In addition to these activities, I participated in many actions, including the seizure of arms from Messrs Guinness’s boat ‘the Clarecastle’, the filling of home-made hand grenades with gelignite, the attempted shooting of hangmen on arrival at Dublin to carry out executions, attempted rescues of prisoners in military custody (Barton, the T.D., at Blessington St., and Dan Breen from the Mater Hospital, after being wounded at Fernside), and the encirclement of Grafton St. shortly before the Truce.
SPECIAL MISSION TO LONDON.
Before I was actually attached to the Intelligence Department, but in the period during which I had carried out a few jobs with the brigade or squad, the brigadier sent for me and I met him at 44 or 46 Parnell Square. Several other Volunteers selected from the different companies were there also, but Dick McKee and Peadar Clancy interviewed us individually. I was asked had I ever been to London, and I said I had not. I was then asked would I be prepared to go there on a special mission and I said ‘certainly’. I was told to be available to travel at short notice, but no further instructions were received about this, so I did not make the trip across.
It was stated afterwards that the object of this visit to London was the shooting of members of the British Cabinet, at the instigation of the Minister for Defence, Cathal Brugha. From stories I heard subsequently, it would appear that the Director of Intelligence, Michael Collins, opposed the plan as being as impracticable and out of harmony with his own plans.
RAIDS ON MAILS.
The first of these was the seizure of the Castle mails at Lower Dominick St., en route to the Castle from the Rink. This raid was carried out by the squad under Mick McDonnell’s command. In the party were Tom Keogh, Jim Slattery, Vinnie Byrne and myself; there may have been one or two others, but I cannot recollect them.
The next raid was on the chief sorting office in the Rink, and was carried out by a party of Volunteers selected by the Vice-Commandant of the 2nd Battalion, Oscar Traynor. As it took place immediately before I joined the Intelligence Staff, I was acting under the command of Traynor on that occasion.
I was in the first party to approach the Rink, and entered the building by going down the mail chutes for the bags. Joe Dolan and another Intelligence Officer had already entered the building and joined our party in holding up the postal staff.
This raid was made possible by the information and maps supplied by one of our contacts, Patrick Moynihan (118), indicating the layout of the Rink and the section where the Government mails were sorted and held.
It is interesting to note that an armoured car always accompanied the mails in transit, and that the building was equipped with alarm bells direct to the Castle. Fortunately, the raid was carried out with such swiftness that we were able to frustrate any attempt to give an alarm, and all government mails for the various Departments were successfully seized. These included mails for the R.I.C., Under-Secretary, Viceroy, military, etc.
The third raid was on Ballsbridge post office. While operating with the Intelligence Department, we received a report that the newly-formed Auxiliary Division with their headquarters at Beggars Bush Barracks, sent a tender of Cadets each morning at about nine o’clock to collect their mails at Ballsbridge post office.
Having surveyed the collections, I submitted a report which was transferred to the Brigadier for local action, and a successful seizure of the Auxiliaries’ mails was made.
The knowledge gained through captured documents was of great value to us. Not alone was the information thus obtained of military importance, but the fact that the transmission of mails became unreliable deterred many would-be informers from sending information through the post.
As a matter of interest, the addresses obtained from the private correspondence of Auxiliary Cadets helped to establish the identity of these people, together with their home addresses in Great Britain. After the burning and sacking of Irish towns, reprisals were taken by the I.R.A. in Great Britain by burning some of the Cadets’ homes.
Arising out of the initial shootings and raids for mails, large sums were offered by way of rewards to the people of Dublin for information which would lead to the arrest of the participants.
ATTEMPTED RESCUE OF Robert BARTON, T.D., AT BERKELEY ROAD.
On 12th February 1920, on instructions from the brigadier, we took up positions at the junction of Mountjoy St., Berkeley Road and Nelson St. We had been advised that Barton, who was on trial in the Dublin police courts, would be removed to Mountjoy jail in a military van.
