One of the most fruitful sources of information to our Department would have been the Post Office, which controlled the delivery of correspondence throughout the country, the dispatch of all telegrams and the working of the telephone system. In those days the Crown forces depended mainly for inter-communication on the telephone and telegraph systems. We possessed the key to the R.I.C. code, which was changed monthly. Through this channel we were able to forestall Crown forces’ raids, impending arrests, etc., but, due to the fact that our helpers in this department were so few, the results obtained were far from complete. Similarly, in the postal dispatch departments and letter sorting offices, we had very few helpers, and, although the members of the Crown forces used the mails freely, the amount of information gathered through interception, raids on mails, etc. was rather limited, due to lack of co-operators. In the Central Telegraph Office, Liam Archer, and in the principal Sorting Office, Paddy Moynihan (nom-de-plume 118) were the most important aides.
The Post Office aides invariably left their information for Michael Collins’s perusal at addresses in Parnell Street, viz: Jim Kirwan, publican, Knocknagow dairy shop, and Liam Devlin, publican. They were the principal rendezvous for these people.
Before leaving the subject of postal assistance, it is well to mention that the Director received valuable information from some postal officials he personally dealt with who were engaged on the mail boats, and from London through Sam Maguire, who was in charge of that city on his behalf.
Amongst the important information that was supplied were particulars of the Castle mails, including Lord French’s mails and how they were transmitted, and the plan of the Sorting Office in the Rink, from which Government mails were subsequently seized. In certain cases, copies of telegrams in code were forwarded to us, and in some instances, letters going to a particular individual who was a suspect came into our hands likewise.
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE.
Counter Intelligence was organised traditionally through the police. In Dublin city the ‘G’ Division controlled all political information, and in the country the Special Crimes Branch of the R.I.C. did likewise. In addition to these two sources of information, the British army had a military Intelligence Service which was conducted in Dublin by Major S.S. Hill Dillon. During 1921, the British Secret Service established an independent Intelligence Unit principally in Dublin, which worked, it is believed, directly with the Cabinet in London through the War Office. Agents of the latter body were identified by us, as these lived as civilians in the City, following fictitious occupations and participating, to a limited degree, in what was their final objective – the elimination of active I.R.A. leaders through secret murder. Many of these Agents were executed on 21st November 1920, before their operational plan was put into effective action.
In Dublin the ‘G’ Division operated with open contempt for the Volunteers until some of their members had been shot. After these shootings ‘G’ Division were ‘confined to barracks’ in the Castle and were thus immobilised from active detection work.
In this body there were two or three officials who co-operated with our Department and supplied valuable information to counteract the activities of the Crown forces. These were Jim McNamara, David Neligan, whom I met frequently and Ned Broy, whom Collins himself met. These men had channels of contact through very reliable intermediaries. In many instances, I or another member of our staff had, at short notice, to meet them adjacent to the Castle in the street. There we learned of intended raids, the location of prisoners, etc. The assistance of those men cannot be sufficiently recognised, due to the fact that they alone were able to confirm beyond doubt the activities of suspects whom we had under observation.
The Director of Intelligence was in touch with contacts in the prison service, warders in Mountjoy Jail – Daly and Peter Breslin. In the R.I.C. he received valuable intelligence from Sergeant McCarthy, stationed in Belfast in the County Inspector’s office.
In the Auxiliary Division of the R.I.C. we had assistance from an Englishman, Sergeant Reynolds of ‘F’ Coy. stationed in Dublin Castle. He supplied information through a friend of his, Bríghid Foley, whom he first met during a raid.
As regards the R.I.C., this Force did not operate in the city of Dublin, but a few friendly members were contacted in the counties where they were stationed. Their headquarters were located at the Depot, Phoenix Park.
The British Military Intelligence Department operated from the Dublin District office at Royal Barracks. Contact was never established with this body other than through the efforts of a typist, Miss Mernin, at a late stage in the struggle.
From the Intelligence Officer of the 1st Southern Division (Florrie O’Donoghue) copies of radiograms intercepted were forwarded to our office for decoding, but, as all these were in the British Naval numerical code, we were unsuccessful in decyphering [sic] them until after the Truce.
