that was to win, and in order to win he needed cash. The money was taken - 15,000 gold bars, 30,000 silver bars and no less than 30 million sestertii. In addition, Caesar took a special fund kept over the centuries in case there was a repeat of the Gallic attack on Rome in 390 BC. Caesar announced that there was no longer any need of this since he had permanently dealt with the threat from the Gauls. Even so, he made no mention of any of this in the Commentaries, merely noting that Metellus, spurred on by his enemies, was generally obstructive.20