When the military van was approaching, some of the Volunteers present ran out a handcart containing painter’s ladders, thus stopping the progress of the van. We drew our pistols and surrounded the van. In the excitement one of the Volunteers discharged his revolver, wounding himself in the leg. However, Barton was not with the party in the van, and as they were unarmed, they were allowed to proceed on their way. Major C[a]rew was in charge of the British party, and appealed to us not to lose our heads and shoot them.
PLAN FOR THE WIPING OUT OF THE POLITICAL BRANCH OF ‘G’ DIVISION IN ONE ACTION.
In September 1920, before becoming a whole-time member of the Intelligence Department, when I was assisting the squad, I was instructed to accompany Paddy Daly and Joe Leonard and report with other members of the squad for an operation to be carried out outside the Upper Castle Yard in the maze of alley-ways that approached the rear entrance of to [sic] S.S. Michael and John’s Church.
We took up the various positions indicated by Mick McDonnell, and we were advised that a party of the political branch of ‘G’ Division would leave from the Upper Castle Yard on their way to eight o’clock Mass in the church mentioned, as was their habit. This was the only occasion that these much-wanted men left the Castle during the week.
Tom Cullen, who was the Assistant Director of Intelligence, took up a position quite close to the Castle Gate, and on a signal from him the job was to proceed. The reason that this signal was necessary before action taking place was to safeguard McNamara should he be a member of the party leaving the Castle, as happened. On the first occasion the job was abortive for this reason. Each subsequent Sunday we took up positions, but the job was called off on the spot, due to the fact that Terry McSwiney was not dead. The latter had been on hunger-strike for a lengthy period, and Collins deferred action until such time as McSwiney would die, so that this would be a fitting climax. In all, we took up positions on four or five Sundays.
BRITISH MILITARY FIRED ON AT NEWCOMEN BRIDGE.
On a Sunday morning early in the month of October 1920, accompanied by Joe Leonard of the squad, we called to collect Paddy Daly at his residence, Bessboro’ Avenue, North Strand, shortly after curfew had ended. We were proceeding shortly after 7 o’clock to report to Michael McDonnell at Saints Michael and John’s in connection with the attempted ambush of members of the political branch of the ‘G’ Division.
Approaching Newcomen Bridge, a lorry containing British Tommies passed us by and pulled up on the Canal Bridge, the soldiers taking up positions on the bridge for search and hold-up purposes. The three of us turned sharply at left angles down Ossory Road where we crossed a wall on to the railway lines. We took Daly’s gun from him and he proceeded to join the squad at its rendezvous, having to pass through the military picket. As daylight broke, we saw a sergeant and some soldiers walking down the railway in our direction, so we decamped and proceeded along the link-line towards Drumcondra. From each overhead bridge we could see a military party on each corresponding canal bridge. At 8.30 a.m., which was approximately the time the squad would be returning, we decided to fire on the military holding Binn’s Bridge, Drumcondra. We both emptied our pistols – I was using a mauser (a peter-the-painter) and Leonard, a colt (.45), and we saw two soldiers fall as a result of our fire. The range was approximately 200 yards. We proceeded along the railway for about a quarter of a mile and climbed down on to the roadway in the neighbourhood of my house. We continued along to Botanic Avenue to the house of a Volunteer Gogg
ins where we left our arms.
As a result of the unexpected attack, the military cordon was withdrawn from all canal bridges and the roads left free again.
Subsequently, Brigadier McKee sent for me and asked me what was in my mind in firing on the soldiers. He seemed to be satisfied with the explanation I gave him. Shortly afterwards, this action was cited in ‘An t-Oglach’ as a splendid example of initiative and, as far as I know, this was the first occasion on which British military had been fired on since the Insurrection. Following this incident the policy of the I.R.A. was extended so as to include attacks on armed soldiers in addition to police and enemy agents.
SWOOP ON ENEMY AGENTS ON 21st NOVEMBER 1920.