In Dublin city at any rate, the main sources of information to the Castle, in addition to police reports, were anonymous letters, telephone calls which we were unsuccessful in intercepting, and material supplied from what was known as the loyalist element.
The ‘G’ Division depended, as also did the Secret Service, for much of their information on particulars supplied, mainly about individuals, by newsvendors, hotel porters, policemen, as well as the ordinary police reports. For instance, Barton of the ‘G’ Division was held in the highest esteem by the publicans, pawnbrokers and other commercial men, due to the fact that he had established a unique method in the tracing of petty larceny and illegal pawning of stolen goods. In carrying out his routine police duties, he had many newsvendors and minor thieves of the pickpocket variety in his power, and he utilised this type of informer for checking up on the movements of prominent wanted Volunteers. After Barton’s demise, informers of this type were contacted by other members of the counter Intelligence Service, and became commonly known as ‘touts’. It was one of these ‘touts’, Pike, who followed Dan Breen and Sean Treacy from Fleming’s of Drumcondra to Fernside, and it was another of these, ‘Chanters’ Ryan, who successfully discovered the hideout during curfew hours, of Dick McKee and Peadar Clancy, from which they were taken prisoner and subsequently shot. At the time of this occurrence, Ryan was serving as a military policeman, but lived in a disreputable neighbourhood in Dublin.
TYPE OF CONTACTS.
Outside those already referred to, the services of friendly waiters, hotel porters, railway officials and, in fact, anyone in a position to supply or confirm information relative to the activity of Crown agents was solicited and utilised. In this connection the elimination of spies was assisted through the medium of reports thus received. This type of helper was contacted by members of our staff. In reality, the number of dependable assistants in this category was strictly limited. The receipt of information was important, but more important still was the necessity for complete silence on the part of our informants, as failure to observe this would have frustrated the work of our Department, as well as possibly leading to the elimination of ourselves. Offers of assistance were many, but the integrity and resourcefulness of the would-be informants in many cases did not qualify them for inclusion in our network of helpers.
If, as a result of information supplied by a hotel aide, shooting accrued, this individual, as well as other members of the hotel staff, was subject to a ‘grilling’ by the Crown forces. Anyone known to have sympathies with Sinn Féin would receive special attention by the Authorities. Such an examination could possibly result in the informant double-crossing us, with unhappy results.
When we got offers of assistance we first had to make up our minds whether we could trust them or not, and then we could only tell them very little. There was the danger that, in their enthusiasm to give information, they would go and ask other people for information without exercising proper caution.
One of our greatest sources of information in the tracing of movements of prominent personages was the society columns of newspapers, cover
ing banquets, dinners, etc. Also ‘Who’s Who’, which enabled us to trace the clubs, hobbies, etc. of these people, as well as Press photographs taken at Castle or similar functions. In our Crow St. office we kept an alphabetical card index of all known enemy agents, Auxiliary Cadets, R.I.C. men, etc. Any information as to their movements, whereabouts or intentions obtained from the Press in this manner was tabulated and circulated to the country Volunteers, if it concerned them. Photographs were studied by our staff, and in many instances our identification, on the street or elsewhere, of these individuals was made possible through a study of their photographs.
G.H.Q. PERSONNEL, CROW ST. AND LATER BRUNSWICK STREET.
Michael Collins was Director of Intelligence. He operated from his own personal office in the daytime and saw his lieutenants at night. Liam Tobin was Deputy D.I., and Tom Cullen was Assistant D.I.
The staff consisted of Frank Thornton, Joe Dolan, Joe Guilfoyle, Paddy Caldwell (later transferred to ‘An t-Oglach’ staff), myself, Frank Saurin, Charlie Byrne, Peter McGee, Dan McDonnell, Ned Kellegher, James Hughes, Con O’Neill, Bob O’Neill, Jack Walsh and Paddy Kennedy.
Jimmy Murray was, I believe, a member of 6th Battalion and acted as Battalion I.O. Murray resided in Kingstown and was at one time employed on the boats.