I was instructed by the Deputy Director of Intelligence to contact a girl who had reported to a Volunteer about some strange residents who were occupying the block of flats in which she was a maid. I met her in this Volunteer’s home over a shop in Talbot St. I think his name was Byrne. I questioned the girl, whose name was Maudie. She described the routine of the residents of the flats, and it would seem from her account that they followed no regular occupation but did a lot of office work in their flats. I arranged with her to bring me the contents of the waste-paper baskets. When these were examined we found torn up documents which referred to the movements of wanted Volunteers, and also photographs of wanted men.
The D.I. and G.H.Q. staff then decided, in the light of Intelligence reports supplied, that the only certain method of dealing with these enemy agents was by surprise and general attack, rather than by picking them off individually.
I last met Maudie on the Saturday evening, 20th November 1920, at our rendezvous, and she told me that all her ‘boarders’ were at home, with the exception of two who were changing their residence that night to Upper Mount Street. I duly reported to the Brigade Headquarters and told Dick McKee of the change of address of two of them and he had already briefed all the squads for action on the following morning. However, he made up a patch unit to attend to the officers in Upper Mount Street.
On the Saturday night I stopped as usual in the ‘dugout’ where we used to stay while on the run. This was located in the unoccupied portion of Summerhill Dispensary, and we gave accommodation for the night to several other Volunteers who were going into action in the morning.
Before curfew that night, I left the Brigade office in the Plaza in Gardiner’s Row and proceeded to Harcourt St. to meet the officer who would accompany me to 28 and 29 Upper Pembroke St. on the following morning. It was thus that I met Paddy Flanagan of the 3rd Battalion, and we fixed a rendezvous for the morning.
When I arrived at Upper Pembroke St. on the Sunday morning, I met Flanagan and a few other Volunteers. I explained to Flanagan that we had no keys for the hall doors in order to gain admission, so we went over our arrangements.
Fortunately, at the zero hour of 9 a.m., the hall door was open and the porter was shaking mats on the steps. There were separate staircases in this double house and a party proceeded up either staircase to the rooms already indicated. I accompanied Flanagan and two other Volunteers to a room at the top of the house occupied by two officers, one of these being Lieut. Dowling. We knocked at the door and pushed it open. The two officers were awake in bed. They were told to stand up and were then shot.
I told Flanagan that I wanted to search the room and he said: ‘Search be damned! Get out of here’. We proceeded down the staircase to the hallway, where a number of other officers had been rounded up from their rooms and were lined up against the side of the staircase that led in the direction of the basement. Our reaching this level was the signal for a volley.
In all there were six or seven agents in residence at this address, all holding British military commissions. All of them were shot, but a few survived their wounds.
All the papers that were captured that morning were brought to Mrs. Byrne’s house in North Richmond St. and were later conveyed by me to our office in Crow Street.
Although instructions were issued for about twenty different operations on the Sunday morning, several were not carried out. Later on, reports were supplied by our officers and these were examined and filed in the Intelligence Office. In some instances the excuses put forward for the non-carrying out of instructions were not considered very satisfactory; in particular, those received from the Commandant of the 1st Battalion regarding two addresses they should have visited on the North Circular Road, adjacent to the Phoenix Park.
The effect of this swoop was very marked, inasmuch as Detective McNamara told me that scenes never before witnessed took place in the Castle. Cabs, sidecars and all modes of conveyance brought people into the Castle who had been operating surreptitiously against the I.R.A.; they were driven in there by their consciences in order to secure protection. In this manner, the efficiency and the effectiveness of the British Secret Service in Ireland was brought to a standstill.
THE IGOE SQUAD.
Towards the end of 1920 a young Irish Volunteer officer by the name of Howlett, who had arrived at Broadstone railway station from the west, was waylaid and shot dead by men dressed in civilian clothes. It was inferred by the Castle authorities that this shooting was done by Sinn Fein elements.