Shortly before the Truce, Murray and Dan McDonnell were our contacts with Dave Neligan, who was then residing with another Secret Service man (Woolley) in Kingstown, having left the ‘G’ Division, on the instructions of Michael Collins, to join the British Secret Service proper.
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND HIS STAFF.
During the daytime Michael Collins worked from an office of his own, and at no time did he visit the Crow St. or Brunswick St. offices. Inter-communication was maintained by his special messenger, Joe O’Reilly. In the evening time Michael Collins used to meet Liam Tobin and Tom Cullen at one of his numerous rendezvous in the Parnell Square area – these were Jim Kirwan’s, Vaughan’s Hotel and Liam Devlin’s.
In the earlier years Michael Collins used to meet these men at 46 Parnell Square and at McCarthy’s in Mountjoy St. They were all on the run and on many occasions they stayed together, sometimes at Joe O’Reilly’s lodgings, Smith’s of Lindsay Road, and on other occasions at Paddy O’Shea’s house in Lindsay Road.
Michael Collins used as his personal office Miss Hoey’s house in Mespil Road; also Mary St., and finally Harcourt Terrace. I was on duty at the Harcourt Terrace office, which was an ordinary dwelling-house, furnished as such, and in the front bedroom the D.I. had his papers. These were concealed in a secret cupboard on the landing, in which he himself could take refuge should the house be raided while he was in occupation.
It was from his personal office that Michael Collins dealt with all the Brigade and country Intelligence reports.
ENEMY AGENTS AND SPIES.
Following the death in action of Sean Treacy, we received information through our contacts in the Special Branch in the Castle that Sergeant Roche and Constable Fitzgerald were in Dublin. They had come to Dublin from Tipperary to identify the remains of Treacy, and, evidently, to be available, if required, in the search for Dan Breen who had escaped, wounded.
On 17th October 1920, I was in touch with Dave Neligan, who told me that the wanted men would probably be dining in the Ormond Hotel that day, having left the Castle to do so. Neligan first arranged that he would take them to lunch and would indicate to me that they were the wanted men. Something went wrong with this arrangement, but nevertheless, the squad took up positions around Grattan Bridge. Neligan came along on his own and bumped into the two R.I.C. men who had left the Ormond and were on their way back. He conversed with them, and after parting from them, he gave the pre-arranged signal by waving his handkerchief. Those of the squad nearest to the R.I.C. men opened fire on them, fatally wounding Roche, but Fitzgerald escaped by running up Capel Street. Both men were wearing civilian clothing.
We understood that Sergeant Roche was a particularly active Crimes Special man, and his gloating over the corpse of Treacy had irritated even some of his own associates.
D.I. O’Sullivan of the R.I.C. was employed by the British in a clerical capacity. He had made the acquaintance of a lady employed in Messrs. Arnott’s, and she subsequently became his fiancée. While waiting for her coming from business in Henry St. he was shot on the 12th December 1920, by members of the squad on instructions from Intelligence Office.
Through information received through one of our contacts employed as a waiter in the Wicklow Hotel, it was confirmed that Doran, the night porter, was in contact with enemy Intelligence officers during curfew hours, and instructions were received that he was to be liquidated. Several efforts were made to carry the order into effect and on 28th January 1921, our contact in the hotel, Paddy O’Shea, raised the restaurant blind, indicating that the man then leaving the hotel was Doran. Doran walked in the direction of some of the waiting squad who acted on my signal and shot him. Subsequently Doran’s widow communicated to Michael Collins that her husband had been shot by Crown forces and that she was in dire straits financially. Rather than tell her the true facts, Collins instructed that she receive financial assistance.
Arising out of a letter which had been intercepted in the course of post by one of Collins’s sorters, the location of the writer, Captain Cecil Lees, was discovered. Captain Lees had not been in Dublin very long when he wrote the letter (reproduced in facsimile in Piaras Beaslai’s ‘Michael Collins’) to a friend of his in the War Office, indicating that he had been in touch with Major S.S. Hill Dillon, District G.S.O., Intelligence Branch, Dublin District, Royal Barracks. From the nature of the text it was clear that Captain Lees was a British Secret Service Agent engaged in the preliminary surveying of prospects for the murder of Irish leaders. This communication was sent to the Director of Intelligence for his instructions and was returned with the comment: ‘“Oggs” him’. This was the code word for the immediate execution of Captain Lees. I and other Intelligence officers, with members of the squad, took up positions each morning endeavouring to intercept Lees leaving his hotel, and on one such morning when he left at an early hour, I think about nine o’clock, he was shot on his way to the Castle.
Brady and Halpin were shot on 4th June 1921 by members of F/Company, 2nd Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Danny Lyons. They had been acting as touts in conveying information to the Crown forces. The information relative to their activities had been supplied through the Brigade Intelligence officers.
Robert Pike was shot on 18th June 1921. He was a member of the tinker class and lived in Tolka Cottages, Drumcondra. I believe he was an ex-soldier who had been in the world war, and he was conveying information to the Crown forces. There was an unconfirmed statement that he had reported on Dan Breen’s and Sean Treacy’s movements from Fleming’s of Drumcondra to Fernside.
Appleford and Bennett were two Auxiliary cadets of F/Company and were shot in Grafton St. in an abortive encircling movement on 24th June 1921. It was intended to enclose Grafton St. and shoot any members of the Crown forces who happened to be there. These two individual cadets, Appleford and Bennett, had been recognised by the Intelligence present, from a marked photograph of F/Company of the Auxiliaries which had been supplied to the Intelligence Department by Sergeant Reynolds, already referred to. The general intention was that anyone in Grafton St. who was fashionably dressed and believed to be an enemy agent was to be shot.
The Director of Intelligence received a report from a veterinary student, Sean Hyde, who was living in 20 Lower Mount St., to the effect that there were two suspects by the names of McMahon and Anglis, living in No. 21 Lower Mount St., where a number of medical students were lodging. I was instructed to investigate and I met Hyde, who gave me all the facts. It would appear that one of these men, McMahon, had been out during curfew on the night that Mr. Lynch of Kilmallock had been shot by Crown forces in the Exchange Hotel, Parliament St. These suspects did not go out in the daytime except to an
ex-servicemen’s club, known as the South Irish Horse Club, in Merrion Square. They also occasionally visited a billiards saloon at the rear of a tobacconist shop in Mount St. This was owned by a Mr. Kerr who was not sympathetic to the movement.
I duly reported back, and instructions were issued that these men were to be shot if they could be intercepted on the street. I was working on this assignment with some members of the Squad, on some occasions with Tom Keogh, Joe Leonard and others. We were unsuccessful in sighting the wanted men. One of Hyde’s friends reported one evening that the two men had gone into Kerr’s billiards saloon. On this occasion I was accompanied only by Joe Leonard. We went into the saloon, in which there was one table, and two gentlemen were playing billiards. The only description I had of McMahon, who was the principal party, was that he wore a signet ring on a finger of his left hand. We sat down on the seat and decided that when the man who was wearing the ring came to our side of the table we would fire. While thus engaged, preparatory to taking action, Hyde’s friend, Conny O’Leary, rushed in and said that McMahon had gone back into his house.
On a check-up afterwards, it appeared that while McMahon had, in fact, entered the shop, he had gone to an upstairs apartment to see a girl, and was not the individual we had seen in the billiards saloon.
We continued after McMahon for a day or two, but the Director of Intelligence deferred action in view of reports which had come to hand concerning the location of other suspects residing in various parts of the city.
THE RE-ARMAMENT OF THE VOLUNTEERS AFTER 1916.
When I joined the Volunteers there were very few arms held by members of the Dublin Brigade, and it became one of our regular duties to report on and seize arms either at private houses or from government sources when opportunity arose.
After the first shooting activities by the Volunteers, it was discovered that a source of supply, viz: serving Tommies, for ammunition was being exploited by the Castle authorities for the issuing surreptitiously of explosive revolver ammunition to Volunteers. Fortunately, information of this move was received, and a general warning was issued to all Volunteers to examine their .45 revolver ammunition for any rounds which bore an imprint ‘Z.Z.’ as these were explosive cartridges.
Espionage and Assasination with Michael Collins' Intelligence Unit: With the Dublin Brigade Page 13