In our investigations which followed, the name Igoe was mentioned for the first time in our Intelligence Office and inquiries were set afoot to identify him, as he and some of his associates had shot Howlett.
A report was received to the effect that several country members of the R.I.C. were living in the Depot, Phoenix Park, and were moving around the city in civilian clothes.
We had no lead to begin inquiries until I was instructed to interview a lady who ran a tea-room and was a member of Cumann na mBan. I made the acquaintance of this lady, Miss Maire Gleeson, the proprietress of the West End Cafe, Parkgate St. This was located adjacent to the main entrance to Phoenix Park, and was a small shop with a tea-rooms [sic] attached. Miss Gleeson informed me that amongst her patrons were several plain-clothes R.I.C. men who dropped in shortly before curfew for a light supper fairly frequently. She said they were living in the Depot. From further investigations it was clear that Head Constable Igoe and other members of his party were the diners mentioned by Miss Gleeson.
I duly reported the facts and the Director of Intelligence had active inquiries made through Brigade Intelligence Officers throughout the country as to the absence from their home stations of the constabulary who were engaged on political work.
In retrospect it would appear that some – probably about a dozen – members of the R.I.C. who had become obnoxious in their own areas, through their zeal in tracking down Volunteers, had been transferred to the Depot for special work, and were acting under the instructions of Head Constable Igoe. These men were ideally situated to carry out the task allotted to them, which was evidently the tracking down of country Volunteers visiting the city, and summarily shooting them. In other respects they were invaluable to General Tudor, the officer commanding the Auxiliary Division of the R.I.C., and to the headquarters staff who were dealing with political information from the country, inasmuch as their services were available for identification purposes in connection with reports reaching the Depot from the country. As time passed, inter-communication between Dublin and the Provinces through the official channels became more hazardous, and the advantage of having men on the spot with a knowledge of their respective local situations was a great asset to the Crown forces.
I met Miss Gleeson several times, but the information obtained was insufficient for an ambush to be arranged. Although efforts were made many times in this connection, the movements of these men were so erratic that no results could be obtained.
In January 1921, the Director of Intelligence had transferred to Dublin a Volunteer by the name of Thomas Newell (also known as Sweeney Newell) who knew Igoe personally, and Newell was attached to our Department in an external capacity.
About this time Igoe and his squad had adopted a technique of moving as a patrol through
the streets of Dublin in a formation that was not noticeable to the pedestrians, and if they came across any country Volunteers in their strolls they either arrested them or beat them up and then arrested them. Needless to remark, as street activities became more general, this patrol became a menace to the Dublin Volunteers who were moving around the streets carrying out ambushes or other jobs.
On a weekday in January, Newell rushed in to our office in Crow St. at about eleven o’clock in the morning and stated that he had seen Igoe and his party proceeding up Grafton St. in the direction of St. Stephen’s Green. I immediately accompanied Newell, and, simultaneously, instructions were sent to the squad, who were ‘standing by’ in the headquarters in Upper Abbey St., to assemble at St. Stephen’s Green and await instructions from me.
As Igoe had been in the habit of visiting railway stations, I assumed that he was heading for Harcourt Street station and that should this be so we could manoeuvre our squad into action positions on St. Stephen’s Green, West, to ambush Igoe’s party on their return journey.
Newell and I proceeded to Grafton St. by the shortest route, and when we had almost reached Weir’s jewellery stores in Grafton Street, I noticed that we had been passed by some men, who, I instinctively recognised as Igoe’s party, altho’ Newell had not had time to confirm this. When they had passed us out, they wheeled on us, and at close range said: ‘Don’t move’, which we did not, as we were unarmed. This manoeuvre took place with pedestrians passing by, unaware of anything unusual taking place.
Without much delay, we were told to keep walking, and a surrounding formation of Igoe’s squad kept pace with us as well as accompanying us.
Espionage and Assasination with Michael Collins' Intelligence Unit: With the Dublin Brigade Page 14
